1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 5 AT TACOMA 6 JOHN ROBERT DEMOS, JR., Case No. 2:26-cv-00408-JHC-TLF 7 Plaintiff, v. REPORT AND 8 RECOMMENDATION MARCO RUBIO, 9 Noted for March 27, 2026 Defendants. 10
11 Plaintiff John Demos, Jr., a state prisoner, has filed an application for leave to 12 proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and a proposed complaint. Dkt. 1. Plaintiff has also 13 filed a “proposed motion to correct clerical error.” Dkt. 2. As discussed below, the Court 14 recommends that the proposed complaint should be dismissed, the IFP application 15 should be denied and the “proposed motion to correct clerical error” (Dkt. 2) should be 16 denied as moot. 17 DISCUSSION 18 Plaintiff is under pre-filing bar orders in a number of courts, including this Court, 19 the Eastern District of Washington, the Washington State courts, the Ninth Circuit Court 20 of Appeals, and the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Demos v. Storrie, 507 U.S. 21 290, 291 (1993). Plaintiff is permitted to submit only three IFP applications and 22 proposed actions each year. See In re John Robert Demos, MC91-269- CRD (W.D. 23 Wash. Jan. 16, 1992); In re Complaints and Petitions Submitted by John Robert Demos 24 1 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 15, 1982). Furthermore under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), plaintiff must 2 demonstrate “imminent danger of serious physical injury” to proceed IFP because he 3 has had more than three prior actions dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to 4 state a claim. See Demos v. Lehman, MC99-113-JLW (W.D. Wash. Aug. 23, 1999).
5 Plaintiff’s submission does not contain “a plausible allegation that [he] faced 6 imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time of filing.” Andrews v. Cervantes, 7 493 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted). “Imminent danger of serious 8 physical injury must be a real, present threat, not merely speculative or hypothetical.” 9 Ruiz v. Woodfill, No. 2:20CV2078TLNDBP, 2020 WL 7054389, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 10 2020), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:20-CV-02078-TLN-DB, 2021 WL 11 148385 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2021); Andrews, 493 F.3d at 1057 n. 11. 12 To meet his burden under § 1915(g), a plaintiff must provide “specific fact 13 allegations of ongoing serious physical injury, or a pattern of misconduct evidencing the 14 likelihood of imminent serious physical injury.” Martin v. Shelton, 319 F.3d 1048, 1050
15 (8th Cir. 2003). “Vague and utterly conclusory assertions” of harm are insufficient. White 16 v. Colorado, 157 F.3d 1226, 1231-32 (10th Cir. 1998). The “imminent danger” exception 17 is available “for genuine emergencies,” where “time is pressing” and “a threat ... is real 18 and proximate.” Lewis v. Sullivan, 279 F.3d 526, 531 (7th Cir. 2002). 19 Here, plaintiff names United States Secretary of State Marco Rubio as the 20 defendant, alleges he is “the realtor” in this “False Claims Act Complaint and Quitam 21 Action”, and alleges “price gouging, collusion, racketeering, unjust enrichment, 22 deceptive and unfair trade practices, monopolizing, corruption, unlawful gains, 23 chicanery, fraud, and manipulation.” Dkt. 1. Plaintiff alleges that defendant’s actions
24 1 have “led to the State of Washington’s financial collapse, insolvency, and 2 displacement.” Id. 3 Plaintiff alleges he became aware of the fraudulent acts through “letters, federal 4 memos, classified documents, confidential documents, for your eyes only, investigative
5 files, and public disclosure documents that were sent to the realtor by ‘mistake.’” Id. He 6 indicates that he subsequently returned the documents to the “correct owners.” Id. 7 Plaintiff makes no allegations establishing he was in imminent danger of serious 8 physical injury at the time he filed his complaint and thus his IFP application should be 9 denied. 10 And, even if the filing fee is paid, the action is subject to dismissal. Pursuant 11 to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is required to review prisoner complaints which “seek[ ] 12 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a government entity,” and 13 to dismiss those, or any portion of those, which are “frivolous, malicious, or fail[ ] to state 14 a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or “seek[ ] monetary relief from a defendant
15 who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 16 F.3d 443, 446-47 (9th Cir. 2000); Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 892 n.3 (9th Cir. 17 2011). 18 A pro se plaintiff’s complaint is to be construed liberally, but, like any other 19 complaint, it must nevertheless contain factual assertions sufficient to support a facially 20 plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. 21 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim for relief is facially plausible when 22 “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 23 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
24 1 “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the 2 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair 3 notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]’ ” Twombly, 550 4 U.S. at 555 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80
5 (1957)). “[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ 6 requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of 7 a cause of action will not do[.]”Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 8 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (on a motion to dismiss, courts 9 “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”)). 10 “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative 11 level.” Id. 12 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts showing (1) the 13 conduct about which he complains was committed by a person acting under the color of 14 state law; and (2) the conduct deprived him of a federal constitutional or statutory right.
15 Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989). A plaintiff must allege that he 16 suffered a specific injury as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant, and he 17 must allege an affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. 18 Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). Sweeping conclusory allegations 19 against an official are insufficient to state a claim for relief. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 20 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988).
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 5 AT TACOMA 6 JOHN ROBERT DEMOS, JR., Case No. 2:26-cv-00408-JHC-TLF 7 Plaintiff, v. REPORT AND 8 RECOMMENDATION MARCO RUBIO, 9 Noted for March 27, 2026 Defendants. 10
11 Plaintiff John Demos, Jr., a state prisoner, has filed an application for leave to 12 proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and a proposed complaint. Dkt. 1. Plaintiff has also 13 filed a “proposed motion to correct clerical error.” Dkt. 2. As discussed below, the Court 14 recommends that the proposed complaint should be dismissed, the IFP application 15 should be denied and the “proposed motion to correct clerical error” (Dkt. 2) should be 16 denied as moot. 17 DISCUSSION 18 Plaintiff is under pre-filing bar orders in a number of courts, including this Court, 19 the Eastern District of Washington, the Washington State courts, the Ninth Circuit Court 20 of Appeals, and the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Demos v. Storrie, 507 U.S. 21 290, 291 (1993). Plaintiff is permitted to submit only three IFP applications and 22 proposed actions each year. See In re John Robert Demos, MC91-269- CRD (W.D. 23 Wash. Jan. 16, 1992); In re Complaints and Petitions Submitted by John Robert Demos 24 1 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 15, 1982). Furthermore under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), plaintiff must 2 demonstrate “imminent danger of serious physical injury” to proceed IFP because he 3 has had more than three prior actions dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to 4 state a claim. See Demos v. Lehman, MC99-113-JLW (W.D. Wash. Aug. 23, 1999).
5 Plaintiff’s submission does not contain “a plausible allegation that [he] faced 6 imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time of filing.” Andrews v. Cervantes, 7 493 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted). “Imminent danger of serious 8 physical injury must be a real, present threat, not merely speculative or hypothetical.” 9 Ruiz v. Woodfill, No. 2:20CV2078TLNDBP, 2020 WL 7054389, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 10 2020), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:20-CV-02078-TLN-DB, 2021 WL 11 148385 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2021); Andrews, 493 F.3d at 1057 n. 11. 12 To meet his burden under § 1915(g), a plaintiff must provide “specific fact 13 allegations of ongoing serious physical injury, or a pattern of misconduct evidencing the 14 likelihood of imminent serious physical injury.” Martin v. Shelton, 319 F.3d 1048, 1050
15 (8th Cir. 2003). “Vague and utterly conclusory assertions” of harm are insufficient. White 16 v. Colorado, 157 F.3d 1226, 1231-32 (10th Cir. 1998). The “imminent danger” exception 17 is available “for genuine emergencies,” where “time is pressing” and “a threat ... is real 18 and proximate.” Lewis v. Sullivan, 279 F.3d 526, 531 (7th Cir. 2002). 19 Here, plaintiff names United States Secretary of State Marco Rubio as the 20 defendant, alleges he is “the realtor” in this “False Claims Act Complaint and Quitam 21 Action”, and alleges “price gouging, collusion, racketeering, unjust enrichment, 22 deceptive and unfair trade practices, monopolizing, corruption, unlawful gains, 23 chicanery, fraud, and manipulation.” Dkt. 1. Plaintiff alleges that defendant’s actions
24 1 have “led to the State of Washington’s financial collapse, insolvency, and 2 displacement.” Id. 3 Plaintiff alleges he became aware of the fraudulent acts through “letters, federal 4 memos, classified documents, confidential documents, for your eyes only, investigative
5 files, and public disclosure documents that were sent to the realtor by ‘mistake.’” Id. He 6 indicates that he subsequently returned the documents to the “correct owners.” Id. 7 Plaintiff makes no allegations establishing he was in imminent danger of serious 8 physical injury at the time he filed his complaint and thus his IFP application should be 9 denied. 10 And, even if the filing fee is paid, the action is subject to dismissal. Pursuant 11 to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is required to review prisoner complaints which “seek[ ] 12 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a government entity,” and 13 to dismiss those, or any portion of those, which are “frivolous, malicious, or fail[ ] to state 14 a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or “seek[ ] monetary relief from a defendant
15 who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 16 F.3d 443, 446-47 (9th Cir. 2000); Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 892 n.3 (9th Cir. 17 2011). 18 A pro se plaintiff’s complaint is to be construed liberally, but, like any other 19 complaint, it must nevertheless contain factual assertions sufficient to support a facially 20 plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. 21 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim for relief is facially plausible when 22 “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 23 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
24 1 “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the 2 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair 3 notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]’ ” Twombly, 550 4 U.S. at 555 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80
5 (1957)). “[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ 6 requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of 7 a cause of action will not do[.]”Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 8 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (on a motion to dismiss, courts 9 “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”)). 10 “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative 11 level.” Id. 12 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts showing (1) the 13 conduct about which he complains was committed by a person acting under the color of 14 state law; and (2) the conduct deprived him of a federal constitutional or statutory right.
15 Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989). A plaintiff must allege that he 16 suffered a specific injury as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant, and he 17 must allege an affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. 18 Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). Sweeping conclusory allegations 19 against an official are insufficient to state a claim for relief. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 20 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988). 21 “The False Claims Act makes liable anyone who ‘knowingly presents, or causes 22 to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval,’ or ‘knowingly 23 makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a
24 1 false or fraudulent claim.’ ” United States ex rel. Campie v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 862 F.3d 2 890, 898–99 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A), (B)) 3 Here, plaintiff’s allegations of “fraud” and “corruption” are generalized and 4 conclusory. He fails to provide any specific, plausible facts concerning the named
5 defendant’s acts or omissions and any connection to an identifiable violation of the law. 6 As such, plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and 7 is subject to dismissal. 8 Plaintiff has also filed a “proposed motion to correct clerical error” in which he 9 challenges the clerk’s captioning of his complaint and asserts that he is seeking to bring 10 a claim under the False Claims Act. Dkt. 2. Because the Court recommends denying the 11 IFP application and dismissing the complaint, the Court should deny this motion (Dkt. 2) 12 as moot. 13 // 14 CONCLUSION
15 For the foregoing reasons, this Court recommends that plaintiff’s proposed IFP 16 application (Dkt. 1) be DENIED and this action be DISMISSED without prejudice. 17 Plaintiff’s “proposed motion to correct clerical error” (Dkt. 2) should be denied as moot. 18 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), the parties shall 19 have fourteen (14) days from service of this report to file written objections. See also 20 Fed. R. Civ. P. 6. Failure to file objections will result in a waiver of those objections for 21 purposes of de novo review by the district judge, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), and can 22 result in a waiver of those objections for purposes of appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 23 U.S. 140, 142 (1985); Miranda v. Anchondo, 684 F.3d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations
24 1 omitted). Accommodating the time limit imposed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), the Clerk is 2 directed to set the matter for consideration on March 27, 2026, as noted in the caption. 3 4 Dated this 12th day of March, 2026. 5 6 7 A
Theresa L. Fricke 8 United States Magistrate Judge
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