MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Dec 13 2018, 10:00 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK Indiana Supreme Court the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals and Tax Court estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Cara Schaefer Wieneke Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Wieneke Law Office, LLC Attorney General of Indiana Brooklyn, Indiana Angela N. Sanchez Assistant Section Chief, Criminal Appeals Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA Jomanda E. Gee, December 13, 2018 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1278 v. Appeal from the Vigo Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Michael J. Lewis, Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge Trial Court Cause No. 84D06-1410-MR-2576
Mathias, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1278 | December 13, 2018 Page 1 of 8 [1] In an appeal from the Vigo Superior Court, Jomanda Gee (“Gee”) challenges
her sentence of sixteen years for voluntary manslaughter as inappropriate in
light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] In September of 2014, Gee lived with her boyfriend, Corey Pryor (“Pryor”).
Her five-year old son, (“K.G.”), lived with Gee and Pryor. Gee’s mother lived
in an apartment across the hall from their second-story apartment. Although
Pryor was living with Gee, Pryor was married. His wife, who lived in
Mississippi with their seven year-old-daughter, was expecting Pryor’s return to
Mississippi so that they could repair their relationship.
[4] Pryor and Gee had been in a physical altercation the day of Pryor’s death. Gee
told police that Pryor poured bleach on her, hit her in the mouth and cut her in
the leg with a knife from the kitchen. After Pryor cut her in the leg, Gee took
the knife from Pryor and stabbed him in the chest. Pryor stumbled down a flight
of stairs and collapsed onto the sidewalk. Gee followed him, still carrying the
knife. Gee indicated to a passerby that Pryor had been stabbed by a man
running down the street. The passerby took Gee’s phone from her and called
the police. Gee left. A short while later, Gee returned to the scene and watched
police from behind a nearby dumpster before approaching police. Pryor died as
a result of his stab wound.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1278 | December 13, 2018 Page 2 of 8 [5] Gee told police that her son had been across the hall at her mom’s apartment
during the altercation. However, Gee’s mother told investigators that K.G.
came to her apartment and told her that Gee had stabbed Pryor. When K.G.
and Gee were visiting at the police station before her interview, K.G. asked Gee
why she stabbed Pryor. When she indicated to her son that Pryor had stabbed
her too, her son responded, “You the one that start it[?]” Ex. Vol, Def.’s Ex. F,
p. 2. Although Gee indicated to police that she was able to take them to the
place where she left the knife, it was never recovered.
[6] Gee was charged with murder, aggravated battery as a Level 3 felony, battery
by means of a deadly weapon as a Level 5 felony, and domestic battery as a
Level 6 felony. The parties entered into a plea agreement, and on March 15,
2018, Gee pleaded guilty but mentally ill to the amended charge of voluntary
manslaughter as a Level 2 felony. The State agreed to dismiss the remaining
charges, and the parties further agreed that Defendant’s sentence would not
exceed sixteen years.
[7] Community Corrections evaluated Gee but denied placement due to the violent
nature of the offense. Another program called Next Steps also deemed Gee not
eligible for admission.
[8] The trial court held a sentencing hearing on April 20, 2018. At this hearing, the
trial court heard victim impact statements from Pryor’s family members,
including Pryor’s father, aunt, and minor daughter. The trial court also heard
testimony from a clinical psychologist and a domestic violence expert.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1278 | December 13, 2018 Page 3 of 8 [9] The clinical psychologist, Dr. Jeffrey Huttinger (“Dr. Huttinger”) concluded
that Gee was suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) as a result
of prior domestic abuse. Dr. Huttinger concluded that when she stabbed Pryor,
Gee acted to get away from an imminent threat or danger. Dr. Huttinger also
determined that Gee was suffering from depression but could not determine if it
was due to experiences prior to incarceration or due to her incarceration. He
recommended intense psychological treatment, as Gee had never received
treatment for her PTSD. He further recommended treatment outside of the
Department of Correction as he believed it to be more readily available.
[10] The domestic violence expert, Dr. Carla Fisher (“Dr. Fisher”) testified that Gee
had a difficult life, had expressed remorse for what she had done, and had
difficulty talking about her past. Dr. Fisher believed that because of Gee’s
history of abuse and the nature of the domestic homicide in this situation, Gee
was unlikely to reoffend. Dr. Fisher also testified that she believed Gee killed
Pryor out of self-defense.
[11] The State introduced evidence of Gee’s prior acts, including a burglary of a
home belonging to a man who had paid Gee for sex. Gee’s attorney read a
statement on Gee’s behalf which expressed her sorrow for her actions.
[12] After considering the evidence presented at the sentencing, the numerous victim
impact statements, and the presentence investigation report, trial court entered
a conviction for voluntary manslaughter and sentenced Gee to the Department
of Correction (“DOC”) for sixteen years. The trial court recommended that she
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1278 | December 13, 2018 Page 4 of 8 receive mental health counseling and be placed in a therapeutic community
program while incarcerated. The trial court also recommended that Gee be
placed in Rockville Correctional Facility so that she could be close to her ailing
mother. Gee appeals this sentence.
Discussion and Decision
[13] Gee challenges her sentence as inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense
and the character of the offender. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that the
court on appeal “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due
consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is
inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the
offender.”
[14] Still, we must and should exercise deference to a trial court’s sentencing
decision because Rule 7(B) requires us to give “due consideration” to that
decision and because we understand and recognize the unique perspective a
trial court brings to its sentencing decisions. Trainor v. State, 950 N.E.2d 352,
355 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Stewart v. State, 866 N.E.2d 858, 866 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2007)), trans. denied. Although we have the power to review and revise
sentences, the principal role of appellate review should be to attempt to “leaven
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MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Dec 13 2018, 10:00 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK Indiana Supreme Court the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals and Tax Court estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Cara Schaefer Wieneke Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Wieneke Law Office, LLC Attorney General of Indiana Brooklyn, Indiana Angela N. Sanchez Assistant Section Chief, Criminal Appeals Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA Jomanda E. Gee, December 13, 2018 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1278 v. Appeal from the Vigo Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Michael J. Lewis, Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge Trial Court Cause No. 84D06-1410-MR-2576
Mathias, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1278 | December 13, 2018 Page 1 of 8 [1] In an appeal from the Vigo Superior Court, Jomanda Gee (“Gee”) challenges
her sentence of sixteen years for voluntary manslaughter as inappropriate in
light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] In September of 2014, Gee lived with her boyfriend, Corey Pryor (“Pryor”).
Her five-year old son, (“K.G.”), lived with Gee and Pryor. Gee’s mother lived
in an apartment across the hall from their second-story apartment. Although
Pryor was living with Gee, Pryor was married. His wife, who lived in
Mississippi with their seven year-old-daughter, was expecting Pryor’s return to
Mississippi so that they could repair their relationship.
[4] Pryor and Gee had been in a physical altercation the day of Pryor’s death. Gee
told police that Pryor poured bleach on her, hit her in the mouth and cut her in
the leg with a knife from the kitchen. After Pryor cut her in the leg, Gee took
the knife from Pryor and stabbed him in the chest. Pryor stumbled down a flight
of stairs and collapsed onto the sidewalk. Gee followed him, still carrying the
knife. Gee indicated to a passerby that Pryor had been stabbed by a man
running down the street. The passerby took Gee’s phone from her and called
the police. Gee left. A short while later, Gee returned to the scene and watched
police from behind a nearby dumpster before approaching police. Pryor died as
a result of his stab wound.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1278 | December 13, 2018 Page 2 of 8 [5] Gee told police that her son had been across the hall at her mom’s apartment
during the altercation. However, Gee’s mother told investigators that K.G.
came to her apartment and told her that Gee had stabbed Pryor. When K.G.
and Gee were visiting at the police station before her interview, K.G. asked Gee
why she stabbed Pryor. When she indicated to her son that Pryor had stabbed
her too, her son responded, “You the one that start it[?]” Ex. Vol, Def.’s Ex. F,
p. 2. Although Gee indicated to police that she was able to take them to the
place where she left the knife, it was never recovered.
[6] Gee was charged with murder, aggravated battery as a Level 3 felony, battery
by means of a deadly weapon as a Level 5 felony, and domestic battery as a
Level 6 felony. The parties entered into a plea agreement, and on March 15,
2018, Gee pleaded guilty but mentally ill to the amended charge of voluntary
manslaughter as a Level 2 felony. The State agreed to dismiss the remaining
charges, and the parties further agreed that Defendant’s sentence would not
exceed sixteen years.
[7] Community Corrections evaluated Gee but denied placement due to the violent
nature of the offense. Another program called Next Steps also deemed Gee not
eligible for admission.
[8] The trial court held a sentencing hearing on April 20, 2018. At this hearing, the
trial court heard victim impact statements from Pryor’s family members,
including Pryor’s father, aunt, and minor daughter. The trial court also heard
testimony from a clinical psychologist and a domestic violence expert.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1278 | December 13, 2018 Page 3 of 8 [9] The clinical psychologist, Dr. Jeffrey Huttinger (“Dr. Huttinger”) concluded
that Gee was suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) as a result
of prior domestic abuse. Dr. Huttinger concluded that when she stabbed Pryor,
Gee acted to get away from an imminent threat or danger. Dr. Huttinger also
determined that Gee was suffering from depression but could not determine if it
was due to experiences prior to incarceration or due to her incarceration. He
recommended intense psychological treatment, as Gee had never received
treatment for her PTSD. He further recommended treatment outside of the
Department of Correction as he believed it to be more readily available.
[10] The domestic violence expert, Dr. Carla Fisher (“Dr. Fisher”) testified that Gee
had a difficult life, had expressed remorse for what she had done, and had
difficulty talking about her past. Dr. Fisher believed that because of Gee’s
history of abuse and the nature of the domestic homicide in this situation, Gee
was unlikely to reoffend. Dr. Fisher also testified that she believed Gee killed
Pryor out of self-defense.
[11] The State introduced evidence of Gee’s prior acts, including a burglary of a
home belonging to a man who had paid Gee for sex. Gee’s attorney read a
statement on Gee’s behalf which expressed her sorrow for her actions.
[12] After considering the evidence presented at the sentencing, the numerous victim
impact statements, and the presentence investigation report, trial court entered
a conviction for voluntary manslaughter and sentenced Gee to the Department
of Correction (“DOC”) for sixteen years. The trial court recommended that she
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1278 | December 13, 2018 Page 4 of 8 receive mental health counseling and be placed in a therapeutic community
program while incarcerated. The trial court also recommended that Gee be
placed in Rockville Correctional Facility so that she could be close to her ailing
mother. Gee appeals this sentence.
Discussion and Decision
[13] Gee challenges her sentence as inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense
and the character of the offender. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that the
court on appeal “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due
consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is
inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the
offender.”
[14] Still, we must and should exercise deference to a trial court’s sentencing
decision because Rule 7(B) requires us to give “due consideration” to that
decision and because we understand and recognize the unique perspective a
trial court brings to its sentencing decisions. Trainor v. State, 950 N.E.2d 352,
355 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Stewart v. State, 866 N.E.2d 858, 866 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2007)), trans. denied. Although we have the power to review and revise
sentences, the principal role of appellate review should be to attempt to “leaven
the outliers” and identify some guiding principles for trial courts and those
charged with improvement of the sentencing statutes, but not to achieve what
we perceive to be a “correct” result in each case. Fernbach v. State, 954 N.E.2d
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1278 | December 13, 2018 Page 5 of 8 1080, 1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219,
1225 (Ind. 2008)), trans. denied.
[15] The appropriate question is not whether another sentence is more appropriate;
rather, the question is whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate. Fonner v.
State, 876 N.E.2d 340, 344 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Whether a sentence is
appropriate “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity
of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to
light in a given case.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224. It is the defendant’s burden
on appeal to persuade us that the sentence imposed by the trial court is
inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006).
[16] A plea agreement is contractual in nature and binds the defendant, the State,
and the trial court. Hull v. State, 799 N.E.2d 1178, 1182 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
The trial court is given the discretion to accept or reject a plea agreement, and if
the trial court accepts the agreement, it is strictly bound by its terms. Id. See also
Ind. Code § 35-35-3-3(e). A defendant may challenge a sentence as
inappropriate even when a trial court imposes a sentence in accordance the
terms of a plea agreement. Childress, 848 N.E.2d at 1080.
[17] For her Level 2 felony conviction, Gee faced ten to thirty years in prison and up
to $10,000 in fines. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4.5. A Level 2 felony carries an
advisory sentence of seventeen and one-half years. Id. However, pursuant to her
plea agreement, Gee faced a maximum sentence of only sixteen years of
incarceration.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1278 | December 13, 2018 Page 6 of 8 [18] Here, considering the nature of the offense, there are few offenses more serious
than taking another’s life. Many of Pryor’s family members came forward to
express the significant impact of their grief.
[19] While Gee told investigators that her five-year-old son was not present when
she stabbed Pryor, evidence exists in the record to show that her son was indeed
present. Gee’s mother told police that K.G. had come to her apartment and told
her that Gee had stabbed Pryor, showing the crime was likely committed in the
presence of a minor child. The record also contains evidence that Pryor had
poured bleach on Gee and had attacked her with the knife prior to her taking
the knife and stabbing him, demonstrating she was instigated or likely acting in
self-defense.
[20] Gee had no prior criminal history. And while Gee had been less than
straightforward with investigators regarding whether her son was in the room
and whether she could lead the police to the location of the knife, she did freely
give a statement that implicated herself.
[21] Gee suffers from PTSD due to abuse in prior relationships and a traumatic
childhood. The domestic violence expert believed that it was unlikely that Gee
would reoffend under these circumstances.
[22] Gee received less than the advisory sentence of seventeen and one-half years.
The trial court indicated it believed the plea agreement to be very favorable and
that sixteen years was a reasonable sentence. The trial court also recommended
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1278 | December 13, 2018 Page 7 of 8 placement in a therapeutic community and that she receive mental health
counseling.
Conclusion
[23] Given the serious and violent nature of the crime, as well as the character of the
offender, we cannot conclude that Gee’s sentence of sixteen years executed in
the DOC for voluntary manslaughter was inappropriate.
[24] Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1278 | December 13, 2018 Page 8 of 8