Johnson v. City of New York

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided January 28, 2021·No. 1:19-cv-08745·Unknown

Opinion

USEC SDNY DOCUMENT □ UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ELEC ON oes a □ SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK Oe Fo. wen FILED! AN 28.202) MICHAEL A. JOHNSON, | pare □□□ Plaintiff, 19-CV-8745 (GBD) ~against- ORDER OF SERVICE CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants. GEORGE B. DANIELS, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his rights on November 8, 2017, by using excessive force and then arresting him. By order dated October 22, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiffs request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (“IFP”). STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they sawggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

BACKGROUND The Court assumes familiarity with the procedural history of this case. Plaintiff Michael Johnson brings this action against several New York City officials, claiming that on November 8, 2017, at a New York City Department of Social Services (DSS) Bronx location, six Defendants assaulted him and then falsely arrested him. He names a total of 34 Defendants: (1) the six defendants who he alleges participated in the November 8, 2017 incidents; (2) eight defendants who Plaintiff alleges were placed on notice months in advance that the six Defendants had planned to assault him; and (3) twenty defendants who did not participate in the events that transpired on November 8, 2017, or are not alleged to have been aware of those events in advance of their occurring. As to the second group of defendants allegedly placed on notice, Plaintiff claims that he had “alerted” these defendants of the “planned” assault. (ECF 14, at 10.) The first group of defendants who allegedly violated Plaintiffs rights on November 8, 2017 are: (1) the City of New York; New York City Police Department (NYPD) Sergeants (2) Alexis Rodriguez and (3) Wendell Wright; (4) Dexter Freeman (“Chief of Department HRA/NYPD”); (5) Harriet Burke, and (6) NYPD Peace Officer Nancy Coleman. The second group of defendants who allegedly were placed on notice that the November 8, 2017 events would transpire are: (1) DSS Commissioner Steven Banks; (2) DSS Deputy Commissioner Jacqueline Dudley; (3) DSS Field Director Peter Uzamere; (4) HASA Program Director James Reed; (5) Human Resources Administration (HRA) Supervisor Michael West; (6) Eugene Ross; (7) Deputy Mayor Herminia Palacio; and (8) Mayor Bill de Blasio. The third group of defendants who Plaintiff does not state any facts showing their personal involvement are: (1) Dominique Anglade, Esq.; (2) Russell Backus; (3) William Bratton; (4) Lawrence Byrne; (5) Margaret Calhoun, Esq.; (6) Edward Delatorre; (7) Deputy Mayor Dean Fuleihen; (8) Inspector Hennessy; (9) Sherman Jones; (10) Sharon McAllister;

(11) Melitza; (12) Carlos Moreno: (13) Mark Peters; (14) NYPD Deputy Commissioner Joseph Reznick; (15) Officer Risc; (16) Commissioner Dermot Shea: (17) Anthony Shorris, (18) Deputy Commissioner Benjamin Tucker; (19) Cyrus R. Vance; and (20) Omar Vargas. DISCUSSION A. Service on the six Defendants allegedly involved in the November 8, 2017 incidents Because Plaintiff has been granted permission to proceed IFP, he is entitled to rely on the Court and the U.S. Marshals Service to effect service. Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d. 119, 123 n.6 (2d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process... in [IFP] cases.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (the court must order the Marshals Service to serve if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed IFP)). Although Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally requires that the summons and complaint be served within 90 days of the date the complaint is filed, Plaintiff is proceeding IFP and could not have served the summonses and second amended complaint until the Court reviewed the second amended complaint and ordered that summonses be issued. The Court therefore extends the time to serve until 90 days after the date summonses are issued. If the second amended complaint is not served within that time, Plaintiff should request an extension of time for service. See Meilleur v. Strong, 682 F.3d 56, 63 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that it is the plaintiff’s responsibility to request an extension of time for service); see also Murray v. Pataki, 378 F. App’x 50, 52 (2d Cir. 2010) (“As long as the [plaintiff proceeding IFP] provides the information necessary to identify the defendant, the Marshals’ failure to effect service automatically constitutes ‘good cause’ for an extension of time within the meaning of Rule 4(m).”). To allow Plaintiff to effect service on Defendants City of New York; Sergeants Alexis Rodriguez and Wendell Wright; Dexter Freeman; Harriet Burke, and Nancy Coleman through the U.S. Marshals Service, the Clerk of Court is instructed to fill out a U.S. Marshals Service

Process Receipt and Return form (‘““USM-285 form’’) for each of these defendants. The Clerk of Court is further instructed to issue summonses and deliver to the Marshals Service all the paperwork necessary for the Marshals Service to effect service upon these defendants. Plaintiff must notify the Court in writing if his address changes, and the Court may dismiss the action if Plaintiff fails to do so. B. Claims dismissed against remaining defendants for lack of personal involvement To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts showing the defendants’ direct and personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Spavone v. N.Y. State t of Corr. Serv., 719 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) (“It is well settled in this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in the alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant may not be held liable under § 1983 solely because that defendant employs or supervises a person who violated the plaintiff’s rights. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662

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