Weaver, J.
Defendant appeals by leave granted from the December 23, 1987, order of Oakland Circuit Judge James S. Thorburn, which denied defendant’s request for modification of judgment for support of the parties’ two minor children in defendant’s custody. We reverse.
The parties obtained a judgment of divorce on July 25, 1979, in which the parties’ three minor children1 were determined to be born of the marriage and custody was awarded to the defendant mother. On November 16, 1983, the divorce judgment was modified to award custody of the two boys, Michael and Ronald, to the plaintiff father. The parties’ daughter, Brandi, remained in the defendant’s custody.
On May 29, 1984, defendant filed a petition for custody of the eldest boy, Michael, which petition was dismissed without prejudice upon plaintiffs request. When defendant’s second petition was also contested, defendant amended the petition to further request custody of the second son, Ronald. As a result of these petitions, the circuit court entered an order on January 25, 1985, awarding custody of Ronald to plaintiff and Michael to defendant. The order further stipulated that plaintiff was not Michael’s biological father and denied all child [104]*104support to defendant for Michael and Brandi.2
On May 4, 1987, through the friend of the court, defendant filed a petition for modification of judgment as to child support for the daughter, Brandi. Plaintiff then, on June 3, 1987, petitioned the court for custody of the daughter. Unable to continue the custody fight in pro per, on October 12, 1987, defendant retained counsel who filed a motion to modify the judgment for support of both Michael and Brandi.
On December 23, 1987, the circuit court awarded $100 per week child support for Brandi to defendant, but denied child support for Michael "because defendant Debra Lynn Johns has alleged that plaintiff is not the biological father of said child and because of the order entered January 25, 1985.” From this order defendant appeals by leave granted, requesting child support for Michael, who has since turned eighteen, retroactive to the date of notice of the petition for modification of child support, or October 12, 1987.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to order child support for the child Michael. We agree._
[105]*105This case presents broad policy ramifications for the care and welfare of children in the State of Michigan. Following a divorce, custody battles are common and often protracted. A parent may go to great lengths to obtain or maintain custody. The noncustodial parent may be disgruntled at having lost custody, and in retaliation against the former spouse may wish to withhold child support payments in order to burden the life of the former spouse. Accordingly, for this Court to sanction the practice, during a custody battle, of allowing parents to agree on a disclaimer of parenthood either to obtain custody or to avoid child support, would be tantamount to engaging in a practice contrary to the welfare of the children of this state.
In this case, plaintiff held himself out as Michael’s father for over fifteen years. During the marriage, Michael lived with both parties and plaintiff treated Michael as his own. When plaintiff filed for divorce in 1979, his complaint stated that all three children were issue born of the marriage, and the judgment of divorce likewise referred to all three children as the minor children of the parties. When plaintiff filed for divorce he requested custody of all three children. Although custody was initially awarded to defendant, plaintiff later obtained custody of both Michael and Ronald from November 16, 1983, until January 25, 1985. There was no allegation of nonpaternity or disclaimer of child support until after defendant challenged plaintiff’s custody of the two boys. Upon transfer of Michael’s custody to defendant, plaintiff stopped paying child support for both Michael and his daughter, Brandi, until defendant later sought child support in 1987, at which time plaintiff again challenged defendant’s custody of the daughter.
From this scenario it could be inferred that, if [106]*106the most affluent parent wishes to avoid child support, that parent need only bring expensive custody challenges in order to intimidate the less affluent parent into foregoing support. While this may temporarily appease the angry spouses, it does not serve the best interests of the children, who may needlessly suffer the effects of inadequate support due to their parents’ embitterment. Therefore, we believe it to be against the public policy of this state for a parent, whether natural or equitable, to suddenly disclaim parenthood by stipulation during a custody battle.
This conclusion accords with the existing law of Michigan. The overriding consideration in matters of child custody and support is the welfare of the children. Ballard v Ballard, 40 Mich App 37, 42; 198 NW2d 451 (1972). Parents may not bargain away a child’s welfare and rights, including the right to receive adequate child support payments. Id. at 43; Wiersma v Wiersma, 241 Mich 565, 566; 217 NW 767 (1928); Cochran v Buffone, 137 Mich App 761, 767; 359 NW2d 557 (1984). An agreement by the parties regarding support will not suspend the authority of the court to enter a support order. West v West, 241 Mich 679, 683-684; 217 NW 924 (1928); Larner v Larner, 113 Mich App 126, 128; 317 NW2d 315 (1982); Adamczyk v Adamczyk, 155 Mich App 326, 328; 399 NW2d 508 (1986). When a court order does not provide for child support, such maintenance may later be provided by the court and does not depend upon a change of circumstances. West, supra at 686; Ballard, supra at 42; Larner, supra.
Where, as in this case, a father rears a child as his own, he is estopped to deny that the child is his. Johnson v Johnson, 93 Mich App 415, 419-420; 286 NW2d 886 (1979). See also Atkinson v Atkinson, 160 Mich App 601, 610-611; 408 NW2d 516 [107]*107(1987), lv den 429 Mich 884 (1987). Moreover, we believe that the circuit court’s judgment of divorce, in which plaintiff was determined to be the father, should be binding on the parties as to their future actions. See In re Cook Estate, 155 Mich App 604, 609-610; 400 NW2d 695 (1986).
We are unimpressed by plaintiff’s argument that defendant’s allegation of nonpaternity, during the battle to obtain custody of Michael, has alienated him from Michael. Plaintiff treated Michael equally with his other children and at one time plaintiff actually sought and obtained custody of Michael. Only during a later custody battle did the allegation of nonpaternity arise, and when plaintiff lost custody he declined further support of the boy. Nothing prevented plaintiff from continuing to nurture his relationship with Michael through love and support after custody was returned to defendant. If plaintiff is now alienated from Michael, he cannot place the entire blame on defendant. In any event, plaintiff’s prior behavior in acknowledging paternity and rearing the child as his own estops him from denying his status as an equitable father and escaping his child support obligations. Atkinson, supra.
Based on the foregoing, defendant is entitled to receive child support payments for Michael retroactive to October 12, 1987.
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Weaver, J.
Defendant appeals by leave granted from the December 23, 1987, order of Oakland Circuit Judge James S. Thorburn, which denied defendant’s request for modification of judgment for support of the parties’ two minor children in defendant’s custody. We reverse.
The parties obtained a judgment of divorce on July 25, 1979, in which the parties’ three minor children1 were determined to be born of the marriage and custody was awarded to the defendant mother. On November 16, 1983, the divorce judgment was modified to award custody of the two boys, Michael and Ronald, to the plaintiff father. The parties’ daughter, Brandi, remained in the defendant’s custody.
On May 29, 1984, defendant filed a petition for custody of the eldest boy, Michael, which petition was dismissed without prejudice upon plaintiffs request. When defendant’s second petition was also contested, defendant amended the petition to further request custody of the second son, Ronald. As a result of these petitions, the circuit court entered an order on January 25, 1985, awarding custody of Ronald to plaintiff and Michael to defendant. The order further stipulated that plaintiff was not Michael’s biological father and denied all child [104]*104support to defendant for Michael and Brandi.2
On May 4, 1987, through the friend of the court, defendant filed a petition for modification of judgment as to child support for the daughter, Brandi. Plaintiff then, on June 3, 1987, petitioned the court for custody of the daughter. Unable to continue the custody fight in pro per, on October 12, 1987, defendant retained counsel who filed a motion to modify the judgment for support of both Michael and Brandi.
On December 23, 1987, the circuit court awarded $100 per week child support for Brandi to defendant, but denied child support for Michael "because defendant Debra Lynn Johns has alleged that plaintiff is not the biological father of said child and because of the order entered January 25, 1985.” From this order defendant appeals by leave granted, requesting child support for Michael, who has since turned eighteen, retroactive to the date of notice of the petition for modification of child support, or October 12, 1987.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to order child support for the child Michael. We agree._
[105]*105This case presents broad policy ramifications for the care and welfare of children in the State of Michigan. Following a divorce, custody battles are common and often protracted. A parent may go to great lengths to obtain or maintain custody. The noncustodial parent may be disgruntled at having lost custody, and in retaliation against the former spouse may wish to withhold child support payments in order to burden the life of the former spouse. Accordingly, for this Court to sanction the practice, during a custody battle, of allowing parents to agree on a disclaimer of parenthood either to obtain custody or to avoid child support, would be tantamount to engaging in a practice contrary to the welfare of the children of this state.
In this case, plaintiff held himself out as Michael’s father for over fifteen years. During the marriage, Michael lived with both parties and plaintiff treated Michael as his own. When plaintiff filed for divorce in 1979, his complaint stated that all three children were issue born of the marriage, and the judgment of divorce likewise referred to all three children as the minor children of the parties. When plaintiff filed for divorce he requested custody of all three children. Although custody was initially awarded to defendant, plaintiff later obtained custody of both Michael and Ronald from November 16, 1983, until January 25, 1985. There was no allegation of nonpaternity or disclaimer of child support until after defendant challenged plaintiff’s custody of the two boys. Upon transfer of Michael’s custody to defendant, plaintiff stopped paying child support for both Michael and his daughter, Brandi, until defendant later sought child support in 1987, at which time plaintiff again challenged defendant’s custody of the daughter.
From this scenario it could be inferred that, if [106]*106the most affluent parent wishes to avoid child support, that parent need only bring expensive custody challenges in order to intimidate the less affluent parent into foregoing support. While this may temporarily appease the angry spouses, it does not serve the best interests of the children, who may needlessly suffer the effects of inadequate support due to their parents’ embitterment. Therefore, we believe it to be against the public policy of this state for a parent, whether natural or equitable, to suddenly disclaim parenthood by stipulation during a custody battle.
This conclusion accords with the existing law of Michigan. The overriding consideration in matters of child custody and support is the welfare of the children. Ballard v Ballard, 40 Mich App 37, 42; 198 NW2d 451 (1972). Parents may not bargain away a child’s welfare and rights, including the right to receive adequate child support payments. Id. at 43; Wiersma v Wiersma, 241 Mich 565, 566; 217 NW 767 (1928); Cochran v Buffone, 137 Mich App 761, 767; 359 NW2d 557 (1984). An agreement by the parties regarding support will not suspend the authority of the court to enter a support order. West v West, 241 Mich 679, 683-684; 217 NW 924 (1928); Larner v Larner, 113 Mich App 126, 128; 317 NW2d 315 (1982); Adamczyk v Adamczyk, 155 Mich App 326, 328; 399 NW2d 508 (1986). When a court order does not provide for child support, such maintenance may later be provided by the court and does not depend upon a change of circumstances. West, supra at 686; Ballard, supra at 42; Larner, supra.
Where, as in this case, a father rears a child as his own, he is estopped to deny that the child is his. Johnson v Johnson, 93 Mich App 415, 419-420; 286 NW2d 886 (1979). See also Atkinson v Atkinson, 160 Mich App 601, 610-611; 408 NW2d 516 [107]*107(1987), lv den 429 Mich 884 (1987). Moreover, we believe that the circuit court’s judgment of divorce, in which plaintiff was determined to be the father, should be binding on the parties as to their future actions. See In re Cook Estate, 155 Mich App 604, 609-610; 400 NW2d 695 (1986).
We are unimpressed by plaintiff’s argument that defendant’s allegation of nonpaternity, during the battle to obtain custody of Michael, has alienated him from Michael. Plaintiff treated Michael equally with his other children and at one time plaintiff actually sought and obtained custody of Michael. Only during a later custody battle did the allegation of nonpaternity arise, and when plaintiff lost custody he declined further support of the boy. Nothing prevented plaintiff from continuing to nurture his relationship with Michael through love and support after custody was returned to defendant. If plaintiff is now alienated from Michael, he cannot place the entire blame on defendant. In any event, plaintiff’s prior behavior in acknowledging paternity and rearing the child as his own estops him from denying his status as an equitable father and escaping his child support obligations. Atkinson, supra.
Based on the foregoing, defendant is entitled to receive child support payments for Michael retroactive to October 12, 1987. The relevant factors in allowing retroactive support are: (1) the ability to pay; (2) who causes the delay in payment; and (3) any other relevant factors. Cochran, supra at 767-768. Here, plaintiff’s admitted weekly take-home pay of $725, contrasted with defendant’s take-home pay of $153 per week, clearly indicates plaintiff’s ability to pay. Regarding the delay in paying Michael’s child support, it is apparent that the delay was caused by plaintiff, who has successfully fought paying support for Michael. As for [108]*108other factors, we deem the disparity of income and defendant’s relatively low level of income to weigh significantly in favor of requiring plaintiff to pay.
Plaintiff is therefore ordered to pay support for Michael retroactive to October 12, 1987. Accordingly, we remand to the trial court for a determination of the proper amount.
Regarding defendant’s request for attorney fees, this Court is unable to address the question without a circuit court order denying such fees. This Court could address the question, however, following a trial court ruling pursuant to defendant’s specific motion for payment of fees brought on the remand for determination of Michael’s retroactive child support.
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
Cavanagh, J., concurred.