Johnson v. Rushton

CourtDistrict Court, D. South Carolina
DecidedApril 24, 2025
Docket6:24-cv-07370
StatusUnknown

This text of Johnson v. Rushton (Johnson v. Rushton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Johnson v. Rushton, (D.S.C. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA GREENVILLE DIVISION

JOHN CLARENCE JOHNSON, JR., ) Civil Action No. 6:24-cv-7370-BHH-TER ) Plaintiff, ) ) -vs- ) ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ) MEGAN ASHLEY RUSHTON and ) TURNER PADGET LAW FIRM, ) ) Defendants. ) ____________________________________

I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, originally filed this action in the Court of Common Pleas, Greenville County, South Carolina, alleging violations of the Privacy Act of 1974 and 18 U.S.C. § 1028. Defendant Turner Padget Law Firm removed the action to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, asserting federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Presently before the Court is Defendant Turner Padget’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 6). Because he is proceeding pro se, Plaintiff was advised pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), that a failure to respond to Defendant’s motion to dismiss could result in the motion being granted and his claims dismissed. After requesting an extension of time, Plaintiff filed his Response (ECF No. 17). All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), DSC. This report and recommendation is entered for review by the district judge.

1 II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS Plaintiff alleges that on October 28, 2021, during court proceedings, his sensitive information--including his full name, date of birth, Social Security number, and home address— was publicly disclosed in an open courtroom to the jury, all court personnel, and everyone else in

the courtroom at that time. He did not give permission for his information to be disclosed. Since that time, he has been inundated with mail and unsolicited phone calls from financial institutions erroneously stating that he is late with payments and his credit scores have taken a substantial hit. He seeks damages from Defendants Megan Ashley Rushton and Turner Padget in the amount of $250,000 for their significant violation of his privacy. Compl. (ECF No. 1-1). III. STANDARD OF REVIEW Defendants move to dismiss this action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion examines whether Plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. The United States Supreme Court has made clear that, under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state

a claim that is plausible on its face. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint’s factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Expounding on its decision in Twombly, the United States Supreme Court stated in Iqbal: [T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require “detailed factual allegations,” but it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully- harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” 2 To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 556, 557, 570) (citations omitted); see also Bass v. Dupont, 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir.2003). [T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require “detailed factual allegations,” but it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 556, 557, 570) (citations omitted); see also Bass v. Dupont, 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir.2003). “A Rule 12(b)(5) motion is a proper means of raising any procedural defense related to service.” Wilson v. Kenny, 941 F.2d 1208 (4th Cir. 1991). A United States district court can grant a defendant's Rule 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss if the district court deems that there was insufficient service of process. See Hyman v. City of Gastonia, 466 F.3d 284, 286 (4th Cir. 2006). A plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that service of process has been perfected in accordance with the requirements of Rule 4. Scott v. Maryland State Dep't of Labor, 673 Fed. Appx. 299, 303 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing Dickerson v. Napalitano, 604 F.3d 732, 752 (2d Cir. 2010)). “Absent waiver or 3 consent, a failure to obtain proper service on the defendant deprives the court of personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” Koehler v. Dodwell, 152 F.3d 304, 306 (4th Cir. 1998). IV. DISCUSSION The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, governs the collection, maintenance, use, and

dissemination of information about individuals where such information is maintained in systems of records by federal agencies. 5 U.S.C. § 552a; see also, e.g., F.A.A. v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 287 (2012) (“The Privacy Act of 1974, codified in part at 5 U.S.C. § 552a, contains a comprehensive and detailed set of requirements for the management of confidential records held by Executive Branch agencies.”) (emphasis added).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Dickerson Ex Rel. Davison v. Napolitano
604 F.3d 732 (Second Circuit, 2010)
United States v. Luke
628 F.3d 114 (Fourth Circuit, 2010)
Federal Deposit Insurance v. Bender
182 F.3d 1 (D.C. Circuit, 1999)
United States v. Mundy (Antoine Marvin)
941 F.2d 1208 (Fourth Circuit, 1991)
Federal Aviation Administration v. Cooper
132 S. Ct. 1441 (Supreme Court, 2012)
Rahmani v. Resorts International Hotel, Inc.
20 F. Supp. 2d 932 (E.D. Virginia, 1998)
Hyman v. City of Gastonia
466 F.3d 284 (Fourth Circuit, 2006)
Koehler v. Dodwell
152 F.3d 304 (Fourth Circuit, 1998)
Dema v. Tenet Physician Services-Hilton Head, Inc.
678 S.E.2d 430 (Supreme Court of South Carolina, 2009)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Johnson v. Rushton, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johnson-v-rushton-scd-2025.