Johnson v. Capital Offset
Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Alford Johnson, as Trustee of the Martha Wood Trust
v. Civil No. 11-cv-459-JD Opinion No. 2014 DNH 110
The Capital Offset Company, Inc., et al.
O R D E R
Alford Johnson, as the trustee of the Martha Wood Trust, brought suit against The Capital Offset Company, Inc.; its president, Jay Stewart; a consultant who later worked for Capital Offset, Stephen Stinehour; and Acme Bookbinding Company, alleging claims arising from printing and binding a photography book, Spiritual Passports. Capital Offset, Stewart, and Stinehour move, in limine, to exclude evidence of damages for the costs incurred in producing Spiritual Passports and evidence of lost profits for books that were not sold. In response, Johnson agrees that certain costs incurred for the production of
Spiritual Passports will not be claimed as damages but objects to the motion to the extent it seeks to exclude other claimed
damages. The court directed the parties to brief the issue of the application of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) in this case, which they have done.
I. Application of the UCC - RSA Chapter 382-A:2 Capital Offset, Jay Stewart, and Stephen Stinehour contend that RSA chapter 382-A:2 (“UCC”) governs the breach of contract
claim and defenses in this case.1 Johnson contends that the UCC does not apply to the breach of contract claim because the parties’ agreement was for services not for goods. The parties agree that a contract existed between Johnson and Capital Offset for printing and binding Spiritual Passports and that the contract was not memorialized by a single signed document but instead was provided in a “fluid process of estimates.” They also agree that one of the estimates, dated July 9, 2009, contains many of the contract terms.
The UCC applies to transactions in goods. RSA 382-A:2-102.
For purposes of the UCC, “goods” are defined as “all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale . . . .” RSA 382-A:2-105. When a contract involves both goods and services, the court may apply the “gravamen of the action” test or the “predominant factor” test to determine whether the UCC governs. In re Trailer & Plumbing Supplies, 133 N.H. 432, 435 (1990).
The “gravamen of the action” test “simply asks whether the underlying action is brought because of alleged defective goods or because of the quality of the service rendered.” Id. at 436. The “predominant factor” test examines the nature of the transaction in the contract and whether the predominant factor, thrust, or purpose of the contract is the rendition of a service,
1 Johnson alleges breach of contract against only Capital Offset. Therefore, the other defendants are not affected by the issue of the application of the UCC in this case.
with goods incidentally involved, or is a sales transaction with labor only incidentally involved. Id. (citing Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 1974)). An example given of a service contract, with incidental goods, is a contract with an artist for a painting, and an example of a sales transaction contract, with incidental labor, is installation of a water heater in a residence. Trailer & Plumbing, 133 N.H. at 436.
In this case, Johnson alleges that under their contract, Capital Offset “agreed to print a certain number of copies of Spiritual Passports in a manner consistent with Plaintiff’s specifications and industry standards for the printing and binding of fine art books.” Compl. ¶ 69. Johnson further alleges that Capital Offset failed to print the books as agreed and that Acme Bookbinding, as Capital Offset’s agent, failed to bind the books as agreed. As such, the action was brought because of the quality of the services provided by Capital Offset, although the result was defective books. Under the gravamen of the action test, therefore, the UCC does not apply.
Similarly, application of the predominant factor test weighs in favor of a service contract. Like a contract for an artist to paint a picture, Johnson hired Capital Offset to produce an art book of photographs by printing the photographs and having the pages bound into books. Therefore, the contract was for
services, printing and binding the books. See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Sheridan, 53 F.R.D. 642, 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
accord Wills v. 10-X Mfg. Co., 609 F.2d 248, 254 (6th Cir. 1979);
see also Duro Bag Mfg., Inc. v. Printing Servs. Co., Inc., 2010 WL 3586855, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 9, 2010).
In Colonial Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 817 F. Supp. 235, 239 (D.N.H. 1993), the court concluded that a contract for the license of computer software was a transaction in goods for purposes of the UCC because the servicing contemplated by the contract was to support the software product. Here, in contrast, the services to be provided by Capital Offset were the purpose of the contract, to produce the book. The UCC does not apply to the breach of contract claim in this case.
II. Motion to Exclude Evidence of Damages Capital Offset, Stewart, and Stinehour all move to exclude evidence of damages based on the costs of producing Spiritual Passports and damages due to lost profits. The motion appears to focus on the breach of contract claim against Capital Offset, but also mentions other claims in passing. The two categories of damages are addressed separately.
A. Costs Incurred in Producing Spiritual Passports The defendants challenge certain items listed as damages by Johnson. In his response to the motion, Johnson agreed that certain costs associated with producing Spiritual Passports are not recoverable as damages because those costs would have been incurred regardless of the defendants’ conduct. The remaining
disputed damages are seventeen items for costs incurred between June 1, 2006, and June 1, 2010.2
1. Breach of Contract To the extent that Capital Offset relies on the provisions of RSA 382-A:2 to exclude production costs, those arguments are inapposite to this case.
“‘The goal of damages in actions for breach of contract is to put the non-breaching party in the same position it would have been in if the contract had been fully performed.’” Audette v. Cummings, 82 A.3d 1269, 1275 (N.H. 2013) (quoting Robert E. Tardiff, Inc. v. Twin Oaks Realty Tr., 130 N.H. 673, 677 (1988)). The nonbreaching party is entitled to consequential damages that are caused by the breach and that “could have been reasonably anticipated by the parties as likely to be caused by the defendant’s breach.” George v. Al Hoyt & Sons, Inc., 162 N.H. 123, 134 (2011). “The requirement of reasonable foreseeability may be satisfied in either of two ways: (1) as a matter of law if the damages follow the breach in the ordinary course of events; or (2) by the claimant specifically proving that the breaching party had reason to know the facts and to foresee injury.” Id. “A party claiming damages for breach of contract must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the damages were caused by the defendant’s alleged wrongful act, as well as
2 The list is reproduced as Appendix A to this order.
the extent and amount of such damages.” Audette, 82 A.3d at 1275.
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