319 Ga. 562 FINAL COPY
S24A0633. JOHNSON v. THE STATE.
PETERSON, Presiding Justice.
Deand’re Dwayne Johnson appeals his convictions related to
the stabbing death of Louis Tyler and non-fatal assault of Vicki
Robinson.1 On appeal, Johnson argues that the trial court plainly
1 The crimes occurred on November 10, 2018, and Louis died the next
morning. A DeKalb County grand jury indicted Johnson on December 18, 2018, and a subsequent reindictment was returned on September 5, 2019, charging Johnson with malice murder (Count 1), felony murder (Counts 2 to 4), aggravated assault of Louis (Count 5), first degree burglary (Count 6), aggravated stalking (Count 7), aggravated assault of Robinson (Count 8), and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony (Count 9). At an October 2019 trial, the jury found Johnson guilty of all counts. The trial court sentenced Johnson to a total of life without the possibility of parole plus 25 years. Specifically, the trial court sentenced Johnson to life without the possibility of parole for Count 1, vacated Counts 2 to 4, purported to merge Counts 5 to 7 with Count 1, sentenced Johnson to 20 consecutive years in custody for Count 8, and sentenced Johnson to five consecutive years in custody for Count 9. Although there may have been a merger error with respect to the burglary and aggravated stalking counts, we decline to address that issue here because any error benefited the defendant and the State has not challenged the merger of those counts. See Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691, 697-698 (4) (808 SE2d 696) (2017) (explaining that even when no party raises a merger error, we have discretion to correct it on direct appeal, but when the error benefits the defendant and the State fails to raise it by cross-appeal, we exercise our discretion to correct the error only in exceptional circumstances). Johnson timely moved for new trial on November 26, 2019, and amended that motion through new counsel on June 30, 2023. After a hearing on August 14, 2023, the trial court denied the erred by failing to charge impeachment of a witness based on bias,
failing to charge knowledge, failing to charge the defense of accident,
and permitting a witness to testify about the victim’s hearsay
statement. Johnson has not shown that the trial court clearly erred
by omitting the instructions regarding the impeachment of a witness
based on bias, knowledge, or accident, and Johnson has failed to
show how any error related to the trial court’s admission of the
alleged hearsay testimony likely affected the outcome. Therefore,
Johnson’s claims of plain error fail, and we affirm.
The evidence at trial showed the following. Johnson and
Jasmine Tyler began dating in May 2016. They had one son, K. J.,
together in September 2017 and broke up in August 2018. Upon
breaking up, Johnson and Jasmine agreed that Johnson would
watch K. J. while she worked, and K. J. otherwise lived with
Jasmine at her grandmother’s house down the road from where
Johnson lived. Jasmine later arranged for her father, Louis Tyler,
motion on September 28, 2023. Johnson filed a timely notice of appeal through appellate counsel, and the case was docketed to the April 2024 term of this Court and submitted for a decision on the briefs. 2 and his long-term girlfriend, Vicki Robinson, to watch K. J. instead
of Johnson.
On October 23, 2018, Johnson “pop[ped] up” at Louis and
Robinson’s apartment uninvited, and Robinson let Johnson in to see
K. J. At Louis’s request, Robinson asked Johnson to leave, and
Johnson responded that calling the police was “the only way [she]
was going to be able to stop him[,]” “forcibly took” K. J., bruising
Robinson, ran from the apartment, and got in a car that drove away.2
Robinson called the police, who found Johnson with K. J. and
returned K. J. to her; an audio recording of this call was played for
the jury. Johnson never legitimized his relationship with K. J. and
did not see K. J. much after that incident.
On October 31, 2018, Johnson texted Jasmine two photographs
of her grandmother’s car with a broken window and communicated
2 Johnson testified in his own defense that he took K. J. because he did
not think the apartment was the best place for K. J.’s health, given that he was sick and the apartment smelled like cigarette smoke. According to Johnson, the physical struggle arose because Robinson “was elbowing [K. J.] in the stomach basically trying to forcefully keep [K. J.] away from” him. Johnson claimed that another relative “pulled [Robinson] off” of K. J. and him, letting them go. 3 that someone had tried to break into her grandmother’s car. Jasmine
was at work and called Louis, who arrived at her grandmother’s
house around midnight and called the police. Jasmine testified that
she believed that Johnson did it, and when she challenged Johnson
via text message as to whether he had called the police to report the
broken window like Johnson told her that he had, Johnson told her
“don’t come back on this street” and that his “cousin was going to
basically beat [her] up.” He also sent threatening text messages
about Louis, saying he was “going to beat [that] man to sleep[.]”At
trial, when asked if there was “any sort of altercation, verbal or
physical, between [Louis] and the defendant[,]”3 the following
exchange ensued:
JASMINE: Yes. My father said that he hit him. STATE: Deand’re hit your dad? JASMINE: Yes. Deand’re hit my father.
Johnson did not object. Similarly, Robinson testified that Louis
called and placed her on speaker phone during that encounter, and
3 It is unclear from the record whether Jasmine’s testimony referred to
an altercation between Louis and Johnson “that night” or “ever.” 4 that Johnson had punched Louis in the stomach after Louis told him
to stop “doing all this foolishness” and “to grow up and get a job and
start taking care of his son.” Johnson did not object to this testimony,
which he elicited on cross-examination. Johnson also elicited
Robinson’s testimony that police who responded to the scene
concluded that Louis had instigated the incident.
In the early morning of November 2, 2018, Robinson had K. J.
at her apartment when she heard a “big boom” as though a tree had
fallen on the house. She looked out her bedroom window and saw
Johnson running behind the apartment. In the living room, she saw
a “big boulder rock through [her] whole front window” and called
911, and an audio recording of this call was played for the jury. Louis
and Robinson pressed charges against Johnson; Jasmine testified
that Johnson admitted to her that he broke Louis and Robinson’s
window.
On the same day, Jasmine obtained an ex parte temporary
restraining order prohibiting Johnson from “harassing, harming, or
abusing the Petitioner’s family or household” and stating that
5 Johnson had no legal right to visit and had no custodial rights
regarding K. J. Johnson “kept calling” and texting Louis and
Robinson about K. J. so much that they “had to . . . turn the phone
off in order to go to sleep [and] to go to work.”4
Jasmine testified that on November 3, 2018, before the
restraining order was served, she received a text message with a
picture of herself in a dress, reading “this is the nice dress to die in.”5
Jasmine called the police, who arrived on the scene but informed her
there was nothing they could do absent the order being served; an
audio recording of that call was played for the jury. Also on that date,
Robinson overheard a phone call between Louis and Johnson in
which Johnson said that he “wanted to apologize” but did not admit
4 A cell phone extraction of Louis’s cell phone, displayed to the jury, revealed 43 calls and nine text messages from different phone numbers associated with Johnson to Louis’s phone between November 2, 2018, and November 10, 2018. While some call logs indicated that Louis’s phone was answered, the records show no communications initiated from Louis’s cell phone to the numbers associated with Johnson. 5 Although Jasmine did not associate the phone number sending that
message with Johnson, Johnson immediately texted her again from another number displaying knowledge about the threatening text message and blaming the message on his cousin. And Jasmine testified that Johnson routinely contacted her from multiple numbers. 6 to breaking Louis and Robinson’s window. The restraining order was
served on November 7, 2018.
Robinson testified that around 7:00 a.m. on November 10,
2018, when K. J. was at Louis and Robinson’s apartment, Johnson
called Louis and Robinson because he “wanted to bring the baby
some money[,]” but they declined the money. At one point, Louis left
the apartment, but he returned shortly after seeing Johnson
walking near the apartment. Around 7:30 or 8:00 p.m., a neighbor
knocked on their door and said, “this guy asked [him] to knock on
your door to tell you it’s a old friend out here who wants to see you.”
Robinson testified that they assumed it was Johnson and were going
to ignore him, but Louis went outside because his “car alarm kept
going off[.]” Robinson called 911; an audio recording of this call was
played for the jury.
According to Robinson, Johnson was “already out there with a
butcher knife[,]” and Robinson heard Louis “hollering, ‘Dre, put the
knife down[.]’ ” She went outside with a door bar, saw Johnson, who
7 “walked a long way with a butcher knife to come to [their] house[,]”6
“going at Louis” and “sticking at Louis with the knife.”7 Robinson
attempted to hit and Louis did hit Johnson with the door bar.
Johnson ran in the open apartment door, where K. J. was in a car
seat on the couch, and tried to close the door. Louis got inside, where
Johnson “was charging at Louis with the knife, so Louis grabbed him
and . . . the knife went in Louis. But Louis held [Johnson] down with
the knife” as Robinson tried to “pry the knife out” of Johnson’s hand,
and he twice stabbed her in the hand before she threw the knife
away and realized that Louis had been stabbed. Louis affirmed that
Johnson had stabbed him in the chest. Johnson tried to give CPR to
Louis, but Robinson stopped him, and the neighbor returned to help
and restrained Johnson.
Paramedics took Louis to a hospital, where he died the next
morning. An autopsy revealed defensive injuries on Louis’s right
6 The record makes clear that Johnson walked about three miles to get
to their apartment. 7 Robinson testified that there was no talking and that Johnson “came
with rage.” 8 arm, a small injury on his back, and a stab wound. The autopsy
report classified the cause of death as a “stab wound to the chest[,]”
or put another way, “the stabbing object causing a fatal injury of the
heart[.]”
The neighbor who had knocked on the door, Isaiah Rogers,
testified that he was walking around 7:30 or 8:00 p.m. on November
10, 2018, when a man approached and offered to pay him to knock
on the door of the apartment and “let them know there’s an old
friend out here trying to see them.” Rogers did so, and “after about
five minutes” he heard screaming from that apartment. He returned
and saw “Louis and the person that [he] knocked on the door for,
wrestling around sort of in the yard.” Johnson had a knife “wielded
at” Louis, and Louis had what Rogers thought was a broom or a
white stick; Rogers saw blood around the rib area of Louis’s shirt
and knew “that he got stabbed.” Johnson then “dashed inside the
house[,]” where Robinson remained, and “tried to shut the door but
Louis stuck the broom inside the door[.]” Inside, Rogers saw a baby
crying on the couch, Louis on top of Johnson, holding his hands
9 down, and Robinson holding his wrists down with her feet. Rogers
grabbed the knife, threw it outside, and put Johnson “in [a] headlock
and made sure he stayed until the police arrived.” When police
arrived, Rogers told them Johnson “stabbed Louis.”
Rogers’s former roommate, Nicholas Herndon, testified that he
arrived and saw Louis bleeding on the ground, Robinson helping
Louis, a baby on the couch, Johnson on the couch, and Rogers
“making sure [Johnson] stayed on the couch.” Herndon called 911,
and an audio recording of that call was played for the jury, during
which another neighbor arrived and asked what happened, and
Johnson responded, “I stabbed him.”
Officer Nathan Foster responded to the scene and testified that
he immediately took Johnson into custody, and Johnson later
volunteered “that it was self-defense.”
Johnson testified in his own defense at trial and denied the
following: (1) threatening Jasmine or Louis via text message, (2)
breaking Jasmine’s grandmother’s car window, (3) telling Jasmine
that he broke the car window, (4) getting in a physical fight with
10 Louis about the car window, (5) breaking the apartment window, or
(6) admitting while Herndon was on the phone with 911 that he
stabbed Louis. According to Johnson, on November 10, he walked to
the apartment to ask if he could help financially with K. J., not
knowing that the temporary restraining order meant that he could
not be near his son anymore. Johnson said that Louis attacked him,
so Johnson “end[ed] up having to use the knife.” Johnson said that
he carried the knife tucked in his pants for protection, as he often
did, because he had gotten robbed before in that area.
According to Johnson, he asked the neighbor to help because
he did not want to cause an altercation. Louis came outside, told
Johnson “you messed up my daughter’s life” and grabbed and
threatened him. Louis grabbed Johnson “[u]p towards the neck
area” with two hands and would not let him go, despite Johnson
yelling for him to do so. Robinson came outside with a door bar,
Johnson pulled out the knife, and Louis let him go. The defense
elicited testimony that Louis was around six feet tall and weighed
11 248 pounds, while Johnson was around five feet and four inches tall
and weighed around 110 to 118 pounds.
Johnson testified that he ran to the house to escape, not
knowing that K. J. was there, and tried to leave when he saw K. J.
Johnson claimed that Louis pushed open the door with the door bar,
charged at Johnson, and swung the door bar. That is “when
[Johnson] jab[bed] with the knife.” Louis slammed him on the
ground, hit him in the face, and tried to grab the knife while they
tussled. Johnson broke his grip and “hit” Louis again out of fear of
“what he would do if he had the knife.” Louis pinned Johnson’s
hands down and instructed Robinson to get the knife, and Johnson
opened his hand to “let her get the knife.” Johnson tried to give CPR
and did not try to run because he said, “I kn[e]w I didn’t do anything
wrong.” On cross-examination, Johnson admitted that he “swung
the knife as a jab” and stabbed Louis in the chest, but he insisted
that it was “[i]n defense.”
1. Johnson contends that the trial court plainly erred by failing
to instruct the jury on the impeachment of a witness based on a
12 witness’s bias for or against a party, on knowledge, and on the
defense of accident. We disagree.
As Johnson concedes on appeal, his trial counsel did not
request any of these instructions or object to their omission at trial,
so we review these claims for plain error only. See OCGA § 17-8-58.8
To establish plain error, Johnson must prove that the instructional
error (1) was not affirmatively waived, (2) was clear and obvious
beyond reasonable dispute, (3) likely affected the outcome of the
proceedings, and (4) seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of judicial proceedings. See Collins v. State, 312
Ga. 727, 738 (5) (864 SE2d 85) (2021). “An appellant must establish
all four elements of the test in order to demonstrate plain error, so
satisfying this test is difficult, as it should be.” Id. (citation and
punctuation omitted). Indeed, if an appellant fails to satisfy any one
8 Under OCGA § 17-8-58 (b):
Failure to object in accordance with subsection (a) of this Code section shall preclude appellate review of such portion of the jury charge, unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects substantial rights of the parties. Such plain error may be considered on appeal even if it was not brought to the court’s attention as provided in subsection (a) of this Code section. 13 prong of the plain error test, we need not consider the other prongs.
See State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 34 (2) (b) n.5 (718 SE2d 232) (2011).
(a) The trial court did not clearly err by omitting the impeachment for bias instruction.
Johnson contends that the trial court plainly erred by failing
to instruct the jury on impeachment of a witness based on a
witness’s bias when ample evidence supported this instruction and
the trial court instructed the jury on prior difficulties evidence. “In
evaluating a claim that the trial court was required to give certain
jury instructions, we view the charge as a whole to determine
whether the jury was fully and fairly instructed.” Clark v. State, 315
Ga. 423, 440 (4) (883 SE2d 317) (2023) (citation and punctuation
omitted); see also Taylor v. State, 272 Ga. 744, 745-746 (1) (534 SE2d
67) (2000) (no error in omission of instruction when charge as given
substantially covered all legal principles relevant to the
determination of the appellant’s guilt).
Here, the trial court directed the jury to “determine the
credibility of the witnesses” and to consider among other things “all
14 of the facts and circumstances of the case, including . . . their interest
or lack of interest in the outcome of the case and their personal
credibility[.]”9 Even assuming that slight evidence supported an
instruction on impeachment for bias, we have said that an
instruction directing jurors to consider a witness’s interest or lack of
interest in the outcome of the case substantially covers the possible
motive, interest, or bias of the State’s witnesses. See, e.g., Baker v.
State, 319 Ga. 456, 461 (2) (902 SE2d 645) (2024) (no clear error in
trial court’s omission of instruction on impeachment of a witness for
bias); Isaac v. State, 319 Ga. 25, 33 (3) (901 SE2d 535) (2024)
9 The full instruction was as follows:
You are not required to accept the testimony of any witnesses, expert or otherwise. Testimony of an expert, like that of all witnesses, is to be given only such weight and credit as you think it is properly entitled to receive. The jury must determine the credibility of the witnesses. In deciding this, you may consider all of the facts and circumstances of the case, including the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their means and opportunity for knowing the facts about which they testify, the nature of the facts about which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or lack of interest in the outcome of the case and their personal credibility as you observe it. To impeach a witness is to show that witness is unworthy of belief. A witness may be impeached by disproving the facts to which the witness testified.
15 (pretermitting whether slight evidence supported a charge on bias,
trial court did not err when the charge as given substantially
covered the declined charge); Foster v. State, 294 Ga. 383, 386 (7)
(754 SE2d 33) (2014) (instruction that the jury determine each
witness’s credibility and consider each witness’s interest or lack
thereof in the case adequately covered the possible motive, interest,
or bias of the State’s witnesses). Therefore, when evaluated in the
context of the jury instructions as a whole, Johnson has not shown
that the trial court clearly erred in omitting the impeachment-for-
bias instruction, and his claim of plain error fails.
(b) The trial court did not clearly err by omitting the knowledge instruction.
Johnson contends that the trial court’s failure to instruct the
jury on knowledge was plain error because this is an element that
the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt and this is a pattern
jury instruction given in most criminal trials.10
10 The pattern jury instruction on knowledge states:
Knowledge on the part of the defendant that the crime of [specific crime] was being committed and that the defendant
16 Here, the trial court thoroughly instructed the jury on the
presumption of innocence, the State’s burden of proof, the definition
of a crime, and intent. These instructions adequately informed the
jury that it could not find Johnson guilty if he did not knowingly and
intentionally participate in the crimes. See Sauder v. State, 318 Ga.
791, 803-804 (5) (b) (901 SE2d 124) (2024) (no clear or obvious error
when trial court failed to instruct the jury on mere presence and
knowledge, because the court instructed on the presumption of
innocence, the State’s burden of proof, criminal intent, and parties
to a crime). Accordingly, considering the jury instructions as a
knowingly and intentionally participated in or helped in the commission of such crime must be proved by the State beyond a reasonable doubt. If you find from the evidence in this case that the defendant had no knowledge that a crime was being committed or that the defendant did not knowingly and intentionally commit, participate, or help in the commission of (and was not a conspirator in) the alleged offense, then it would be your duty to acquit the defendant. On the other hand, should you find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant had knowledge that the crime of [specific crime] was being committed and that the defendant knowingly and intentionally participated or helped in the commission of it, then you would be authorized to convict the defendant. Georgia Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases § 1.43.10. 17 whole, the trial court’s omission of the knowledge instruction was
not a clear or obvious error, and Johnson’s claim for plain error fails.
(c) The trial court did not clearly err by omitting the instruction on the defense of accident.
Johnson contends that the trial court plainly erred by omitting
an instruction on the defense of accident. To authorize a requested
jury instruction, there need be only “slight evidence to support the
theory of the charge, and the necessary evidence may be presented
by the State, the defendant, or both.” McIver v. State, 314 Ga. 109,
138 (2) (g) (875 SE2d 810) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).
The accident instruction applies “where it satisfactorily appears
there was no criminal scheme, undertaking, intention, or criminal
negligence.” OCGA § 16-2-2. Put another way, this defense “arises
when a defendant contends that his acts were accidental or a
product of misfortune rather than criminal intent or negligence.”
Stepp-McCommons v. State, 309 Ga. 400, 403 (2) (a) (845 SE2d 643)
(2020) (citation and punctuation omitted).
18 Here, Johnson contends that Robinson’s testimony that
Johnson stabbed Louis when Louis grabbed Johnson and held him
down during the fight for control over the knife constituted slight
evidence supporting the defense of accident. But this account
mischaracterizes Robinson’s testimony, which makes clear that
before Louis grabbed Johnson, Johnson “was charging at Louis with
the knife[.]”11 Therefore, the testimony that Johnson points to as
slight evidence actually undercuts his contention that the stabbing
was an accident.
Even assuming that Johnson stabbed Louis during the fight for
control over the knife, Johnson insisted at trial that he intended to
brandish the knife in self-defense, and the mere fact that the
stabbing may have occurred during a fight for control over the knife
does not render the stabbing an accident. Although a defendant may
assert both the defense of accident and the defense of self-defense,
11 Indeed, Robinson testified that Johnson “was charging at Louis with
the knife, so Louis grabbed him and . . . the knife went in Louis. But Louis held [Johnson] down with the knife” as Robinson tried to “pry the knife out of Johnson’s hand[.]” 19 the defendant is entitled to charges on both only if slight evidence
supports both charges. See Hudson v. State, 284 Ga. 595, 597 (4)
(669 SE2d 94) (2008) (evidence supported both charges when
defendant testified that she used a knife to “force” the threatening
victim “to get back” but did not mean to stab him or understand how
the knife became lodged in his chest). By asserting these alternative
defenses, “the defendant in essence tells the jury, ‘I didn’t mean to
[stab] the victim. But if you find that I [stabbed] him intentionally,
I was justified in doing so, because it was the only way to stop him
from seriously injuring me.’” McClure v. State, 306 Ga. 856, 861 (1)
(834 SE2d 96) (2019).
Here, Johnson points to no evidence that he did not intend to
stab Louis. Rather, Johnson testified at trial that he used the knife
in self-defense, he “swung the knife as a jab[,]” he stabbed Louis in
the chest, and he hit Louis again after the stabbing out of fear of
what Louis would do if he had the knife. Given this evidence, the
trial court did not clearly err by omitting the accident instruction.
See Stepp-McCommons, 309 Ga. at 403-404 (2) (a) (no error in
20 omitting accident instruction where defendant testified he shot the
victim in self-defense without intending to “murder” the victim);
Morris v. State, 303 Ga. 192, 199-200 (V) (C) (811 SE2d 321) (2018)
(accident instruction unwarranted when evidence supported only a
self-defense instruction); Dolensek v. State, 274 Ga. 678, 681 (6) (558
SE2d 713) (2002) (no error in omitting accident instruction when
evidence demonstrated only that the defendant acted intentionally
“to defend himself and to scare off his attackers”).
2. Johnson contends that the trial court plainly erred by
admitting Jasmine’s testimony that Louis previously told her that
Johnson hit him on the night the car window was broken.
Specifically, Johnson argues the admission of this testimony was
plain error because the testimony was inadmissible hearsay and
impermissible character evidence. We disagree.
As Johnson concedes on appeal, his trial counsel failed to object
to the admission of this evidence, so we review this claim for plain
error only. See Merritt v. State, 311 Ga. 875, 889 (6) (860 SE2d 455)
(2021) (reviewing admission of evidence at trial without objection for
21 plain error); OCGA § 24-1-103 (d) (“Nothing in this Code section
shall preclude a court from taking notice of plain errors affecting
substantial rights although such errors were not brought to the
attention of the court.”).
Here, even if we assume that the trial court’s admission of the
testimony was a clear or obvious error under any of the grounds
asserted by Johnson, Johnson cannot obtain reversal because he has
failed to show that the error affected his substantial rights. Rather,
the contested testimony was merely cumulative of other testimony,
and the evidence of Johnson’s guilt was overwhelming.
To begin, Jasmine’s testimony that Louis told her Johnson hit
him was cumulative of Robinson’s testimony describing what she
heard on speaker phone during the encounter and recounting
Louis’s depiction of the confrontation. Therefore, Jasmine’s
testimony added nothing to Robinson’s depiction of the
confrontation and was merely cumulative of other unchallenged
testimony. See Allen v. State, 310 Ga. 411, 416-417 (3) (851 SE2d
541) (2020) (admission of challenged testimony did not affect
22 defendant’s substantial rights when that testimony was cumulative
of other unchallenged evidence); McKinney v. State, 307 Ga. 129, 135
(2) (b) (834 SE2d 741) (2019) (any error in admission of conviction
resulting from defendant’s prior attack against the victim did not
affect defendant’s substantial rights when the challenged evidence
was cumulative of other testimony and the jury heard substantial
testimony about other prior difficulties between the defendant and
the victim).
Moreover, evidence of Johnson’s guilt was overwhelming.
Weeks before the stabbing, a phone number associated with Johnson
sent messages about Louis to Jasmine’s phone number threatening
that the sender was “going to beat [that] man to sleep.” The jury
heard substantial testimony about other prior difficulties between
Louis and Johnson, including testimony regarding conflict over the
broken apartment window and Johnson’s role as a father, and audio
recordings of various 911 calls related to prior difficulties between
Jasmine, Robinson, Louis, and Johnson were played for the jury.
23 It was uncontested that Johnson walked about three miles to
Louis and Robinson’s apartment while carrying a butcher knife and
that Johnson stabbed Louis. Two eyewitnesses besides Johnson
testified that Johnson stabbed Louis. Robinson testified that she
saw Johnson “going at Louis[,]” “sticking at Louis with the knife[,]”
and “charging at Louis with the knife” before “the knife went in
Louis.” And Louis affirmed to her that Johnson stabbed him in the
chest. Similarly, Rogers testified that within five minutes of
knocking at Johnson’s request on the apartment door, he heard
screaming and returned to see Louis and Johnson “wrestling” as
Johnson had a knife “wielded at” Louis. By then, Louis already had
blood around his rib area, and Rogers knew “that he got stabbed.”
Rogers later told police that Johnson “stabbed Louis.”
In addition to those eyewitness accounts, Rogers’s former
roommate, Herndon, testified that shortly after the stabbing he
heard Johnson admit that he had stabbed Louis. Officer Foster
similarly testified that Johnson volunteered that he had stabbed
24 Louis. And Johnson himself testified that he pulled out the knife,
“jab[bed] with the knife[,]” and “hit” Louis again after the stabbing.
Accordingly, given that the contested testimony was merely
cumulative of other admitted evidence and that evidence of
Johnson’s guilt was overwhelming, Johnson has not met his burden
under the plain error standard to show a reasonable probability that
the outcome of his trial would have been different absent the
contested testimony, and his claim of plain error fails.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
25 Decided August 13, 2024.
Murder. DeKalb Superior Court. Before Judge Adams.
Frances C. Kuo, Jonathan O. Oden, for appellant.
Sherry Boston, District Attorney, Joshua M. Geller, Tyshawn Y.
Jackson, Lenny I. Krick, Deborah D. Wellborn, Assistant District
Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Beth A. Burton,
Deputy Attorney General, Clint C. Malcolm, Meghan H. Hill, Senior
Assistant Attorneys General, Eric C. Peters, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.