John Jay Lacey v. Andrew Richard Lacey, Markus Ankuan Sermons, and David Michael Goldman

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedMay 1, 2026
Docket3:26-cv-00169
StatusUnknown

This text of John Jay Lacey v. Andrew Richard Lacey, Markus Ankuan Sermons, and David Michael Goldman (John Jay Lacey v. Andrew Richard Lacey, Markus Ankuan Sermons, and David Michael Goldman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
John Jay Lacey v. Andrew Richard Lacey, Markus Ankuan Sermons, and David Michael Goldman, (M.D. Fla. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

JOHN JAY LACEY,

Plaintiff,

vs. Case No. 3:26-cv-169-MMH-MCR

ANDREW RICHARD LACEY, MARKUS ANKUAN SERMONS, and DAVID MICHAEL GOLDMAN,

Defendants. /

ORDER THIS CAUSE is before the Court sua sponte. Proceeding pro se, Plaintiff, John Jay Lacey, initiated this action on January 29, 2026, by filing a Civil Complaint (Doc. 1; Complaint). Upon review, the Court finds that the Complaint is an impermissible “shotgun pleading.” In the analysis that follows, the Court will discuss some of the problems with the Complaint and provide Plaintiff with the opportunity to file a corrected complaint consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)). Plaintiff should carefully review this Order and consider utilizing the resources available for pro se litigants, cited below, before filing his corrected complaint. Failure to comply with the pleading requirements set forth in this Order may result in the dismissal of this action without further notice. As a preliminary matter, the Court offers some general guidance for Plaintiff as he drafts his corrected complaint. This guidance is not directed at

particular deficiencies in the Complaint but instead is intended to be generally useful for Plaintiff as he navigates the complexities of federal practice. While pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by an attorney, Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964, 967 (11th Cir. 1986), the pro se

litigant is still required to “‘conform to procedural rules.’” Riley v. Fairbanks Capital Corp., 222 F. App’x 897, 898 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2002)).1 The Rules require that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Rule 8(a)(2). “‘A complaint need not specify in detail the precise theory giving rise to recovery. All that is required is that the defendant be on notice as to the claim being asserted against him and the grounds on which it rests.’” Evans v. McClain of Ga., Inc., 131 F.3d 957, 964 n.2 (11th Cir.

1997) (quoted authority omitted). Despite Rule 8(a)’s liberal pleading standard, “a complaint must still contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting

1 All filings with the Court must be made in accordance with the requirements of the Rules and the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida (Local Rules(s)). The Local Rules are available for review at www.flmd.uscourts.gov. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are available online. In citing to Riley, the Court notes that “[a]lthough an unpublished opinion is not binding … , it is persuasive authority.” United States v. Futrell, 209 F.3d 1286, 1289 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36–2 (“Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.”). all material elements of a cause of action.” Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314, 1320 (11th Cir. 2006) (emphasis omitted). Additionally, Rule 10 requires that,

in a complaint, a plaintiff “state [his] claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” Rule 10(b). Rules 8 and 10 work together “‘to require the pleader to present his claims discretely and succinctly, so that his adversary can discern what he is

claiming and frame a responsive pleading, the court can determine which facts support which claims and whether the plaintiff has stated any claims upon which relief can be granted, and, at trial, the court can determine that evidence which is relevant and that which is not.’” Fikes v. City of Daphne, 79 F.3d 1079,

1082 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoted authority omitted). Significantly, a complaint may not run afoul of the Eleventh Circuit’s prohibition against shotgun pleading. See generally Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1321–23 (11th Cir. 2015) (outlining four

broad categories of impermissible shotgun pleadings). The Eleventh Circuit has unequivocally instructed that shotgun pleadings are “altogether unacceptable.” Cramer v. State of Fla., 117 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Cook v. Randolph Cnty., 573 F.3d 1143, 1151 (11th Cir. 2009) (“We have had much to

say about shotgun pleadings, none of which is favorable.” (collecting cases)). Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has engaged in a “thirty-year salvo of criticism aimed at shotgun pleadings, and there is no ceasefire in sight.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321; see, e.g., id. at 1321 n.9 (collecting cases). Striking shotgun pleadings is more than just procedural formalism: as the Court in Cramer

recognized, “[s]hotgun pleadings, whether filed by plaintiffs or defendants, exact an intolerable toll on the trial court’s docket, lead to unnecessary and unchannelled discovery, and impose unwarranted expense on the litigants, the court and the court’s parajudicial personnel and resources.” Cramer, 117 F.3d

at 1263. As such, when faced with the burden of deciphering a shotgun pleading, it is the trial court’s obligation to strike the pleading on its own initiative and force the plaintiff to replead to the extent possible under Rule 11. See id. (admonishing district court for not striking shotgun complaint on its own

initiative); see also Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321 n.10 (“[W]e have also advised that when a defendant fails to [move for a more definite statement], the district court ought to take the initiative to dismiss or strike the shotgun pleading and give the plaintiff an opportunity to replead.”).

Relevant here, one type of improper pleading occurs when the plaintiff “commits the sin of not separating into a different count each cause of action or claim for relief.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1322–23; see, e.g., id. at 1323 n.13 (collecting cases). Indeed, Rule 10(b) requires that: “[i]f doing so would promote

clarity, each claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence … must be stated in a separate count … .” Rule 10(b); see also Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trs. of Cent. Fla. Cmty. College, 77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996) (explaining that a properly drawn complaint “will present each claim for relief in a separate count, as required by Rule 10(b), and with such clarity and precision that the

defendant will be able to discern what the plaintiff is claiming and to frame a responsive pleading” (footnote omitted)). In the Complaint, Plaintiff appears to assert multiple claims under state law, but he fails to include any identifiable counts or explain which facts support each claim. See generally Complaint. As

a result, it is impossible to discern what claim(s) Plaintiff brings.

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Related

Rosemary C. Riley v. Fairbanks Capital Corporation
222 F. App'x 897 (Eleventh Circuit, 2007)
Fikes v. City of Daphne
79 F.3d 1079 (Eleventh Circuit, 1996)
Cramer v. State of Florida
117 F.3d 1258 (Eleventh Circuit, 1997)
United States v. Futrell
209 F.3d 1286 (Eleventh Circuit, 2000)
Nicole Loren v. Charles M. Sasser, Jr.
309 F.3d 1296 (Eleventh Circuit, 2002)
Michael Snow v. Directv, Inc.
450 F.3d 1314 (Eleventh Circuit, 2006)
Cook v. Randolph County, Ga.
573 F.3d 1143 (Eleventh Circuit, 2009)
Diane L. Holbrook v. Castle Key Insurance Co.
405 F. App'x 459 (Eleventh Circuit, 2010)
James Wright v. Lanson Newsome, Warden
795 F.2d 964 (Eleventh Circuit, 1986)

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John Jay Lacey v. Andrew Richard Lacey, Markus Ankuan Sermons, and David Michael Goldman, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/john-jay-lacey-v-andrew-richard-lacey-markus-ankuan-sermons-and-david-flmd-2026.