Johnson v. United States

32 Fed. Cl. 709, 75 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1078, 1995 U.S. Claims LEXIS 27, 1995 WL 59950
CourtUnited States Court of Federal Claims
DecidedFebruary 15, 1995
DocketNos. 267-89T, 274-89T, 343-89T, 482-89T, 90-508T and 91-1017T
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 32 Fed. Cl. 709 (Johnson v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Federal Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Johnson v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 709, 75 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1078, 1995 U.S. Claims LEXIS 27, 1995 WL 59950 (uscfc 1995).

Opinion

OPINION

HARKINS, Senior Judge.

Plaintiffs in these six consolidated cases seek refunds of income taxes. Their income tax reports claimed depreciation deductions, investment tax credits, and energy tax credits, from investments in programs that involved so-called leveraged leasing of solar energy equipment. The depreciation deductions and tax credits were disallowed, the additional assessments have been paid, and the claims for refunds have been denied.

The complaints identified 161 individuals in a numbered list of 87 plaintiffs, 74 of which involved joint returns filed by husband and wife and 13 were individuals. The solar energy investment program was active from 1981 through 1985. Tax years relevant to plaintiffs’ claims are 1982, 1983, 1984, and 1985. Some of the initial plaintiffs have been dismissed by stipulation. Appendix A lists the remaining plaintiffs by name, investment year and number of units purchased.

Plaintiffs’ claims were the subject of an 8-day trial during the period from July 26 to August 4, 1993. Posttrial briefing was concluded on April 7, 1994. Plaintiffs’ proposed findings of fact were numbered 1 to 311; defendant’s proposed findings of fact were numbered 1 to 363. On March 12, 1993, the parties filed a joint stipulation of fact that contained five items, which was adopted in the order closing proof. Appendix B lists facts that control the disposition of plaintiffs’ claims.

Plaintiffs, as a group, include CPAs, securities brokers/dealers, securities representatives, insurance brokers, and other profes[711]*711sionals. In the relevant years, many possessed investment portfolios, all were sophisticated investors. The solar energy program in which they invested was started in 1981 to take advantage of business opportunities foreseen to accompany rising energy costs and tax incentives designed to promote investments in alternative energy sources. The investment program was controlled and operated by seven individuals who were the principal officers in two corporations located in Northbrook, Illinois, Solargistics Corporation (Solargistics) and Geodesco, Inc. (Geo-desco).

All four of the principal officers active in Solargistics were CPAs, three had been employees of the IRS, and one also was an attorney. Of the three principals in Geodes-co, one was an attorney, two had backgrounds in operating a business as well as some knowledge of the solar energy industry.

Operations in the investment program did not involve many employees. In 1982, Solar-gistics had three full-time employees in the Northbrook office, and Geodesco had 10 to 15 full-time employees. Geodesco operated through dealerships, which were responsible for their own employees.

Organization and operations of the investment program did not require full time attention of the two promoters, each of whom owned 50 percent of Solargistics shares, acted as its officers, and were its sole directors. One devoted 20-25 hours per week in 1982, and 15 hours per week in 1983 and 1984; the other devoted 10-20 hours per week Spring 1982, 40-60 hours per week in Fall 1982, 25-30 hours per week during 1983, and full time for both Solargistics and Geodesco during 1984. Each received compensation of approximately $60,000 in 1982 and $30,000 in 1983.

Solargistics’ promotional materials, Equipment Brochures and Transaction Summaries, described investment credit and depreciation allowances, with emphasis on income tax benefits. The 1982 summary stated that for a net cash outlay of $5,600, with no further surviving personal obligation, the equipment transaction would produce an effective tax writeoff of $15,600. The 1983 summary stated that for a net cash outlay of $6,500 in 1983, and $800 in 1984, with no future outlay, the equipment transaction would produce an effective tax writeoff of $16,125 during the year of purchase. The summary for 1984 asserted the same benefits. The promotional materials for 1982 and 1983 were written by the person that had organized Solargistics and Geodesco.

Solargistics’ investment program was designed as a leveraged leasing vehicle. The purchase documents required to be executed with initial payment included: (1) Purchase Agreement; (2) Equipment Rental Agreement; (3) Option Agreement; (4) Assignment of Option Premium Proceeds; and (5) Maintenance Agreement. The promotional brochures described the transaction as a purchase of solar equipment from a manufacturer, through Solargistics, with 75 percent of the purchase price financed by the manufacturer, through Solargistics. The purchase was subject to a lease of the equipment to Geodesco and a rental agreement with Geo-desco. The lessee would sublease to end users, and remain liable to the investor on the rental contract. This arrangement, however, does not conform to the approved type of leveraged equipment lease that had developed in the 1970s and was recognized as acceptable business techniques.

Sheldon Drobny, a principal in Solargistics’ organization and operations, testified that the arrangement did not represent either a simple leveraged leasing transaction nor a complex leveraged leasing transaction such as were depicted schematically in 1988 CCH Tax Transactions Library, Equipment Leasing: Vol. 2, U 12.01. Mr. Drobny used these diagrams as a testimonial aid.

Rev.Proc. 75-21, 1975-1 C.B. 715, sets forth guidelines used by the IRS to determine whether certain transactions purporting to be leases of property are, in fact, leases for income tax purposes. Solargistics’ program was not submitted to the IRS for an advance ruling. The type of transaction covered by the IRS procedure, commonly called a “leveraged lease,” was described:

Such a lease transaction generally involves three parties: a lessor, a lessee and a lender to the lessor. In general, these [712]*712leases are net leases, the lease term covers a substantial part of the useful life of the leased property, and the lessee’s payments to the lessor are sufficient to discharge the lessor’s payments to the lender.

Id. at 715.

In the 1970s, equipment leasing became an established service industry for a variety of capital goods, ranging from jet planes, railroad cars, automobiles, computers, special industry machinery, to miscellaneous capital goods such as restaurant equipment. Government publications noted equipment leasing accounted foi 15 percent of capital investment spending in 1976, and the volume was expected to continue upward to accompany market developments. In the Commerce Department publication, a leveraged lease was defined:

A lease in which the lessor borrows a portion of the purchase price of the leased equipment from institutional investors. In a typical transaction, 20 to 40% of the purchase price is provided by one or more investors who become owners and lessors of the equipment. The balance of the purchase price is borrowed from institutional investors on a non-recourse basis to the owner. The borrowing is secured by a first lien on the equipment, an assignment of the lease, and an assignment of the lease rental payments. A leveraged lease may also refer to transactions in which a lessor finances equipment to be leased by borrowing from a bank or some other lending agency, using the lease and equipment as security.

Bureau of Domestic Commerce, U.S. Dept, of Commerce, Equipment Leasing and Rental INDUSTRIES: -TRENDS AND PROSPECTS 26 (1976).

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32 Fed. Cl. 709, 75 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1078, 1995 U.S. Claims LEXIS 27, 1995 WL 59950, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johnson-v-united-states-uscfc-1995.