MARING, Justice.
[¶ 1] Madonna Johnson appeals a divorce judgment, challenging the trial court’s denial of child support and spousal support and its division ‘ of the parties’ property. She also argues the trial court erred in modifying an interim order without notice during appearances of counsel. [100]*100We do not address the latter issue because Madonna failed to raise it at trial. In the Interest of B.D., 510 N.W.2d 629, 632 (N.D.1994). As to the other issues, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
[¶ 2] Madonna and Antonyio Johnson married in 1986, while both were serving in the United States Air Force and stationed in England. After their marriage, the Johnsons received a transfer to McGuire Air Force Base in New Jersey and were living there in 1988 when they received a phone call from Michelle Clayton, the wife of Madonna’s son David Clayton. Michelle told them David was in jail in Vermont and she was stranded in Pennsylvania with two small children, the youngest of whom, Jessica, was David’s child. Michelle was unable to find a place to stay and had no money, so Madonna and Antonyio drove to Pennsylvania to get Michelle and the children. Michelle stayed with the Johnsons for approximately one week, and then the Johnsons purchased a bus ticket for Michelle so that she could return to her family in Kentucky. Before she left, Michelle asked the John-sons to take the three-month-old Jessica until she got back on her feet, and the Johnsons agreed. Madonna obtained a temporary order of custody, and the John-sons planned to keep Jessica for 30 days; however, Michelle never returned to claim the child.
[¶ 3] In the ten years that followed, the Johnsons raised Jessica to believe she was their child; she called them her mother and father and they called her their daughter. Antonyio listed Jessica as his dependent on his federal tax returns. The Air Force listed Jessica as Antonyio’s dependent daughter on his transfer orders and for medical benefits, placing her under his social security number. Though Jessica’s birth certificate identified her last name as Clayton, the Johnsons consistently called her Jessica Johnson. Jessica was baptized in Antonyio’s family’s church in Georgia, where both Antonyio and Madonna pledged to love and nurture Jessica, and to continue to take care of her. The John-sons initiated adoption proceedings in both New Jersey and Kentucky, obtaining consents from her natural parents, but each time they were transferred before completion of the adoption.
[¶ 4] During these years, Jessica had only minimal contact with her biological parents and Madonna and Antonyio led Jessica to believe that David was her older brother. At some point, either David or Michelle told Jessica her true parentage. Madonna and Antonyio were upset by this because they felt Jessica was too young to be told. After Jessica learned her true parentage, the Johnsons told Jessica they had adopted her. Neither David nor Michelle ever expressed any interest in taking Jessica back.
[¶ 5] Madonna retired from the military in 1992, after 20 years of service, and began drawing a military pension, part of which is attributable to a disability benefit. At that time, Antonyio was transferred to the Azores, and Madonna and Jessica stayed in Kentucky because they could not accompany him. While Antonyio served abroad, he and Jessica exchanged videos, pictures, letters and cards and Antonyio continued to act as her father, signing his letters to her “Love, Dad.” Following An-tonyio’s return from the Azores in 1993, he was assigned to Eglin Air Force Base in Florida and, at his request, Madonna and Jessica moved there to join him. While in Florida, Madonna took care of Jessica and also attended a local technical college in order to get a degree in education.
[¶ 6] During their tenure in Florida, An-tonyio grew dissatisfied with the marriage. He received transfer orders to go to Korea without the family, and he informed Madonna he wanted her to file for a divorce before he got back. If she did not do so, he said he would initiate divorce proceedings upon his return. Madonna failed to [101]*101file for divorce, and upon Antonyio’s return and subsequent assignment to Grand Forks Air Force Base, he initiated proceedings here in North Dakota.
[¶ 7] During the divorce trial, Madonna ■ claimed she and Antonyio equitably adopted Jessica and sought child support from Antonyio. She also sought spousal support and a division of the parties’ military pensions. The trial court issued a memorandum opinion, which it incorporated fully into the divorce judgment. In that memorandum opinion, it concluded North Dakota does not recognize the doctrine of equitable adoption, such that the concept was a “stranger to North Dakota jurisprudence.” Therefore, the trial court refused to impose a child support obligation upon Antonyio. It also denied Madonna’s request for spousal support, reasoning that both parties were “able bodied.” Finally, the trial court divided the parties’ property based on its weight in pounds and refused to divide the parties’ military pensions.
II.
[¶ 8] Madonna argues the trial court erred in its conclusion North Dakota does not recognize equitable adoption. We agree.
A.
[¶ 9] North Dakota law clearly recognizes the doctrine of equitable adoption. Adoption, unknown to the common law, is entirely a creature of statute. Matter of Adoption of K.A.S., 499 N.W.2d 558, 566 (N.D.1993). Before North Dakota’s admission to the United States, our territorial laws regulated adoption. See 1887 Compiled Laws of the Territory of Dakota §§ 2622 — 2631. Following statehood, our early statutes also contained adoption provisions. See N.D. Rev.Code §§ 2797— 2806 (1895). Our current adoption law, the Revised Uniform Adoption Act, is found in N.D.C.C. Ch. 14-15. The doctrine of equitable adoption developed in this state alongside these laws and is grounded in the equitable principle that equity regards as done that which • ought to have been done. See 7 Samuel Williston, Law of Contracts § 16.21, p. 471 (4th ed.1997); see also N.D.C.C. § 31-11-05(20) (“[t]hat which ought to have been done is to be regarded as done in favor of one to whom and against one from whom performance is due.”). The doctrine holds that:
when an individual who is legally competent to adopt a child enters into a valid and binding contract to do so, and when there is consideration supporting this contract in the' form of part performance falling short of undertaking or completing a statutory adoption, the contract may be enforced in equity to the extent of allowing the child'to occupy the status of a formally adopted child for certain purposes.
George A. Locke, Annotation, Modem Status of Law as tó Equitable Adoption or Adoption by Estoppel, 97 A.L.R.3d 347, § 2[a] at 353 (1980). The doctrine is an equitable remedy to enforce a contract right and, therefore, it is not intended to create the legal relationship of parent and child, with all its attendant consequences, and does not effect a legal adoption. 2 Am.Jur.2d, Adoption § 53 at 930 (1994). The doctrine of equitable adoption, despite its name, bears almost no relationship to a statutory legal adoption. While the name may cause some confusion, we find its use prevalent in treatises and case law. Presented'with this well established name, we conclude it' best to' use “equitable adoption” to describe this equitable remedy.
[¶ 10] Our own law of equitable adoption finds its' roots within the context of a large-scale social experiment, the “placing out” of homeless and indigent children from urban areas in the East to the western United States. Between 1853 and 1929, 150,000 to 200,000 children were relocated by train to the west by charitable and religious societies.1 See Marilyn Irvin [102]*102Holt, The Orphan Trains: Placing Out in America (University of Nebraska Press 1992). See also Donald Dale Jackson, For city waifs, a bittersweet trip, Smithsonian, vol. 17, no. 5, at 95 (1986); Orphan Train Riders: Their Oum Stories, vols. 1-4 (Orphan Train Heritage Society of America, Inc.1992, 1998, 1995, 1997). Relocation of these children was seen as the answer to several social problems of the day. It alleviated growing population pressures due to immigration into eastern cities, while satisfying the call for labor in agricultural areas to the west. Holt, at 27. Further, child welfare reformers felt it afforded children of the street an opportunity to grow up with rural values in more “hopeful surroundings.” Id. Most placements were memorialized only with an oral agreement made at the train platform and few children were ever formally adopted, leaving them in legal limbo. Id. at 141-42.
[¶ 11] Nearly all of our Court’s cases dealing with equitable adoption arise from contracts to adopt entered into in that historical context. Our case law contains three reported cases dealing with the inheritance rights of children placed out in North Dakota by the New York Foundling Hospital, a Catholic organization which began moving children westward in 1870. Holt, at 109. In addition, the companion cases of Borner v. Larson, 70 N.D. 313, 293 N.W. 836 (1940), and Muhlhauser v. Becker, 74 N.D. 103, 20 N.W.2d 353 (1945), involve children who were received under a contract to adopt with a “children’s home,” though that organization and the children’s origin are not identified.
[¶ 12] The first of these cases is Klein v. Klein, in which a young man placed in a North Dakota home sought to inherit from his deceased “mother,” Katherine Klein. 69 N.D. 353, 286 N.W. 898 (1939). The young man, Nick, had never been formally adopted, but claimed he should inherit according to an indenture contract Katherine entered into with the Foundling Hospital in 1922. Id. at 899-900. The contract provided Katherine could return him to the Foundling Hospital until he reached the age of twenty-one, canceling the indenture; however, if she elected to keep him, he was to be considered her own child and would inherit from her estate as would a natural child. Id. Nick was a “hard child to manage” and was “addicted to thievery,” such that he was committed to the State Training School as a juvenile. Id. at 900. During Nick’s period of legal troubles, Katherine’s priest wrote to the Foundling Hospital to communicate Katherine’s wish that it retrieve Nick. Id. The Foundling Hospital wrote back, expressing sorrow that Nick “turned out so unsatisfactorily,” and indicated the next agent in North Dakota would take Nick back. Id. at 901. Our Court stated a contract promising to devise property could be enforced in equity. Id. at 902. However, the Court concluded the contract with the Foundling Hospital was terminated before Nick’s twenty-first birthday, and thus he could not inherit from Katherine’s estate, despite that the Foundling Hospital never sent someone for him. Id. at 901-02.
[¶ 13] The next two cases, Bomer and Muhlhauser, involved siblings who sought to inherit from a deceased as his children, based on his unfulfilled promise to adopt them. In Bomer, the siblings wished to be recognized as the deceased’s 'adopted children so they could nominate an administrator for the estate under § 8657, 1913 Comp. Laws. 293 N.W. at 837. A three justice majority of this Court held the children were not entitled to nominate an administrator under that statute because they had not been adopted according to statutory procedures. Id. at 840. The majority stated, however, its decision in no way determined the children’s interest in the estate; should they come forward with proof of a contract to adopt, their rights [103]*103would be determined according to that agreement. Id. Two dissenting, justices argued the children clearly established the deceased entered into a contract to- adopt them which created the same “rights, obligations and duties that an adoption legally executed would have created.” Id. The minority thus contended the children were entitled to nominate an administrator under the statute. Id. In Muhlhauser, the same parties returned, though .in that case the issue was the authority of the county court to interpret the contract to adopt. 20.N.W.2d at 354. The court recognized that a contract to adopt could be specifically enforced in equity, but concluded the county court, which was not a court of equity, had no jurisdiction to interpret such a contract. Id. at 359. See also Zimmerman v. Kitzan, 65 N.W.2d 462, 466 (N.D.1954) (“Such a contract may be established in a court of equity if there is sufficient evidence.”).
[¶ 14] Our Court next considered equitable adoption in Fish v. Berzel, 101 N.W.2d 548 (N.D.1960). There, we concluded a child placed here under a Foundling Hospital indenture, which was never canceled, could inherit as would a natural child of the deceased, despite that she was never, adopted according to statutory procedures. Id. at 556-57. Further, we honored the contract to adopt, under which the child received one-half of the estate, over the decedent’s wishes expressed in his will, which left the child only one-third. Id. at 551.
[¶ 15] Finally, this Court considered the right of individuals to inherit from a child placed in the home of their natural parents under a contract' with the Foundling Hospital. Geiger v. Estate of Connelly, 271 N.W.2d 570, 571 (N.D.1978). John Con-nelly was received under an indenture into the North Dakota home of John and Annie Geiger; he died without lineal descendants, and the Geigers’ natural children and grandchildren claimed the indenture had the legal effect of a statutory adoption, which would allow them to inherit from his estate. Id. at 572-73. Our Court disagreed. Relying on Fish, we stated the beneficiary of such an indenture could inherit according to the laws of intestate succession because of the indenture’s terms, but that the contract’s terms went no farther. Id. at 573. We concluded a contract or agreement to adopt “does not, in and of itself, create a status of parent and child between the child and the promi-sor.” Id.
[¶ 16] In addition to the case law of this Court, we consider persuasive the case of Ceglowski v. Zachor, 102 F.Supp. 513 (D.N.D.1951). In that case, a childless North Dakota couple, Stephen and Theres-sa Ceglowski, traveled to Germany where they agreed to adopt the child of Stephen’s brother, Andrew. Id. at 514. The Ce-glowskis promised to adopt the child, named Henry, and to bring him up as if he was their own; however, the couple never formally adopted Henry. Id. at 515. Stephen died in 1949, and Theressa died intestate in 1950; Henry sought to inherit from the estate under the 40-year old contract. Id. at 514-15. The district court concluded North Dakota law allowed specific enforcement of a contract to adopt so long as the contract was established by “clear, cogent and convincing” evidence, which left no reasonable doubt as to the agreement and the parties’ intentions. Id. at 517. Finding the contract to be clearly established by evidence of the parties’ conduct, the court concluded the agreement should be specifically enforced. Id.
[¶ 17] We conclude longstanding North Dakota precedent recognizes the doctrine of equitable adoption, in that our Court has repeatedly held a contract to adopt may be specifically enforced in equity. Therefore, we hold the trial court erred in concluding the doctrine is unknown to our law.
B.
[¶ 18] Madonna recognizes our pri- or case law deals with contracts to adopt only in the context of inheritance law. She [104]*104argues, however, that the doctrine should also apply in the domestic context of child support and child custody. We agree.
[¶ 19] We consider instructive several cases of other courts which have considered the issue now before us.2 In Wener v. Wener, the court determined a divorcing husband was obligated to pay child support for a child because he agreed with his wife, who was not the child’s natural mother, to adopt the child and held the child out as his own. 35 A.D.2d 50, 312 N.Y.S.2d 815, 817-18 (N.Y.App.Div.1970). In that case, the husband supported the child during the marriage, claimed the child as his dependent on a federal income tax return, wrote a letter to his wife expressing his love for the child, and sent the child a card which he signed “Love Dad”; however the child was never formally adopted and the parental rights of its natural parents were never terminated. Id. at 817. The court stated that, “[h]aving agreed to adopt the child and support her, and having treated her as his own prior to the parties’ separation, the [husband] may not now disavow all obligation and shift the entire burden onto [his wife].” Id. at 818. See also Lewis v. Lewis, 85 Misc.2d 610, 381 N.Y.S.2d 631 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1976).
[¶ 20] The Nevada Supreme Court has also imposed a child support obligation based on a contract to adopt made be-' tween spouses. In Frye v. Frye, a child’s stepfather agreed with his wife to adopt her child from a previous marriage and treated the child as his own, such that the child perceived him as her own father. 103 Nev. 301, 738 P.2d 505, 505 (1987). The stepfather saw an attorney regarding the adoption, effectuated the termination of the parental rights of the child’s natural father, and signed a petition to adopt indicating he wished to establish a parent-child relationship. Id. The adoption, however, was never finalized, and during divorce proceedings the stepfather denied any obligation toward the child. Id. The court concluded the stepfather intended to, and promised he would, adopt the child, and in furtherance of that promise, left the child without a legal father. Id. at 506. The court concluded the doctrine of equitable adoption allowed a child support obligation to be imposed upon the stepfather, stating that “where there is a promise to adopt, and in reasonable, foreseeable reliance on that promise a child is placed in a position where harm will result if repudiation is permitted, the courts of this state stand ready to provide such remedies as equity requires.” Id.
[¶ 21] Finally, in Geramifar v. Geramifar, the Maryland Court of Appeals recently concluded the doctrine of equitable adoption could be used to compel an adoptive parent to pay child support. 113 Md. App. 495, 688 A.2d 475 (1997). In that case, the parties traveled to Iran to adopt a child, promising each other and the Republic of Iran that they would care for the boy. Id. at 478. Four months after taking the child, the parties separated without ever having initiated adoption proceedings or the termination of the child’s natural parents’ rights. Id. at 476. The court concluded there was a contract between the husband and wife to adopt, care for and support the child and, thus, that the parties effected an equitable adoption. Id. at 478. Following this equitable adoption, the husband had a duty to support the child and the child’s best interests required enforcement of that obligation. Id. at 479.
[¶ 22] The current case presents us with circumstances which are similar or identical to those present in the cases above, and we agree with the reasoning employed by those courts. We conclude our state’s public policy supports application of the [105]*105doctrine of equitable adoption and that nothing in North Dakota law bars such an application.
[¶23] In circumstances involving child welfare in this state, the best interests of the child are paramount, their importance often surpassing the interests of adults involved. Our statutes mandate that we look to the child’s best interests to determine an appropriate outcome in situations involving custody of a child when parents divorce, N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2; the appointment of a guardian ad litem for a child, N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.4; imposition of supervised visitation between a child and an abusive parent, N.D.C.C. § 14-05-22; modification of a child custody arrangement following a divorce judgment, N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6; the custody of an illegitimate child, N.D.C.C. 14-09-05; placement of a juvenile offender outside her home and possibly out-of-state, N.D.C.C. § 27-20-02; placement in treatment services for children with serious emotional disorders, N.D.C.C. § 50-06-06.13; and the disposition of a deprived child, N.D.C.C. § 27-20-30. We also look to the child’s best interests in determining whether and how much child support to award. N.D.C.C. § 14-09-09.7; see also N.D.A.C. Ch. 75-02-04.1.
[¶ 24] In addition, our case law shows a consistent recognition that the best interests of children take precedence in cases involving their well-being. Our Court has stated that while visitation is a privilege of a non-custodial parent, it is a right of the child, and that such visitation is presumed to be in the child’s best interests. Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 2000 ND 1, ¶ 21, 603 N.W.2d 896. We have also stated the “primary purpose of visitation is to promote the best interests of the children, not the wishes or desires of the parent.” Moilan v. Moilan, 1999 ND 103, ¶ 29, 598 N.W.2d 81. We have held a child’s best interests may require scheduled visitation with someone who is not the child’s parent. Love v. DeWall, 1999 ND 139, ¶ 8, 598 N.W.2d 106. We have developed factors to be considered when determining whether a change of residence of a custodial parent is in a child's best interests. Stout v. Stout, 1997 ND 61, ¶ 34, 560 N.W.2d 903. Finally, we have held that a psychological parent may be given custody of a child, and that the child’s best interests must be considered in determining whether to place a child in the custody of such a non-parent third-party. Hamers v. Guttormson, 2000 ND 93, ¶ 5, 610 N.W.2d 758.
[¶ 25] We conclude the public policy of this state, expressed through both our statutes and this Court’s case law, requires protection of the welfare and best interests of children. Applying the doctrine of equitable adoption to-impose a child support obligation, when , the circumstances of the case require it, fully comports with this public policy.
[¶ 26] In addition, we conclude nothing in the law of this state bars application of the doctrine in the context of a child support obligation. First, the existence of statutory adoption procedures does not forbid the proposed application of the doctrine. As we explained above, the doctrine of equitable adoption developed in this state alongside our long existing statutes authorizing formal adoption. Nothing in our current adoption law or in its legislative history suggests our legislature intended its enactment to do away with the well established equitable doctrine. See N.D.C.C. Ch. 14 — 15; Minutes of the House Judiciary Committee on H.B. 1161 (Feb. 3, 1971); Reports of Senate Committee on the Judiciary on H.B. 1161 (March 2, 1971). Rather, our adoption statutes and the doctrine of equitable adoption coexist, operating side by side to promote the best interests of the child.3 As stated by the Texas Supreme Court in Cubley v. Barbee,
[106]*106[ejquity follows the law except in those matters which entitle the party to equitable relief, although the strict rule of law be to the contrary. It is at this point that their paths diverge. As the archer bends his bow that he may send the arrow straight to the mark, so equity bends the letter of the law to accomplish the object of its enactment.... [H]e who has taken possession of a child in the capacity of an adopting parent cannot escape the duties and liabilities incident to that capacity by failing to follow the forms that the statute has prescribed to that end.
123 Tex. 411, 73 S.W.2d 72, 81 (1934) (citing Holloway v. Jones, 246 S.W. 587, 590 (Mo.1922)). Finally, this Court decided Geiger seven years after the 1971 enactment of our present adoption statutes. 271 N.W.2d 570. In that case, we did not hold the doctrine of equitable adoption had been preempted by the Revised Uniform Adoption Act, but instead we reaffirmed the viability of the doctrine. Id.
[¶ 27] Second, we conclude the statutes comprising the Uniform Parentage Act (“UPA”), N.D.C.C. Ch. 14-17, do not apply to the circumstances presented in this case. In P.E. v. W.C., we declared the UPA’s purpose was to provide “substantive legal equality for all children, regardless of the marital status of their parents, and to identify the person against whom the children’s rights may be asserted.” 552 N.W.2d 375, 377 (N.D.1996). In doing so, we relied on the comments of the drafters of the uniform law. See 9B Uniform Laws Annotated, UPA Prefatory Note (1987). An examination of those comments reveals the UPA’s drafters were primarily concerned with the legal system’s disparate treatment of legitimate and illegitimate children. Id. at 287-89. Our own legislative history regarding its enactment in this state indicates proponents of the act contemplated it as a means of identifying a child’s natural father. See Minutes of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S.B. 2245 (Jan. 27, 1975). To that end, the UPA contains provisions establishing a presumption of paternity, N.D.C.C. § 14-17-04; declaring who may bring an action to determine paternity, N.D.C.C. § 14-17-05; imposing a time limit for bringing such an action, N.D.C.C. § 14-17-06; declaring circumstances under which jurisdiction exists in the courts of this state to hear such an action, N.D.C.C. § 14-17-07; establishing requirements for tests used to determine whether a genetic relationship exists, N.D.C.C. § 14-17-10; and identifying types of evidence which may be produced to establish or rule out paternity, N.D.C.C. § 14-17-11. Thus, the history and provisions of the UPA clearly indicate it applies within the context of determining the paternity of an illegitimate child. The case currently before this Court does not arise in that context because Jessica’s parentage is known; she is the natural child of David and Michelle Clayton. Rather, this case concerns events outside the context of a paternity determination, which the provisions of the UPA do not address.
[¶ 28] We acknowledge the UPA contains sections which, at first glance and read alone, would appear to relate to the case at bar. Section 14-17-01, N.D.C.C., defines a “parent and child relationship” as one between a child and her natural or adoptive parents “incident to which the law confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties, and obligations.” Section 14-17-03, N.D.C.C., states such a relationship may be established between a child and an adoptive parent “by proof of adoption under the Revised Uniform Adoption Act.” We determine these provisions do not apply to the circumstances of this case.
[107]*107[¶ 29] There is no evidence in the comments of the UPA’s drafters or in our legislative history indicating these provisions were intended to apply to the circumstances contemplated by the doctrine of equitable adoption. Further, the comments of the UPA’s drafters state the act was intended to be “one interlocking and interdependent piece of legislation,” which would “not lend itself to being enacted in part.” 9B Uniform Laws Annotated, UPA Prefatory Note at 289. Thus, each part of the UPA should be read in context with the others, in order to effectuate its purpose. As we ..explained above, the purpose of the UPA, determining who is to be considered a child’s natural parents, is not implicated in this case because Jessica’s natural parentage is not disputed. The UPA’s policies and purpose simply do not apply in this kind of case; thus, those provisions do not dispose of our doctrine of equitable adoption. Finally, our decision in Geiger is relevant to our determination the UPA does not apply here. We decided Geiger in 1978, three years after our legislature enacted the UPA. 271 N.W.2d 570. We did not conclude the, then recently enacted, UPA did away with our longstanding doctrine of equitable adoption. Further, while we stated a contract to adopt did not, “in and of itself’ establish a parent-child relationship, we did not hold such a- relationship could only- be established by compliance with the terms of the UPA. Id. at 573. Thus, we conclude the UPA does not bar us from applying the doctrine of equitable adoption in the context of a child support óbligation.
[¶ 30] Third, we conclude the circumstances in the case presently before us are not those contemplated by N.D.C.C. § 14-09-09, which governs the liability of a stepparent for support of a stepchild, and therefore, that the statute does not preclude the imposition of a child support obligation in this case. Under that section, a stepparent is not -liable for the support of her spouse’s dependent child “unless the child is received into the stepparent’s family.” If a stepparent receives a child into the family, “the stepparent is liable, to the extent of the stepparent’s ability, to • support [the child] during the marriage and so long thereafter as [the child] remain[s] in the stepparent’s family,” ■
[¶ 31] We have stated'that a “stepparent naturally takes on a family relationship with children of a spouse.” Hedstrom v. Berg, 421 N.W.2d 488, 489 (N.D.1988). We believe a relationship of love, affection, kindness and generosity between stepparent and stepchild is in a stepchild’s best interests. It would be contrary to our state’s public policy to undermine the development of such relationships by encumbering a normal stepparent-stepchild réla-tionship with the threat of child support obligations which go beyond that required by N.D.C.C. § 14-09-09. Stepparents in this state might refrain from taking then-spouses’ children into their homes, for fear that their kindness could result in the accrual of a burdensome obligation. We recognize, given the increased prevalence of blended families in our society, such a result would be detrimental to many children in this state.
[¶ 32] Yet the relationship presented in this case is not the normal stepparent-stepchild relationship envisioned by that statute. In such a normal relationship, the child is aware that the stepparent is just that, the spouse of the child’s natural parent, Though the stepparent may, and hopefully does, extend love to the child through words and deeds, the stepparental context of those actions is understood by all involved. In the case at bar, Antonyio and Madonna led Jessica to believe she was their natural child; both parents and child referred to Antonyio as Jessica’s father or dad. Antonyio also participated in. leading Jessica to believe that her natural father was, in fact, her brother. Finally, even after Jessica learned her trueparent-age, the Johnsons told Jessica they had formally adopted her. Thus, the parties engaged in an elaborate fiction, which is [108]*108not a part of the normal stepparent-stepchild relationship and which is not contemplated by N.D.C.C. § 14-09-09. The normal stepparent-stepchild relationship also does not involve a contract to adopt the stepchild, which is required for application of the doctrine of equitable adoption. Thus, the existence of a contract to adopt and the parties’ construction of fictional relationships removes this case from the arena of normal stepparent-stepchild obligations regulated by N.D.C.C. § 14-09-09. Nothing in this opinion should be construed as imposing new obligations on a normal stepparent-stepchild relationship.
[¶ 33] Finally, we conclude our child support guidelines do not preclude the imposition of a child support obligation on one who has equitably adopted a child. Section 75-02-04.1-01(1), N.D.A.C., defines a child as “any child, by birth or adoption, to whom a parent owes a duty of support.” The regulation does not state that such an obligation may be imposed only in cases where a child has been adopted according to statutory procedures. In addition, we believe our state’s public policy of promoting the well-being of children, which is expressed through the guidelines, supports the imposition of a child support obligation on an equitable parent when the circumstances of the case require it. Finally, Antonyio conceded at oral argument if our state recognized the doctrine of equitable adoption, nothing in the child support guidelines would bar the imposition of such an obligation on an equitable parent.
[¶ 34] Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude the doctrine of equitable adoption may be applied to impose a child support obligation upon an equitable parent when the circumstances of the case so require. North Dakota’s well established policy of protecting the best interests and welfare of children supports such an application and nothing in our state’s present law forbids it, should facts and circumstances supporting it be proven.
C.
[¶ 35] Madonna argues she presented evidence to the trial court which proved she and Antonyio equitably adopted Jessica and which justifies the imposition of a child support obligation upon Antonyio.
[¶ 36] The evidence establishing the contract to adopt must be clear, cogent and convincing evidence. See Ceglowski, 102 F.Supp. at 517. We have stated that in order to create an enforceable contract, there must exist a mutual intent to create a legal obligation. Moen v. Meidinger, 1998 ND 161, ¶ 6, 583 N.W.2d 634. However, “[i]t is the words of the contract and the manifestations of assent which govern, not the secret intentions of the parties.” Id. (citing Amann v. Frederick, 257 N.W.2d 436, 439 (N.D.1977)). Thus, the parties’ mutual assent to a contract is to be determined by their “objective manifestations of contractual assent.” Id.
[¶ 37] The contract to adopt must be supported by consideration. The existence of consideration is a question of law. Matter of Estate of Jorstad, 447 N.W.2d 283, 285 (N.D.1989). Good consideration may consist of a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee. N.D.C.C. § 9-05-01; Maragos v. Norwest Bank Minnesota, N.A., 507 N.W.2d 562, 565 (N.D.1993). Antonyio testified he agreed to adopt Jessica in order to preserve marital harmony. This form of non-economic consideration is similar to that which has been held valid in equitable adoption cases in the inheritance context. See Locke, Annotation, Modem Status of Law as to Equitable Adoption or Adoption by Estoppel, 97 A.L.R.3d 347, § 2[a] at 355 (e.g. love and affection accruing to the adoptive parent from the child, giving by the child of companionship and obedience).
[¶ 38] We adhere to our statement in Geiger, however, that a contract to adopt “does not, in and of itself, create the status of parent and child between the child and the promisor.” 271 N.W.2d at [109]*109573. Application of the doctrine of equitable adoption in the domestic context, unlike its application in inheritance cases, contemplates an ongoing relationship between living parties and, therefore, something more than the agreement to adopt is required.
[¶ 39] The inquiry includes whether there exist indicia of a true parent-child relationship between the child and the alleged equitable parent. See 2 Am.Jur.2d, Adoption § 55 at 933-34 (1994). Some of the facts and circumstances considered by courts include representations by the alleged equitable parents to the child that she was their natural child; representations to the child that she had been adopted; holding the child out to the community as their child; baptizing the child as their daughter in the family’s church; claiming the child as a dependent on income tax returns; having the child use the alleged equitable parent’s last name; referring to the alleged equitable parents as mom and dad; signing cards and letters to the child “Love, Dad”; incomplete efforts to adopt the child and the natural parents’ consent to the adoption of the child. See Locke, Law as to Equitable Adoption, at 358; 2 Am.Jur.2d, Adoption § 55 at 934 (1994). An additional factor tending to establish that a child was equitably adopted is the distant relationship with the natural parents.4 See In re Marriage of Valle, 53 Cal.App.3d 837, 126 Cal.Rptr. 38 (Cal.Ct.App.1975); see also 2 Am. Jur.2d, Adoption § 55 at 934 (1994).
[¶ 40] Antonyio argues even if the doctrine of equitable adoption may be applied to impose a child support obligation, Madonna does not have standing to seek that remedy because she is not Jessica’s natural parent. We disagree. “Standing is a concept utilized to determine if a party is sufficiently affected so as to insure that a justiciable controversy is presented to the court.” Billey v. North Dakota Stockmen’s Association, 1998 ND 120, ¶ 7, 579 N.W.2d 171. Madonna is a party to the contract to adopt and, in her counterclaim below, she requested that the trial court determine. she and Antonyio equitably adopted Jessica, making her their child and imposing parental obligations upon both of them. The substantive circumstances of this case, a divorce in which child support was requested, are identical to the other cases in which husbands have been held to have equitably adopted children for the purposes of imposing child support. See Wener, 35 A.D.2d 50, 312 N.Y.S.2d 815; Frye, 103 Nev. 301, 738 P.2d 505; Geramifar, 113 Md.App. 495; 688 A.2d 475. Further, the circumstances presented by this case are similar to’ those in Geramifar, in that there, the parties never initiated adoption proceedings and neither party was a natural parent of the child. 688 A.2d at 476. We determine there is no requirement that a party to a contract to adopt, who brings a suit to enforce that contract, must be the child’s natural parent, and also that child support is a natural and proper subject in a divorce action. We conclude Madonna’s status as a party to the contract to adopt and as the individual now acting as the child’s mother by equitable adoption makes her “sufficiently affected” so that she presents a justiciable controversy.
D.
[¶"41] North Dakota’s law has recognized the doctrine of equitable adoption for six decades and developed this equitable remedy to protect children. Our case law has consistently upheld this doctrine. The public policy of our state supports application of the doctrine to impose a child support obligation under certain circumstances and nothing in our law forbids it. However, whether the particular facts and circumstances of this case establish that Jessica was equitably adopted and [110]*110warrant application of the doctrine to impose a child support obligation upon Anto-nyio is a factual question which must be resolved by the trial court. 2 Am.Jur.2d, Adoption § 53 at 932 (1994). Thus, we reverse the trial court judgment concluding Antonyio is not Jessica’s equitable parent. We remand for the trial court to make findings of fact and to apply the law set forth in this opinion.
III.
[¶ 42] Madonna argues the trial court’s refusal to divide the parties’ military pensions, using the Bullock formula, was clearly erroneous. From the record before us, we are unable to determine the rationale underlying the trial court’s decision. Therefore, we remand for the trial court to clarify its findings and reasoning.
[¶ 43] Under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24, a trial court must make such equitable distribution of the marital property of divorcing parties, “as may seem just and proper.” The trial court’s determinations regarding property division are treated as findings of fact which this Court will not reverse unless clearly erroneous. N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a); Mellum v. Mellum, 2000 ND 47, ¶ 14, 607 N.W.2d 580. There is no set formula for this division, but rather it should be based on the facts of the case. Mellum, at ¶ 14.
[¶ 44] In dividing property, the trial court is to use the Ruff-Fischer guidelines, considering the following factors:
the respective ages of the parties to the marriage; their earning abilities; the duration of the marriage and the conduct of each during the marriage; their station in life; the circumstances and necessities of each; their health and physical conditions; their financial circumstances as shown by the property owned at the time; its value and income-producing capacity, if any, and whether it was accumulated or acquired before or after the marriage; and such other matters as may be material.
Kautzman v. Kautzman, 1998 ND 192, ¶ 9, 585 N.W.2d 561. The distribution need not be equal to be equitable, but the trial court must explain a substantial disparity in the division. Fox v. Fox, 1999 ND 68, ¶ 7, 592 N.W.2d 541. We do not require the trial court to make specific findings; however it must indicate its rationale in distributing the property. Weigel v. Weigel, 2000 ND 16, ¶ 6, 604 N.W.2d 462. We will remand for clarification of missing or conclusory findings when we are unable to determine the trial court’s rationale through inference and deduction. Mellum, at ¶ 16.
[¶ 45] We have held that federal military retirement pensions are divisible martial property assets. Bullock v. Bullock, 354 N.W.2d 904, 907-08 (N.D.1984). In Bullock, we approved a formula for distributing such pensions: the years of marriage divided by the number of years served in the military multiplied by one-half the retirement pay. Id. at 908-09, 911. However, this Court has also stated the Bullock formula is not the only method of evaluating and distributing retirement pay as part of the estate. Anderson v. Anderson, 504 N.W.2d 569, 571 n. 2 (N.D.1993).
[¶ 46] In this case, the trial court refused to divide the parties’ military pensions. Such a refusal is not, in and of itself, clearly erroneous. However, on the record before us, we are unable to determine the trial court’s rationale for this decision because we lack information on the division of the couple’s other marital assets. The trial court’s memorandum opinion, which it incorporated into the divorce judgment, states that Madonna may retain “the approximately 11,000 pounds of personal property of the approximately 14,000 pounds of personal property and effects possessed by the parties at the time of their separation” and Antonyio may retain the remainder. The memorandum opinion and judgment do not explain what items are included in the 14,000 pounds of [111]*111property distributed between the parties, and never address the value of this property-
[¶ 47] Given the lack of information in the record regarding the parties’ other property, we are unable to determine whether the trial court’s refusal to divide the military pensions resulted in an equitable division of the parties’ marital estate. Therefore, we remand for the trial court to clarify its findings and the reasoning underlying its decision, according to the Ruff-Fischer guidelines.
IV.
[¶ 48] Madonna contends the trial court’s refusal to award or reserve temporary or permanent spousal support was clearly erroneous. We disagree.
[¶ 49] Spousal support determinations are treated as findings of fact which will not be set aside on appeal unless clearly erroneous. Weigel, 2000 ND 16, ¶ 6, 604 N.W.2d 462. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous under N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a) only if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, there is no evidence to support it, or, though some evidence supports it, on the entire record we are left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made. Riehl v. Riehl, 1999 ND 107, ¶ 7, 595 N.W.2d 10. In determining whether spousal support should be awarded, the trial court should apply the Ruff-Fischer guidelines; though a trial court need not make specific findings as to each factor, we must be able to discern a rationale for its determination. Id. at ¶ 8. In order to award spousal support, the trial court must find the requesting spouse is disadvantaged. Id. at ¶ 9. A “disadvantaged” spouse is one who has “foregone opportunities or lost advantages as a consequence of the marriage and who has contributed during the marriage to the supporting spouse’s increased earning capacity.” Id.
[¶ 50] From the record before us, we are unable to determine the trial court’s decision to deny spousal support was clearly erroneous. Madonna served in the military for twenty years and now earns a military pension, along with which she receives some benefits. She was employed during much of the parties’ marriage and is currently working as an administrative assistant at a technical college. While living in Florida, Madonna did not work, but instead pursued and nearly completed a degree in elementary education. She estimates she has approximately one and one-half more years of classes to take in order to finish her degree, and she testified she receives free tuition, for school through her employer. The trial court considered her “able bodied.”
[¶ 51] There is evidence in the record suggesting Madonna is not a disadvantaged spouse and supporting the trial court’s decision to deny spousal support. Thus, that decision is not clearly erroneous, and we affirm. On remand, however, following clarification of the parties’ property division, the trial court may revisit its decision to deny spousal support because the two issues are so closely intertwined. See Emter v. Emter, 1999 ND 102, ¶ 14, 595 N.W.2d 16.
V, '
[1152] We conclude our case law has long recognized the doctrine of equitable adoption and that the doctrine may be applied, when the circumstances of the case require, to impose a child support obligation on an equitable parent and to justify an award of visitation to such a parent.5 Therefore, we reverse the decision of the trial court concluding Antonyio and Madonna did not equitably adopt Jessica, and we remand for the trial court to determine whether the facts of this case warrant [112]*112application of the doctrine of equitable adoption. On remand, the trial court is also to clarify its division of the parties’ marital property, according to the Ruff-Fischer guidelines, and explain its rationale for refusing to divide the parties’ military pensions. Finally, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Madonna’s request for spousal support, but we determine the trial court may revisit the issue on remand in conjunction with its review of the division of the parties’ property.
[¶ 53] GERALD W. VANDE WALLE, C.J., WILLIAM A. NEUMANN, CAROL RONNING KAPSNER, JJ., concur.