Johnson v. San Carlos Inn

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: November 14, 2019
• Docket: 3:19-cv-00061
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 SCOTT JOHNSON, Case No. 19-cv-00061-SK

8 Plaintiff, ORDER REQUIRING FURTHER 9 v. BRIEFING AND CONTINUNG HEARING 10 SAN CARLOS INN, 11 Defendant. Regarding Docket No. 22

12 13 Defendant San Carlos Inn, L.P. (“Defendant”) moves for judgment on the pleadings on the 14 grounds that (1) Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief is moot because all alleged barriers have 15 either been remedied or do not exist, and (2) Plaintiff lacks standing. Plaintiff makes several 16 procedural arguments in response to Defendant’s motion and fails to address these factual issues 17 in any way. 18 First, Plaintiff argues that this motion was filed in violation of the stay on all proceedings 19 pursuant to General Order 56. General Order 56 states in relevant part: “All other discovery and 20 proceedings are STAYED unless the assigned judge orders otherwise.” Several judges in this 21 District have rejected similar arguments regarding the scope of General Order 56, finding that 22 “General Order 56 does not stay all proceedings in an ADA case, but instead stays only discovery 23 and similar proceedings” in ADA access cases. Johnson v. Winchester Campbell Properties, LLC, 24 2018 WL 6619940, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2018) (citing cases); see also Moralez v. Whole 25 Foods Market, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 2d 987, 993 n. 2 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that General Order 26 56’s stay “plainly refers to discovery issues, and does not bar a defendant from moving to dismiss 27 on res judicata grounds”); Che v. San Jose/Evergreen Cmty. College District Found., et al., No. 1 56, the Court concludes that the language imposing a stay on ‘[a]ll other discovery and 2 proceedings’ does not clearly encompass the filing of an answer or motion in response to a 3 complaint.”). This Court agrees and finds that General Order 56 does not bar Defendant from 4 challenging Plaintiff’s standing or subject matter jurisdiction. Federal courts are under a duty to 5 raise and decide issues of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte at any time it appears subject 6 matter jurisdiction may be lacking. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12; Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 7 1077 (9th Cir. 1983). If the Court determines that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, the Court 8 must dismiss the case. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Alternatively, to the extent the stay under 9 General Order 56 applies to Defendant’s motion, the Court, in its discretion grants relief from the 10 stay to consider this motion. See General Order 56, ¶ 9. 11 Second, Plaintiff argues that the Court may not consider evidence outside of the pleadings 12 without converting the motion to one for summary judgment. However, the Court may look 13 beyond the pleadings and consider extrinsic evidence on a motion for judgment on the pleadings 14 when a party challenges subject-matter jurisdiction. United States v. In re Seizure of One Blue 15 Nissan Skyline Auto., & One Red Nissan Skyline, 683 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1089 (C.D. Cal. 2010); 16 Maya v. Centx Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that in evaluating motion 17 to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that plaintiff lacks constitutional 18 standing to sue, courts may consider evidence outside the pleadings). 19 Finally, Plaintiff argues that the Court should treat Defendant’s motion regarding 20 “statutory standing” under the standard for failure to state a claim. (Dkt. No. 24 at 3.) However, 21 the Ninth Circuit has made clear that while “lack of statutory standing requires dismissal for 22 failure to state a claim, lack of Article III standing requires dismissal for lack of subject matter 23 jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).” Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 24 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2011) (emphasis in original). Here, Defendant is challenging Plaintiff’s 25 constitutional standing under Article III and Plaintiff has an obligation to demonstrate that he does 26 have standing. 27 Because injunctive relief is the only available remedy under Title III, a plaintiff claiming 1 injury-in-fact, traceability, redressability – but also a sufficient likelihood that he [or she] will be 2 wronged again in a similar way.” Ervine v. Desert View Reg’l Med. Ctr. Holdings, LLC, 753 F.3d 3 862, 867 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation and citation omitted). A plaintiff can show likelihood 4 of future injury by demonstrating an intent to return to a noncompliant accommodation or that he 5 was deterred from visiting a noncompliant accommodation because he encountered barriers 6 related to his disability there. Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 948-50 (9th 7 Cir. 2011). “In determining whether a plaintiff’s likelihood of return is sufficient to confer 8 standing, courts have examined factors including: (1) the proximity of the business to the 9 plaintiff’s residence, (2) the plaintiff’s past patronage of the business, (3) the definitiveness of the 10 plaintiff’s plans to return, and (4) the plaintiff’s frequency of travel near the defendant.” Crandall 11 v. Starbucks Corp., 249 F. Supp. 3d 1087, 1106 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (citation omitted). 12 Before dismissing this case based on lack of jurisdiction, the Court will provide Plaintiff 13 with an opportunity to address Defendant’s arguments on the merits regarding whether any 14 barriers to access remain and whether Plaintiff has standing. The Court notes that Plaintiff should 15 have some knowledge regarding the status of the barriers based on the joint inspection conducted 16 on July 10, 2019. Plaintiff vaguely argues that he has not had an opportunity to conduct a site 17 inspection “to assess the claimed new changes.” (Dkt. No. 24 at 5.) However, Defendant does not 18 argue that it made changes after the site inspection on July 10, 2019. Nevertheless, if Plaintiff 19 contends the parking lot was not compliant with the ADA on July 10, 2019, Plaintiff may inspect 20 the parking lot again. Additionally, if Plaintiff elects to submit a declaration to demonstrate 21 standing, the Court will permit Defendant to depose Plaintiff for a maximum of two hours on the 22 statements in his declaration. 23 Plaintiff shall submit a supplemental opposition to address the merits of Defendant’s 24 motion by no later than December 12, 2019. The extended period provides time for Plaintiff to 25 inspect the parking lot before submitting his supplemental opposition. If Plaintiff files a 26 declaration to demonstrate his standing, he shall make himself available to be deposed by no later 27 /// 1 than January 6, 2020. Defendants may submit a supplemental reply by no later than January 13, 2 |} 2020. The Court HEREBY CONTINUES the hearing on Defendant’s motion to January 27, 2020. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 Dated: November 14, 2019 .

SALLIE KIM 6 United States Magistrate Judge 7 8 9 10 11 a 12

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