John Tyronne Martin v. State of Florida

Fifth Circuit

John Tyronne Martin v. State of Florida

533 F.2d 270, 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 8580

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

DecidedJune 11, 1976

DocketS76-1010

StatusPublished

Cited by6 cases

This text of 533 F.2d 270 (John Tyronne Martin v. State of Florida) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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John Tyronne Martin v. State of Florida, 533 F.2d 270, 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 8580 (5th Cir. 1976).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Petitioner Martin was charged with robbery in 1969, convicted March 6, 1970, and sentenced to a term of six months to 20 years. The trial judge refused to grant him credit on his sentence for time served in jail while awaiting trial. After exhausting state remedies, Martin brought his claim for presentence detention credit to the federal courts in a habeas corpus action. The District Court denied relief and this appeal followed.

In Jackson v. Alabama, 530 F.2d 1231 (CA5, 1976), this court reviewed the law on this question and reaffirmed the general rule of Gremillion v. Henderson, 425 F.2d 1293, 1294 (CA5, 1970): “there is no federal constitutional right to credit for time served prior to sentence.” The present case is on all fours with Gremillion. There, as here, the trial judge had complete discretion to grant or deny credit. 1 As in Gremillion, therefore, the petitioner has not been victimized by any “arbitrary classification.” Id. at 1294 n. 4.

An exception to the general rule may be claimed by a criminal defendant who is confined before sentencing because his indigency prevents him from making bond. Because of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees against wealth discrimination, such a defendant is entitled to credit if he is sentenced to the statutory maximum term for his particular offense. Hill v. Wainwright, 465 F.2d 414 (CA5, 1972); Hart v. Henderson, 449 F.2d 183 (CA5, 1971). But this exception does not benefit Martin. He was sentenced to serve 20 years at most, whereas the statutory maximum sentence for robbery in Florida was, at the time, life imprisonment. 2 As was squarely held in Jackson v. Alabama, supra, the exception mentioned applies only to those prisoners serving maximum sentences. Moreover, the record indicates that Martin was not confined before trial because of his poverty *272 but because the state court judge decided to revoke bail. Thus the wealth discrimination analysis underlying Hart and Hill is not relevant here.

Martin also complains of the District Court’s failure to appoint counsel. There is no merit in this contention.

AFFIRMED.

1

. Although credit for time served would be mandatory under the present law of Florida, Fla.Stat.Ann. § 921.161(1) (Supp.1974), in 1970 the decision on whether to allow credit was relegated to the sentencing judge’s discretion. Fla.Stat.Ann. § 921.161(1) (1973); Richardson v. State, 243 So.2d 598 (Fla.App., 1971). We are not asked to construe the new statute as being retroactive.

2

. Fla.Stat.Ann. § 813.011 (1973).

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PER CURIAM:

Petitioner Martin was charged with robbery in 1969, convicted March 6, 1970, and sentenced to a term of six months to 20 years. The trial judge refused to grant him credit on his sentence for time served in jail while awaiting trial. After exhausting state remedies, Martin brought his claim for presentence detention credit to the federal courts in a habeas corpus action. The District Court denied relief and this appeal followed.

In Jackson v. Alabama, 530 F.2d 1231 (CA5, 1976), this court reviewed the law on this question and reaffirmed the general rule of Gremillion v. Henderson, 425 F.2d 1293, 1294 (CA5, 1970): “there is no federal constitutional right to credit for time served prior to sentence.” The present case is on all fours with Gremillion. There, as here, the trial judge had complete discretion to grant or deny credit. 1 As in Gremillion, therefore, the petitioner has not been victimized by any “arbitrary classification.” Id. at 1294 n. 4.

An exception to the general rule may be claimed by a criminal defendant who is confined before sentencing because his indigency prevents him from making bond. Because of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees against wealth discrimination, such a defendant is entitled to credit if he is sentenced to the statutory maximum term for his particular offense. Hill v. Wainwright, 465 F.2d 414 (CA5, 1972); Hart v. Henderson, 449 F.2d 183 (CA5, 1971). But this exception does not benefit Martin. He was sentenced to serve 20 years at most, whereas the statutory maximum sentence for robbery in Florida was, at the time, life imprisonment. 2 As was squarely held in Jackson v. Alabama, supra, the exception mentioned applies only to those prisoners serving maximum sentences. Moreover, the record indicates that Martin was not confined before trial because of his poverty *272 but because the state court judge decided to revoke bail. Thus the wealth discrimination analysis underlying Hart and Hill is not relevant here.

Martin also complains of the District Court’s failure to appoint counsel. There is no merit in this contention.

AFFIRMED.

1

. Although credit for time served would be mandatory under the present law of Florida, Fla.Stat.Ann. § 921.161(1) (Supp.1974), in 1970 the decision on whether to allow credit was relegated to the sentencing judge’s discretion. Fla.Stat.Ann. § 921.161(1) (1973); Richardson v. State, 243 So.2d 598 (Fla.App., 1971). We are not asked to construe the new statute as being retroactive.

2

. Fla.Stat.Ann. § 813.011 (1973).

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533 F.2d 270, 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 8580, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/john-tyronne-martin-v-state-of-florida-ca5-1976.

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