John Thornton v. Debra Fifer And Claudio Mosquera
Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
)
DEBRA FIFER and ) No. 76203-6-1 CLAUDIO MOSQUERA, )
) DIVISION ONE
Respondents, )
)
V. )
)
JOHN THORNTON, LAJUANA ) UNPUBLISHED LOCKLIN, and AARON JOHNSON, )
) FILED: April 30, 2018 Appellants. )
)
Cox, J. —John Thornton, Lajuana Locklin, and Aaron Johnson appeal the trial court's order issuing a writ of restitution, arguing that the nonjudicial foreclosure sale of property occupied was invalid. They further argue that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to continue or stay the unlawful detainer proceeding. Because this unlawful detainer action complied with the requirements of the Deeds of Trust Act, chapter 64.12 RCW,and other applicable law, we affirm.
The material facts are undisputed. Locklin defaulted on a promissory note secured by a deed of trust on her property. The successor trustee under the deed of trust instituted nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings and issued a notice of sale on January 12, 2016. On June 24, 2016, Debra Fifer and Claudio Mosquera (collectively "Fifer") purchased the property at the nonjudicial foreclosure sale, and they recorded the successor trustee's deed on July 12, 2016.
No. 76203-6-1/2 • • On October 21, 2016, following the sale, Locklin and her husband Aaron
Johnson (collectively "Locklin-Johnson") sued their lender, alleging wrongful foreclosure, and other claims. On November 16, 2016, Fifer commenced this unlawful detainer proceeding, seeking possession of the property purchased at the sale. Fifer named Locklin-Johnson and the tenant occupying the property, John Thornton, as defendants. Fifer attached copies of the notice of trustee's sale, the trustee's deed upon sale, and the notice to vacate previously served to Locklin-Johnson and Thornton. After a show cause hearing on December 1, 2016, the trial court issued a writ of restitution to Fifer.
Locklin-Johnson and Thornton appeal.
WRIT OF RESTITUTION
Locklin-Johnson argue that the trial court erred in granting the writ of restitution because the nonjudicial foreclosure was improper and therefore the trustee's sale was in violation of the Deeds of Trust Act. We disagree.
RCW 61.24.060 allows the purchaser at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale "to utilize an unlawful detainer action under chapter 59.12 RCW to secure possession of the property."1 In turn, RCW 59.12.032 requires a purchaser utilizing the unlawful detainer action to comply with the requirements of RCW 61.24.040 and 61.24.060.
1 River Stone Holdings NW, LLC v. Lopez, 199 Wn. App. 87, 93, 395 P.3d 1071 (2017); see Fed. Nat. Mortg. Ass'n v. Ndiave, 188 Wn. App. 376, 381-82, 353 P.3d 644 (2015).
No. 76203-6-1/3 • The purchaser at a trustee's sale may bring the unlawful detainer action to
evict if possession is not transferred within 20 days following the sale.2 The purchaser must provide written notice of the purchase to the previous owner, and it must give written notice to any tenants to vacate within 60 days.3 Only limited issues may be raised in the unlawful detainer action because the purpose is to provide a speedy resolution of the right to possession of real property.4 Thus, unlawful detainer actions are "limited to the question of possession" and related issues and do not provide a forum for litigating claims to title or challenges to the underlying foreclosure action.5 This court reviews the trial court's findings of fact in an unlawful detainer action for substantial evidence.6 Any unchallenged findings of fact are verities on appea1.7 We review de novo interpretation of the Deeds of Trust Act.5 Locklin-Johnson argue that the Deeds of Trust Act was violated because the trustee failed to provide the requisite notice of default and because of an alleged bankruptcy stay. They argue that these issues have yet to be decided in
2 RCW 61.24.060(1); see Ndiaye, 188 Wn. App. at 381-82.
3 RCW 61.24.060(2).
4 Ndiaye, 188 Wn. App. at 382-83; see Christensen v. Ellsworth, 162 Wn.2d 365, 370-71, 173 P.3d 228(2007).
5 Ndiaye,188 Wn. App. at 382.
6 Lang Pham v. Corbett, 187 Wn. App. 816, 825, 351 P.3d 214 (2015).
7 Id.
8 Housing Auth. of City of Pasco & Franklin County v. Pleasant, 126 Wn.
App. 382, 387, 109 P.3d 422(2005).
No. 76203-6-1/4 • the pending wrongful foreclosure action. But Locklin-Johnson's arguments are
not material to this case, given the limited issues that may be raised in an unlawful detainer action.
Locklin-Johnson do not dispute that Fifer fulfilled the requirements for a successful unlawful detainer claim under the Deeds of Trust Act.9 Specifically, Fifer purchased the property at the foreclosure sale, the trustee's deed conveyed title to Fifer, and it was duly recorded. On June 30, 2016, Fifer notified Locklin- Johnson of the sale and provided Thornton with a 60-day notice to vacate.19 Thornton failed to vacate within the 60-day period. Fifer instituted the unlawful detainer action on November 16, 2016, and served Locklin-Johnson and Thornton with an eviction summons.
In addition, the trustee's deed recites facts showing that the trustee's sale was conducted in compliance with all of the requirements of the Deeds of Trust Act. That recital alone is "prima facie evidence of such compliance and conclusive evidence thereof in favor of bona fide purchasers."11 It is undisputed that Fifer is a bona fide purchaser at the trustee's foreclosure sale.
Even though Fifer satisfied all of the requirements for an unlawful detainer action, Locklin-Johnson argue that, because they filed the wrongful foreclosure action before Fifer filed the unlawful detainer action, the trial court erred in
9 Lang Pham, 187 Wn. App. at 825.
10 RCW 61.24.060(2).
11 RCW 61.24.040(7).
No. 76203-6-1/5 • • issuing the writ. They argue that Fifer knew or should have known that they were
not entitled to the property. We disagree because it is not relevant what Fifer knew at the time of the unlawful detainer action, which was almost six months after they purchased the property at the foreclosure sale.
The Deeds of Trust Act permitted Locklin-Johnson to challenge any alleged errors before the foreclosure sale or to seek restraint of the sale before it occurred.12 If Locklin-Johnson believed the foreclosure was in error, they could have moved to restrain the sale, but they failed to do so. That failure constitutes a waiver of all but fundamental defects going to the validity of the sale itself such as a sale beyond the statutory deadline.13 Because Locklin-Johnson commenced their wrongful foreclosure action after the foreclosure sale, and they did not seek to restrain the sale, Fifer was entitled to possess the property and pursue this unlawful detainer action. Although Locklin-Johnson's claims against the lender or trustee are still unresolved, any recovery is limited to monetary damages and may "not affect in any way the validity or finality of the foreclosure sale or a subsequent transfer of the property."14
12 RCW 61.24.130(1); RCW 61.24.090; see Plein v. Lackey, 149 Wn.2d 214, 225-26,67 P.3d 1061 (2003).
Plein, 149 Wn.2d at 229; Cox v. Helenius, 103 Wn.2d 383, 388,693 13 P.2d 683(1985).
14 RCW 61.24.127(2).
No. 76203-6-1/6 • • In light of Locklin-Johnson's failure to identify any defect relevant to the
validity of this unlawful detainer proceeding, the trial court did not err in issuing the writ of restitution.
STAY OR CONTINUANCE
Locklin-Johnson argue that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a continuance or a stay. We disagree.
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