UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
ROBERT W. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. 5:22-cv-00463-MAD-TWD
COLLEEN McMAHON, Defendant.
ROBERT W. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. 5:22-cv-00464-MAD-TWD
SHAWN RUSIN, Defendant.
ROBERT W. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. 5:22-cv-00465-MAD-TWD
DAVID E. POWELL, Defendant.
ROBERT W. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. 5:22-cv-00466-MAD-TWD
NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, Defendant.
ROBERT W. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. 5:22-cv-00467-MAD-TWD
VERA HOUSE, INC, and MARCUS OF VERA HOUSE, INC., Defendants.
THÉRÈSE WILEY DANCKS, United States Magistrate Judge
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER Plaintiff Robert W. Johnson (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, commenced the five (5) above-captioned actions on April 26, 2022, and, in lieu of paying the Northern District of New York’s filing fee, seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”).1 I. IFP APPLICATIONS Plaintiff declares that he is unable to pay the filing fee for the above-captioned actions.2
The undersigned has reviewed each of Plaintiff’s IFP applications and determines that he financially qualifies to procced IFP. Therefore, Plaintiff’s IFP applications are granted. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Under Section 1915(e), the Court must dismiss a complaint filed IFP if it determines that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, when the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these
grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66,
1 The undersigned notes that by Order to Show Cause filed May 6, 2022, Chief United States District Court Judge Glenn T. Suddaby ordered Plaintiff to show cause why he should not be enjoined from filing any future pleadings or documents of any kind (including motions) in the Northern District of New York pro se without prior permission of the Chief Judge or his or her designee (except pleadings or documents in an action that is open at the time of the issuance of the Court’s anti-filing injunction or “Pre-Filing Order,” until that action is closed). See In Re: Robert W. Johnson, No. 22-pf-00003-GTS (N.D.N.Y.) (filed 05/06/22). Between April 26, 2022, and May 5, 2022, a period of only ten (10) days, Plaintiff filed forty-seven (47) pro se civil rights actions in this District, including the five (5) actions at bar.
2 To that end, in each application to proceed IFP, Plaintiff declares that he is not incarcerated, he is not employed, he has no take home wages, he has not received other income in the past twelve months, he has no money in cash or in checking or savings account, he has no items of value, he has no expenses, and he has no debts or financial obligations. 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, emphasis in original). A claim is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (holding that “a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible”); Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437 (“[A]n action is ‘frivolous’ when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless . . . or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Having carefully reviewed the operative pleadings, the Court finds that they consist of purported “appeals” from decisions and/or orders recently issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (“Southern District”) and District of Connecticut. See Johnson v. McMahon, 5:22-cv-00463-MAD-TWD (N.D.N.Y.) (operative pleading consists
of a two-page motion for default judgment from the Southern District) (filed 04/26/22); Johnson v. Rusin, 5:22-cv-00464-MAD-TWD (N.D.N.Y.) operative pleading consists of a two-page motion for default judgment from the District of Connecticut) (filed 04/26/22); Johnson v. Powell, 5:22-cv-00465-MAD-TWD (N.D.N.Y.) (operative pleading consists of a two-page motion for default judgment from the District of Connecticut) (filed 04/26/22); Johnson v. Vera House, 5:22-cv-00466-MAD-TWD (N.D.N.Y.) (operative pleading consists of a two-page motion for default judgment from the District of Connecticut) (filed 04/26/22); Johnson v. New York State Division of Human Rights, No. 5:22-cv-00467-MAD-TWD (N.D.N.Y.) (operative pleading consists of an “Appeal for Alleged Injunction” from the District of Connecticut) (filed 04/26/22).3 At the time of filing, Plaintiff was advised of the impropriety of filing such actions in this District but insisted on doing so anyway. Plaintiff’s extensive and abusive litigation history in the Southern District of New York and District of Connecticut reveals that he is subject to numerous bar orders/filing injunctions.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Wolf, 1:19-cv-07337-GHW, Bar Order (S.D.N.Y.) (filed 07/13/20); Johnson v. New York Police Dep’t, 1:20-cv-01368-CM, Bar Order (S.D.N.Y.) (filed 08/13/20); Johnson v. Town of Onondaga, 1:19-cv-11128-CM, Bar Order (S.D.N.Y.) (filed 04/01/21); Johnson v. Vera House, Inc., 3:22-CV-00314-SALM, Bar Order (D. Conn) (filed 04/13/22). Plaintiff is also subject to a bar order in the Southern District of Ohio. Johnson v. Coe, Nos. 2:19-CV-02428- EAS, 2:19-CV-02490-EAS, 2:19-CV-02865-EAS, Bar Orders (S.D. Ohio) (filed 08/05/19). He has also been warned by the Second Circuit that the continued filing of frivolous appeals could result in a filing injunction. See Johnson v. Wolfe, 2020 WL 2544909, at *1 (2d Cir. May 7, 2020). Moreover, in Johnson v. Vera House, 3:22-CV-00314-SALM, it was ordered: “If Mr. Johnson files any action in any District Court within the Second Circuit in the future, he must
attach a copy of this Order to his Complaint. The District Courts of the Second Circuit are the District of Connecticut; the District of Vermont; and the Eastern, Northern, Southern, and
3 The Court notes that a review of the District of Connecticut’s CM/ECF System confirms this fact. See 3:22-CV-00146-SALM (D. Conn.) (filed 01/25/22; dismissed 02/17/22; notice of possible anti-filing injunction 02/17/22); 3:22-CV-00256-SALM (D. Conn.) filed 02/14/22; dismissed 02/17/22; notice of possible anti-filing injunction 02/17/22); 3:22-CV-00233-SALM (D. Conn.) (filed 02/05/22; dismissed 02/17/22; notice of possible anti-filing injunction 02/17/22); 3:22-CV-00314-SALM (D. Conn.) (filed 02/28/22; dismissed 03/18/22; Order enjoining Plaintiff from filing future civil actions in the District of Connecticut without leave of court 03/18/22). In each of the foregoing actions filed in the District of Connecticut, United States District Judge Sarah A. L. Merriam found that dismissal was required because the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the matter, Plaintiff’s IFP complaints failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and/or failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Western Districts of New York.” Johnson v. Vera House, Inc., 3:22-CV-00314-SALM, 2022 WL 829337, at *5 (D. Conn. Mar. 18, 2022) (emphasis in original). Plaintiff has also failed to comply with that Order. In sum, Plaintiff’s attempt to circumvent the bar orders issued by the Southern District of
New York and District of Connecticut, and the warning issued by the Second Circuit, by commencing the five (5) above-captioned “appeals” in this District is wholly improper and frivolous. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Moreover, in Case 5:22-cv-00463-MAD-TWD, Plaintiff names the Honorable Colleen McMahon, Chief United States District Judge of the Southern District of New York, as a defendant because she “abused her immunities” and denied Plaintiff relief.4 However, claims against judges are barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991); see, e.g., Parsons v. United States, 20-CV-7231 (LLS), 2020 WL 5634260, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2020) (dismissing claims against Chief Judge McMahon under the doctrine of judicial immunity and as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (iii)) (citing Mills
v. Fischer, 645 F.3d 176, 177 (2d Cir. 2011) (“Any claim dismissed on the ground of absolute judicial immunity is ‘frivolous’ for purposes of [the IFP statute].”)); Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 760 (2d Cir. 1999) (“A complaint will be dismissed as ‘frivolous’ when ‘it is clear that the
4 A review of the Southern District’s CM/ECF System confirms Chief Judge McMahon dismissed several of Plaintiff’s actions as frivolous. See, e.g., 1:19-cv-02902-CM (S.D.N.Y.) (filed 03/29/19; dismissed 05/22/19); 1:19-cv-07111-CM (S.D.N.Y.) (filed 07/30/19; dismissed 11/25/19); 1:19-cv-08249-CM (S.D.N.Y.) (filed 09/03/19; dismissed 01/31/20); 1:19-cv-08508- CM (S.D.N.Y.) (filed 09/10/19; dismissed 11/15/19); 1:19-cv-08662-CM (S.D.N.Y.) (filed 09/18/19; dismissed 11/12/19); 1:19-cv-08832-CM (S.D.N.Y.) (filed 09/20/19; dismissed 12/03/19); 1:19-cv-09336-CM (S.D.N.Y.) (filed 10/07/19; dismissed 11/26/19); 1:19-cv-11127- CM (S.D.N.Y.) (filed 12/02/19; dismissed 01/24/20); 1:19-cv-11128-CM (S.D.N.Y.) (filed 12/02/19; dismissed 01/27/20); 1:19-cv-11202-CM (S.D.N.Y.) (filed 12/05/19; dismissed 02/05/20); 1:19-cv-11831-CM (S.D.N.Y.) (filed 12/20/19; dismissed 02/14/20); 1:20-cv-01368- CM (S.D.N.Y.) (filed 02/14/20; dismissed 08/13/20). defendants are immune from suit.’” (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. at 327)), appeal dismissed (Dec. 1, 2020). Based upon the foregoing, the Court recommends that Plaintiff’s complaints be dismissed upon initial review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).
Typically, a court should not dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint without granting leave to amend “when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1991). Inasmuch as the problem with Plaintiff’s complaints are substantive and cannot be cured by a better pleading, the Court recommends dismissal without leave to amend. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000). ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motions to proceed in forma pauperis are granted for purposes of initial review only; and it is further RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s complaints in the five (5) above-captioned actions be
DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii), and it is further ORDERED that the Clerk provide Plaintiff with a copy of this Order and Report- Recommendation, along with copies of the unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance with Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report.5 Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the
5 If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order and Report-Recommendation by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the Order and Report-Recommendation was mailed to you to serve Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (Supp. 2013); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, 6(a).
Dated: May 10, 2022 ¢ Lo , 4 Syracuse, New York eel Theérése Wiley Dancks United States Magistrate Judge
and file objections. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d). Ifthe last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed. R. Civ. 6(a)(1)(C).
2022 WL 829337 York State, et al., 3:22CV00191(SALM) (Jan. 31, 2022); Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. Johnson v. Kent, et al., 3:22CV00192(SALM) (Jan. 31, United States District Court, D. Connecticut. 2022); Johnson v. Connell, et al., 3:22CV00207(SALM) (Feb. 7, 2022); Johnson v. McMahon, et al., 3:22CV00230(SALM) Robert W. JOHNSON (Feb. 9, 2022); Johnson v. Davidson Automotive Group, v. et al., 3:22CV00231(SALM) (Feb. 9, 2022); Johnson VERA HOUSE, INC. and Marcus of Vera House, Inc. v. New York State Division of Human Rights, et al., 3:22CV00232(SALM) (Feb. 9, 2022); Johnson v. Civ. No. 3:22CV00314(SALM) New York State, et al., 3:22CV00233(SALM) (Feb. 9, | 2022); Johnson v. Powell, et al., 3:22CV00256(SALM) Signed 03/18/2022 (Feb. 14, 2022); Johnson v. New York State Insurance Company, 3:22CV00257(SALM) (Feb. 14, 2022); Johnson Attorneys and Law Firms v. Moschouris, et al., 3:22CV00313(SALM) (Feb. 28, 2022); Johnson v. Vera House, Inc., et al., 3:22CV00314(SALM) Robert W. Johnson, Watertown, NY, Pro Se. (Feb. 28, 2022). The Court has now issued Initial Review Orders in ORDER ENJOINING PLAINTIFF FROM FILING fourteen of these cases. In each instance, the Court has FUTURE CIVIL ACTIONS IN THE DISTRICT OF found that dismissal was required because the Court CONNECTICUT WITHOUT LEAVE OF COURT lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the matter, the Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could SARAH A. L. MERRIAM, UNITED STATES DISTRICT be granted, or the Complaint failed to comply with the JUDGE requirements of Rule 8. See Johnson v. Fenstermaker, et *1 Self-represented plaintiff Robert W. Johnson al., 3:22CV00101(SALM), at Doc. #12 (Feb. 17, 2022); (“plaintiff”), a resident of New York State, has filed Johnson v. Hilton, et al., 3:22CV00110(SALM), at Doc. 28 actions in the District of Connecticut since January #11 (Feb. 17, 2022); Johnson v. Utica National Insurance 19, 2022. In each case, he has moved to proceed in Group, et al., 3:22CV00124(SALM), at Doc. #11 (Feb. forma pauperis. See Johnson v. Fenstermaker, et al., 17, 2022); Johnson v. Chumsky, 3:22CV00145(SALM), 3:22CV00101(SALM) (Jan. 19, 2022); Johnson v. Pathfinder at Doc. #11 (Feb. 17, 2022); Johnson v. Rusin, et al., Bank, et al., 3:22CV00109(SALM) (Jan. 20, 2022); 3:22CV00146(SALM), at Doc. #11 (Feb. 17, 2022); Johnson Johnson v. Hilton, et al., 3:22CV00110(SALM) (Jan. 20, v. Connell, et al., 3:22CV00207(SALM), at Doc. #7 (Feb. 28, 2022); Johnson v. Utica National Insurance Group, et al., 2022); Johnson v. McMahon, et al., 3:22CV00230(SALM), 3:22CV00124(SALM) (Jan. 21, 2022); Johnson v. Sugerman at Doc. #7 (Feb. 17, 2022); Johnson v. Davidson Automotive Law Firm, et al., 3:22CV00126(SALM) (Jan. 21, 2022); Group, et al., 3:22CV00231(SALM), at Doc. #7 (Feb. 17, Johnson v. Kim, et al., 3:22CV00138(SALM) (Jan. 25, 2022); 2022); Johnson v. New York State Division of Human Rights, Johnson v. Brown, et al., 3:22CV00139(SALM) (Jan. 25, et al., 3:22CV00232(SALM), at Doc. #7 (Feb. 17, 2022); 2022); Johnson v. Catalano, 3:22CV00140(SALM) (Jan. 25, Johnson v. New York State, et al., 3:22CV00233(SALM), 2022); Johnson v. Empower Federal Credit Union, et al. at Doc. #7 (Feb. 17, 2022); Johnson v. Powell, et al., 3:22CV00141(SALM) (Jan. 25, 2022); Johnson v. EMPRO 3:22CV00256(SALM), at Doc. #7 (Feb. 17, 2022); Johnson v. Insurance, et al., 3:22CV00142(SALM) (Jan. 25, 2022); New York State Insurance Company, 3:22CV00257(SALM), Johnson v. Comfort Inn Hotel, et al., 3:22CV00143(SALM) at Doc. #7 (Feb. 17, 2022); Johnson v. Moschouris, et al., (Jan. 25, 2022); Johnson v. Watertown Savings Bank, et al., 3:22CV00313(SALM), at Doc. #7 (March 18, 2022); Johnson 3:22CV00144(SALM) (Jan. 25, 2022); Johnson v. Chumsky, v. Vera House, Inc., et al., 3:22CV00314(SALM), at Doc. #7 3:22CV00145(SALM) (Jan. 25, 2022); Johnson v. Rusin, (March 18, 2022). et al., 3:22CV00146(SALM) (Jan. 25, 2022); Johnson v. Carthage Area Hospital Inc., 3:22CV00154(SALM) (Jan. 27, *2 The Court has also dismissed another ten of plaintiff's 2022); Johnson v. Loewenguth, et al., 3:22CV00167(SALM) cases due to plaintiff's failure to file a sufficient motion to (Jan. 28, 2022); Johnson v. Michaels & Smolak, P.C., proceed in forma pauperis, or to pay the filing fee, after without payment of fees and costs was insufficient. See the Court. Johnson v. Pathfinder Bank, et al., 3:22CV00109(SALM), at Doc. #10 (Feb. 28, 2022); Johnson v. Sugerman Law Firm, et al., 3:22CV00126(SALM), at Doc. #9 (Feb. 28, Johnson v. Fenstermaker, et al., 3:22CV00101(SALM), 2022); Johnson v. Kim, et al., 3:22CV00138(SALM), at at Doc. #13 (Feb. 17, 2022); see also Johnson v. Doc. #9 (Feb. 28, 2022); Johnson v. Brown, et al., Hilton, et al., 3:22CV00110(SALM), at Doc. #12 (Feb 17, 3:22CV00139(SALM), at Doc. #9 (Feb. 28, 2022); Johnson 2022); Johnson v. Utica National Insurance Group, et al., v. Catalano, 3:22CV00140(SALM), at Doc. #9 (Feb. 28, 3:22CV00124(SALM), at Doc. #12 (Feb. 17, 2022); Johnson 2022); Johnson v. Empower Federal Credit Union, et al. v. Chumsky, 3:22CV00145(SALM), at Doc. #12 (Feb. 17, 3:22CV00141(SALM), at Doc. #9 (Feb. 28, 2022); Johnson 2022); Johnson v. Rusin, et al., 3:22CV00146(SALM), at v. EMPRO Insurance, et al., 3:22CV00142(SALM), at Doc. Doc. #12 (Feb. 17, 2022); Johnson v. McMahon, et al., #9 (Feb. 28, 2022); Johnson v. Comfort Inn Hotel, et al., 3:22CV00230(SALM), at Doc. #8 (Feb. 17, 2022); Johnson v. 3:22CV00143(SALM), at Doc. #9 (Feb. 28, 2022); Johnson Davidson Automotive Group, et al., 3:22CV00231(SALM), v. Watertown Savings Bank, et al., 3:22CV00144(SALM), at Doc. #8 (Feb. 17, 2022); Johnson v. New York State at Doc. #9 (Feb. 28, 2022); Johnson v. Loewenguth, et al., Division of Human Rights, et al., 3:22CV00232(SALM), at 3:22CV00167(SALM), at Doc. #9 (Feb. 28, 2022).1 Doc. #8 (Feb. 17, 2022); Johnson v. New York State, et al., 3:22CV00233(SALM), at Doc. #8 (Feb. 17, 2022); Johnson 1 In another four of plaintiff's cases, the Court v. Powell, et al., 3:22CV00256(SALM), at Doc. #8 (Feb. 17, 2022). denied, without prejudice to re-filing, plaintiff's motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, As the Court observed in the Notice, plaintiff is a resident of as insufficient. See Johnson v. Carthage Area New York. His claims to date have primarily been brought Hospital Inc., 22CV00154(SALM), at Doc. #7 against other parties in New York, relating to events that (Feb. 17, 2022); Johnson v. Michaels & Smolak, appear to have occurred in New York. There does not appear P.C., 22CV00188(SALM), at Doc. #6 (Feb. 17, to be any arguable connection to the District of Connecticut. 2022); Johnson v. New York State, et al., Plaintiff may be filing in alternative districts -- including, 22CV00191(SALM), at Doc. #6 (Feb. 17, 2022); but not by any means limited to, the District of Connecticut Johnson v. Kent, et al., 22CV00192(SALM), at -- because he has been barred from filing in the Southern Doc. #6 (Feb. 17, 2022). Plaintiff has filed a Notice District of New York. See Johnson v. Town of Onondaga, No. of Appeal in three of these cases. 1:19CV11128(CM), at Doc. #7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2021). On February 17, 2022, the Court issued a Notice to plaintiff in a number of his dismissed cases, cautioning him that he In addition to the Notice issued by this Court in February, could be subject to an injunction prohibiting him from filing plaintiff has been previously warned by a number of courts additional cases in this District without approval of the Court, against filing frivolous matters. See, e.g., Johnson v. Wolfe, based on his history of filing meritless cases. The Court No. 19-3891, 2020 WL 2544909, at *1 (2d Cir. May warned: 7, 2020) (cautioning plaintiff that the continued filing of frivolous appeals could result in a filing injunction); Johnson v. Coe, Nos. 2:19CV02428(EAS), 2:19CV02490(EAS), The Court cautions plaintiff that the 2:19CV02865(EAS), 2019 WL 3543542, at *4 (S.D. Ohio repeated filing of cases that lack Aug. 5, 2019) (order declaring plaintiff a “vexatious litigator” any arguable legal merit, or fail to and imposing a filing injunction). state a legitimate claim for relief under federal law, will result in the *3 After the Court issued its Notice, plaintiff filed a number imposition of sanctions. Specifically, of appeals, as well as two additional civil matters in this Court. the Court will enter an injunction See Johnson v. Moschouris, et al., 3:22CV00313(SALM) prohibiting the filing of further (Feb. 28, 2022); Johnson v. Vera House, Inc., et al., 3:22CV00314(SALM) (Feb. 28, 2022) Each of those two new matters, like the 26 that came before them, fails to state a arguable basis for subject matter jurisdiction. entry of a dismissal order, was dismissed either as a result of defects in the application to proceed in forma pauperis, or “Federal courts have both the inherent power and the at the Initial Review stage, as lacking merit. A review of the constitutional obligation to protect their jurisdiction from national PACER Case Locator reveals that plaintiff has also conduct which impairs their ability to carry out Article III filed at least 100 cases across the country in the past several functions.” In re Martin Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1261 (2d Cir. years, including 15 cases in the District of Vermont in the 1984). “The filing of repetitive and frivolous suits constitutes month of February 2022, and at least eight in the District of the type of abuse for which an injunction forbidding further New Jersey this year. As previously noted, other courts have litigation may be an appropriate sanction.” Shafii v. British been forced to limit plaintiff's access because of his abuse of Airways, PLC, 83 F.3d 566, 571 (2d Cir. 1996). the system. The second factor likewise weighs strongly in favor of a [A] district court, in determining filing injunction. Plaintiff cannot have an “objective good whether or not to restrict a litigant's faith expectation of prevailing[.]” Safir, 792 F.2d at 24. future access to the courts, should In the Initial Review Orders in plaintiff's prior cases, the consider the following factors: (1) Court articulated the defects in plaintiff's complaints and the litigant's history of litigation the requirements for pleading in federal court. For example, and in particular whether it entailed the Court has previously instructed plaintiff that a complaint vexatious, harassing or duplicative must contain sufficient information to put a defendant on lawsuits; (2) the litigant's motive in notice of the claims against him. The Court has informed pursuing the litigation, e.g., does the plaintiff that a complaint must allege concrete harm, and that litigant have an objective good faith this Court will dismiss frivolous suits. The Court has also expectation of prevailing?; (3) whether informed plaintiff that any complaint must comply with the the litigant is represented by counsel; requirements of Rule 8. Despite these prior orders, plaintiff (4) whether the litigant has caused continues to file facially defective pleadings. Accordingly, the needless expense to other parties or Court concludes that plaintiff does not have an objective good has posed an unnecessary burden on faith expectation of prevailing on his claims. the courts and their personnel; and (5) whether other sanctions would be *4 The third factor, whether plaintiff is represented by adequate to protect the courts and counsel, weighs against an injunction, because plaintiff is other parties. Ultimately, the question self-represented. the court must answer is whether a litigant who has a history of vexatious The fourth factor, “whether the litigant has caused needless litigation is likely to continue to abuse expense to other parties or has posed an unnecessary burden the judicial process and harass other on the courts and their personnel[,]” Safir, 792 F.2d at 24, parties. weighs strongly in favor of an injunction. While this Court has addressed all of plaintiff's claims at the initial review stage, such that no defendant has been required to appear and answer Safir v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 19, 24 (2d Cir. 1986). his complaints, the same has not always been true in other courts. See, e.g., Johnson v. Adams No. 19-4061 (2d Cir. Dec. Despite ample notice that the filing of frivolous actions will 6, 2019); Johnson v. Performant Recovery, Inc., et al., No. not be permitted, plaintiff has not been deterred. The Court 4:19CV05789(SBA) (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2019); Johnson v. therefore considers, in light of the Safir factors, whether an Performant Recovery, Inc., et al., No. 20-15022 (9th Cir. Jan injunction barring plaintiff from filing further actions without 7, 2020). Thus, plaintiff has caused “needless expense” to leave of the Court is appropriate. other parties. Safir, 792 F.2d at 24. The first factor weighs strongly in favor of an injunction. Moreover, even here in the District of Connecticut, where defendants have not been required to respond because the failure to pay the required filing fee, plaintiff has undoubtedly PERMANENT INJUNCTION as against plaintiff Robert “posed an unnecessary burden on the courts and their W. Johnson: personnel[.]” Id. Robert W. Johnson is hereby permanently enjoined from Finally, the fifth factor weighs in favor of an injunction bringing any future case as a self-represented plaintiff in the because “other sanctions would be [in]adequate to protect District of Connecticut without leave of the Court. the courts and other parties.” Safir, 792 F.2d at 24. Plaintiff claims to be indigent; although he spends a great deal of To seek leave of the Court to file a new action in this money on postage for his court filings, he claims to have no District, Mr. Johnson shall file a motion of no more than source of financial support and no expenses. Thus, financial three pages captioned “Application Pursuant to Court Order sanctions would be meaningless and unenforceable. Plaintiff Seeking Leave to File.” He shall attach to this motion as has been undeterred by the prior orders of this and other “Exhibit 1” the proposed Complaint he seeks to file. He shall courts. No amount of explanation has affected plaintiff's attach as “Exhibit 2” to the motion a copy of this Order. determination to continue asserting meritless claims. See Johnson v. Adams, No. 19-4061, 2020 WL 2968458, at *1 The Clerk of the Court shall not file any future submission (2d Cir. May 7, 2020) (“Appellant has filed several frivolous from Mr. Johnson of any kind, with the sole exception of a matters in this Court[.] Appellant has previously been warned Notice of Appeal from this Order, without the approval of against filing new frivolous appeals. Accordingly, Appellant the assigned judge. If Mr. Johnson files any submission, the is warned that the continued filing of duplicative, vexatious, Clerk shall provide the submission to the assigned judge to or clearly meritless appeals, motions, or other papers could determine whether it complies with this Order. result in the imposition of both a monetary sanction and a sanction that would require Appellant to obtain permission If Mr. Johnson files any action in any District Court within from this Court prior to filing any further submissions in the Second Circuit in the future, he must attach a copy this Court[.]” (citations omitted)); Johnson v. New York of this Order to his Complaint. The District Courts of the State Ins. Fund, No. 19CV11831(CM), 2020 WL 764036, Second Circuit are the District of Connecticut; the District of at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2020) (noting plaintiff's “pattern Vermont; and the Eastern, Northern, Southern, and Western of vexatious and frivolous litigation[,]” and the prior orders Districts of New York. entered in the Southern District of New York which “directed Plaintiff to show cause why a filing injunction should not Failure to comply with this Order will be sufficient grounds be imposed[ ]”); Johnson v. May, No. 1:19CV01390(JBM) for this Court to deny any motion by Mr. Johnson for leave (TSH), at Doc. #4 at 7 (C.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2019) (“Plaintiff is to file. cautioned that there must be a basis in law and fact for each of his claims as well as a basis to allege those claims against the Nothing in this Order shall be construed as having any effect named defendants. If there is no basis for a claim or a basis to on Mr. Johnson's ability to defend himself in any criminal or allege a claim against any particular defendant, Plaintiff may civil action brought against him. Nothing in this Order shall be be sanctioned.”). The Court therefore finds that no sanctions construed as denying Mr. Johnson access to the courts through short of a filing injunction would be effective. Cf. United the filing of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus or other States v. McLaughlin, No. 3:17CR00129(MPS), 2019 WL extraordinary writ. Nothing in this Order shall be construed 5538112, at *3 (D. Conn. Oct. 25, 2019); Miller v. Stallworth, as denying Mr. Johnson access to the United States Courts of No. 3:19CV00484(CSH), 2019 WL 3080913, at *2 (D. Conn. Appeals. Nothing in this Order shall be construed as affecting Jul. 15, 2019); Tibbetts v. Stempel, No. 3:97CV02561(CFD), any pending action previously brought by Mr. Johnson in any 2005 WL 2146079, at *8 (D. Conn. Aug. 31, 2005), aff'd sub forum. nom., Tibbetts v. Dittes, 167 F. App'x 851 (2d Cir. 2006); In re Martin-Trigona, 592 F. Supp. 1566, 1569-70 (D. Conn. 1984), It is so ordered this 18th day of March, 2022, at New Haven, aff'd, 763 F.2d 140 (2d Cir. 1985). Connecticut. Slip Copy, 2022 WL 829337 End of Document © 2022 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2020 WL 2544909 because it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); see also 28 United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. U.S.C. § 1915(e). Robert W. JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, Appellant has filed several frivolous matters in this Court, v. including his appeals docketed under 2d Cir. 19-1688, Catherine O’Hagan WOLFE, 19-2174, 19-2235, 19-3657, 19-3889, 19-3891, and 19-4062. et al., Defendants-Appellees. Appellant has previously been warned against filing new frivolous appeals. See 2d Cir. 19-4062, doc. 22; 2d Cir. 19-3891 19-3889, doc. 49. Accordingly, Appellant is warned that | the continued filing of duplicative, vexatious, or clearly May 7, 2020 meritless appeals, motions, or other papers could result in the imposition of both a monetary sanction and a sanction that Attorneys and Law Firms would require Appellant to obtain permission from this Court prior to filing any further submissions in this Court (a “leave- Robert W. Johnson, Pro Se to-file” sanction). See In re Martin-Trigona, 9 F.3d 226, 229 S.D.N.Y. – N.Y.C., 19-cv-7337, Woods, J. (2d Cir. 1993); Sassower v. Sansverie, 885 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1989) (per curiam). Present: Pierre N. Leval, Raymond J. Lohier, Jr., Joseph F. Bianco, Circuit Judges. All Citations Opinion *1 Appellant, pro se, moves for leave to proceed in forma Not Reported in Fed. Rptr., 2020 WL 2544909 pauperis. Upon due consideration, it is hereby ORDERED End of Document © 2022 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2020 WL 5634260 of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to United States District Court, S.D. New York. relief. Tyler Joseph PARSONS, Plaintiff, The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint v. must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that The UNITED STATES of America's, Executive is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 Branch; Judge McMahon, the United States U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court of America's Judicial Branch, Defendants. to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the 20-CV-7231 (LLS) alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court | must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Signed 09/18/2020 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the Attorneys and Law Firms elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal Tyler Joseph Parsons, New York, NY, pro se. conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. ORDER OF DISMISSAL LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: BACKGROUND *1 Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brings this action alleging that Defendants violated his “rights to a speedy and fair Plaintiff Tyler Joseph Parsons, using the Court's general trial.” (ECF No. 2 at 2.) By order dated September 11, complaint form, brings this complaint, invoking the Court's 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed without federal question jurisdiction. prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP). He alleges the following: “I, Tyler Parsons, was denied my constitutional rights regarding a fair and speedy trial upon dismissal of my filed case.” (ECF No. 2 at 5.) He does not STANDARD OF REVIEW specify the case that he is referencing. In the Relief section of The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of his complaint, Plaintiff writes: the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. regarding the original filing, I noted § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., that no more than 1 to 2 hundred 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss thousand dollars was owed to me. a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. After these complications I have filed See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). to plea for double this amount. While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris (Id. at 6.) v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman A review of the Court's records reveals that on September v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) 23, 2019, Plaintiff filed a case in this Court against the (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in “United States of America Federal Government (FL, IL, original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at NY),” alleging that his rights to “life, liberty, and the pursuit CV-8828, 2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2019). By order dated October broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge.” Stump 25, 2019, Chief Judge McMahon dismissed Plaintiff's case as v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978). frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Id. at ECF No. 4. Plaintiff's claims against Chief Judge McMahon arise of out of her rulings and actions while presiding over Parsons, *2 It appears therefore that Plaintiff brings this new action ECF 1:19-CV-8828; such rulings and actions were within because he disagrees with Judge McMahon's October 25, the scope of her judicial capacity and jurisdiction. The Court 2019 decision. On November 7, 2019, Plaintiff filed a notice therefore dismisses Plaintiff's claims against Chief Judge of appeal in that case, but because he failed to pay the filing Colleen McMahon and “The United States of America's fee or file an application to proceed IFP on appeal, his appeal Judicial Branch” under the doctrine of judicial immunity and was dismissed. See Parsons v. United States, No. 19-3880 (2d as frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (iii); Mills Cir. Mar. 4, 2020). v. Fischer, 645 F.3d 176, 177 (2d Cir. 2011) (“Any claim dismissed on the ground of absolute judicial immunity is ‘frivolous’ for purposes of [the in forma pauperis statute].”); Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 760 (2d Cir. 1999) (“A DISCUSSION complaint will be dismissed as ‘frivolous’ when ‘it is clear that the defendants are immune from suit.’ ” (quoting Neitzke The Court construes Plaintiff's action as an attempt to v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989))). Plaintiff's claims challenge Judge McMahon's October 25, 2019 dismissal of against “The United States of America's, Executive Branch” his prior action. See Parsons, ECF 1:19-CV-8828. Plaintiff are dismissed as barred by sovereign immunity and as names the Executive Branch of the United States government frivolous. See United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 as a Defendant, but he does not include any allegations against (1980) (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 any members of the Executive Branch. (1941)) (“The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued ..., and the terms of its Plaintiff's claims against Chief Judge Colleen McMahon consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction must be dismissed. Judges are absolutely immune from to entertain the suit.”). suit for damages for any actions taken within the scope of their judicial responsibilities. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. *3 District courts generally grant a pro se plaintiff an 9, 11 (1991). Generally, “acts arising out of, or related to, opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects but leave individual cases before the judge are considered judicial in to amend is not required where it would be futile. See Hill v. nature.” Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2009). Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123–24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. “Even allegations of bad faith or malice cannot overcome Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Because the defects in judicial immunity.” Id. (citations omitted). This is because Plaintiff's complaint cannot be cured with an amendment, the “[w]ithout insulation from liability, judges would be subject Court declines to grant Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint. to harassment and intimidation....” Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1994). In addition, as amended in 1996, § 1983 provides that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, CONCLUSION injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated, or declaratory relief was unavailable.” Plaintiff's complaint, filed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1983. is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (iii). Judicial immunity does not apply when the judge takes action SO ORDERED. “outside” his judicial capacity, or when the judge takes action that, although judicial in nature, is taken “in absence of All Citations jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 9-10; see also Bliven, 579 F.3d at 209-10 (describing actions that are judicial in nature). Slip Copy, 2020 WL 5634260