Johnston v. Commonwealth

22 Pa. 102
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJuly 1, 1853
StatusPublished
Cited by23 cases

This text of 22 Pa. 102 (Johnston v. Commonwealth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Johnston v. Commonwealth, 22 Pa. 102 (Pa. 1853).

Opinion

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Woodward, J.

It has been suggested that it does not sufficiently appear from the magistrate’s conviction what the worldly employment was, for performing which on Sunday, the defendant was convictéd; but a reference to the record will show that the suggestion is groundless. Complaint was made before Alderman McMasters, of the city of Pittsburgh, .that the defendant had performed certain worldly employment on the Lord’s-day, commonly called Sunday, the 4th day of September, A. d. 1853. A summons was issued, and when the defendant appeared and ascertained the grounds of complaint, he did what was very unusual in [107]*107a Justice’s Court, but which we cannot say was illegal, he put in several special pleas in the nature of confession and avoidance. To the fourth of his pleas, the Commonwealth demurred, and thus brought the facts therein alleged upon the record, and by admitting them made them a substantive ground of the judgment. , In this plea it was alleged by the defendant, that the omnibus and horses which he was driving on that day, were a “ public conveyance for the transportation of persons travelling upon the streets and roads, in the information mentioned, daily, each and every day of the week, including Sunday, and that he, the said defendant, was hired by the proprietors of the said horses and omnibus at and for a certain price per month, and a,t the time mentioned in said information, he was engaged in fulfilling the contract in that behalf on his part with the proprietors of the said omnibus.”

He did not allege that be was a traveller, nor that he was employed by travellers, but that he was executing a contract of service with the. proprietors of a line of public conveyances. The alderman, with these facts alleged and admitted before him, considered that such work was worldly employment within the meaning of the Act of Assembly, and proceeded, in the following words, to convict the said “ William Johnston, omnibus driver, of having done and performed worldly employment or business, not being a work of necessity or charity, on the Lord’s-day, commonly called Sunday, the 4th day of September, a. d. 1853, in driving certain horses, to which was attached an omnibus, in which certain persons were carried over the streets of the city of Pittsburgh, and from the said city over and along certain roads within the county of Allegheny, contrary to the Act of Assembly in such case made and provided;” and accordingly adjudged him to suffer the penalty of four dollars. This conviction must be taken in connection with the facts placed on the record by the plea-and demurrer ; and so taken, it is certain, to every intent, that the defendant was convicted for prosecuting on Sunday his occupation as an omnibus driver. The defendant himself having excluded every other conclusion, and, by legitimate means, developed the real issue with unwonted exactness, there is no room left for professional cavil or judicial astutia on this point. Special pleading, before a justice of the peace, is a novelty which is by no means to be encouraged; but when a defendant has been permitted to resort to this mode of getting his facts on record, it is too late for him, in a Court of error, to desert the facts, or to ask us to shut our eyes upon them.

Strictly stated, then, the question presented for our adjudication by the record brought up by this certiorari, is, whether omnibus driving, as an occupation, may be lawfully pursued on Sunday by a person hired by the month for that purpose.

[108]*108Under the stat. of 29 Ch. 2, which forbids only labor in one’s “ ordinary calling on Sunday,” it is apparent the defendant would be obnoxious to the penalty, for his work was according to his “ ordinary calling,”—“daily, each and everyday of the week, including Sunday,” is his own descriptive language. Rut our Act of Assembly is more comprehensive in its terms than the English statute, as we took occasion to show at large, recently, in the ease of The Commonwealth v. Omit. With us not only are men prohibited from prosecuting their “ ordinary callings,” on Sunday, but from “any worldly employment or business whatsoever,” except works of charity and necessity, and such specific kinds of labor as are enumerated in the proviso of the Act. It is very manifest then, that omnibus driving is a forbidden business, unless it be a work of charity or necessity, or fall within the proviso That it is not within the proviso is apparent from the works enumerated, the dressing of victuals, the landing of passengers by water, the ferrying over the water travellers or persons removing with their families, and the delivery of milk or other necessaries of life. These are what the legislature exempted from the operation of the statute, and no man in his senses will contend that driving an omnibus by the month is either the one or the other of these things. Is it then a work of charity or necessity ? This is the only remaining question.

It is impossible to lay down any general rule as to works of charity and necessity. If the works enumerated in the proviso of the statute be taken as a legislative sample of works of necessity, it might be said, in general, that supplying the ordinary demands of our physical natures, and relieving from situations of peril and exposure, are necessary acts, which incur no blame; and perhaps all would agree, that visiting and administering to the sick and destitute, and labors for the spiritual welfare of men, are works both of charity and necessity. Certain it is, that against such there is no law,- and they may be performed on any day. Still, the exigencies of human life, which demand works of charity and necessity, are so numerous, and so diversified by attending circumstances, as to defy classification, and to forbid the attempt to prescribe a general rule. The best we can do is to judge of cases as they arise, and to treat them as within the prohibition, or the saving clauses of the statute, according to the specific features which each presents.

Omnibuses aye great conveniences in large towns and populous districts, and the driving them may, in many circumstances which it were easy to imagine, be both a necessity and a charity, and as such perfectly lawful on Sunday; but we are not now dealing with special cases, or extraordinary occasions, but with an ordinary every-day employment. The defendant’s fourth plea contains [109]*109no suggestion of circumstances which might have rendered his act necessary. The justifying fact alleged is, that he was hired by the month, and was fulfilling his contract. But if the work was unlawful, his contract was void so far as regarded the Sunday labor; for it is well settled by the authorities, that if any act is forbidden under a penalty, a contract to do it is void: Kepner v. Keefer, 6 Watts 233, and the cases there cited. In general, a contract of hiring by the month does not bind the laborer to work on Sunday; yet, as the statute does not forbid every species of labor, but expressly licenses such as are mentioned in the proviso, it is obvious that a person hired by the month to perform any of those labors, may be required to perform them on Sunday. The defendant, however, is not within that category. He was not hired to execute an employment that is exempted from the penalties of the statute, or which, per se, is a work of charity and necessity. Not a circumstance is suggested on the record to distinguish his work on Sunday from what it was on any other day of' the week.

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Bluebook (online)
22 Pa. 102, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johnston-v-commonwealth-pa-1853.