Johnson v. Mantena LLC

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: March 31, 2020
• Docket: 5:19-cv-06468
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 SAN JOSE DIVISION 7 SCOTT JOHNSON, 8 Case No. 5:19-cv-06468-EJD Plaintiff, 9 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 10 v. MANTENA’S MOTION TO DISMISS

MANTENA LLC, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 10 Defendants.

□ 13 Plaintiff Scott Johnson alleges that Defendants Mantena LLC and Alireza Parhizkari

14 || violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the California Unruh Civil Rights Act. © 3 15 || Defendant Mantena LLC contends that this Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff's action. 4 16 || Having considered the Parties’ briefs,’ the Court GRANTS Defendant Mantena’s motion to

17 || dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 18 I. | BACKGROUND 19 A. Factual Background 20 On October 3, 2019, Plaintiff, a level C-5 quadriplegic, filed a lawsuit against Defendants, 21 who operate a family dental practice on property located at 2324 Montpelier Dr., San Jose, 22 || California. See Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief (“Compl.”) □□ 1-6, Dkt. 1. Plaintiff 23 alleges that he went to the dental practice on four occasions (January 2019, March 2019, and twice 24 || in April 2019) and that during these visit Defendants failed to provide (1) accessible parking, (2) 25 26 |i; 7. Defendant Parhizkari does not join Defendant Mantena’s motion. 27 * Pursuant to N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b), this Court found this motion suitable for consideration without oral argument. See Dkt. 24. 28 Case No.: 5:19-cv-06468-EJD ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT MANTENA’S MOTION TO DISMISS

1 accessible door hardware, and (3) accessible paths of travel leading to and into the Dental Clinic. 2 || Id. §§ 10, 12-17. Plaintiff alleges these barriers continue to exist and that he is deterred from 3 returning to the Dental Clinic because of the barriers. /d. 9§13, 15, 17, 23. Defendant Mantena, 4 || however, contends that after receiving Plaintiff's Complaint, it immediately remedied the alleged 5 || ADA violations. See Declaration of Lakshmigayathri Mudundi (“Mudundi Decl.”) {§ 6—7, Dkt. 6 10-1. 7 B. Procedural History 8 On November 6, 2019, Defendant Mantena filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's action for 9 || lack of jurisdiction. Defendant Mantena LLC’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for Lack 10 || of Jurisdiction (“Mot.”), Dkt. 10. Plaintiff filed his opposition on November 20, 2019. Plaintiff’s 1] Opposition to Defendant Mantena LLC’s Motion to Dismiss (“Opp.”), Dkt. 14. On November 27, 12 || 2019, Defendants filed their reply. Defendant Mantena LLC’s Reply (“Reply”), Dkt. 16. 13 Il. LEGAL STANDARD 14 To contest a plaintiff's showing of subject-matter jurisdiction, a defendant may file a Rule 3 15 12(b)(1) motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). A defendant may either challenge jurisdiction a 16 || “facially” by arguing the complaint “on its face” lacks jurisdiction or “factually” by presenting 3 17 || extrinsic evidence (affidavits, etc.) demonstrating the lack of jurisdiction on the facts of the case. 18 Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004); Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 19 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). 20 “In a facial attack, the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a complaint are 21 insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1039. During a 22 || facial attack, the court examines the complaint as a whole to determine if the plaintiff has “alleged 23 a proper basis of jurisdiction.” Watson v. Chessman, 362 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1194 (S.D. Cal. 24 || 2005). When evaluating a facial attack, the court assumes the complaint’s allegations truth and 25 draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Wolfe, 392 F.3d at 362. The court may not 26 || consider evidence outside the pleadings when deciding a facial attack. See, e.g., MVP Asset 27 || Mgmt. (USA) LLC v. Vestbirk, 2011 WL 1457424, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2011). 28 Case No.: 5:19-cv-06468-EJD ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT MANTENA’S MOTION TO DISMISS

1 In contrast, in resolving a factual attack, the district court may review evidence beyond the 2 || complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. Safe Air, 373 3 F.3d at 1039. No presumptive truthfulness attaches to the plaintiff’s allegations and the existence 4 || of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating the merits of 5 || jurisdictional claims. Gregory Vill. Partners, L.P. vy. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 805 F. Supp. 2d 888, 6 895 (N.D. Cal. 2011). Further, once the defendant presents extrinsic evidence, the plaintiff, must 7 || establish jurisdiction with evidence from other sources. /d.; see also Savage v. Glendale Union 8 || High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003). 9 I. DISCUSSION 10 Defendant Mantena brings both a “facial” and “factual” challenge. Defendant Mantena 11 supplies a declaration to support its claim that Plaintiff’s claims are now moot. See Mot. at 4—7. 12 In the alternative, Defendant Mantena contends that Plaintiff’s Complaint, on its face, does not 13 allege sufficient facts to support jurisdiction. Reply at 5. The Court addresses these arguments in 14 turn. 3 15 A. General Order 56 a 16 Plaintiff first argues that Defendant Mantena’s motion to dismiss is barred by General 3 17 || Order 56, which imposes a stay on “[a|ll other discovery and proceedings.” This Court, and others 18 in this District, however, have routinely rejected this argument. See Johnson v. DTBA, LLC, 2019 19 |} WL 6311408, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2019) (collecting cases). The Court again rejects this 20 argument. 21 B. Mootness 22 Defendant Mantena first brings a factual challenge to the Complaint and argues that 23 || Plaintiff's claims are moot. Mot. at 5-6. Mootness is raised under Rule 12(b)(1). /d. In the ADA 24 || context, since plaintiff can only sue for injunctive relief, “once a defendant has remedied ADA 25 || violations complained of by a Plaintiff, the Plaintiffs claims become moot and he or she loses 26 || standing, meaning the court no longer has subject matter jurisdiction over the ADA claims.” 27 || Johnson v. Cal. Welding Supply, Inc., 2011 WL 5118599, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 20111). 28 Case No.: 5:19-cv-06468-EJD ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT MANTENA’S MOTION TO DISMISS

1 Indeed, federal courts are “without power to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of 2 || litigants in the case before them.” DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974) (quoting North 3 Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971)). The inability to review moot cases derives from 4 || Article III’s requirement that a “case or controversy” exist between the parties. DeFunis, 416 US. 5 || at 316. A case is moot “if subsequent events [make] it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful 6 || behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” United States v. Concentrated Phosphate 7 || Export Ass’n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968). However, a defendant’s voluntary cessation of allegedly 8 || wrongful conduct is unlikely to moot a case. Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013). 9 While Defendant Mantena may be correct that they have remedied the alleged ADA 10 || violations, their declaration is insufficient at this point to show mootness. The declaration states 11 || that all ADA violations have remedied, but it provides no exhibits or other evidence to support 12 || these statements. Rather, all that the Court has to support Defendant Mantena’s statements of 13 || remediation are Defendant Mantena’s own words, which contrast Plaintiff's pleadings that the 14 || violations “currently” exist. Compare Mudundi Decl. (declaring that Defendant Mantena 3 15 immediately took steps to resolve the ADA violations), with Compl. 13, 15, 17 (alleging that a 16 ADA violations “currently” exist at the Dental Clinic); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 3 17 1216 (9th Cir. 2011) (“If there are two alternative explanations, one advanced by defendant and 18 || the other advanced by plaintiff, both of which are plausible, the plaintiff's complaint survives a 19 || motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).”). 20 The Court cannot make the credibility determination Defendant Mantena seeks; doing so, 21 would improperly allow a defendant to defeat jurisdiction by declaration. The defendant could 22 || always defeat jurisdiction by simply declaring that the alleged violations, which form the basis of 23 || the case, are remedied. See Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 998 (9th Cir. 24 || 2018) (“[T]he unscrupulous use of extrinsic documents to resolve competing theories against the 25 complaint risks premature dismissals of plausible claims that may turn out to be valid after 26 || discovery.”). Such a practice is improper. Indeed, a “[j|urisdictional finding of genuinely 27 || disputed facts is inappropriate when the jurisdictional issue and substantive issues are so 28 Case No.: 5:19-cv-06468-EJD ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT MANTENA’S MOTION TO DISMISS

1 intertwined that the question of jurisdiction is dependent on the resolution of factual issues going 2 || to the merits of the action.” Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039 (alteration in original) 3 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 4 Here, the question of whether this Court has jurisdiction and whether Plaintiff's claim is 5 || meritorious are intertwined because the ADA underlies each question. If the Court determines it 6 || lacks jurisdiction because Defendant Mantena has remedied the problem, it by default declares 7 || that Plaintiffs action is no /onger meritorious. The Court cannot make that determination at this 8 || point. See Thornhill Publ’g Co., Inc. v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 9 1979) (“[I]t seems settled that, when a statute provides the basis for both the subject matter 10 || jurisdiction of the federal court and the plaintiffs’ substantive claim for relief, a motion to dismiss 1] for lack of subject matter jurisdiction rather than for failure to state a claim is proper only where 12 || the allegations of the complaint are frivolous.” (citation omitted)). Accordingly, Defendant □ 13 Mantena’s motion to dismiss on mootness grounds is DENIED.*

14 C. Standing 3 15 A disabled person claiming access discrimination must establish Article III standing to Q 16 || maintain a suit under the ADA. Chapman vy. Pier I Imps. (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 946 (9th Cir.

17 |} 2011). The only remedy available to a private litigant under the ADA is an injunction—so, the

18 plaintiff must prove he suffered an injury-in-fact and that there is a threat of future harm. /d. 19 || Indeed, demonstrating “past exposure to illegal conduct” alone is insufficient to demonstrate a 20 || present case or controversy. Instead, “the plaintiff must allege continuing, present adverse effects 21 stemming from the defendant’s actions.” Civil Rights Educ. & Enf’t Ctr. v. Hosp. Props. Tr., 867 22 || F.3d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir. 2017) “CRREC”). There are two ways to demonstrate standing under 23 94 || * The Court notes that Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that once “it is represented to [Plaintiff] that the Dental Clinic and its facilities are accessible,” he “will return to the Dental Clinic to avail 25 || himself of its services.” Compl. §/ 23. Defendant Mantena has made representations that the Clinic is now ADA compliant. Yet, Plaintiff contends he has still not inspected the site to assess 26 || compliance. Opp. at 4-5. The Court has provided Plaintiff leave to amend its complaint. See infra. Within this time, Plaintiff is ordered to perform the joint site inspection and assess whether 27 || Defendants have remedied (1) the accessible parking violation, (2) the accessible door hardware violation, (3) the accessible path of travel violation, and (4) any other non-alleged ADA violations. 28 Case No.: 5:19-cv-06468-EJD ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT MANTENA’S MOTION TO DISMISS

1 the ADA. A plaintiff must show that he has either suffered an “injury-in-fact coupled with an 2 || intent to return,” or alternatively is deterred from returning to the premises. Chapman, 631 F.3d at 3 944. While courts take a broad view of constitutional standing in disability access cases, the 4 || ADA's reach is “not unlimited.” /d. at 946. 5 Defendant Mantena brings a facial challenge to the Complaint and argues that Plaintiff has 6 || not established standing because Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to show that either he has a 7 || definitive plan to return to the Dental Clinic or is deterred from visiting the Dental Clinic. Reply 8 at 5-6.° The Court addresses these arguments in turn. 9 1. Intent to Return 10 “Although encounters with the noncompliant barriers related to one's disability are 1] sufficient to demonstrate an injury-in-fact for standing purposes, a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must additionally demonstrate ‘a sufficient likelihood that he will again be wronged in a _ . 13 similar way.’” Chapman, 631 F.3d at 948 (quoting City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111

14 || (1983)). To determine whether a plaintiff's likelihood of returning to a place of public © 3 15 || accommodation is sufficient to confer standing, courts examine factors such as “(1) the proximity Q 16 || of defendant's business to plaintiff's residence, (2) plaintiff's past patronage of defendant's

17 || business, (3) the definitiveness of plaintiff's plans to return, and (4) the plaintiff's frequency of

18 || travel near defendant.” Johnson v. Overlook at Blue Ravine, LLC, 2012 WL 2993890, at *3 (E.D. 19 || Cal. 2012) (collecting cases); see also Johnson v. DTBA, LLC, 2019 WL 6311408, at *3—*5 (N.D. 20 || Cal. Nov. 25, 2019) (applying factors). 21 22 23 lla. ae. __. This was not an argument Defendant Mantena raised in its Motion to Dismiss. Rather, Plaintiff 24 || argued in opposition that it had pled sufficient facts to supporting standing. Opp. at 7-12. In response, Defendant Mantena argued that Plaintiff had not pled sufficient facts to support 25 standing. Reply at 5. Hence, this argument was not “raised for the first time in a reply brief.” See Graves v. Arpaio, 623 F.3d 1043, 1048 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that arguments raised for the first 26 || time in areply brief are waived). Moreover, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and are thus obliged to consider attacks to jurisdiction just as they are obliged to inquire “sua sponte 27 || whenever a doubt arises as to the existence of federal jurisdiction.” Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. V. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278 (1977). The Court may thus consider this argument. 28 Case No.: 5:19-cv-06468-EJD ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT MANTENA’S MOTION TO DISMISS

] a. Proximity of Place of Public Accommodation 2 This factor considers the proximity of the subject business to the plaintiff's residence/place 3 || of business. In Blue Ravine, the court concluded that while a distance of “approximately fifteen 4 || miles” between the business and plaintiff's home was relatively close, it only weighed slightly in 5 Plaintiff's favor. 2012 WL 2993890, at *8. Plaintiff resides in Carmichael, California. The 6 Dental Clinic is in San Jose, which is more than 130 miles from Plaintiff’s home. Fed. R. Evid. 7 || 201 (stating that court may take judicial notice on its own of things “generally known within the 8 || trial court’s territorial jurisdiction”). “This is over a two-hour drive (in good traffic).” DTBA, 9 || 2019 WL 6311408, at *3. Given the distance and lengthy drive, this factor weighs in Defendant 10 || Mantena’s favor. 11 b. Past Patronage of Public Accommodation 12 Plaintiff alleges that he visited the Dental Clinic on four occasions. Compl. § 10. This 13 || factor thus weighs slightly in Plaintiff's favor. 14 c. Definitiveness of Plans to Return 3 15 Much like in D7BA, Plaintiff has no specific plans to return to the Dental Clinic. He only a 16 || has a general plan to return to the Dental Clinic to avail himself of “its services and to determine 3 17 || compliance with the disability access laws.” Compl. § 23; accord DTBA, 2019 WL 6311408, at 18 *3. This “some-day intention” to return is insufficient—the Complaint lacks ““‘any description of 19 || concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when [he will avail himself to the Clinic].” 20 || Blue Ravine, 2012 WL 2993890, at *3; see also Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 21 (1992) (holding that past visits to project areas did not prove imminent injury); Lyons, 461 U.S. at 22 102 (“Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy 23 || regarding injunctive relief. . . if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.”). 24 In response, Plaintiff argues that under Ninth Circuit precedent, all that a plaintiff must 25 show is “deterrence.” Opp. at 10-12. This Court has already rejected that argument. See DTBA, 26 || 019 WL 6311408, at *3. The Court declines to recite that same analysis here and instead directs 27 || Plaintiffto DTBA. Plaintiff's geographic distance and lack of concrete plans to return to the Clinic 28 Case No.: 5:19-cv-06468-EJD ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT MANTENA’S MOTION TO DISMISS

1 or even the Bay Area, prevent the Court from inferring that he intends to return to the Clinic. Cf 2 Camarillo v. Carrols Corp., 518 F.3d 153, 158 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding it was “reasonable to infer, 3 || based on the past frequency of her visits and the proximity of defendants’ restaurants to her home, 4 || that Camarillo intends to return to these restaurants in the future”). This factor thus favors 5 || Defendant Mantena. 6 d. Frequency of Travel Near Public Accommodation 7 Plaintiff presents no evidence that he has specific ties to the Bay Area or the Clinic. This 8 factor thus favors Defendant Mantena. 9 Accordingly, while Plaintiff has pled that he suffered an injury-in-fact by encountering the 10 || ADA violations, he has not demonstrated that he will imminently suffer that same injury as he has 1] not demonstrated that he intends to return to the Clinic. 12 2. Deterrence 13 “A disabled individual also suffers a cognizable injury if he is deterred from visiting a 14 || noncompliant public accommodation because he has encountered barriers related to his disability 3 15 there.” Chapman, 631 F.3d at 949. Still, under this test, an ADA plaintiff must show an intent to a 16 || return. See id. (“[W]e have Article III jurisdiction to entertain requests for injunctive relief both to 3 17 || halt the deterrent effect of noncompliant accommodation and to prevent imminent 18 ‘discrimination,’ . . . against a disabled individual who plans to visit a noncompliant 19 || accommodation in the future.” (emphasis added)). 20 Plaintiff argues that he has sufficiently alleged that he is deterred from visiting the Dental 21 Clinic. As support, Plaintiff relies on CREEC for the proposition that it is enough to plead only an 22 || intent to return after remediation. Opp. at 12. This is ttue—an ADA plaintiff need not intend to 23 || return to the allegedly ADA-noncompliant place until after remediation. See CREEC, 867 F.3d at 24 1100-01. There must, however, be some plausible intent to return. For instance, in Parr v. L&L 25 || Drive-Inn Restaurant, the court held that the disabled plaintiff established a likelihood of future 26 || injury because the plaintiff pled (1) he patronized other restaurants in the defendant’s restaurant 27 || chain, which served similar food to the restaurant he would have frequented but-for ADA 28 Case No.: 5:19-cv-06468-EJD ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT MANTENA’S MOTION TO DISMISS

1 || violations, and (2) the restaurant he wanted to patronize was close to his residence and was on a 2 || familiar bus line. 96 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1079-80 (D. Haw. 2000); see also Doran y. 7-Eleven, Inc., 3 524 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the plaintiff adequately alleged deterrence 4 || because the plaintiff alleged that the 7-Eleven store, the alleged ADA-noncompliant place, was in 5 an area he frequented at least once a year, was near his favorite fast-food restaurant, and he had 6 || been there “on ten to twenty prior occasions”). Likewise, in Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods 7 || Jnc., the Ninth Circuit found standing based on deterrence where a disabled plaintiff sued a store 8 || located 70 miles from his residence. 293 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 2002). There, the plaintiff 9 || alleged that he had visited the store (the alleged ADA noncompliant place) on several occasions in 10 || the past and would prefer to patronize the store if it were accessible. /d. at 1138-39. The plaintiff 11 also alleged he was likely to return since the grocery store was part of his favorite grocery chain 12 || and the store was located in the town where the plaintiff visited his grandmother every week. Jd. 13 || at 1135. 14 The facts of this case do not present a similar deterrent effect. Plaintiffs formulaic 3 15 || recitation of an intent to return is insufficient as a matter of law. Lujan, 504 US. at 564; see also a 16 || Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 662, 678 (2009) (“[A] complaint [does not] suffice if it tenders 3 17 ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of “further factual enhancement.’ (alteration in original) (citation 18 || omitted). Plaintiff alleges only that he is deterred from visiting the clinic. See Compl. 423. He 19 || fails to allege why he prefers this Dental Clinic to the ample other dental clinics throughout the 20 || Sacramento-area. Additionally, Plaintiff fails to allege that he intends to frequent the Bay Area in 21 || the future. Likewise, Plaintiff provides no indication that he has any sort of concrete plan to visit 22 || the Dental Clinic in the future. His allegations of deterrence are thus strictly theoretical; he has 23 not demonstrated a sufficient likelihood that he will be wronged in a similar way. See Strojni v 24 Wickstrom Hosp., LLC, 2020 WL 1467067, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2020). 25 Finally, and as noted, Plaintiffs reliance on CREEC is misplaced. CREEC did not involve 26 || the issue in this case, i.e. what must a plaintiff allege to support standing. See 867 F.3d at 1096 27 || (“We must decide (1) whether a plaintiff may rely on the ‘deterrent effect doctrine’ to establish 28 Case No.: 5:19-cv-06468-EJD ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT MANTENA’S MOTION TO DISMISS

1 constitutional standing under the ADA where she lacks firsthand knowledge that an establishment 2 || isnotin ADA compliance; and (2) whether a plaintiff has constitutional standing where her only 3 motivation for visiting a facility is to test it for ADA compliance.”); see also Strojnik v. 4 || Bakersfield Convention Hotel I, LLC, 2020 WL 509156, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2020) 5 (“Plaintiffs implicit suggestion that CREEC somehow undid decades of Ninth Circuit and 6 Supreme Court precedents to hold for the first time that conclusory allegations of one’s intent to 7 || return and deterrence from returning to a place to be sufficient to establish imminent future harm 8 || is neither logical nor rooted in the four corners of the case.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to 9 || allege imminent future injury and therefore lacks standing under the ADA. 10 IV. CONCLUSION 1] For the above reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant Mantena’s motion to dismiss for 12 || mootness but GRANTS Defendant Mantena’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing under Rule 13 12(b)(1). The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's related Unruh 14 || Act claim, which is DISMISSED without prejudice. See Johnson v. Torres Enters. LP, 2019 WL 3 15 || 285198, at *4 (N_D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2019) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a a 16 || claim for violation of the Unruh Act premised solely on a violation of the ADA). 3 17 When dismissing a complaint, a court should grant leave to amend “unless it determines 18 || that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 19 || F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court finds amendment would not be futile. Accordingly, 20 || Plaintiff's claims are dismissed with leave to amend. He may file an amended complaint by May 21 28, 2020. Plaintiff is instructed to complete the joint site inspection within this time. See supra 22 || n.3. Plaintiff may not add new claims or parties without leave of the Court or stipulation by the 23 || parties pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. 25 Dated: March 31, 2020 26 aOD. EDWARD J. DAVILA 27 United States District Judge 28 Case No.: 5:19-cv-06468-EJD ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT MANTENA’S MOTION TO DISMISS