HOLMAN, J.
This is an appeal from a judgment for defendant in a wrongful death action brought in products liability and negligence by plaintiff as the representative of decedent’s estate. A demurrer to [697]*697both counts was sustained upon the ground that the action had not been commenced within the time permitted by ORS 12.115 (1).
Plaintiff’s decedent was killed in the course of his employment. A plywood sander manufactured by defendant ejected a piece of plywood which hit decedent. The sander had been purchased from defendant by decedent’s employer in 1959. The fatal accident occurred on February 19, 1970. This action was commenced within three years thereafter on February 16, 1973.
ORS 12.115 (1) provides as follows:
“In no event shall any action for negligent injury to person or property of another be commenced more than 10 years from the date of the act or omission complained of.”
The question in this ease is whether this statute is applicable to the present situation. If it is, the trial court was correct in sustaining the demurrer because the “act or omission complained of” was either the negligent manufacture of the article in the one count or the sale of the defective article by defendant to the employer of plaintiff’s decedent in the other, and both occurred more than 10 years prior to the commencement of plaintiff’s action. Plaintiff’s position is that the statute applies to neither count.
Plaintiff contends that ORS 12.115 (1) has no application to his negligence count because the statute providing for an action for wrongful death, ORS 30.-020,
In the case of Josephs v. Burns & Bear, 260 Or 493, 491 P2d 203 (1971), we held that ORS 12.115 (1) was applicable to an action against architects and engineers for negligent supervision and construction of a building, the roof of which collapsed some 17 years later causing the damage complained of. We there held that the statute was intended by the legislature to be one of ultimate repose which could abolish a cause of action before it accrued. We determined [699]*699from the legislative history of the statute that OES 12.115 (1) was enacted in response to the opinion of this court in Berry v. Branner, 245 Or 307, 421 P2d 996 (1966). In Berry, a medical malpractice ease involving a foreign object left in the body cavity of a surgery patient, we held that the cause of action did not “accrue” and, therefore, the statute of limitations did not begin to run until such time as the object was discovered, or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have been discovered by the patient. This was a reversal of previous case law which held that in such situations the cause of action accrued and the statute commenced to run at the time of the negligent act or omission. The legislative response to Berry was the enactment of OES 12.110 (4), which limited the bringing of a malpractice action to a period of two years from the time the injury was discovered or should have been discovered, and, in any event, to within a seven-year period④ from the time of the treatment, omission, or operation upon which the action was based.
At the same time, the legislature recognized that the rationale of Berry might be applicable to other situations in which negligence went understandably undetected until after the pertinent statute of limitations expired. As a result, as part of the same legislative act, it enacted OES 12.115 (1), which established a 10-year statute of ultimate repose for such cases. We said in Josephs v. Burns & Bear, supra at 498-99:
“In Berry, we held that the cause of action did not ‘accrue’ until the patient knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known of the injury inflicted upon her. It is clear that the legis[700]*700lative committees which were dealing with the problem of long delayed tort litigation brought about by lack of discovery considered the possibility of defining the time when a cause of action ‘accrued’ as a response to the Berry decision. It is our belief that the legislature chose as preferable to the amendment the enactment in one bill of ORS 12.110 (4) relating specifically to medical malpractice claims and of ORS 12.115 (1) relating generally to other tort claims. ORS 12.115 (1) left the discovery rationale of Berry intact, should this court subsequently chose [sic] to apply the Berry rationale to torts other than medical malpractice, but prescribed an ultimate cut-off date in any event for the commencement of tort claims litigation.”
Plaintiff attempts to distinguish Josephs from the present situation by claiming that in Josephs a cause of action accrued at the time the building was defectively built, despite the fact that the damage claimed was caused by the collapse of the roof 17 years later, whereas, in the present case, no cause of action accrued until decedent was fatally injured, which occurrence was less than three years prior to the commencement of this action. In other words, plaintiff is contending that in Josephs, as in Berry, pre-existing but undetected damage existed from the time of defendant’s negligence and a cause of action accrued from that time, while in the present case all damage occurred at the time plaintiff’s decedent was fatally injured, and thus no cause of action accrued until then. Whether such a distinction is a relevant one depends on the rationale behind the enactment of a statute of ultimate repose. In general, there are usually two reasons which are advanced as justification for the imposition of such statutes. The first concerns the lack of reliability and availability of evidence after a lapse of long periods of time. This rationale primarily [701]*701protects defendants who, without prior notice of pending claims, would necessarily find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to mount a defense because of the nonpreservation of evidence and the disappearance or death of witnesses after a long lapse of time. However, the reliability of plaintiff’s evidence relating to long-past occurrences, transactions or conditions is also a relevant feature.
The second rationale concerns the public policy of allowing people, after the lapse of a reasonable time, to plan their affairs with a degree of certainty, free from the disruptive burden of protracted and unknown potential liability; e.g. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F2d 553, 559 (2d Cir 1962) (dictum), cert, denied 372 US 912, 83 S Ct 726, 9 L Ed 2d 720 (1963).
These rationales are obviously applicable without regard to whether or not undetected damage had occurred at the time of the original negligence. The existence of such damage at the time of the original negligence is irrelevant to the application of the statute and its underlying policies, and we so held in Josephs. Contrary to plaintiff’s analysis of when the damage first occurred in Josephs, the plaintiff there made the argument which the plaintiff makes here, i.e., that the damage did not occur until the subsequent accident, and, therefore, the cause of action did not accrue and the statute did not commence to run until that time. We stated in Josephs:
“Plaintiff points out that OES 12.010 specifies that the limitation statutes in chapter 12 shall only commence to run from the time the cause of action accrues and that the present cause of action could not come into existence before the damage was inflicted. We can answer this argument only [702]*702by saying that in onr opinion ORS 12.115 (1) was intended to apply as a ten-year limitation from the date of the act or omission regardless of when the damage resulted or when the act or omission was discovered.” Josephs v. Burns & Bear, supra at 500.
Plaintiff also contends that such a result is in violation of the following language of the Oregon Constitution, Art I, § 10:
“* * * [E]very man shall have remedy by due course of law for injury done him in his person, property or reputation.”
A cause of action may be constitutionally abolished or limited so long as it is not done arbitrarily and there is a legitimate, countervailing public interest or policy which arguably is served by such action. There are legitimate public policies which are served by the enactment of a statute of ultimate repose, which policies have heretofore been identified.
Plaintiff next contends that ORS 12.115 (1) has no application to his products liability count because the statute by its literal terms is applicable only to “negligent injury” and negligence is foreign and unnecessary to strict liability, which is the basis of a products liability ease. In Josephs we used the term “tort claims” rather than “actions for negligent injury,” which were the words of the statute. The broader language was unnecessary to the disposition of that case as negligence was all that was involved. We now have a situation where it is necessary to determine whether it was the intention of the legislature to limit the scope of ORS 12.115 (1) to its literal terms.
We find no evidence in the legislative history which indicates the legislature specifically considered [703]*703the products liability concept when it enacted the statute. It would have been difficult for the legislature to anticipate the subsequent state of products liability law since this court first fully embraced Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A six months after the effective date of ORS 12.115 (1), when we decided the case of Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or 467, 435 P2d 806 (December 29, 1967). Statutory construction difficulties usually arise from situations in which the legislature did not anticipate the problem. This situation is no exception. Had the problem been anticipated, would the legislature have included products liability cases within the purview of ORS 12.115 (1) or would it have excluded them so that liability from undiscovered injury or defect would go on forever from the time of the act or omission complained of?
Plaintiff’s principal argument is based upon the well-known proposition that this court cannot ignore the plain meaning of unambiguous words in a statute. The rule is thus stated in Lane County v. Heints Const. Co. et al, 228 Or 152, 157, 364 P2d 627 (1961):
“* * * [W]e first take note that the court is not authorized to rewrite a statute or to ignore the plain meaning of unambiguous words to correct the action of the legislature, or, in this instance, the action of the Board of County Commissioners of Lane county.
“ * * The court’s province, after all, is to ascertain what the legislature intended from the language used, with such aid as may be found in the rules of interpretation and legitimate extrinsic sources; to construe statutes, not to enact them; to declare what the legislature has done, not what it should have done. * * *’ Fullerton v. Lamm, 177 Or 655, 670, 163 P2d 941, 165 P2d 63. (Emphasis supplied.)”
However, the rule requiring the court to follow the [704]*704plain meaning of seemingly unambiguous language is not inflexible and not without exceptions. Hence, if the literal import of the words is so at variance with the apparent policy of the legislation as a whole as to bring about an unreasonable result, the literal interpretation must give way and the court must look beyond the words of the act. In U. S. v. Amer. Trucking Ass’ns., 310 US 534, 542-44, 60 S Ct 1059, 84 L Ed 1345 (1940), the United States Supreme Court said:
“In the interpretation of statutes, the function of the courts is easily stated. It is to construe the language so as to give effect to the intent of Congress. There is no invariable rule for the discovery of that intention *
“There is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes. Often these words are sufficient in and of themselves to determine the purpose of the legislation. In such cases we have followed their plain meaning. When that meaning has led to absurd or futile results, however, this Court has looked beyond the words to the purpose of the act. Frequently, however, even when the plain meaning did not produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable one ‘plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole’ this Court has followed that purpose, rather than the literal words. When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no ‘rule of law’ which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on ‘superficial examination’ * * (Footnotes omitted.)
This rule is firmly established in Oregon. In Fox v. Galloway, 174 Or 339, 346-47, 148 P2d 922 (1944), this court stated that:
“* * * The cardinal rule of statutory eon[705]*705struction is to ascertain the meaning of the legislature and give it effect, if such meaning is constitutional. In determining the intent many things are taken into consideration: the language used, the object to be accomplished, whether a literal interpretation of the language will lead to an impossibility or an absurdity, the history behind the act, and numerous other matters, no one of which is absolutely controlling as to the legislative intent. It is from a combination of all these that the intent is deduced: Union Fishermen’s Co. v. Shoemaker, 98 Or. 659, 193 P. 476, 194 P. 854; State v. Gates, 104 Or. 112, 206 P. 863; Colder v. Orr, 105 Or. 223, 209 P. 479; State ex rel. Hood River Hospital v. Employees’ Hospital Association, 157 Or. 618, 73 P. (2d) 693.
“If the language is plain and unambiguous, if it can be given but one meaning, and that meaning does not lead to an impossibility or an absurdity such as the legislature could not be supposed to have intended, the court must give effect to that meaning if constitutional, even though the result may be, in the court’s opinion, harsh, unjust or mistaken in policy: Public Service Commission v. Pacific Stages, Inc., 130 Or. 572, 281 P. 125; State v. Tollefson, 142 Or. 192, 16 P. (2d) 625; Anderson v. Thomas, 144 Or. 572, 26 P. (2d) 60.
“When, however, a literal application of the language produces an absurd or unreasonable result, it is the duty of the court to construe the act, if possible, so that it is a reasonable and workable law and not inconsistent with the general policy of the legislature: Othus v. Kozer, 119 Or. 101, 248 P. 146; State v. Hay, 132 Or. 223, 283 P. 753; Portland Van & Storage Co. v. Hoss, 139 Or. 434, 9 P. (2d) 122, 81 A. L. R. 1136 * * (Emphasis supplied.)
Fox has been subsequently cited with approval, e.g., Peters et al v. McKay et al, 195 Or 412, 439, 238 P2d [706]*706225, 246 P2d 585 (1952), and most recently in State v. Irving, 268 Or 204, 206, 520 P2d 354 (1974).
In this context it would not be an unreasonable extension of the often quoted statement “* * * a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers * * Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 US 457, 459, 12 S Ct 511, 36 L Ed 226 (1892), to state its corollary which would be that a thing may not be within the letter of the statute and yet be within the intention of its makers. As stated earlier, it is the legislative intent which controls. When such intent is manifest the courts must give it effect, even though to do so does violation to the literal meaning of its words. Allen v. Multnomah County, 179 Or 548, 554, 173 P2d 475 (1946); Fish v. Bishop, 176 Or 210, 212-13, 156 P2d 204 (1945).
This approach is generally referred to as the rule of the equity of the statute. 2A Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction 351-77, ch 54 (4th ed 1973). The rule is premised on the fact that people often resort to particularities in their communications when in fact they are only attempting to communicate a general principle. In such cases, it would be wholly unreasonable not to apply the unstated principle to a thing which comes within the principle but which does not come within the narrow confines of the illustrative particularity. Willamette Univ. v. Tax Com., 245 Or 342, 344, 422 P2d 260 (1966); Corbett Inves’t Co. v. State Tax Com., 181 Or 244, 250, 181 P2d 130 (1947).
In determining whether the exclusion of products liability cases from the purview of the statute in question would bring about an unreasonable re-[707]*707suit, it is necessary to determine whether the reasons behind the application of the statute to negligence cases are equally applicable to products liability cases. If the policies behind the statute are equally applicable to both, and there are no relevant distinguishing features of consequence, it would be unreasonable to apply the statute to negligence cases but not to products liability cases.
The rationales behind the enactment of statutes of repose have already been identified. Clearly, the rationale concerning the prevention of the burden of protracted and unknown potential liability is applicable to both theories of recovery alike, and assertion of this rationale is indicative of the application of the statutes of ultimate repose in either case.
The application of the rationale concerning the reliability and availability of evidence to products liability cases is more difficult to determine. In the trial of a products liability case the plaintiff must show a defect in the product which caused injury to his person or property. In this part of his case he does not have to go back in time farther than that of the injury, which must be within two years in the usual case, or, if the injury causes death, three years.
However, in addition he must also prove the defect was in existence at the time the product was sold. This is the part of a products case which usually generates the greatest dispute, and this would be so to a progressively greater extent as the time the product was put into the stream of commerce became more remote. The usual method of proof involves a showing by plaintiff that no change relevant to the condition which caused the injury has taken place during the life of the article. This is ordinarily shown by [708]*708proof that no intentional change was made by the purchaser and that the product has not been subject to a degree of misuse during its life which would have brought about an inadvertent change. The usefulness of this kind of evidence becomes more precarious as the life of the article prior to the infliction of the injury increases.
The defense against the claim usually involves an attempt to disprove plaintiff’s allegations that the article was defective at the time it was put into the stream of commerce. This requires the testimony of people who were familiar with the condition of the article at the time it was sold. As in the present case of a plywood sander, the product is often installed in the purchaser’s plant by the manufacturer and, if so, the testimony of the workman who installed it would be pertinent. Also, in an effort to show that the likelihood of such a defect occurring prior to sale was minimal, the seller usually calls the manufacturer’s supervisory employees who, at the time of the manufacture of the article, were intimately concerned and therefore familiar with production methods and quality controls. A defense also involves an attempt by the defendant to determine the kind of use and treatment the article has received since it was put into the stream of commerce. Insofar as a dispute revolves around the condition of the article at the time it was put into the stream of commerce, the reliability and availability of the evidence is as much a problem as if the case were one based upon negligence in manufacture or sale.
In fact, there is seldom much difference between the way negligence cases and products liability cases are tried. Plaintiff usually pleads one [709]*709count in negligence and one count in products liability, as was done here. As has been demonstrated, the difference in the two cases is that in a negligence ease the reasonableness of the defendant’s actions is in question while in a products liability case it is the condition of the article at the time of the sale which is in question. Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 269 Or 485, 525 P2d 1033 (1974); Roach v. Kononen/Ford Motor Co., 269 Or 457, 525 P2d 125 (1974). Evidence which is relevant to one usually is relevant to the other. Roach, supra at 466. The two issues are both related to approximately the same period of time — that is, the time of manufacture and sale. It is our conclusion that there is no substantial difference between the evidence that is used to prove the two types of cases insofar as the applicability of a statute relating to the reliability and availability of evidence is concerned.
There being no difference of substantial consequence in the application to each kind of case of the rationales behind the enactment of a statute of ultimate repose, such as OES 12.115 (1), the exclusion from the purview of the statute of products liability cases would be at variance with the policy of the legislation and, therefore, would bring about an unreasonable result. In such an instance, the literal interpretation of the statute gives way and the court must look beyond the words of the act and construe the statute in accordance with the policy prompting the legislation. It is our conclusion that the statute covers products liability cases as well as those of negligence.
The dissent does not attack the premise that in nearly all instances the evidence (as distinguished from the issue to be proved) is the same in products liability cases as it is in negligence cases. Any statute [710]*710limiting the time within which an action can he brought is primarily concerned with the availability and reliability of evidence after the lapse of time. Thus, the dissent would put this court in the position of saying the legislature intended different statutes to apply in situations where the problems of availability and reliability of the evidence are the same. It would also place this court in the position of holding that if a person negligently sells a defective article he has the benefit of a ten-year statute of ultimate repose, but if liability is attached without fault for the sale of a defective article, liability can conceivably go on forever. Negligent sellers are eventually relieved of liability while faultless sellers are not given such consideration.
The dissent places the court in this position by demonstrating that at the time of the passage of the statute in question, the legislature necessarily was aware of other forms of strict liability, such as the concept of ultrahazardousness as well as conditions constituting nuisances, such as “fume” and “chemical spray” situations. It infers therefrom that, having had knowledge of such concepts, the legislature would have specifically included strict liability causes of action within the purview of ORS 12.115 (1), had this been its intention.
The fallacy of this reasoning is in assuming that problems concerning the availability and credibility of evidence are the same in all types of strict liability. The dissent’s assumption is valid only if such problems in ultrahazardousness cases are the same as they are in products liability cases. One can draw all the similarities or dissimilarities one desires from the various theories of recovery, but the thing of im[711]*711portance is the similarity or dissimilarity of the evidence it takes to prove the respective theories. The fact remains that the evidence in products liability cases and negligence cases is identical, so the problems of the availability and credibility of evidence have to be the same. The contrary is true in the average nltrahazardonsness case. Proof of the issues in such a case is not so likely to be obscured by the passage of time. The principal issues are the extent of the damage, which necessarily is of recent vintage, and whether the activity which caused the damage is of the kind that is abnormally dangerous. The inherently dangerous propensities of liquid natural gas, dynamite, aluminum fumes, or of other substances and activities are matters that usually are readily capable of proof without regard to the passage of time. As an example, see McLane v. Northwest Natural Gas, 255 Or 324, 467 P2d 635 (1970). In many fumes cases the passage of time makes proof more readily available instead of to the contrary.
The above illustrates that the fact that the doctrine of ultrahazardousness was known to the legislature when it enacted OES 12.115 (1) and the fact that both ultrahazardousness and products liability are forms of strict liability are both irrelevant to whether the legislature would have intended products liability cases to come within the purview of the statute had such form of liability been in existence at that time.
The dissent further argues that the legislature could foretell the coming of the products liability concept subsequently arrived at in Heaton v. Ford Motor Company, supra, by statements in Wights v. Staff Jennings, 241 Or 301, 405 P2d 624 (1965), as well as by authority in other states and Section 402A of Re[712]*712statement (Second) of Torts. If someone had made a complete analysis of that particular part of tort law for the legislature, by hindsight we might say he could have made an educated guess; but we do not find the slightest indication in the legislative history that such was the fact or that the concept of products liability was discussed.
The dissent also contends that the complaint states a cause of action for ultrahazardousness and, therefore, the statute of ultimate repose does not apply even if it is applicable to products liability cases. This will come as a great surprise to both litigants. Plaintiff asserts an action under the rule of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. “Ultrahazardousness” as a theory of recovery is never mentioned by anyone. We do not assume to construe plaintiff’s complaint in a manner which he did not intend and for which he makes no contention.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
ORS 30.020. “(1) When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, the personal representative of the decedent, for the benefit of the decedent’s surviving [698]*698spouse, surviving children, surviving parents and other individuals, if any, who under the law of intestate succession of the state of the decedent’s domicile would be entitled to inherit the personal property of the decedent, may maintain an action against the wrongdoer, if the decedent might have maintained an action, had he lived, against the wrongdoer for an injury done by the same act or omission. The action shall be commenced within three years after the occurrence of the injury causing the death of the decedent.