Johnson v. Milwaukee County

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedMarch 12, 2024
Docket2:23-cv-01475
StatusUnknown

This text of Johnson v. Milwaukee County (Johnson v. Milwaukee County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Johnson v. Milwaukee County, (E.D. Wis. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN ______________________________________________________________________________ RANDOLPH JOHNSON,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 23-cv-1475-pp

MILWAUKEE COUNTY, DENITA R. BALL, WILLIAM DUCKERT and CAPTAIN HUGHES,

Defendants. ______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING FILING FEE (DKT. NO. 2) AND SCREENING COMPLAINT UNDER 28 U.S.C. §1915A ______________________________________________________________________________

Plaintiff Randolph Johnson, who is incarcerated at Milwaukee County Jail and is representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that the defendants violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. This decision resolves the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, dkt. no. 2, and screens his complaint, dkt. no. 1. I. Motion for Leave to Proceed without Prepaying the Filing Fee (Dkt. No. 2)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applies to this case because the plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(h). The PLRA lets the court allow an incarcerated plaintiff to proceed with without prepaying the civil case filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the plaintiff must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). He then must pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prison trust account. Id. On November 9, 2023, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $48.93. Dkt. No. 5. The court received $50 towards that fee

on November 30, 2023. The court will grant the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and will require him to pay the remainder of the filing fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this order. II. Screening the Complaint A. Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, the court must screen complaints brought by incarcerated persons seeking relief from a governmental entity or officer or

employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint if the incarcerated person raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court applies the same standard that it applies when considering whether to dismiss a case

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, “accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d

824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The court construes liberally complaints filed by plaintiffs who are representing themselves and holds such complaints to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). B. The Plaintiff’s Allegations The complaint names as defendants Milwaukee County, Milwaukee County Sheriff Denita R. Ball and Jail Captains William Duckert and Hughes.

Dkt. No. 1 at 1. The complaint alleges that Sheriff Ball and both captains “are responsible for the policies and procedures in effect at” the jail. Id. at 2. It asserts that the “policies and procedures presently in effect at” the jail “offend the eight [sic] and Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. The plaintiff alleges that over the past six months, jail “administration” continued to implement COVID-19 protocols, even though the state and federal regulations expired in May 2023. Id. at 2–3. He says that the jail “is being r[u]n under and [sic] extreme restraining schedule for detainees and their families.”

Id. at 3. The plaintiff alleges that under the schedule, the jail allows detainees out of their cells only from 10:30 a.m. to 1:45 p.m., and then from 3:30 p.m. to 5:45 p.m. Id. He says, “[h]owever, this restraining schedule never happens and most days [detainees] are out 2 or 3 hours” because meals last forty-five minutes and because of “medical services and other extemporaneous staff issues.” Id. The plaintiff alleges that there are “several times when [detainees] are locked in for 27 to 28 hours.” Id. He asserts that this equates to detainees “being punished with solitary confinement without cause.” Id. The plaintiff

attached a handwritten schedule of dayroom time that he says the jail provided to detainees in October 2023. Id. at 6. The plaintiff alleges that “the complaints are endless from detainees and their families.” Id. at 4. He says “the emotional distress and mental anguish is so extreme that often detainees refused to lock-in and the 20 to 27 hours lock- ins have provoke[d] detainees to become mentally deranged.” Id. The plaintiff contends that some detainees “start kicking the cells doors and yelling and

some detainees ask to be taken out under a threat of suicide.” Id. He says that on August 11, 2023, twenty-seven detainees “made national news when they refused to lock-in and barracated themselfs [sic] in the unit library.” Id. He says the detainees “were making a peaceful protest . . . and were asking to be heard by management but that did not happen.” Id. The plaintiff claims that the detainees “got assaulted with gas, Tasers and some got beaten with police batons.” Id. The plaintiff asserts that jail staff “did not learn anything from the last six months of constant turmoil,” even though “the misguided policies and

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Johnson v. Milwaukee County, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johnson-v-milwaukee-county-wied-2024.