FIRST DIVISION BARNES, P. J., LAND and WATKINS, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules
September 8, 2023
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A23A1122. SUDDARTH et al v. LOUNSBROUGH.
LAND, Judge.
We granted this interlocutory appeal to consider the trial court’s denial of John
and Caitlin Suddarth (collectively “the Suddarths”) motion for summary judgment in
Samantha Lounsbrough’s action seeking to hold the Suddarths liable for injuries
Lounsbrough sustained after she slipped on a pile of leaves and fell down the
Suddarths’ front steps while delivering a package. The Suddarths argue that the trial
court erred in denying summary judgment because they did not have knowledge of
the allegedly hazardous condition, that Lounsbrough’s knowledge of the condition
was equal or superior to the Suddarths’, and that Lounsbrough failed to exercise
ordinary care. Because Lounsbrough has failed to show that the Suddarths had
superior knowledge of the hazard, we reverse. “Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issues of material fact
remain and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. On appeal, we
review a trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, construing the evidence
and all inferences drawn from it in a light favorable to the nonmovant.” (Citations and
punctuation omitted.) Stolte v. Hammack, 311 Ga. App. 710, 710 (716 SE2d 796)
(2011).
So viewed, the record shows that on Sunday, December 1, 2019, Lounsbrough
was working as a rural mail carrier for the United States Postal Service (USPS).
Lounsbrough did not have a regular route and was called in to deliver packages on
a co-worker’s mail route because the USPS was “shorthanded.” As part of her route,
Lounsbrough stopped to deliver a package at the Suddarths’ home at 6:20 p.m., when
it was already dark. Lounsbrough had previously delivered mail to the Suddarths’
mailbox but had never delivered a package to the home’s front porch.
Although it had rained earlier in the day, the rain had stopped around 3:00 p.m.
Lounsbrough wore leather boots, which she typically wore to work when it was
raining, but recalled that the ground “was not saturated” or “slippery.”1 Lounsbrough
1 John deposed that the driveway and walkway to the front porch were “damp” when he returned home that evening.
2 parked in the Suddarths’ driveway and exited her mail truck. She walked towards the
front porch and stone stairway carrying the package and her scanner while “looking
at the ground to the best [she] could.” As she walked toward the porch, Lounsbrough
noticed that “[w]here [she] was walking was covered in leaves and the leaves were
crunchy.” The porch light was not on, but a doorbell video of the incident shows that
portions of the yard and porch were illuminated with holiday decor. Lounsbrough
walked partially up the stairs, reached over the remaining steps, and placed the
package at the top of the stairs. Lounsbrough then “turned around to walk down[,] .
. . slid off the bottom step, and rolled into” a pile of leaves. Lounsbrough deposed that
she could not see anything because “[i]t was dark” but that she knew there were
leaves on the steps because she “heard them.”2 Lounsbrough stated that the leaves on
the porch “could have been” wet because “[i]t rained earlier that day.” Lounsbrough
did not know if her left foot twisted or slipped when she fell.
Caitlin, who was home alone with the couple’s newborn, received a notification
on her phone that “there was motion outside” and went to see if Lounsbrough was
okay. Lounsbrough asked Caitlin to turn on the porch light so that she could find her
2 Caitlin Suddarth deposed that she did not remember there being any leaves on the steps or on the front porch.
3 scanner, and Caitlin replied that the light did not work, instead using her cell phone
flashlight to help Lounsbrough find her scanner.3 Eventually, Lounsbrough made it
back to her mail truck and finished her route. As a result of the fall, Lounsbrough
broke her foot.
At the time of the incident, the Suddarths “primarily” used their garage door
to enter and exit their home, but also used their front door “several times a week” and
received deliveries to their front door. Caitlin deposed that she had ordered an item
for her newborn but did not recall “if [she] was waiting [for that order on] that
particular day” and was surprised at the delivery because it was a Sunday. Prior to
going outside to check on Lounsbrough, Caitlin did not remember the last time she
had gone out on her front porch. Caitlin told her husband about Lounsbrough’s fall
when he returned home later that evening, and John deposed that either “[a] couple
of days after or the following day,” he looked at where the fall occurred and did not
see any leaves. There are several trees in the front yard, and John deposed that he
“clean[ed] up the yard every week” typically on Saturdays, by “blow[ing] everything
from the outside to the middle of the yard and . . . mulch[ing] them with the mower”
3 John Suddarth deposed that the light on the front porch was working on the night of the incident and that while they “typically” turned it on at night, the light was not on a timer.
4 for “aesthetic appeal.” John did not recall whether he had cleaned up yard debris on
the Saturday before Lounsbrough’s fall, and no pictures were taken of the porch or
steps at the time of Lounsbrough’s fall.
Lounsbrough filed a lawsuit against the Suddarths, asserting that the couple
was negligent in failing to properly maintain their porch and in failing to warn
invitees of its dangerous condition. The Suddarths filed a motion for summary
judgment, and after a hearing which was not transcribed, the trial court entered an
order denying the Suddarth’s motion for summary judgment. Thereafter, the trial
court granted the Suddarths a certificate for immediate review, and this Court granted
their application for an interlocutory appeal.
1. The Suddarths argue that the trial court erred in denying their motion for
summary judgment because there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether
they had knowledge of the allegedly hazardous condition and that Lounsbrough’s
knowledge was equal or superior to their knowledge. We agree.
Georgia premises liability law imposes liability on a property owner for
“injuries [to invitees] caused by [the owner’s] failure to exercise ordinary care in
keeping the premises and approaches safe.” OCGA § 51-3-1. “Although the owner
of the premises must exercise ordinary care, the owner is not an insurer of an invitee’s
5 safety, nor does the mere fact that an accident occurred create a presumption of
negligence.” (Footnote omitted.) Thomas v. Deason, 289 Ga. App. 753, 754-755 (658
SE2d 165) (2008).
“To prevail in a slip and fall case, the plaintiff must show (1) that the defendant
had actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard, and (2) that the plaintiff lacked
knowledge of the hazard, despite the exercise of ordinary care, due to actions or
conditions within the defendant’s control.” (Footnote omitted.) Porter v. Omni
Hotels, Inc., 260 Ga. App.
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FIRST DIVISION BARNES, P. J., LAND and WATKINS, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules
September 8, 2023
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A23A1122. SUDDARTH et al v. LOUNSBROUGH.
LAND, Judge.
We granted this interlocutory appeal to consider the trial court’s denial of John
and Caitlin Suddarth (collectively “the Suddarths”) motion for summary judgment in
Samantha Lounsbrough’s action seeking to hold the Suddarths liable for injuries
Lounsbrough sustained after she slipped on a pile of leaves and fell down the
Suddarths’ front steps while delivering a package. The Suddarths argue that the trial
court erred in denying summary judgment because they did not have knowledge of
the allegedly hazardous condition, that Lounsbrough’s knowledge of the condition
was equal or superior to the Suddarths’, and that Lounsbrough failed to exercise
ordinary care. Because Lounsbrough has failed to show that the Suddarths had
superior knowledge of the hazard, we reverse. “Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issues of material fact
remain and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. On appeal, we
review a trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, construing the evidence
and all inferences drawn from it in a light favorable to the nonmovant.” (Citations and
punctuation omitted.) Stolte v. Hammack, 311 Ga. App. 710, 710 (716 SE2d 796)
(2011).
So viewed, the record shows that on Sunday, December 1, 2019, Lounsbrough
was working as a rural mail carrier for the United States Postal Service (USPS).
Lounsbrough did not have a regular route and was called in to deliver packages on
a co-worker’s mail route because the USPS was “shorthanded.” As part of her route,
Lounsbrough stopped to deliver a package at the Suddarths’ home at 6:20 p.m., when
it was already dark. Lounsbrough had previously delivered mail to the Suddarths’
mailbox but had never delivered a package to the home’s front porch.
Although it had rained earlier in the day, the rain had stopped around 3:00 p.m.
Lounsbrough wore leather boots, which she typically wore to work when it was
raining, but recalled that the ground “was not saturated” or “slippery.”1 Lounsbrough
1 John deposed that the driveway and walkway to the front porch were “damp” when he returned home that evening.
2 parked in the Suddarths’ driveway and exited her mail truck. She walked towards the
front porch and stone stairway carrying the package and her scanner while “looking
at the ground to the best [she] could.” As she walked toward the porch, Lounsbrough
noticed that “[w]here [she] was walking was covered in leaves and the leaves were
crunchy.” The porch light was not on, but a doorbell video of the incident shows that
portions of the yard and porch were illuminated with holiday decor. Lounsbrough
walked partially up the stairs, reached over the remaining steps, and placed the
package at the top of the stairs. Lounsbrough then “turned around to walk down[,] .
. . slid off the bottom step, and rolled into” a pile of leaves. Lounsbrough deposed that
she could not see anything because “[i]t was dark” but that she knew there were
leaves on the steps because she “heard them.”2 Lounsbrough stated that the leaves on
the porch “could have been” wet because “[i]t rained earlier that day.” Lounsbrough
did not know if her left foot twisted or slipped when she fell.
Caitlin, who was home alone with the couple’s newborn, received a notification
on her phone that “there was motion outside” and went to see if Lounsbrough was
okay. Lounsbrough asked Caitlin to turn on the porch light so that she could find her
2 Caitlin Suddarth deposed that she did not remember there being any leaves on the steps or on the front porch.
3 scanner, and Caitlin replied that the light did not work, instead using her cell phone
flashlight to help Lounsbrough find her scanner.3 Eventually, Lounsbrough made it
back to her mail truck and finished her route. As a result of the fall, Lounsbrough
broke her foot.
At the time of the incident, the Suddarths “primarily” used their garage door
to enter and exit their home, but also used their front door “several times a week” and
received deliveries to their front door. Caitlin deposed that she had ordered an item
for her newborn but did not recall “if [she] was waiting [for that order on] that
particular day” and was surprised at the delivery because it was a Sunday. Prior to
going outside to check on Lounsbrough, Caitlin did not remember the last time she
had gone out on her front porch. Caitlin told her husband about Lounsbrough’s fall
when he returned home later that evening, and John deposed that either “[a] couple
of days after or the following day,” he looked at where the fall occurred and did not
see any leaves. There are several trees in the front yard, and John deposed that he
“clean[ed] up the yard every week” typically on Saturdays, by “blow[ing] everything
from the outside to the middle of the yard and . . . mulch[ing] them with the mower”
3 John Suddarth deposed that the light on the front porch was working on the night of the incident and that while they “typically” turned it on at night, the light was not on a timer.
4 for “aesthetic appeal.” John did not recall whether he had cleaned up yard debris on
the Saturday before Lounsbrough’s fall, and no pictures were taken of the porch or
steps at the time of Lounsbrough’s fall.
Lounsbrough filed a lawsuit against the Suddarths, asserting that the couple
was negligent in failing to properly maintain their porch and in failing to warn
invitees of its dangerous condition. The Suddarths filed a motion for summary
judgment, and after a hearing which was not transcribed, the trial court entered an
order denying the Suddarth’s motion for summary judgment. Thereafter, the trial
court granted the Suddarths a certificate for immediate review, and this Court granted
their application for an interlocutory appeal.
1. The Suddarths argue that the trial court erred in denying their motion for
summary judgment because there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether
they had knowledge of the allegedly hazardous condition and that Lounsbrough’s
knowledge was equal or superior to their knowledge. We agree.
Georgia premises liability law imposes liability on a property owner for
“injuries [to invitees] caused by [the owner’s] failure to exercise ordinary care in
keeping the premises and approaches safe.” OCGA § 51-3-1. “Although the owner
of the premises must exercise ordinary care, the owner is not an insurer of an invitee’s
5 safety, nor does the mere fact that an accident occurred create a presumption of
negligence.” (Footnote omitted.) Thomas v. Deason, 289 Ga. App. 753, 754-755 (658
SE2d 165) (2008).
“To prevail in a slip and fall case, the plaintiff must show (1) that the defendant
had actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard, and (2) that the plaintiff lacked
knowledge of the hazard, despite the exercise of ordinary care, due to actions or
conditions within the defendant’s control.” (Footnote omitted.) Porter v. Omni
Hotels, Inc., 260 Ga. App. 24, 24-25 (579 SE2d 68) (2003). “The true basis for an
owner’s liability is his superior knowledge of the existence of a condition that could
subject his invitees to an unreasonable risk of injury.” (Footnote omitted.) Garrett v.
Hanes, 273 Ga. App. 894, 895 (616 SE2d 202) (2005). More specifically, we have
held that in cases concerning falls on “naturally occurring substances,” the rule is
that where the accumulation of [that substance] on a premises is naturally occurring and not attributable to any affirmative action on the proprietor’s part, the proprietor has no affirmative duty to discover and remove it in the absence of evidence that it had become an obvious hazard by means other than natural accumulation.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) SRA Mgmt., LLC v. Prince, 362 Ga. App. 636,
639 (869 SE2d 583) (2022). Thus, “[l]iability results only from an owner’s failure to
6 exercise ordinary care to take remedial action after notice to him of the defective
condition coupled with a failure to take remedial action within a reasonable time.”
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 640.
Here, “[t]here is no evidence that any affirmative action by [the Suddarths]
caused the leaves . . . to collect on the steps, and no evidence that [the Suddarths] had
actual knowledge of this condition.” Porter, 260 Ga. App. at 25 (1). Lounsbrough
argues that the Suddarths had actual and/or constructive knowledge of the allegedly
hazardous condition of the porch because they failed to clear the leaves from the area.
John Suddarth’s general knowledge that leaves fall on his property and weekly
cleaning of his yard, however, does not equate to knowledge of the specific
accumulation of leaves that Lounsbrough alleges caused her to fall. See St. Joseph’s
Hosp. of Atlanta, Inc. v. Hall, 344 Ga. App. 1, 3-4 (1) (a) (806 SE2d 669) (2017)
(hospital’s general knowledge that melted ice or snow in its parking deck can re-
freeze and that black ice is slippery was not enough to show that hospital had superior
knowledge of the specific ice hazard that caused plaintiff’s injuries). Meanwhile,
Lounsbrough acknowledged that she “heard” the leaves under her feet as she walked
to the Suddarth’s front porch, and thus Lounsbrough “had reason to believe that this
debris, which fell naturally from trees overhead, would land on all the steps, including
7 the one where [she] fell.” Porter, 260 Ga. App. at 26 (1). Under these circumstances,
Lounsbrough’s knowledge was at least equal to the Suddarth’s, and the Suddarths
were entitled to summary judgment. Id. at 25 (1).
Moreover, even if the Suddarths had a duty to discover and remove the leaves,
no evidence shows that they breached their duty because no evidence shows that the
leaves remained on the front steps “for a sufficient amount of time that they should
have been discovered and removed in a reasonable inspection of the premises[.]”
(Citation omitted.) Cleveland v. Snowdrop Properties, N.V., 232 Ga. App. 447, 448
(501 SE2d 546) (1998). John cleaned his property of fallen leaves on a weekly basis
and Lounsbrough has provided no evidence that this was unreasonable. Caitlin was
home alone with the couple’s newborn and could not recall when she had last used
the front porch. It is undisputed that it rained that day, and there is no evidence
showing how long the leaves were present on the steps. Thus, no evidence in the
record shows that the leaves were on the front steps long enough that a reasonable
inspection would have discovered them, and the Suddarths cannot be liable on this
ground. See id. at 547-548.
Lounsbrough also argues that the Suddarths had actual and/or constructive
knowledge of the allegedly hazardous condition of the porch because they failed to
8 provide proper lighting. A premises owner owes no obligation – even to an invitee
– “to illuminate passageways, porches or steps, absent a contractual or statutory duty
to do so,” and liability may only be imposed “if the lack of lighting prevents the
injured party from discovering a dangerous condition of which the owner but not the
injured party should be aware.” (Emphasis supplied.) Evans v. Parker, 172 Ga. App.
416, 417 (2) (323 SE2d 276) (1984). Here, Lounsbrough has provided no evidence
of a contractual or statutory duty on the part of the Suddarths, and she does not allege
that the steps themselves were a dangerous condition she was unable to discover due
to poor lighting. Compare Hatcher v. City of Albany, 147 Ga. App. 843, 844 (1) (250
SE2d 537) (1978) (“Whether the combination of maintaining irregular steps and
failing to provide lighting to illuminate the steps constituted negligence was a matter
which the trial court should have submitted to the jury”) (emphasis supplied).
Because there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Suddarths had
actual or constructive knowledge of the leaves on their front porch, the alleged failure
to provide adequate lighting creates no grounds for liability. See id. (homeowner’s
failure to provide adequate lighting for social guest’s departure did not give rise to
liability where guest had equal knowledge of the allegedly hazardous condition).
Therefore, the trial court erred in denying summary judgment to the Suddarths.
9 2. As a result of our holding in division 1, we need not reach the Suddarths’
remaining enumeration of error.
Judgment reversed. Barnes, P. J., and Watkins, J., concur.