[Cite as Johnston, Exr. v. Munger, 2025-Ohio-3146.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JACQUELINE M. JOHNSTON, : EXECUTOR, ET AL., : Plaintiffs-Appellees, : No. 114638 v. : DEBORAH MUNGER, : Defendant-Appellant.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 4, 2025
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CV-24-993737
Appearances:
Harrington, Hoppe & Mitchell, Ltd., and Matthew M. Ries, for appellees.
Thomas M. Horwitz Co., LPA, and Thomas M. Horwitz, for appellant.
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, P.J.:
Defendant-appellant Deborah Munger (“appellant”) appeals from the
trial court’s December 3, 2024 judgment vacating its November 25, 2024 entry
dismissing the case with prejudice and setting the case for a hearing on plaintiffs- appellees, Jacqueline Johnston, executor of the estate of John Mathews, Sr., and
JJM Reggies Real Estate LLC’s (collectively “appellees”) motion to enforce the
settlement agreement. After a thorough review of the facts and pertinent law, we
affirm.
Factual and Procedural History
In March 2024, appellees filed this action against appellant. A detailed
recitation of the facts is not necessary for the disposition of this appeal; in
summation, the case involves a dispute regarding ownership of appellee JJM
Reggies Real Estate LLC.
On November 22, 2024, the parties filed a “stipulation for dismissal
with prejudice.”1 The stipulation provided that the “above-captioned matter is
settled and dismissed with prejudice, each party to bear its own costs. The Court
retains jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement between said parties.” The
stipulation also contained a signature line, with “IT IS SO ORDERED” language, for
the trial court judge to sign. (Capitalization in original.) The trial court judge did
not sign the parties’ proposed order. Instead, on November 25, 2024, the trial court
issued the following entry: “pursuant to the stipulation filed by the parties on
November 22, 2024, case dismissed with prejudice. Court costs assessed as each
their own.”
1 The court’s docket indicates that it was filed by only appellant’s counsel, but the stipulation is signed by counsel for all parties. Two days later, on November 27, appellees filed a motion to reopen the
case and enforce the settlement agreement. On December 2, appellant filed a brief
in opposition to appellees’ motion and a motion to strike the filing; the trial court
did not rule on appellant’s motion to strike. On December 3, the trial court issued
the following entry: “The court’s 11/25/2024 journal entry . . . is hereby vacated as
having been made in error when the court intended to adopt the stipulated dismissal
filed by the parties on 11/22/2024 . . . . The case therefore remains pending on the
court’s active docket. Hearing set for 12/11/2024 . . . on [appellees’] motion to
enforce settlement agreement . . . .” Appellant appealed from the trial court’s
December 3, 2024 judgment and presents the following three assignments of error
for our review:
I. The trial court erred when it vacated without jurisdiction the November 25, 2024 dismissal with prejudice.
II. The trial court erred when it failed to grant appellant’s motion to strike appellees’ motion to reopen case.
III. In the alternative, the trial court erred when it set a hearing on the appellees’ motion to enforce settlement agreement instead of denying it.
Relevant Case Law
The central issue in this appeal is whether the trial court had
jurisdiction to vacate its November 25, 2024 entry dismissing the case with
prejudice; appellant contends it did not and appellees contend it did. There are
three primary cases that we examine in deciding this issue: (1) Infinite Sec.
Solutions, L.L.C. v. Karam Properties, II, 2015-Ohio-1101; (2) State ex rel. Gideon v. Page, 2024-Ohio-4867; and (3) Educare Med. Staffing, LLP v. Stabler, 2024-
Ohio-3295 (8th Dist.).
Karam Properties
In Karam Properties, the Supreme Court of Ohio considered “a trial
court’s authority to retain jurisdiction when it dismisses a civil case to thereafter
enforce a settlement agreement between the parties.” Id. at ¶ 1.
Karam Properties involved two cases that were consolidated at the
trial-court level; the cases revolved around claims that were filed as a result of a fire
at an apartment complex in Toledo, Lucas County, Ohio. At a pretrial settlement
conference, the parties orally agreed to settle their claims for an agreed-upon sum.
The parties advised the trial court that they had resolved all issues except how to
divide the settlement funds. They informed the court that they would attempt to
resolve their issues regarding division of the settlement money, but they would
submit the issue to the court if they were unable to agree.
The governing local rule allowed 30 days following settlement of a
case to submit a dismissal entry before “‘the judge may order the case dismissed for
want of prosecution or file an order of settlement and dismissal and assess costs.’”
Id. at ¶ 9, quoting Lucas Cty. Gen.R. 5.05(F). One week after the parties had agreed
to settle, the trial court sua sponte filed a dismissal entry, stating: “Parties having
represented to the court that their differences have been resolved, this case is
dismissed without prejudice, with the parties reserving the right to file an entry of
dismissal within thirty (30) days of this order.” Id. One of the parties filed a motion to set aside the dismissal entry
pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B). The party contended that the dismissal was a mistake
because “the settlement had not been finalized, no monies exchanged hands, no
papers were exchanged or signed and the remaining outstanding issue of the
priority/apportionment of the proceeds between [the parties] ha[d] not been
resolved.” Id. at ¶ 10. The party sought to have the trial court vacate the dismissal
entry under Civ.R. 60(B)(1) and reopen the case to decide the priority issue.
Another party opposed the motion, contending that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to decide the priority issue because it arose after the final
settlement agreement and was the subject of a pending federal lawsuit. And yet
another party filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement and for an order
permitting it to pay the agreed-upon settlement amount to the court.
The trial court held a hearing on the Civ.R. 60(B) motion. The filing
party contended that the trial court’s dismissal without prejudice was a “placeholder
entry, pending submission of whatever the final entry is.” Id. at ¶ 11. The trial court
ultimately denied both the Civ.R. 60(B) motion and the motion to enforce the
settlement agreement as moot. The trial court reasoned that its dismissal was
“conditional, that it retained jurisdiction to determine the priority issues without
vacating the dismissal entry, and that [one of the parties’] claim to the settlement
funds had priority.” Id. The party who opposed the Civ.R. 60(B) motion appealed,
contending that the court lacked jurisdiction over the matter after the trial court’s
dismissal of the case. The court of appeals agreed.
On appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court, the Court noted that both the
trial and appellate courts “focused on whether the trial court’s dismissal was
conditional or unconditional as the linchpin for determining whether the trial court
retained jurisdiction to enforce the parties’ settlement agreement.” Id. at ¶ 20. The
Court noted that although appellate courts have focused on conditional versus
unconditional dismissals, there is no such provision in the Ohio Rules of Civil
Procedure for a conditional dismissal. Further, the Court itself has “never expressly
held that a court may ‘conditionally’ dismiss a case. Neither [has the Court] defined
what ‘conditional dismissal’ means or under what circumstances such a dismissal is
appropriate.” Id. at ¶ 22. Thus, the Karam Properties Court “reject[ed] the notion
of a ‘conditional’ dismissal and focus[ed] more precisely on the fundamental
question of whether, and if so, how, a trial court may retain jurisdiction after a
dismissal for purposes of enforcing a settlement agreement.” Id.
The Karam Properties Court reasoned
that, as a general principle, a trial court may retain jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement when it dismisses a civil case. Retaining jurisdiction provides the most efficient means of enforcing the agreement. It keeps the matter in the court most familiar with the parties’ claims, if not their settlement positions. And it keeps the parties from having to file another action. The question, then, is how retention of jurisdiction is achieved.
Id. at ¶ 25. In contemplating how retention of jurisdiction is effectuated, the
Court noted that some Ohio appellate districts have held that a trial court’s dismissal
entry “need only allude or refer to a settlement” for the trial court to retain
jurisdiction; the Court rejected this approach. Id. at ¶ 26. The Karam Properties
Court cited the following cases as examples where the trial court only alluded to or
referred to a trial court’s retention of jurisdiction pursuant to a settlement
agreement: Henneke v. Glisson, 2008-Ohio-6759, ¶ 8 (12th Dist.) (trial court’s
dismissal judgment stated “By agreement, case dismissed”); Estate of Berger v.
Riddle, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 3623, *2 (8th Dist. Aug. 18, 1994) (trial court’s
dismissal judgment stated, “All claims and counterclaims in the above numbered
cases [are] settled and dismissed with prejudice at defendants’ costs”); and Hines v.
Zofko, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 1320, *1 (11th Dist. Mar. 25, 1994) (trial court’s
dismissal judgment stated, “Case settled and dismissed”). The Karam Properties
Court also cited State ex rel. Spies v. Lent, 2009-Ohio-3844, ¶ 47 (5th Dist.), which
we recite the facts of below.
In State ex rel. Spies, the State filed a complaint alleging nuisance and
seeking injunctive relief against the owners of a bar. The parties entered into a
settlement agreement, and the trial court’s “judgment entry recites the terms of [the]
agreement reached by the parties at that time[.]” Id. at ¶ 6. Indeed, the trial court’s
judgment read that “[i]t is, therefore, Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed, that the
agreement of the parties shall be adopted and incorporated into the Order of the
Court as if fully rewritten . . . .” Id. at ¶ 16. Under the settlement agreement, the case would remain pending while the court monitored the parties’ compliance with
certain time-sensitive provisions of the agreement. Further, although the entry
stated that all claims were settled, it also stated that the case was continued for a
formal determination of the State’s nuisance allegation.
Later, the trial court entered a judgment ordering that the subject
property be sold at sheriff’s sale pursuant to the terms of the parties’ settlement
agreement. The State filed a motion for a final hearing, wherein it represented that
all claims had been settled pursuant to the parties’ settlement agreement. The trial
court held a hearing and thereafter issued its final judgment dismissing the case.
The appellate court found that the original dismissal “indicate[d] that
the [trial] court intended to reserve jurisdiction to enforce the settlement
agreement.” Id. at ¶ 53.
The Karam Properties Court disagreed with the respective courts of
appeal in Henneke, Estate of Berger, Hines, and State ex rel. Spies, finding that “in
order for a court to enforce a settlement agreement following a dismissal, the
dismissal entry must either incorporate the settlement agreement or expressly state
that the court retains jurisdiction to enforce the settlement.” Karam Properties,
2015-Ohio-1101 at ¶ 26. The Court premised its finding on two long-standing
principles of the law: (1) that courts speak through their journal entries and (2) the
expectation of finality in legal proceedings. The Court provided as an example the
following language in a trial court’s judgment as being sufficient to retain jurisdiction: “The court hereby retains jurisdiction to enforce the settlement
agreement reached between the parties.” Id. at ¶ 31.
Thus, the Karam Properties Court found that the trial court in that
case did not retain jurisdiction under the subject judgment, which provided as
follows: “Parties having represented to the court that their differences have been
resolved, this case is dismissed without prejudice, with the parties reserving the
right to file an entry of dismissal within thirty (30) days of this order.” Id. at ¶ 9.
Further, because the trial court denied the motion of the party moving
for relief under Civ.R. 60(B) as moot, the Karam Properties Court declined to
address whether that relief was appropriate and, rather, remanded the case to the
trial court for it to consider the issue first.
State ex rel. Gideon
In State ex rel. Gideon, 2024-Ohio-4867, a municipality filed an
eminent-domain case against a property owner to obtain an easement on the
owner’s property to install a new sewer. The parties thereafter agreed to a
settlement at a conference with a magistrate. The trial court issued a judgment
directing the parties to submit an entry for the court’s approval within 60 days or
the court would consider dismissing the case. The parties failed to sign a settlement
agreement or submit an entry. The trial court dismissed the case and directed the
clerk to “terminate the case from the Court’s active docket.” Id. at ¶ 4. The court’s
dismissal entry also provided that the “parties may hereafter submit an amended
entry reflecting the terms of the settlement and/or dismissal.” Id. The municipality filed a motion to vacate the dismissal and enforce
the settlement agreement. “The motion did not expressly invoke Civ.R. 60(B).” Id.
at ¶ 5. The property owner opposed the motion, contending that the trial court lost
jurisdiction over the case when it entered its dismissal entry. The trial court held a
hearing, at which the municipality contended the court could vacate the dismissal
under both Civ.R. 60(B) and its inherent authority. The trial court ultimately
granted the municipality’s motion in part, vacated the dismissal, and set the matter
for a hearing to decide whether to enforce the settlement agreement.
The property owner filed a writ of prohibition against the trial court
judge with the appellate court. The judge and the municipality filed motions to
dismiss, which the appellate court granted. On appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court,
the property owner relied on Karam Properties in contending that the trial court
did not have jurisdiction to consider the parties’ settlement agreement. The State
ex rel. Gideon Court distinguished Karam Properties, stating the following:
Karam, however, is not applicable here, because the trial court in Karam had not vacated its dismissal entry before it attempted to enforce a settlement agreement. See Karam at ¶ 11. In Karam, we remanded the case to the trial court to consider whether the appellant was entitled to relief under Civ.R. 60(B). Id. at ¶ 33. In contrast, here, [the trial court judge], upon [the municipality’s] motion, vacated her dismissal entry before attempting to enforce the settlement agreement. [The trial court judge] did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to do so.
Id. at ¶ 14.
The State ex rel. Gideon Court reasoned that “[w]hen a common pleas
court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over a case, ‘it is almost always because a statute explicitly removed that jurisdiction.’” Id. at ¶ 15, quoting Ohio
High School Athletic Assn. v. Ruehlman, 2019-Ohio-2845, ¶ 9. The Court found
that no statutes removed the trial court’s jurisdiction in State ex rel. Gideon, so the
trial court “unquestionably had subject-matter jurisdiction” over the case. State ex
rel. Gideon at id., citing Schlegel v. Sweeney, 2022-Ohio-3841, ¶ 12.
Regarding relief under Civ.R. 60(B), the Court noted that the trial
court did not sua sponte invoke the rule to vacate its dismissal; rather, the
municipality filed a motion to vacate the dismissal. And the Court found that
although the municipality’s motion did not explicitly cite the basis on which it was
seeking relief, the property owner failed to cite “authority requiring that motion
explicitly state what authority it is being filed under before a court has jurisdiction
to consider it.” Id. at ¶ 16. The Court further added that at the hearing on the motion
the municipality contended that the trial court vacated the dismissal under
Civ.R. 60(B) or the court’s inherent authority. The Ohio Supreme Court held that
“[a]t a minimum, [the trial court] did not patently and unambiguously lack
jurisdiction to consider [the municipality’s] motion, and once [the court] did so, [it]
did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to grant it.” Id.
Educare Med. Staffing
Educare Med. Staffing, 2024-Ohio-3295 (8th Dist.), is a case from
this court wherein the panel vacated the trial court’s judgment that considered the
parties’ respective motions to enforce their settlement agreement after the case had
been dismissed with prejudice. The joint stipulation of dismissal stated that the trial court was to retain jurisdiction over the case for the purpose of enforcing the
settlement agreement, but the trial court’s judgment of dismissal did not contain
language retaining jurisdiction. Specifically, the trial court’s entry stated that
“[u]pon notice from the parties, effective as of 01/07/2022, all claims in this matter
are hereby voluntarily dismissed with prejudice.” Id. at ¶ 7. Citing Karam
Properties, 2015-Ohio-1101, this court further found that “the entry did not
incorporate the settlement agreement. Based on the foregoing, the trial court did
not retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement.” Id.
Analysis
The trial court’s November 25, 2024 dismissal judgment — “pursuant
to the stipulation filed by the parties on November 22, 2024, case dismissed with
prejudice. Court costs assessed as each their own” — was not the clear
pronouncement of retention of jurisdiction that the Ohio Supreme Court set forth in
Karam Properties, 2015-Ohio-1101. The issue for us to decide is whether it was
sufficient for the trial court to retain jurisdiction.
We first consider whether the trial court’s judgment merely “alluded
to or referred to” the court’s retention of jurisdiction — an approach rejected by the
Karam Properties Court. Id. at ¶ 26. In considering this issue, we compare the
language the trial court used here to the language in these cases cited by the Karam
Properties Court as merely alluding to or referring to jurisdiction.
The Karam Properties Court’s citation to State ex rel. Spies, 2009-
Ohio-3844 (5th Dist.), as a case where the trial court only alluded to or referred to the trial court’s retention of jurisdiction is perplexing because there “[t]he court’s
judgment entry recite[d] the terms of an agreement reached by the parties at that
time[,]” and the agreement provided for the court’s continuing jurisdiction. Id. at
¶ 6. State ex rel. Spies, is not helpful, therefore, to our determination of whether the
trial court here only alluded or referred to a settlement agreement.
In Henneke, 2008-Ohio-6759 (12th Dist.), the trial court’s judgment
stated, “By agreement, case dismissed.” Id. at ¶ 8. In Estate of Berger, 1994 Ohio
App. LEXIS 3623 (8th Dist. Aug. 18, 1994), the trial court’s judgment read, “All
claims and counterclaims in the above-numbered cases [are] settled and dismissed
with prejudice at defendants’ costs.” Id. at *2. And in Hines, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS
1320 (11th Dist. Mar. 25, 1994), the trial court’s judgment stated, “Case settled and
dismissed.” Id. at *1.
Henneke, Estate of Berger, and Hines used the words “by agreement”
or “settled” in dismissing the cases. Here, the trial court went further and stated
that the case was dismissed “pursuant to the stipulation filed by the parties.” The
stipulation reserved the trial court’s jurisdiction to enforce the parties’ settlement
agreement. We find this case distinguishable from Henneke, Estate of Berger, and
Hines, and hold that the trial court here retained jurisdiction.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in vacating its judgment
because appellees did not file a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment. In
State ex rel. Gideon, 2024-Ohio-4867, the Supreme Court of Ohio distinguished that
case from Karam Properties, noting that the trial court in Karam Properties did not vacate its dismissal prior to attempting to enforce the parties’ settlement agreement.
In contrast, in State ex rel. Gideon, a motion was filed — not a Civ.R. 60(B) motion,
but a motion to vacate the dismissal and enforce the settlement agreement — and
the trial court vacated its dismissal and scheduled a hearing on the settlement
agreement. Thus, on the authority of State ex rel. Gideon, the lack of a Civ.R. 60(B)
motion was not fatal to the trial court’s ability to vacate its dismissal.
Finally, the dismissal judgment of the trial court in Educare Med.
Staffing, 2024-Ohio-3295 (8th Dist.), was completely devoid of even a reference to
a settlement agreement. Rather, the judgment merely stated that “upon notice from
the parties . . . all claims in this matter are hereby voluntarily dismissed with
prejudice.” Id. at ¶ 7.
In sum, we find that the trial court’s language in its dismissal entry —
“pursuant to the stipulation filed by the parties” — was sufficient to reserve the
court’s jurisdiction and a Civ.R. 60(B) motion was not the only means by which the
court could vacate its dismissal entry. The first assignment of error is overruled.
Appellant’s second and third assignments of error relate to the trial court’s alleged
lack of jurisdiction, which we have found not to be the case; thus, the assignments
of error are moot and we decline to consider them. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellees recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment
into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
______ MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, PRESIDING JUDGE
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., and KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR