1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Robert Johnson, No. CV-19-02827-PHX-JAT
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 City of Mesa, et al.,
13 Defendants. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Joint Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending 16 Appeal. (Doc. 225). Plaintiff Robert Johnson has filed a response objecting to the motion, 17 (Doc. 229), and Defendants have replied. (Doc. 230). The Court now rules. 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 Johnson sues the City of Mesa and Mesa Police Department officers based on events 20 stemming from Johnson’s May 23, 2018 arrest. Defendants filed motions for summary 21 judgment arguing, among other things, that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity 22 on the Fourth Amendment excessive force claims. (Docs. 174, 176, 181). 23 On September 8, 2021, this Court issued an order granting in part and denying in 24 part Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. (Doc. 214). The Court granted summary 25 judgment in favor of Defendants on Johnson’s negligent supervision claim. The Court 26 denied summary judgment on Johnson’s Fourth Amendment excessive force claims against 27 individual Defendants, Johnson’s state law assault and battery claim against individual 28 Defendants and the City, Johnson’s Monell claim against the City, and Johnson’s state law 1 negligent training claim against the City. (Doc. 214 at 36–37). 2 Following the denial of their motions for summary judgment, individual Defendants 3 filed notices of appeals seeking interlocutory review of the Court’s denial of qualified 4 immunity. (Doc. 217, 218, 219). On October 12, 2021, Defendants moved to stay all 5 pretrial proceedings pending the interlocutory appeals. (Doc. 225 at 1). Johnson objects to 6 the stay, arguing that Defendants do not meet the factors to grant a stay. (Doc. 229 at 1). 7 For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion is granted. 8 II. LEGAL STANDARD AND ANALYSIS 9 The Court is divested of its jurisdiction over the aspects of the case subject to proper 10 appeal. Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982). But when a notice 11 of appeal is filed with respect to a nonappealable order, the district court is not divested of 12 jurisdiction. Id. at 388-389. Circuit courts have jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal 13 from a denial of summary judgment to “review a denial of qualified immunity.” Isayeva v. 14 Sacramento Sheriff’s Dep’t, 872 F.3d 938, 945 (9th Cir. 2017). This is because qualified 15 immunity is “immunity from suit, not just a defense to liability.” Knox v. Sw. Airlines, 124 16 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1997). Thus, this Court loses jurisdiction over a good faith appeal 17 of the fourth amendment excessive force claims. 18 Johnson’s Monell and state law claims, however, remain in this Court’s jurisdiction. 19 See, e.g., Leibel v. City of Buckeye, 382 F. Supp. 3d 909, 913 n.1 (D. Ariz. 2019) (“A 20 district court isn’t divested of jurisdiction ‘to address aspects of the case that are not the 21 subject of the appeal.’” (quoting United States v. Pitner, 307 F.3d 1178, 1183 n.5 (9th Cir. 22 2002)). Though the Court retains jurisdiction over the rest of the claims, a stay pending 23 appeal may nevertheless be warranted. “A district court has discretionary power to stay 24 proceedings in its own court.” Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1109 (9th Cir. 25 2005) (citing Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)). 26 Judicial discretion in exercising a stay is guided by the Landis factors.1 The Ninth
27 1 While the parties’ briefs used the factors set out in Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009), the Court has adopted the Landis test, which follows the majority approach taken by courts 28 in this circuit. Kuang v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, No. 18-cv-03698-JST, 2019 WL 1597495, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2019) (collecting cases). These courts have reasoned that the Nken 1 Circuit in Lockyer set out the Landis framework as: (1) “the possible damage which may 2 result from the granting of a stay,” (2) “the hardship or inequity which a party may suffer 3 [if the case is allowed] to go forward,” and (3) “the orderly course of justice measured in 4 terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law which could 5 be expected to result from a stay.” Id. at 1110. Applying the Landis factors, this Court finds 6 a stay is warranted. 7 A. Balancing Hardships 8 Under the first two Landis factors, “the Court must balance the hardships of the 9 parties if the action is stayed or if the litigation proceeds.” Manriquez v. DeVos, No. 17- 10 CV-07210-SK, 2018 WL 5316174, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2018). “‘[I]f there is even a 11 fair possibility that the stay . . . will work damage to someone else,’ the party seeking the 12 stay ‘must make out a clear case of hardship or inequity.’” Id. (alteration in original) 13 (quoting Landis, 299 U.S. at 255). 14 Granting the stay would cause minimal harm to Johnson. While Johnson argues that 15 “[e]very moment of delay in resolving his case on the merits is prejudicial,” (Doc. 229 at 16 2), all his claims will not be resolved regardless of whether the Court stays proceedings or 17 not. Johnson would still need to try the Fourth Amendment claims against the officers later.
18 test “is applicable when there is a request to stay a district court’s judgment or order pending an appeal of the same case,” while Landis applies to the decision to stay 19 proceedings. 23andMe, Inc. v. Ancestry.com DNA, LLC, No. 18-CV-02791-EMC, 2018 WL 5793473, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2018); see also, e.g., Freeman Expositions, Inc. v. 20 Glob. Experience Specialists, Inc., No. SACV1700364CJCJDEX, 2017 WL 6940557, at *1 n.3 (C.D. Cal. June 27, 2017). While Landis concerns the power of the court to control 21 its docket and efficiency, Nken focuses on whether “equity demands that the court preserve the pre-judicial-relief status quo pending the appellate court’s determination of the 22 correctness of that relief.” Kuang, No. 18-cv-03698-JST, 2019 WL 1597495, at *3. In Peck v. Cty. of Orange, 528 F. Supp. 3d 1100 (C.D. Cal. 2021), the court applied Landis and 23 granted a stay of proceedings while police officers who were denied qualified immunity sought interlocutory review. The court applied Landis because the Ninth Circuit’s decision 24 of the interlocutory appeal “will likely bear on questions that must be answered” in other aspects of the case. Id. at 1106. Given the factual similarities between Peck and the case at 25 issue here, this Court also applies Landis.
26 Because the Nken factors substantially overlap the Landis factors, the Court did not require additional briefing from the parties. See Nken, 556 U.S. at 433–34 (The four Nken factors 27 are: “(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) 28 whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.”). 1 Under these circumstances, the Court finds that the stay would cause minimal damage to 2 Johnson. 3 Turning to the second factor, Defendants have made out a clear case of hardship if 4 the case were to proceed. See Landis, 299 U.S.
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1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Robert Johnson, No. CV-19-02827-PHX-JAT
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 City of Mesa, et al.,
13 Defendants. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Joint Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending 16 Appeal. (Doc. 225). Plaintiff Robert Johnson has filed a response objecting to the motion, 17 (Doc. 229), and Defendants have replied. (Doc. 230). The Court now rules. 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 Johnson sues the City of Mesa and Mesa Police Department officers based on events 20 stemming from Johnson’s May 23, 2018 arrest. Defendants filed motions for summary 21 judgment arguing, among other things, that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity 22 on the Fourth Amendment excessive force claims. (Docs. 174, 176, 181). 23 On September 8, 2021, this Court issued an order granting in part and denying in 24 part Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. (Doc. 214). The Court granted summary 25 judgment in favor of Defendants on Johnson’s negligent supervision claim. The Court 26 denied summary judgment on Johnson’s Fourth Amendment excessive force claims against 27 individual Defendants, Johnson’s state law assault and battery claim against individual 28 Defendants and the City, Johnson’s Monell claim against the City, and Johnson’s state law 1 negligent training claim against the City. (Doc. 214 at 36–37). 2 Following the denial of their motions for summary judgment, individual Defendants 3 filed notices of appeals seeking interlocutory review of the Court’s denial of qualified 4 immunity. (Doc. 217, 218, 219). On October 12, 2021, Defendants moved to stay all 5 pretrial proceedings pending the interlocutory appeals. (Doc. 225 at 1). Johnson objects to 6 the stay, arguing that Defendants do not meet the factors to grant a stay. (Doc. 229 at 1). 7 For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion is granted. 8 II. LEGAL STANDARD AND ANALYSIS 9 The Court is divested of its jurisdiction over the aspects of the case subject to proper 10 appeal. Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982). But when a notice 11 of appeal is filed with respect to a nonappealable order, the district court is not divested of 12 jurisdiction. Id. at 388-389. Circuit courts have jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal 13 from a denial of summary judgment to “review a denial of qualified immunity.” Isayeva v. 14 Sacramento Sheriff’s Dep’t, 872 F.3d 938, 945 (9th Cir. 2017). This is because qualified 15 immunity is “immunity from suit, not just a defense to liability.” Knox v. Sw. Airlines, 124 16 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1997). Thus, this Court loses jurisdiction over a good faith appeal 17 of the fourth amendment excessive force claims. 18 Johnson’s Monell and state law claims, however, remain in this Court’s jurisdiction. 19 See, e.g., Leibel v. City of Buckeye, 382 F. Supp. 3d 909, 913 n.1 (D. Ariz. 2019) (“A 20 district court isn’t divested of jurisdiction ‘to address aspects of the case that are not the 21 subject of the appeal.’” (quoting United States v. Pitner, 307 F.3d 1178, 1183 n.5 (9th Cir. 22 2002)). Though the Court retains jurisdiction over the rest of the claims, a stay pending 23 appeal may nevertheless be warranted. “A district court has discretionary power to stay 24 proceedings in its own court.” Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1109 (9th Cir. 25 2005) (citing Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)). 26 Judicial discretion in exercising a stay is guided by the Landis factors.1 The Ninth
27 1 While the parties’ briefs used the factors set out in Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009), the Court has adopted the Landis test, which follows the majority approach taken by courts 28 in this circuit. Kuang v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, No. 18-cv-03698-JST, 2019 WL 1597495, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2019) (collecting cases). These courts have reasoned that the Nken 1 Circuit in Lockyer set out the Landis framework as: (1) “the possible damage which may 2 result from the granting of a stay,” (2) “the hardship or inequity which a party may suffer 3 [if the case is allowed] to go forward,” and (3) “the orderly course of justice measured in 4 terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law which could 5 be expected to result from a stay.” Id. at 1110. Applying the Landis factors, this Court finds 6 a stay is warranted. 7 A. Balancing Hardships 8 Under the first two Landis factors, “the Court must balance the hardships of the 9 parties if the action is stayed or if the litigation proceeds.” Manriquez v. DeVos, No. 17- 10 CV-07210-SK, 2018 WL 5316174, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2018). “‘[I]f there is even a 11 fair possibility that the stay . . . will work damage to someone else,’ the party seeking the 12 stay ‘must make out a clear case of hardship or inequity.’” Id. (alteration in original) 13 (quoting Landis, 299 U.S. at 255). 14 Granting the stay would cause minimal harm to Johnson. While Johnson argues that 15 “[e]very moment of delay in resolving his case on the merits is prejudicial,” (Doc. 229 at 16 2), all his claims will not be resolved regardless of whether the Court stays proceedings or 17 not. Johnson would still need to try the Fourth Amendment claims against the officers later.
18 test “is applicable when there is a request to stay a district court’s judgment or order pending an appeal of the same case,” while Landis applies to the decision to stay 19 proceedings. 23andMe, Inc. v. Ancestry.com DNA, LLC, No. 18-CV-02791-EMC, 2018 WL 5793473, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2018); see also, e.g., Freeman Expositions, Inc. v. 20 Glob. Experience Specialists, Inc., No. SACV1700364CJCJDEX, 2017 WL 6940557, at *1 n.3 (C.D. Cal. June 27, 2017). While Landis concerns the power of the court to control 21 its docket and efficiency, Nken focuses on whether “equity demands that the court preserve the pre-judicial-relief status quo pending the appellate court’s determination of the 22 correctness of that relief.” Kuang, No. 18-cv-03698-JST, 2019 WL 1597495, at *3. In Peck v. Cty. of Orange, 528 F. Supp. 3d 1100 (C.D. Cal. 2021), the court applied Landis and 23 granted a stay of proceedings while police officers who were denied qualified immunity sought interlocutory review. The court applied Landis because the Ninth Circuit’s decision 24 of the interlocutory appeal “will likely bear on questions that must be answered” in other aspects of the case. Id. at 1106. Given the factual similarities between Peck and the case at 25 issue here, this Court also applies Landis.
26 Because the Nken factors substantially overlap the Landis factors, the Court did not require additional briefing from the parties. See Nken, 556 U.S. at 433–34 (The four Nken factors 27 are: “(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) 28 whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.”). 1 Under these circumstances, the Court finds that the stay would cause minimal damage to 2 Johnson. 3 Turning to the second factor, Defendants have made out a clear case of hardship if 4 the case were to proceed. See Landis, 299 U.S. at 255. Defendants argue that allowing the 5 case to proceed will likely cause individual Defendants to “suffer irreparable injury” as it 6 would require Johnson to “first prove that a Mesa police officer committed an underlying 7 constitutional violation.” (Doc. 225 at 5). Thus, allowing the trial to go forward “would rob 8 the doctrine of its essential purpose.” (Id. at 4) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 9 231 (2009)). Johnson claims that going to trial would not be an irreparable injury, 10 especially as the case has been going on for years and discovery has completed. (Doc. 229 11 at 2). 12 The Court finds that a stay will serve the purpose of qualified immunity to avoid 13 trial and the burdens of pretrial matters. Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 308 (1996). If 14 the Court does not stay the Monell claim, the Court and jury would likely need to evaluate 15 the individual officers’ conduct—subverting the purpose of qualified immunity and 16 harming individual Defendants. See Monfils v. Taylor, 165 F.3d 511, 519 (7th Cir. 1998); 17 Peck v. Cty. of Orange, 528 F. Supp. 3d 1100, 1106 (C.D. Cal. 2021). Therefore, the 18 balance of the first two Landis factors supports a stay. 19 B. Orderly Course of Justice 20 The final Landis factor requires the Court to consider “the simplifying or 21 complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law which could be expected to result from 22 a stay.” Lockyer, 398 F.3d at 1110. “[C]onsiderations of judicial economy are highly 23 relevant” to this evaluation. Gustavson v. Mars, Inc., No. 13-CV-04537-LHK, 2014 WL 24 6986421, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2014). 25 Johnson argues that the public interest is in a speedy and inexpensive determination 26 of every action which weighs in favor of denying the stay. (Doc. 229 at 2). Defendants 27 contend that the public interest leans in favor of the stay because the Court may be required 28 to hold two trials which could be more expensive. (Doc. 225 at 6). 1 Here, the Court finds that a stay would “be the most efficient and fairest course □ □ . 2|| [as] there are ‘independent proceedings which bear upon the case.’” Nat’l Union Fire Ins. 3|| Co of Pittsburgh, PA vy. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 11-04897 JW, 2012 WL 219428, at *1 (N.D. 4}| Cal. Jan. 24, 2012) (quoting Levya v. Certified Grocers of Cal., Ltd., 593 F.2d 857, 863 5|| (9th Cir. 1979)). If the Court were to proceed to trial on the Monell and the state law claims, 6 || the Court and jury would likely have to evaluate the individual officers’ conduct, even || though that same conduct is the subject of the interlocutory appeal. Confronted with this 8 || issue in similar cases, courts have found that a stay would simplify the issues on other 9|| pending claims and mitigate the risk of duplicative trials. See, e.g., Peck, 528 F. Supp. 3d at 1107; Hernandez v. City of San Jose, No. 16-CV-03957-LHK, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73803, at *48 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2017); Monfils, 165 F.3d at 519. The Court thus 12 || concludes that the overlap in issues weighs in favor of a stay. 13 Ht. CONCLUSION 14 In sum, a stay is in the interest of “economy of time and effort” for the Court, for 15 || counsel and for litigants. Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). It would also 16 || ensure that the policy behind qualified immunity is preserved. 17 Accordingly, 18 IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Joint Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending || Appeal (Doc. 225) is granted. The case is stayed pending a decision of the Court of 20 || Appeals on the pending appeal. If for any reason the appeal is dismissed, or when the 21 || Court of Appeals issues a decision, Plaintiff must file a notice of readiness for trial within 22 || 7 days. 23 Dated this 14th day of January, 2022. 24 A 25 James A. Teilborg 26 Senior United States District Judge 27 28
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