Johnson v. Johnson

Utah Supreme Court

Johnson v. Johnson

439 P.2d 843, 21 Utah 2d 23, 1968 Utah LEXIS 576

CourtUtah Supreme Court

DecidedApril 18, 1968

Docket11110

StatusPublished

Cited by6 cases

This text of 439 P.2d 843 (Johnson v. Johnson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Utah Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Johnson v. Johnson, 439 P.2d 843, 21 Utah 2d 23, 1968 Utah LEXIS 576 (Utah 1968).

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Opinions

HENRIOD, Justice:

Appeal from a divorce decree, having to do only with alimony, support money and property division. Affirmed, with no costs awarded.

This was a default divorce. The parties signed a so-called property settlement agreement, having to do principally with division of personal property, monthly payments and the like. The complaint had said the parties had no real property, — which was true. There ensued three more or less informal hearings looking to the equities of such division and payments. The last one revealed that the defendant had acquired an interest in real property from his parents eight days before the default judgment entered by the trial court, who considered the acquisition and awarded plaintiff a one-fourth interest therein on top of the terms of the stipulated property agreement which the court had before it.

Both parties agree that the trial court doesn’t have to pay any attention to written stipulations of the parties inter se. That is the law in this state, without burdening this opinion with citation of authority.

Defendant, however, says that the court abused its discretion by not adhering to the [24]*24provisions of the stipulation without a hearing anew of all the facts.

In recognizing the basic equities of the stipulation, but taking into consideration the acquisition of additional property by defendant before the findings, conclusions and decree of divorce were entered, we fail to see that the court abused its discretion in not having another rehearsal before the curtain went down. The presumption here is that the court studied the stipulation, gave it great weight, and recognized its terms along with the after-acquired property. We see no such capriciousness in its decision as would require another hearing or a second guess because of the acquisition of the interest in realty before decree. Actually, the court had all the facts before it, before it concluded as it did.

CROCKETT, C. J., and CALLISTER and ELLETT, JTJT., concur.

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HENRIOD, Justice:

Appeal from a divorce decree, having to do only with alimony, support money and property division. Affirmed, with no costs awarded.

This was a default divorce. The parties signed a so-called property settlement agreement, having to do principally with division of personal property, monthly payments and the like. The complaint had said the parties had no real property, — which was true. There ensued three more or less informal hearings looking to the equities of such division and payments. The last one revealed that the defendant had acquired an interest in real property from his parents eight days before the default judgment entered by the trial court, who considered the acquisition and awarded plaintiff a one-fourth interest therein on top of the terms of the stipulated property agreement which the court had before it.

Both parties agree that the trial court doesn’t have to pay any attention to written stipulations of the parties inter se. That is the law in this state, without burdening this opinion with citation of authority.

Defendant, however, says that the court abused its discretion by not adhering to the [24]*24provisions of the stipulation without a hearing anew of all the facts.

In recognizing the basic equities of the stipulation, but taking into consideration the acquisition of additional property by defendant before the findings, conclusions and decree of divorce were entered, we fail to see that the court abused its discretion in not having another rehearsal before the curtain went down. The presumption here is that the court studied the stipulation, gave it great weight, and recognized its terms along with the after-acquired property. We see no such capriciousness in its decision as would require another hearing or a second guess because of the acquisition of the interest in realty before decree. Actually, the court had all the facts before it, before it concluded as it did.

CROCKETT, C. J., and CALLISTER and ELLETT, JTJT., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

439 P.2d 843, 21 Utah 2d 23, 1968 Utah LEXIS 576, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johnson-v-johnson-utah-1968.

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