Jolly v. Mohave, County of

District Court, D. Arizona·Decided February 17, 2022·No. 3:19-cv-08088·Unknown

Opinion

WO

Clifford Jolly, No. CV-19-08088-PCT-JJT

Plaintiff, ORDER

v.

County of Mohave, et al.,

Defendants. At issue are the Summary Judgment Motion filed by Defendants Daniel and Jane Doe Oehler (Doc. 186), accompanied by a Statement of Facts (Doc. 187), and the Summary Judgment Motion filed by Defendant City of Kingman (Doc. 188), accompanied by a Statement of Facts (Doc. 189). Plaintiff Clifford Jolly, appearing pro se, filed a Response to Kingman’s Motion (Doc. 200) two days after the deadline to do so, with no controverting statement of facts, and filed no timely response to the Oehlers’ Motion.1 Also at issue are two Daubert Motions: the Oehlers’ Motion to Preclude Opinions and Expert Testimony of Brian Barker (Doc. 185), and Kingman’s Motion in Limine Re: Exclusion of Plaintiff’s Purported Police Practices Expert (Doc. 190). Because Plaintiff filed no response to either Daubert Motion, Defendants filed two Motions for Summary Adjudication (Docs. 202, 203) of the Daubert Motions. In this Order, the Court also addresses the Oehlers’ Motion

1 Around the filing deadline of January 31, 2022, Plaintiff apparently had trouble filing his Response (Doc. 200), so the Court construes the two-day delay as a timely filing, even though Plaintiff did not request an extension of time. Sixteen days later, Plaintiff impermissibly filed additional documents, which the Court will address below. for Rule 37 Sanctions (Doc. 175). The Court resolves all of these Motions without oral argument. LRCiv 7.2(f). The Court laid out the procedural history of this three-year-old matter in its prior Order (Doc. 199) and need not repeat it here. Four consecutive sets of counsel have sought to be relieved of representing Plaintiff in this matter, and the fourth counsel withdrew with Plaintiff’s consent on January 10, 2022. (Doc. 198.) For the reasons stated in detail in the prior Order (Doc. 199), the Court did not further extend Plaintiff’s deadlines to respond to Defendants’ present Motions (which the Court had already extended), and Plaintiff’s responses were all due on January 31, 2022. Plaintiff timely filed only a partial Response to one of Defendants’ Motions, that is, Kingman’s Motion for Summary Judgment; Defendants’ other Motions were uncontested. Local Rule 7.2(i) provides that a party’s failure to timely file a responsive brief “may be deemed a consent to the denial or granting of the motion and the Court may dispose of the motion summarily.” At the Rule 16 Scheduling Conference and in the Scheduling Order (Doc. 44 ¶ 16), the Court warned the parties of their obligations to timely respond to motions and comply with all applicable Rules and Court Orders and that the consequences of failing to respond to a dispositive motion include the granting of the motion and dismissal of the case. Moreover, the Court granted the repeated requests by Plaintiff to extend the deadlines in this matter—as the Court summarized in its prior Order (Doc. 199)—including extensions ranging from four to six weeks (Doc. 194) to respond to the present Motions. Plaintiff’s pro se status does not provide an excuse for his failure to comply with the deadlines set by the Court and the applicable Rules of practice. See Am. Ass’n of Naturopathic Physicians v. Hayhurst, 227 F.3d 1104, 1107-08 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that pro se litigants are not excused from following court rules); Carter v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 784 F.2d 1006, 1008-09 (9th Cir. 1986) (same). Because the Court warned Plaintiff of the consequences of failing to timely file responsive briefs in this matter, under Local Rule 7.2(i), Defendants are entitled to summary disposition of the Oehlers’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 187), the Oehlers’ Motion to Preclude Opinions and Expert Testimony of Brian Barker (Doc. 185), and Kingman’s Motion in Limine Re: Exclusion of Plaintiff’s Purported Police Practices Expert (Doc. 190). See Brydges v. Lewis, 18 F.3d 651, 652 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (concluding that the pro se plaintiff’s failure to timely respond to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment when the court had warned plaintiff of the consequence of a failure to respond warranted granting the motion for summary judgment in the defendant’s favor under the applicable Local Rule). Two days after the response deadline, Plaintiff filed a partial Response (Doc. 200) to Kingman’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 188). Although the Response obliquely refers to evidence that may or may not exist, the Response contains no actual citation to evidence as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(1)(A) and was accompanied by no controverting statement of facts.2 In opposing a motion for summary judgment, a nonmoving party has the burden of showing a genuine issue of triable fact exists to overcome entry of summary judgment. See Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). The Court “rel[ies] on the nonmoving party to identify with reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment.” Id. The Court need not assume this burden and “scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact.” Id.; see also Carmen v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that it would be more than “unfair” to require the district court “to search the entire record” if a party fails to “disclose where in the record the evidence for [the factual claims] can be found”). Hence, Local Rule 56.1(b), in pertinent part, provides:

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Jolly v. Mohave, County of, (D. Ariz. 2022).

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