Jones Bey v. La Casse

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedDecember 10, 2020
Docket1:20-cv-09171
StatusUnknown

This text of Jones Bey v. La Casse (Jones Bey v. La Casse) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jones Bey v. La Casse, (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK SISTER E. JONES-BEY, Plaintiff, 20-CV-9171 (LLS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND DANA LA CASSE, et al., Defendants. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff Sister E. Jones-Bey, appearing pro se, brings this action under the Court’s federal question jurisdiction, alleging that Defendants violated her constitutional rights. By order dated November 4, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.

BACKGROUND Plaintiff, who resides in the Bronx, filed this complaint against the City of New York; Dana La Casse, a Child Protection Specialist with the New York City Administration for Children’s Services (ACS); and Vicknell Powell, Plaintiff’s landlord. (ECF 2-1 at 10.) The complaint contains the following allegations. On September 28, 2020, an unidentified person lodged a “false report” with the New York State Office of Children and Family Services Registry, prompting La Casse to come to Plaintiff’s apartment and attempt to enter and interrogate her and her children without permission or a warrant. La Casse “held a meeting about [Plaintiff’s] tribe without [her] knowledge or consent,” and filed a “fraudulent” petition in New York State Family Court, Bronx County, seeking the removal of Plaintiff’s children from her custody. (ECF 2 at 17.) It is not clear from the complaint whether Plaintiff’s children were actually removed. According to Plaintiff, ACS has been “harassing” her “for 11 years.” (Id. at 6.) Powell, Plaintiff’s landlord, whom Plaintiff describes as a “coconspirator” of La Casse,

“intercepted” Plaintiff’s mail, “took a package that belonged” to Plaintiff, and “presented fraud” to “several city and state officials” to intimidate and harass her and to “force” her and her children to leave their apartment. (Id. ¶ 4.) Attached to the complaint are documents showing that Powell is attempting to evict Plaintiff and to obtain back rent that Plaintiff allegedly owes. (Id. at 17-22.) Plaintiff seeks money damages and the imposition of “penalties” on Defendants.1 (ECF 2-2 at 8.) DISCUSSION A. Claims Arising from Family Court Proceedings Plaintiff’s assertions against the City of New York and La Casse appear to arise out of family court proceedings and possible removal of Plaintiff’s children from her care. The Court construes these claims as arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, a

plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988).

1 Plaintiff mentions a false arrest case that she has pending, under a different name, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. See Bey v. Antoine, 19-CV- 1877 (E.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 27, 2019). That case does not appear to bear any relationship to this one. Substantive Due Process Plaintiff’s assertions may implicate the substantive component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Substantive due process “provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997). Parents have a “constitutionally protected liberty interest

in the care, custody and management of their children,” and can bring a substantive due process claim to challenge a child’s removal. Southerland v. City of N.Y., 680 F.3d 127, 142 (2d Cir. 2011). But the right to family integrity “‘does not automatically override the sometimes competing’ government interest in protecting children, [ ] particularly from harm caused by the parents themselves.” E.D. ex rel. V.D. v. Tuffarelli, 692 F. Supp. 2d 347, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Kia P. v. McIntyre, 235 F.3d 749, 758 (2d Cir. 2000)). To establish a substantive due process claim with respect to the removal of a child, “a plaintiff must demonstrate that the state action was so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.” Southerland, 680 F.3d at 151 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[M]ere failure to meet local or professional standards, without

more, should not generally be elevated to the status of constitutional violation,” Wilkinson ex rel. Wilkinson v. Russell, 182 F.3d 89, 106 (2d Cir. 1999); see, e.g., Kia P., 235 F.3d at 759 (caseworkers violate due process where their actions lack “any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate governmental objective”). Thus, courts have imposed liability only for “‘obvious extremes,’” such as knowingly making false statements, manufacturing evidence, or ignoring exculpatory information. Tuffarelli, 692 F. Supp. 2d at 360 (quoting Wilkinson, 182 F.3d at 104).

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Jones Bey v. La Casse, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jones-bey-v-la-casse-nysd-2020.