John Paul Jones, III v. Armed Forces Retirement Home

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedMarch 8, 2016
StatusUnpublished

This text of John Paul Jones, III v. Armed Forces Retirement Home (John Paul Jones, III v. Armed Forces Retirement Home) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
John Paul Jones, III v. Armed Forces Retirement Home, (Miss. 2016).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

JOHN PAUL JONES, III, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DE-3330-15-0149-I-1

v.

ARMED FORCES RETIREMENT DATE: March 8, 2016 HOME, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

John Paul Jones, III, Albuquerque, New Mexico, pro se.

Robert Charles Rutherford, Jr., Washington Navy Yard, D.C., for the agency.

BEFORE

Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman Mark A. Robbins, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which denied his request for corrective action under Veterans Employment Opportunities Act of 1998 (VEOA). Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only when: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. See title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). ¶2 The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. The appellant exhausted his administrative remedies with the Department of Labor and timely filed an appeal alleging that the Armed Forces Retirement Home (“AFRH” or “the agency”) violated his veterans’ preference rights when it did not select him for a Health System Administrator position under Vacancy Announcement 14-AFRH-137P, which was open to United States Citizens. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1, Tab 7 at 5, 26. The agency adjudicated the appellant’s veterans’ preference and included him on the certificate of Best Qualified candidates referred to the selecting official, but none of the referred candidates were interviewed or selected because the agency determined that none of the applicants had any long-term care experience. IAF, Tab 7 at 7, 25, Tab 9 at 6, Tab 10 at 5. The agency re-advertised the position to attract new applicants. Id. ¶3 On appeal, the appellant argued that the agency’s decision to repost the position without selecting a candidate was “an enormous RED FLAG, indicating unlawful action.” IAF, Tab 1 at 5. The appellant further argued, among other things, that the agency failed to credit his military experience. Id. The administrative judge advised the parties of the applicable law and burdens of 3

proof and ordered the appellant to submit evidence and argument to determine whether there was a genuine dispute of material fact at issue on appeal. IAF, Tab 8. After considering the parties’ submissions, the administrative judge denied the appellant’s request for corrective action under VEOA, without holding a hearing, and found that there was no genuine dispute of material fact regarding his allegation that the agency violated VEOA. IAF, Tab 13, Initial Decision (ID) at 8; Tabs 9-12. ¶4 In reaching his decision, the administrative judge found that the appellant offered no evidence to contradict the sworn declaration of the agency’s human resources specialists stating that the agency decided to re-advertise the position and cancel the vacancy announcement without making a selection because none of the applications had long-term care experience. ID at 7; IAF, Tabs 9-10. The administrative judge also found, based on the undisputed facts, that the appellant failed to generate a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the allegation that the agency failed to credit his military experience. ID at 6. The appellant filed a petition for review, and the agency responded in opposition to his petition. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3. ¶5 To be entitled to relief under VEOA, the appellant must prove by preponderant evidence that the agency’s action violated one or more of his statutory or regulatory veterans’ preference rights in its selection process. Graves v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 114 M.S.P.R. 209, ¶ 10 (2010). A preponderance of the evidence is that degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable person, considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a contested fact is more likely to be true than untrue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(c)(2). The Board has the authority to decide a VEOA appeal on the merits, without a hearing, where there is no genuine dispute of material fact and one party must prevail as a matter of law. Haasz v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 108 M.S.P.R. 349, ¶ 9 (2008). A factual dispute is “material” if, in light of the governing law, its resolution could affect the outcome. 4

Waters-Lindo v. Department of Defense, 112 M.S.P.R. 1, ¶ 5 (2009). A factual dispute is “genuine” when there is sufficient evidence favoring the party seeking an evidentiary hearing for the administrative judge to rule in favor of that party should that party’s evidence be credited. Id. ¶6 Preference-eligible veterans applying for Federal employment have the right “to credit for all experience material to the position for which examined, including experience gained in religious, civic welfare, service, and organizational activities, regardless of whether” such experience is unpaid. 5 U.S.C. § 3311(2); see 5 C.F.R. § 302.302(d); see also Miller v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 121 M.S.P.R. 88, ¶ 7 (2014). Although a preference eligible is entitled to have a broad range of experiences considered by the agency in reviewing his application for a position, how the agency adjudges and weighs those experiences is beyond the purview of the Board’s review in a VEOA appeal. Miller, 121 M.S.P.R. 88, ¶ 9. ¶7 The matter at issue in a VEOA appeal is not whether a particular agency action is proper and should be sustained. Id. Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 3311(2) and 5 C.F.R. § 302

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John Paul Jones, III v. Armed Forces Retirement Home, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/john-paul-jones-iii-v-armed-forces-retirement-home-mspb-2016.