Johnson v. Horace Mann Mutual Insurance Company

241 So. 2d 588, 1970 La. App. LEXIS 4672
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedNovember 17, 1970
Docket11526
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 241 So. 2d 588 (Johnson v. Horace Mann Mutual Insurance Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Johnson v. Horace Mann Mutual Insurance Company, 241 So. 2d 588, 1970 La. App. LEXIS 4672 (La. Ct. App. 1970).

Opinion

241 So.2d 588 (1970)

Hazel JOHNSON et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
HORACE MANN MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 11526.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.

November 17, 1970.
Rehearing Denied December 11, 1970.

*589 Maurice R. Franks, New Orleans, for appellants.

Mayer & Smith, by Paul R. Mayer, Shreveport, for appellees.

Before BOLIN, DIXON and HEARD, JJ.

En Banc. Rehearing Denied December 11, 1970.

DIXON, Judge.

Plaintiff has brought an action for damages on behalf of her minor son and herself against the boy's teacher, his principal and the Horace Mann Mutual Insurance Company. She claims the damages to her son resulted from an excessive beating administered with a stick by the physical education teacher, Zolon Stiles. There was a trial by jury, and the verdict was returned in favor of the defendants, rejecting the demands of the plaintiffs, who have appealed.

Most of the facts are clear and most of the evidence is without contradiction. Jimmy Pharr was a student at Sarepta High School where paddling was a frequent form of punishment. On the day in question Coach Stiles had his paddle in his pocket before the beginning of his last period, a physical education class. He struck Jimmy Pharr once because Jimmy would not line up properly for a foot racing event; later in the same class, he administered a whipping to Jimmy as punishment for an improper start in another event.

After the class, Jimmy reported to the principal, who is also a defendant, and complained of the whipping, showing the principal marks on his backside. Jimmy's mother took him to a physician that afternoon, who found that he had multiple bruises of the body. Bruises were identified *590 behind the right ear, the left shoulder, the left buttock and left thigh. There is no evidence that the bruises were caused by any trauma other than the whipping.

Plaintiffs attempted to show that Jimmy suffered serious after-effects from the whipping. The evidence adduced at the trial of the case does not support their claim. The whipping occurred on March 27. Jimmy was hospitalized for three days beginning June 9 in an effort to determine the origin of headaches which Jimmy claims began after the whipping. The medical evidence does not support his claim that the headaches were caused by the whipping. There is evidence that Jimmy had been frequently absent from school, and frequently gave "headaches" as a reason for his absence before the altercation complained of.

The principal of the school, Harold Newsom, was also named a defendant. It was alleged that Newsom knew of the dangerous propensities of Stiles and negligently failed to take any steps to correct them.

The evidence only developed one prior occurrence on which a student had reported to the principal his having been bruised by a whipping from Stiles. The record does not establish that Stiles' actions in this earlier incident were unjustified. We cannot assume that Stiles should have been corrected or criticized by the principal on this previous occasion. The evidence does not establish that the principal knew of the dangerous manner in which the coach administered punishment to the students, nor that he should have anticipated that a student would be injured by an excessive whipping. Therefore, we cannot find Newsom is liable for the injuries inflicted by Stiles.

Although it may be doubtful that Louisiana law permits public school teachers to use corporal punishment, the parties to this litigation did not choose to fight on this battleground. Rather, it is tacitly conceded that the charge of the trial judge to the jury is correct. There was no objection by plaintiffs to the following charge:

"I further charge you that teachers are not prohibited from using corporal punishment; that is, spanking or whipping a child, but rather, that they have discretionary authority with respect thereto and that corporal punishment must be reasonable and confined within the bounds of moderation. Thus, it is seen that under the Law of the State of Louisiana, Mr. Zolon Stiles had the right to physically punish Jimmy Pharr if it constituted reasonable punishment and was confined within the bounds of moderation. Therefore, if you find that Mr. Stiles was reasonable and confined the physical punishment within bounds of moderation, he was not at fault, and you must return a verdict in favor of Mr. Stiles and against Mrs. Johnson and Jimmy Pharr."

No Louisiana statute or judicial decision is cited to us to establish the right of teachers to use corporal punishment. There is an effort by the defendants to draw upon a statute and civil code articles for an inference that teachers have the same right of corporal punishment as parents. R.S. 17:416 is the Louisiana statute concerning the discipline of pupils. It does not in any way attempt to confer upon teachers the right to use corporal punishment. It does not in fact reprobate the conduct of Jimmy Pharr, even as described by Zolon Stiles.[1]

*591 In connection with the statutory authorization of teachers to hold pupils to a strict accountability for disorderly conduct, the defendants refer to Civil Code Article 218 which confirms that the father and mother have a right to correct the child, "provided it be done in a reasonable manner." Reasoning that teachers stand "in loco parentis" by virtue of C.C. 220, defendants conclude that teachers are authorized to use corporal punishment. However, C.C. 220 states only:

"Fathers and mothers may, during their life, delegate a part of their authority to teachers, schoolmasters and others to whom they intrust their children for their education, such as the power of restraint and correction, so far as may be necessary to answer the purposes for which they employ them.
"They have also the right to bind their children as apprentices."

C.C. 220 does not say that fathers and mothers do delegate the power of restraint and correction to teachers, but that fathers and mothers may delegate such power. It might have been said, in days when schooling was a voluntary matter, that there was an implied delegation of such authority from the parent to the school and teacher selected by the parent. Such a voluntary educational system, like the system of apprenticeship also referred to in the article, has long since disappeared. Parents no longer have the power to choose either the public school or the teacher in the public school. Without such power to choose, it can hardly be said that parents intend to delegate the authority to administer corporal punishment by the mere act of sending their child to school.

Those cases in Louisiana which have dealt with the problem of corporal punishment in the schools are: Burrage v. Gill, 15 La.App. 126, 130 So. 857; Houeye v. St. Helena Parish School Board, 223 La. 966, 67 So.2d 553; Frank v. Orleans Parish School Board, La.App., 195 So.2d 451. The matter is the subject of a note in 14 Loyola Law Review 288.

The Burrage case did not arise from the public schools, but from the Louisiana Training Institute, a place of detention for juvenile delinquents and neglected dependents. The plaintiff was awarded $600.00 for what the court referred to as having been "brutally and unmercifully whipped," from which he "sustained no aftereffects." The court, in the Burrage case, reversed a *592 jury verdict which had been rendered in favor of the defendant.

Houeye v. St.

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Bluebook (online)
241 So. 2d 588, 1970 La. App. LEXIS 4672, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johnson-v-horace-mann-mutual-insurance-company-lactapp-1970.