Jonathan Massa v. Teamsters Local Union 79

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: January 23, 2025
• Docket: 23-13855
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 23-13855 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 01/23/2025 Page: 1 of 12

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-13855 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

JONATHAN TRENT MASSA, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION 79, UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees. ____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 8:22-cv-00796-KKM-JSS ____________________ USCA11 Case: 23-13855 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 01/23/2025 Page: 2 of 12

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Before ROSENBAUM, NEWSOM, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Jonathan Massa appeals the district court’s order granting United Parcel Service, Inc.’s (“UPS”) and Teamsters Local Union 79’s (“Union”) motions for summary judgment on his complaint alleging race discrimination, disability discrimination, and retalia- tion under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. The district court found that Massa’s claims were untimely and, alternatively, that they failed on the merits. Massa appeals, arguing that genuine issues of material fact remain about the timeliness and merits of his claims. After careful review, we assume Massa’s claims were timely, but we conclude that summary judgment was nonetheless appropriate on the merits. So we affirm. I. Massa worked for UPS as a part-time package “preloader” at its Bayside facility in Tampa. During his employment, he was a member of the Union, and a collective bargaining agreement be- tween UPS and the Union governed his employment. In November 2019, Massa suffered a serious knee injury while playing basketball. The injury required surgery and then ex- tensive physical therapy. Massa testified that he was under a work restriction for at least six months after this injury. He ultimately did not return to work at UPS. USCA11 Case: 23-13855 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 01/23/2025 Page: 3 of 12

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After the injury, Massa notified UPS and the Union about the injury and sent pictures of his knee, which showed a displaced kneecap. According to Massa, his UPS supervisor, Liz Harrill, and two Union stewards, Marc Joey Howard and Alan Lucciola, told him to apply for leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). So Massa submitted an FMLA application. The appli- cation was denied, though, because Massa had not worked a suffi- cient number of hours in the preceding twelve months. It does not appear that Massa contacted human resources for UPS. In early January 2020, UPS sent a letter to Massa at the ad- dress where he had lived for many years, warning that he would be terminated unless he reported to work within 48 hours. A dis- charge letter followed on January 14, 2020, stating that Massa had been terminated on January 13, 2020, for an unauthorized leave of absence. Massa testified that he did not receive the 48-hour notice or discharge letter. But over the next few months, he came to under- stand he had been fired. In January or February 2020, Massa learned that his TeamCare health insurance had been canceled. He spoke with union steward Lucciola, who said he would “figure it out” and call Massa back, but he never did. Then, near the end of March 2020, Massa submitted a COBRA1 election form opting to

1 COBRA refers to Comprehensive Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, which provides that “employers must allow former employees the oppor- tunity to continue health care coverage under the employer’s plan if a USCA11 Case: 23-13855 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 01/23/2025 Page: 4 of 12

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keep his insurance through self-payments. UPS also sent a final paycheck to Massa for his unused vacation time on February 13, 2020. In early April 2020, Massa submitted a claim for short-term disability with TeamCare, starting from the date of the injury. On the form, his physician provided an estimated return to work date of July 1, 2020. On October 13, 2020, Union steward Howard texted Massa that UPS “would like to make you an offer of $250 for your open grievances and also asking for a resignation instead of being fired.” This offer related to the fact that, at the time he was terminated, Massa had a substantial number of open grievances related to at- tendance-related disciplinary letters he had received, many from the latter half of 2019. Frank Dore, the UPS labor relations man- ager who made the offer, testified that the company, despite Massa’s termination, was still required to process Massa’s griev- ances, many of which concerned pay, and so the offer was intended to clear Massa from the grievance log. Union business agent Thor Johnson described UPS’s offer as consistent with its practices in similar cases, and he explained that the “resignation” reference meant that UPS would remove the “discharge on his record” so that Massa could say he voluntarily resigned when seeking future employment.

qualifying event occurs,” such as discharge from employment. Meadows v. Ca- gles, Inc., 954 F.2d 686, 691 (11th Cir. 1992). USCA11 Case: 23-13855 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 01/23/2025 Page: 5 of 12

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Later, in March 2021, Howard invited Massa to attend a meeting with Dore and Johnson relating to his open grievances and his absence from work. Dore said he would consider rehiring Massa if he had good, documented reasons for being absent. Massa refused the meeting, stating that he would handle the matter through his lawyer. Instead, on June 1, 2021, Massa filed charges of discrimina- tion with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Then he sued UPS and the Union in federal court, al- leging claims of race discrimination, disability discrimination, and retaliation under Title VII and the ADA. After discovery, the district court granted summary judg- ment to UPS and the Union. The court found that all Massa’s claims were untimely because he failed to file a charge of discrimi- nation within 300 days of receiving notice of his termination. And even if they were not time-barred, the court said, Massa’s claims failed on the merits. This appeal followed. II. We review de novo an order granting summary judgment, considering the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Stewart v. Booker T. Washington Ins., 232 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). But summary judgment should be denied if “a USCA11 Case: 23-13855 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 01/23/2025 Page: 6 of 12

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reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A. Massa first contends that the district court erred in conclud- ing that his claims were untimely because the 300-day EEOC-filing period did not begin to run until UPS made the $250 offer in Octo- ber 2020, confirming his termination. He also argues that UPS and the Union breached their duties to provide notice under the CBA, and that the record contains genuine issues of material fact about his knowledge of his termination. We need not resolve whether Massa’s EEOC charge was timely filed. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982) (holding that “filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit”). Even assum- ing the district court erred in dismissing Massa’s claims as time barred, “we can affirm the court’s judgment for any reason sup- ported by the record, even if the district court did not rely on that reason.” Wright v. City of St. Petersburg, Fla., 833 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir. 2016) (quotation marks omitted). And in any case, we agree with the court that summary judgment was appropriate on the merits, for the reasons we explain below. B. Next, Massa contends that the district court erred in grant- ing summary judgment on his ADA discrimination claim. He as- serts that UPS failed to prove he could not perform the essential functions of the preloader position. And he believes that UPS and USCA11 Case: 23-13855 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 01/23/2025 Page: 7 of 12

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the Union violated the ADA by failing to assist him with returning to work. 2 The ADA makes it unlawful for employers to “discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A qualified individual is an “individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” Id. § 12111(8); Holly v. Clairson Indus., L.L.C., 492 F.3d 1247, 1256 (11th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, an ADA plaintiff must show that he can perform the essential functions of his job, either with or without a reasonable accommodation. D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1229 (11th Cir. 2005). An indi- vidual who cannot perform the essential functions of his job, even with an accommodation, is not a “qualified individual” protected by the ADA. Holly, 492 F.3d at 1256. Essential functions are the “fundamental job duties of a po- sition that an individual with a disability is actually required to per- form.” Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361, 1365 (11th Cir. 2000). “Determining whether a particular job duty is an essential function involves a factual inquiry to be conducted on a case-by-case basis.”

2 Massa addresses only the ADA in the section of his brief concerning his dis-

crimination claims; he does not reference Title VII or explain how the ADA analysis is applicable to Title VII. Accordingly, we deem the Title VII race- discrimination claim abandoned. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680–81 (issues not raised on appeal are deemed abandoned). USCA11 Case: 23-13855 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 01/23/2025 Page: 8 of 12

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Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1258 (11th Cir. 2001); see Holly, 492 F.3d at 1257; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). “The employee has the burden of identifying an accommo- dation and demonstrating that it is reasonable.” Frazier-White v. Gee, 818 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2016). And in this Circuit, “an employer’s duty to provide a reasonable accommodation is not triggered unless a specific demand for an accommodation has been made.” Id. at 1255–56. Here, undisputed evidence shows that, in the months fol- lowing his injury, Massa was physically incapable of performing the essential functions of his preloader position. UPS presented evi- dence that Massa’s job required physical labor, specifically handling packages and standing or walking for several hours at a time. Massa also testified that, due to his knee injury and surgery, he was physically unable to perform the job of preloader for at least six months after the injury. So we reject Massa’s argument that genu- ine issues of material fact remain about his ability to perform the essential functions of the preloader position. Massa’s claim that UPS failed to offer a reasonable accom- modation, such as light work, fails for several reasons. To start, Massa does not dispute the district court’s conclusion that he failed to plead an accommodation claim. 3 Nor does the record show that

3 Generally, we will not consider the merits of an argument that the district

court declined to consider based on its finding that the issue was not properly raised, when, on appeal, a party fails to challenge the district court’s USCA11 Case: 23-13855 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 01/23/2025 Page: 9 of 12

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Massa requested an accommodation from UPS for his injury, or that he otherwise notified UPS or the Union of his recovery sta- tus—not just the injury itself—between his injury in November 2019 and the issuance of the 48-hour notice and discharge letter in January 2020. Because Massa never made a request for an accom- modation, UPS’s “duty to provide a reasonable accommodation [was] not triggered.” Frazier-White, 818 F.3d at 1255–56. And fol- lowing Massa’s injury, UPS was not required under the ADA to grant an “indefinite leave[] of absence so that he could work at some uncertain point in the future.” Wood v. Green, 323 F.3d 1309, 1314 (11th Cir. 2003) (explaining that a leave of absence may be reasonable if it would allow the employee to “perform the essential functions of their jobs presently or in the immediate future”). For these reasons, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Massa’s ADA discrimination claim. C. Turning to the retaliation claims, Massa argues that he es- tablished genuine issues of material fact as to whether he engaged in protected activity by complaining about race discrimination and about the cancellation of his medical benefits. He also claims he established a causal link between his protected activity and the “culmination” of the “termination process” in October 2020, when he received the $250 offer to settle his open grievances.

preliminary finding and raises arguments only as to the merits. See Akridge v. Alfa Ins. Cos., 93 F.4th 1181, 1199 (11th Cir. 2024). USCA11 Case: 23-13855 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 01/23/2025 Page: 10 of 12

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Both Title VII and the ADA prohibit retaliation against em- ployees because they engaged in protected conduct, which in- cludes opposition to practices made unlawful by the respective anti-discrimination laws. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-3(a), § 12203(a); How- ard v. Walgreen Co., 605 F.3d 1239, 1244 (11th Cir. 2010); McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068, 1075-77 (11th Cir. 1996). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under either Title VII or the ADA, a plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged in statutorily protected expression; (2) he suffered an adverse employment ac- tion; and (3) there was a causal link between the protected expres- sion and adverse action. See Stewart, 117 F.3d at 1287. One way to establish a causal link is to show that the em- ployer knew of the statutorily protected activity and there was a close temporal proximity between this awareness and the adverse action. Higdon v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211, 1220 (11th Cir. 2004). But without other evidence tending to show causation, a claim of retal- iation fails as a matter of law “[i]f there is a substantial delay be- tween the protected expression and the adverse action.” Id. With- out more, a delay of three to four months between the protected activity and termination is too long, as a matter of law, to satisfy the causation element of a retaliation claim. Thomas v. Cooper Light- ing, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007). Here, the district court properly granted summary judg- ment on Massa’s retaliation claims. Massa identifies two potential sources of protected activity: (1) his grievances alleging race dis- crimination by his supervisor, Harrill; and (2) his complaints about USCA11 Case: 23-13855 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 01/23/2025 Page: 11 of 12

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the cancellation of his medical benefits. But even assuming he en- gaged in protected activity, Massa cannot establish a causal connec- tion between the protected activity and his termination. The last of Massa’s race-based complaints was filed on Au- gust 15, 2019, nearly five months before the 48-hour notice and dis- charge letter in January 2019, which is too long to satisfy the cau- sation element for a retaliation claim. See Thomas, 506 F.3d at 1364. And we see no other circumstantial evidence from which the jury could infer that the two events were causally related, particularly in light of Massa’s undisputed injury, his unauthorized absence from work, and his prior history of attendance-related discipline. Nor can Massa show that his termination was in retaliation for complaining to his supervisor about the cancellation of his med- ical benefits. The record shows that UPS finalized the termination of Massa’s employment in February 2020, cutting off his medical benefits and paying out his accrued leave, even if his pay grievances remained unresolved. Thus, the alleged protected activity came after, and in response to, the alleged retaliation. No reasonable jury could conclude that Massa’s termination was in retaliation for pro- tected conduct which had not yet occurred. Massa responds by pointing to the texts and conversations after the January 2020 discharge letter, claiming that the termina- tion process “culminated” in the October 2020 offer to settle his open grievances for $250. Even assuming we agreed with that in- terpretation—which, to be clear, we don’t—Massa still cannot es- tablish the causal-connection element. Massa states that he USCA11 Case: 23-13855 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 01/23/2025 Page: 12 of 12

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complained to his UPS supervisor shortly after finding out about the denial of his benefits in late January or early February 2020, and he then submitted an application for short-term disability in early April 2020. But more than six months passed from the latest of these events to the $250 offer in October 2020, which, again, is too long under our precedent to reasonably infer a causal connection. See Thomas, 506 F.3d at 1364. And nothing more than speculation, not reasonable inferences from record evidence, supports Massa’s claim that his knee injury provided UPS the “perfect cover” to “al- low the termination process to take its course” due to retaliatory animus. For these reasons, the district court properly granted sum- mary judgment to UPS and the Union on Massa’s claims of discrim- ination and retaliation under the ADA and Title VII. 4 AFFIRMED.

4 Massa does not appear to make any distinct argument about the Union on

the merits of his claims for discrimination or retaliation.