Johnson v. Ends In E. Inc.

District Court, N.D. California·Decided November 29, 2021·No. 5:20-cv-06946·Unknown

Opinion

SCOTT JOHNSON, Case No. 5:20-cv-06946-EJD

Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S v. MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS Defendant. Re: Dkt. No. 15

Plaintiff Scott Johnson seeks attorneys’ fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. Section 12205 and Cal. Civ. Code Section 55. Dkt. No. 15. Defendant Ends In E. Inc. argues that the fees and costs are duplicative, unnecessary, and unreasonable. Dkt. No. 16. The Court found this motion suitable for consideration without oral argument. See N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). Having considered the Parties’ papers, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. On October 6, 2020, Mr. Johnson filed a lawsuit against Ends In E. Inc, a California Corporation. See Dkt. No. 1. Mr. Johnson is a level C-5 quadriplegic who cannot walk and has significant manual dexterity impairments. Compl. ¶ 1, Dkt. No. 1. Mr. Johnson alleged that Ends In E. Inc unlawfully failed to provide handicap patrons with accessible parking, dining surfaces, sales counters, and restrooms. Id. ¶¶ 27–43. On March 23, 2021, Mr. Johnson notified the Court that the Parties had settled the merits of this case. See Dkt. No. 13. Thereafter, on May 6, 2021, Mr. Johnson filed a motion for Case No.: 20-cv-6946-EJD attorneys’ fees and costs. Notice of Motion and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for an Award of Attorneys’ Fees (“Mot.”), Dkt. No. 15. On May 13, 2021, Ends In E. Inc. filed an opposition to the motion. Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Fees and Costs (“Opp.”), Dkt. No. 16. Thereafter, on May 27, 2021, Mr. Johnson filed a reply. Reply in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees (“Reply”), Dkt. No. 18. Both the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Unruh Act permit a “prevailing” plaintiff to recovery attorneys’ fees. 42 U.S.C. § 12205; Cal. Civ. Code § 55. A plaintiff who enters into a legally enforceable settlement agreement is a prevailing party. Barrios v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed'n, 277 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2002). While attorneys’ fees statutes “enable private parties to obtain legal help in seeking redress for injuries resulting from the actual or threatened violation of specific federal laws,” the intent of the statutes is not to “punish or reward attorneys.” Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986); Van Gerwen v. Guarantee Mut. Life Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 1047 (9th Cir. 2000). To calculate recoverable fees, federal and state courts look to the lodestar method. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 440 (1983); Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1132 (2001). The lodestar method is “strong[ly] presum[ed]” to represent a reasonable fee. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council, 478 U.S. at 565. The court arrives at this figure by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433; Ketchum, 24 Cal. 4th at 1132. The fee applicant bears the burden of showing that the requested rate is reasonable based on “the prevailing market rate in the community for similar services of lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” D'Emanuele v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 904 F.2d 1379, 1384 (9th Cir. 1990) (quotation marks omitted), overruled on other grounds by Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 559 (1992). In making this determination, courts look to other decisions in “the forum in which the district court sits.” Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 500 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Nadarajah v. Holder, 569 F.3d 906, 917 (9th Cir. 2009); Case No.: 20-cv-6946-EJD Johnson v. Allied Trailer Supply, 2014 WL 1334006, at *5 n. 3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2014); Johnson v. Li, 2020 WL 3268580, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2020), aff'd sub nom. Johnson v. Li as trustee of Li Fam. Tr. dated Mar. 10, 1988, 848 F. App'x 744 (9th Cir. 2021). A. Attorneys’ Fees Mr. Johnson requests $5,746.00 in attorney fees and costs. See 42 U.S.C. § 12205; Cal. Civ. Code § 55. The court must multiply the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433; Ketchum, 24 Cal. 4th at 1132. i. Reasonable Hourly Rates “Determination of a reasonable hourly rate is not made by reference to rates actually charged by the prevailing party. In determining a reasonable hourly rate, the district court should be guided by the rate prevailing in the community for similar work performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Chalmers v. City of L.A., 796 F.2d 1205, 1210–11 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted), amended on denial of reh'g, 808 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1987). In making this determination, courts look to other decisions in “the forum in which the district court sits.” Barjon, 132 F.3d at 500; Nadarajah, 569 F.3d at 917. In calculating the reasonable hourly rate, the Court must assess “the novelty and difficulty of the issues, the skill required to try the case, whether or not the fee is contingent, the experience held by counsel and fee awards in similar cases.” Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1114 (9th Cir. 2008). “While disability access cases are a subset of civil rights practice, it would be naive to equate the level of skill required to litigate a routine disability access case with the level of skill required to successfully litigate a more complicated civil rights case raising novel or complicated constitutional issues.” Johnson v. Wayside Prop., Inc., 2014 WL 6634324, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2014). “[T]he burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence– in addition to the attorneys’ own affidavits–that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, Case No.: 20-cv-6946-EJD experience and reputation.” Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 980 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Mr. Johnson seeks an hourly rate of $650 for attorney Russell Handy, $550 for attorney Dennis Price, $500 for attorney Amanda Seabock, $400 for attorney Josie Zimmermann, and $100 for the paralegals and legal assistants. Dkt. No. 15-1, Declaration of Mark Potter in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Litigation Expenses (“Potter Decl.”) ¶¶ 10–15. In support of the hourly rates requested, Mr. Johnson relies on the Declaration of Mark Potter in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Litigation Expenses, Dkt. No. 15-1. In addition, Mr. Johnson provides documentation of the bill

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