Johnson v. City of New York

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedApril 18, 2023
Docket1:23-cv-03018
StatusUnknown

This text of Johnson v. City of New York (Johnson v. City of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Johnson v. City of New York, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK GLENN JOHNSON, Plaintiff, ~ 23 Civ. 3018 (PAE) OF NEW YORK: NEW YORK CTY ORDER OF SERVICE OFFICERS JOHN AND JANE DOES 1-6, 25TH PRECINCT, Defendants.

PAUL A. ENGELMAYER, United States District Judge: Plaintiff Glenn Johnson, who ts currently detained at the Anna M. Kross Center (“AMKC”) on Rikers Island, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he was illegally stopped and searched, and that he was subsequently “falsely arrested, imprisoned, and maliciously prosecuted based upon lies told by the NYPD police officers John and Jane Does 1-6” of the 25th Precinct.” Dkt. 1 at 4. On April 12, 2023, the Court granted Johnson’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.! STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity, See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune

' Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(G). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v, Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicittude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits ~ to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rutes of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp, v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible-—-not merely possible—that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.

DISCUSSION A. New York City Police Department Johnson’s claims against the New York City Police Department must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued. N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396 (“[A]ll actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shal! be brought in the name of the City of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law.”); Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Emerson v, City of New York, 740 F. Supp. 2d 385, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff is generally prohibited from suing a municipal agency.”). B. Service on the City of New York Because Johnson has been granted permission to proceed IFP, he is entitled to rely on the Court and the U.S, Marshals Service to effect service Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d. 119, 123 n.6 (2d Cir, 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process .. . in [IFP] cases.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (the court must order the Marshals Service to . serve if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed IFP)). To allow Johnson to effect service on the City of New York through the U.S. Marshals Service, the Clerk of Court is instructed to fill out a U.S. Marshals Service Process Receipt and Return form (“USM-285 form”) for the City of New York. The Clerk of Court is further instructed to issue a summons and deliver to the Marshals Service all the paperwork necessary for the Marshals Service to effect service upon the City of New York.

? Although Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally requires that a summons be served within 90 days of the date the complaint is filed, Plaintiff is proceeding IFP and could not have served the summons and the complaint until the Court reviewed the complaint and ordered that the summons be issued. The Court therefore extends the time to serve until 90 days after the date the summons is issued.

If the complaint is not served within 90 days after the date the summons is issued, Johnson should request an extension of time for service. See Meilleur v. Strong, 682 F.3d 56, 63 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that it is the plaintiff’s responsibility to request an extension of time for service). Johnson must notify the Court in writing if his address changes, and the Court may dismiss the action if Johnson fails to do so. C. John and Jane Doe Defendants Under Valentin v. Dinkins, a pro se litigant is entitled to assistance from the district court in identifying a defendant. 121 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 1997). In the complaint, Johnson supplies sufficient information to permit the New York City Police Department to identify the police officers responsible for the alleged deprivation of his rights. It is therefore ordered that the New York City Law Department, which is the attorney for and agent of the New York City Police Department, must ascertain the identity and badge number of each John and Jane Doe whom Johnson secks to sue here and the addresses where these defendants may be served.

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Meilleur v. Strong
682 F.3d 56 (Second Circuit, 2012)
Walker v. Schult
717 F.3d 119 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Emerson v. City of New York
740 F. Supp. 2d 385 (S.D. New York, 2010)
Jenkins v. City of New York
478 F.3d 76 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)

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Bluebook (online)
Johnson v. City of New York, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johnson-v-city-of-new-york-nysd-2023.