Johnson v. Weigle

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedOctober 22, 2020
Docket2:20-cv-01988
StatusUnknown

This text of Johnson v. Weigle (Johnson v. Weigle) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Johnson v. Weigle, (D. Ariz. 2020).

Opinion

1 WO MH 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Timothy Ray Johnson, No. CV 20-01988-PHX-JAT (MHB) 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 Unknown Weigle, 13 Defendant.

14 15 Plaintiff Timothy Ray Johnson, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison 16 Complex-Florence, has filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 17 § 1983 (Doc. 1) and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2). The Court will 18 dismiss the Complaint with leave to amend. 19 I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee 20 The Court will grant Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. 28 21 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. 22 § 1915(b)(1). The Court will not assess an initial partial filing fee. Id. The statutory filing 23 fee will be collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month’s income credited 24 to Plaintiff’s trust account each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C. 25 § 1915(b)(2). The Court will enter a separate Order requiring the appropriate government 26 agency to collect and forward the fees according to the statutory formula. 27 . . . . 28 . . . . 1 II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 2 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 3 against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 4 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 5 has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which 6 relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 7 such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). 8 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 9 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does 10 not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the- 11 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 12 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 13 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 14 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 15 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 16 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content 17 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 18 misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 19 relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 20 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual 21 allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there 22 are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681. 23 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts 24 must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 25 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent 26 standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 27 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 28 . . . . 1 If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other 2 facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal 3 of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 4 Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, but because it may 5 possibly be amended to state a claim, the Court will dismiss it with leave to amend. 6 III. Complaint 7 In his one-count Complaint, Plaintiff asserts a claim for deficient medical care 8 against Defendant Doctor Weigle. Plaintiff claims that he swallowed foreign objects and 9 put something in his penis. According to the Complaint, “[t]he surgeon” said he needed 10 surgery, and Plaintiff “signed a[n] AMA form even though [he] should not have signed it,” 11 resulting in “3 surgeries instead of 1.” 12 IV. Failure to State a Claim 13 To prevail in a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) acts by the defendants 14 (2) under color of state law (3) deprived him of federal rights, privileges or immunities and 15 (4) caused him damage. Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 16 2005) (quoting Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Idaho Fish & Game Comm’n, 42 F.3d 1278, 17 1284 (9th Cir. 1994)). In addition, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific injury 18 as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant and he must allege an affirmative link 19 between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371- 20 72, 377 (1976). 21 Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 22 520-21 (1972), conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey 23 v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Further, a liberal interpretation of a 24 civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially 25 pled. Id. 26 Not every claim by a prisoner relating to inadequate medical treatment states a 27 violation of the Eighth Amendment. To state a § 1983 medical claim, a plaintiff must show 28 (1) a “serious medical need” by demonstrating that failure to treat the condition could result 1 in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain and (2) the 2 defendant’s response was deliberately indifferent. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th 3 Cir. 2006). 4 “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 5 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must both 6 know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health; “the official must both be aware 7 of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm 8 exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).

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Related

Gardner v. Collins
27 U.S. 58 (Supreme Court, 1829)
Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Rizzo v. Goode
423 U.S. 362 (Supreme Court, 1976)
United States v. Sanford
429 U.S. 14 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Hebbe v. Pliler
627 F.3d 338 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Ivey v. Board of Regents of University of Alaska
673 F.2d 266 (Second Circuit, 1982)
Elviraida Laracuente v. The Chase Manhattan Bank
891 F.2d 17 (First Circuit, 1989)
Michael Henry Ferdik v. Joe Bonzelet, Sheriff
963 F.2d 1258 (Ninth Circuit, 1992)
Farmer v. Brennan
511 U.S. 825 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Lopez v. Smith
203 F.3d 1122 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)

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Bluebook (online)
Johnson v. Weigle, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johnson-v-weigle-azd-2020.