John O. Paivinen v. Eugene A. Sands

399 F.2d 697, 55 C.C.P.A. 1502
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedNovember 14, 1968
DocketPatent Appeal 7803
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 399 F.2d 697 (John O. Paivinen v. Eugene A. Sands) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
John O. Paivinen v. Eugene A. Sands, 399 F.2d 697, 55 C.C.P.A. 1502 (ccpa 1968).

Opinion

SMITH, Judge.

The issues involved in this appeal concern Paivinen’s burden of proof and whether, under the applicable standard, those proofs are sufficient to establish an actual reduction to practice in view of all the evidence submitted by the parties.

Those issues arise on appeal by the party Paivinen, the junior party, from a decision of the Board of Patent Inter- *698 ferenees 1 awarding priority to the senior party, Sands. That decision is the result of the board’s consideration of the case on remand from this court in the first appeal, Paivinen v. Sands, 339 F.2d 217, 52 CCPA 906, 1030 (1964). There this court reversed a prior decision by the board awarding priority to Sands. We remanded to the board for a determination of priority on the basis of all of the relevant evidence. 339 F.2d at 228, 52 CCPA at 920. We shall assume familiarity with our prior opinion.

Burden of Proof

Our previous decision was predicated on our interpretation of the board’s position that Paivinen’s parent application does not support at least some of the counts. 2 There was, however, confusion with respect to which counts were unsupported by the Paivinen parent application. We remanded the issue of burden of proof to the board for further consideration in view of the unsatisfactory state of the record with respect to the issue of support. 3

On remand, the board ruled that Paivinen must prove priority beyond a reasonable doubt as to counts 1-5. However, as to count 6, his burden is only that of a preponderance of the evidence.

In considering this issue, it should be remembered that the Paivinen application in interference was filed after the issuance date of the Sands patent, and thus Paivinen has the burden of establishing priority beyond reasonable doubt unless support for the subject matter in interference can be found in his co-pending application filed prior to the issuance of the Sands patent. Conner v. Joris, 241 F.2d 944, 44 CCPA 772; Sellner v. Solloway, 267 F.2d 321, 46 CCPA 897; Paivinen v. Sands, supra. Since the Paivinen application is based upon a parent Paivinen case filed September 9, 1954, the basic inquiry here is whether, as a matter of law, the counts in interference find support in the disclosure of the parent application, Paivinen v. Sands, supra.

As the board observed, there are two limitations that are not clearly explicit in the parent Paivinen application: (1) the “incapable of reversing” limitation included in counts 1-5, derived from the requirement, as in count 1, of “the third of said means * * * being incapable of reversing the condition of saturation *699 of said body,” and (2) the “switch” limitation in counts 2-6, i. e., in count 6, from the requirement of that count that the two sensing field generators and the two reset field generators have a “switch in common”. Counts 2-5 contain, in effect, both such limitations.

As to the first point, we have concluded, as did the board, that the “incapable of reversing” limitation is not. inherent in the device as disclosed in the parent Paivinen application. Paivinen’s position is that this limitation is inherent in any practical implementation of the Paivinen idea, and particularly when tor-roidal cores of the Orthonik material disclosed in the parent Paivinen application are used. 4

The board held that this limitation cannot be deemed inherent in the Paivi-nen circuit in view of a statement appearing in the Paivinen application in interference that the Paivinen circuit might be designed to operate for the intended purpose with either a pulse that just reverses the saturation condition of an input core or one which is incapable of doing so, 5 relying on Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 305 U.S. 47, 573, 59 S.Ct. 8, 83 L.Ed. 34 (1938); Hansgirg v. Kemmer, 102 F.2d 212, 26 CCPA 937 (1939); and Brand v. Thomas, 96 F.2d 301, 25 CCPA 1053 (1938). It concluded that since the device might be made either reversing or non-reversing, relying on the presumptive correctness of the statements of the Paivinen application in interference, non-reversing is not inherent in the parent Paivi-nen disclosure. The board did not find anything in the evidence to establish the contrary, and specifically found that party Paivinen did not testify that his system would not work with a reversal of an input core, and that the Sands’ tests did not establish this.

While Paivinen recognizes that an argument of inherency cannot be based upon what one skilled in the art might do in following the disclosure of an application, Brand v. Thomas, supra, Hansgirg v. Kemmer, supra, he urges that, from the testimony of witnesses for both sides, and from Sands’ tests, the inspect pulse must be incapable of switching an input core to achieve the intended operation in a practical circuit.

Paivinen concedes that although it may be conceptually correct that his circuit could operate properly with an inspect pulse that just switches an input core, this presupposes the ideal situation of a perfectly square hysteresis loop, no variation whatever in the amplitude and/or duration of the inspect pulse, or in the size or magnetic characteristics of the different input cores, or in the circuit parameters or the tightness of the windings on such cores.

However influential that argument and that testimony might be in simpler contexts, we must agree with the board that the statement in the Paivinen application in interference to the effect that the device could be designed to operate for the intended purposes with either reversing or non-reversing, precludes a finding that’ non-reversing operation is inherent in the parent application.

*700 That conclusion is further supported by a review of the Paivinen parent application itself. If the parent Paivinen application is to support counts 1 to 5, it must disclose a sensing or inspect pulse generator “incapable of reversing” a single one of the cores from high impedance or negative remanence to low impedance or positive saturation, the other two of those cores being at low impedance when the inspect pulse arrives.

The parent Paivinen application does not show an inspect pulse source incapable of reversing a single core when the other cores are already in the low impedance positive remanence condition.

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Bluebook (online)
399 F.2d 697, 55 C.C.P.A. 1502, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/john-o-paivinen-v-eugene-a-sands-ccpa-1968.