This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A14-1532
John Wesley Cridge, petitioner, Appellant,
vs.
State of Minnesota, Respondent.
Filed March 2, 2015 Affirmed Ross, Judge
Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CR-11-32499
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rochelle R. Winn, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Kelly O’Neill Moller, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Smith, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Schellhas,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
ROSS, Judge
John Wesley Cridge pleaded guilty to second-degree criminal sexual conduct, and
the district court sentenced him to 60 months in prison. Cridge asked the district court to allow him to withdraw his plea, arguing that it was not voluntary and intelligent. Because
Cridge presented no evidence supporting his contentions that the state coerced him to
plead guilty or that he misunderstood his plea, and because his prior statements
undermine his postconviction arguments, we affirm.
FACTS
In February 2012, John Wesley Cridge pleaded guilty to second-degree criminal
sexual conduct. The conviction arose from an August 2011 incident in which Cridge
invited a man into his apartment to smoke. Once inside, Cridge forced the man to the
floor, hit him in the face, and pinned him down. Cridge then pulled down the man’s
pants, fondled his genitals, and ejaculated on him.
While in custody awaiting his plea hearing, Cridge signed a plea petition form
declaring his intent to plead guilty. On the form he indicated that his inability to post bail
did not cause him to plead guilty. And he represented that his guilty plea was voluntary,
that no one had made promises or threats to coerce his plea, and that no plea agreement
existed. Cridge also noted that although he had previously been a patient in a mental
hospital and had been treated by a psychiatrist for a mental condition, he had not recently
been ill or taken any medication.
Cridge submitted his petition at his plea hearing, where he testified that he was “of
good mental health to understand what’s going on here today,” was “in a good state of
mind,” and “knew what was going on.” Neither his conduct discernable from the record
nor his other statements tend to undermine any of these assertions. After Cridge’s guilty
plea, the district court granted him conditional release until his sentencing hearing. The
2 next month, the district court sentenced him to a 60-month prison term and a 10-year
conditional release period.
Two years after his sentencing, Cridge petitioned the district court for
postconviction relief, seeking to withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to trial. Cridge
argued that his plea was not voluntary and intelligent. He alleged that he pleaded guilty
only because he was desperate to seek medical treatment for unspecified injuries caused
by a car collision. He also vaguely asserted that he was confused at the time of his plea.
Cridge did not provide any affidavit or new testimony to support his petition, and
the plea hearing transcript contains no discussion of any car collision, pain, or treatment
needs. The district court was nonetheless aware of Cridge’s collision because the
collision had led the court to revoke Cridge’s conditional release several weeks before the
plea hearing; Cridge had crashed a stolen vehicle just after midnight on January 1. He had
complained of injuries, and police took him to a hospital for treatment.
The district court considered Cridge’s written allegations supporting his
arguments, and it denied his petition. Cridge appeals.
DECISION
A defendant has a right to withdraw his guilty plea after sentencing only if he
proves to the court that “withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Minn.
R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1; State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010). He can
prove manifest injustice if he can establish that constitutional requirements were not met.
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94 (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S. Ct.
160, 164 (1970)). The Constitution requires a guilty plea to be accurate, voluntary, and
3 intelligent. Id. Whether the circumstances of a guilty plea satisfy the constitutional
requirements is a legal question, which we assess de novo. Id. But our review of the
postconviction court’s fact findings is limited to whether evidence in the record supports
them. Butala v. State, 664 N.W.2d 333, 338 (Minn. 2003).
Cridge argues that his guilty plea was not voluntary. We examine the
circumstances of a guilty plea to determine whether the plea is voluntary. Raleigh, 778
N.W.2d at 96. We consider all the relevant circumstances to ensure that a guilty plea does
not arise from improper pressure or coercion. Id. Cridge marked on his signed plea
petition that no one promised anything or threatened him to obtain the plea and that no
plea agreement existed. And at Cridge’s plea hearing, his lawyer acknowledged that
Cridge was making a “straight plea to the court.” Cridge maintains that his plea was not
voluntary because it was “improperly influenced by the pain he was experiencing as a
result of the car accident” and because he “needed to seek medical attention.” He
suggests a connection between his supposed treatment needs and his release before
sentencing. But his plea petition states that he was not pleading guilty to avoid pretrial
incarceration. And the preconviction record contains no evidence that Cridge needed
medical care. Even during his postconviction proceeding, Cridge failed to specify any
alleged medical problem. The district court could reasonably infer that he was not
experiencing overwhelming pain during the plea hearing because he testified at the
hearing that he was in a good state of mind. Cridge’s duty to tell the truth at his plea
hearing was a fundamental and obvious obligation. See Anderson v. State, 746 N.W.2d
901, 907 (Minn. App. 2008). The postconviction court was justified in crediting Cridge’s
4 preconviction statements to the district court over his postconviction allegations. See
Coolen v. State, 288 Minn. 44, 49, 50–51, 179 N.W.2d 81, 85–86 (1970).
We add that even if Cridge did have a genuine medical need, he has not
established coercion because he does not establish (or even allege) that the state made
access to treatment contingent on his pleading guilty or that he requested treatment before
making his plea. In Perkins v. State, the supreme court affirmed the denial of a petition
for postconviction relief under similar circumstances. 559 N.W.2d 678 (Minn. 1997).
Perkins sought to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that, because he wanted to leave
jail to receive medical treatment, his plea was not voluntary and intelligent. Id. at 690.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A14-1532
John Wesley Cridge, petitioner, Appellant,
vs.
State of Minnesota, Respondent.
Filed March 2, 2015 Affirmed Ross, Judge
Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CR-11-32499
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rochelle R. Winn, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Kelly O’Neill Moller, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Smith, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Schellhas,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
ROSS, Judge
John Wesley Cridge pleaded guilty to second-degree criminal sexual conduct, and
the district court sentenced him to 60 months in prison. Cridge asked the district court to allow him to withdraw his plea, arguing that it was not voluntary and intelligent. Because
Cridge presented no evidence supporting his contentions that the state coerced him to
plead guilty or that he misunderstood his plea, and because his prior statements
undermine his postconviction arguments, we affirm.
FACTS
In February 2012, John Wesley Cridge pleaded guilty to second-degree criminal
sexual conduct. The conviction arose from an August 2011 incident in which Cridge
invited a man into his apartment to smoke. Once inside, Cridge forced the man to the
floor, hit him in the face, and pinned him down. Cridge then pulled down the man’s
pants, fondled his genitals, and ejaculated on him.
While in custody awaiting his plea hearing, Cridge signed a plea petition form
declaring his intent to plead guilty. On the form he indicated that his inability to post bail
did not cause him to plead guilty. And he represented that his guilty plea was voluntary,
that no one had made promises or threats to coerce his plea, and that no plea agreement
existed. Cridge also noted that although he had previously been a patient in a mental
hospital and had been treated by a psychiatrist for a mental condition, he had not recently
been ill or taken any medication.
Cridge submitted his petition at his plea hearing, where he testified that he was “of
good mental health to understand what’s going on here today,” was “in a good state of
mind,” and “knew what was going on.” Neither his conduct discernable from the record
nor his other statements tend to undermine any of these assertions. After Cridge’s guilty
plea, the district court granted him conditional release until his sentencing hearing. The
2 next month, the district court sentenced him to a 60-month prison term and a 10-year
conditional release period.
Two years after his sentencing, Cridge petitioned the district court for
postconviction relief, seeking to withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to trial. Cridge
argued that his plea was not voluntary and intelligent. He alleged that he pleaded guilty
only because he was desperate to seek medical treatment for unspecified injuries caused
by a car collision. He also vaguely asserted that he was confused at the time of his plea.
Cridge did not provide any affidavit or new testimony to support his petition, and
the plea hearing transcript contains no discussion of any car collision, pain, or treatment
needs. The district court was nonetheless aware of Cridge’s collision because the
collision had led the court to revoke Cridge’s conditional release several weeks before the
plea hearing; Cridge had crashed a stolen vehicle just after midnight on January 1. He had
complained of injuries, and police took him to a hospital for treatment.
The district court considered Cridge’s written allegations supporting his
arguments, and it denied his petition. Cridge appeals.
DECISION
A defendant has a right to withdraw his guilty plea after sentencing only if he
proves to the court that “withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Minn.
R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1; State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010). He can
prove manifest injustice if he can establish that constitutional requirements were not met.
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94 (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S. Ct.
160, 164 (1970)). The Constitution requires a guilty plea to be accurate, voluntary, and
3 intelligent. Id. Whether the circumstances of a guilty plea satisfy the constitutional
requirements is a legal question, which we assess de novo. Id. But our review of the
postconviction court’s fact findings is limited to whether evidence in the record supports
them. Butala v. State, 664 N.W.2d 333, 338 (Minn. 2003).
Cridge argues that his guilty plea was not voluntary. We examine the
circumstances of a guilty plea to determine whether the plea is voluntary. Raleigh, 778
N.W.2d at 96. We consider all the relevant circumstances to ensure that a guilty plea does
not arise from improper pressure or coercion. Id. Cridge marked on his signed plea
petition that no one promised anything or threatened him to obtain the plea and that no
plea agreement existed. And at Cridge’s plea hearing, his lawyer acknowledged that
Cridge was making a “straight plea to the court.” Cridge maintains that his plea was not
voluntary because it was “improperly influenced by the pain he was experiencing as a
result of the car accident” and because he “needed to seek medical attention.” He
suggests a connection between his supposed treatment needs and his release before
sentencing. But his plea petition states that he was not pleading guilty to avoid pretrial
incarceration. And the preconviction record contains no evidence that Cridge needed
medical care. Even during his postconviction proceeding, Cridge failed to specify any
alleged medical problem. The district court could reasonably infer that he was not
experiencing overwhelming pain during the plea hearing because he testified at the
hearing that he was in a good state of mind. Cridge’s duty to tell the truth at his plea
hearing was a fundamental and obvious obligation. See Anderson v. State, 746 N.W.2d
901, 907 (Minn. App. 2008). The postconviction court was justified in crediting Cridge’s
4 preconviction statements to the district court over his postconviction allegations. See
Coolen v. State, 288 Minn. 44, 49, 50–51, 179 N.W.2d 81, 85–86 (1970).
We add that even if Cridge did have a genuine medical need, he has not
established coercion because he does not establish (or even allege) that the state made
access to treatment contingent on his pleading guilty or that he requested treatment before
making his plea. In Perkins v. State, the supreme court affirmed the denial of a petition
for postconviction relief under similar circumstances. 559 N.W.2d 678 (Minn. 1997).
Perkins sought to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that, because he wanted to leave
jail to receive medical treatment, his plea was not voluntary and intelligent. Id. at 690.
The supreme court held that Perkins, who had “full-blown AIDS,” was not entitled to
postconviction relief because he was competent at the time of the plea hearing and jail
officials had tried to meet his medical needs. Id. at 691–92. Like Perkins, Cridge had
opportunities to express health concerns but did not do so. See id. at 691. And even now
Cridge does not allege that the state withheld care. We conclude that he presented no
evidence to the district court that the state subjected him to any improper pressure or
coercion rendering his plea involuntary. See Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96.
In his supplemental pro se brief, Cridge argues that his plea was unintelligent. For
a guilty plea to be intelligent, a defendant must understand “the charges against him, the
rights he is waiving, and the consequences of his plea.” Id. Cridge broadly asserts that he
did not understand what was happening at his plea hearing, but he offers no details or
supporting evidence. He does not claim that he misunderstood the charge against him, his
rights, or the consequences of his decision. To the contrary, Cridge told the court that he
5 was of sound mind and understood what was happening. Nothing in the transcript
indicates confusion. And his signed plea petition likewise specifically states that he
understood the charges, his rights, and the consequences of pleading guilty.
The district court’s findings are well-supported. We hold that Cridge’s plea was
both voluntary and intelligent.
Affirmed.