COFFIN, Chief Judge.
Appellant, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from the dismissal of his civil rights complaint, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The complaint alleges that appellant was denied due process during two disciplinary proceedings because his requests for legal assistance and for leave to call witnesses (or alternatively to submit statements from witnesses) were denied and because he was placed in solitary confinement for three days in violation of prison regulations. With respect to his solitary confinement and requests for legal assistance, we affirm the decision of the district court on the grounds stated in the court’s thoughtful opinion. The denials of appellant’s requests to call witnesses or submit written statements will be the focus of this opinion.
Appellant’s verified complaint alleges that on May 19, 1978, he was transferred from the general prison population to segregation. The next day he received a disciplinary report charging him with disobeying a corrections officer and disruptive conduct and describing the two incidents out of which the charges stemmed. On May 31, appellant was brought before the disciplinary board for a hearing at which he requested permission to call witnesses or, alternatively, to submit written statements from witnesses. These requests were denied by the chairman, who did not state his reasons for the denial. The chairman read the disciplinary report, noted appellant’s plea of not guilty, accepted the disciplinary report as true, found appellant guilty, and sentenced him to thirty days isolation and ninety days loss of good time credits. Appellant appealed to the superintendent of the prison, which appeal was subsequently denied.
On June 5, 1978, appellant, apparently having been returned to the general population, received another disciplinary report, this time charging him with encouraging a riot, making threats, and conduct disruptive of security, and, again, describing the offending incident. Three days later, appellant was transferred to segregation. On June 20, he received notice that a disciplinary hearing was scheduled for Juné 22. At the hearing appellant requested that an inmate witness, who also was in segregation and who, he maintained, “clearly [would present] no rational threat to the good order and security of the institution if allowed to testify on [appellant’s] behalf” be allowed to attend. This request, along with appellant’s request for staff legal assistance, were denied by the chairman, on the grounds that they were “irrelevant”. Appellant pleaded not guilty, but the board, “[b]ased upon [the] disciplinary report and no additional evidence offered”, found him guilty and sentenced him to fifteen days in [995]*995isolation. An appeal was filed with the superintendent which was still pending when this suit was commenced.
Prison regulations permit inmates to call witnesses, if it “will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals”, and to present “relevant, noncumulative documentary evidence” in their defense. The district court stated that “[presumably, [appellant’s] requests were denied for . . . reasons [consistent with these regulations]” and that the regulations conformed with the due process requirements for disciplinary hearings established in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). Furthermore, the court reasoned, since neither Wolff nor the regulations required the disciplinary board to state its reasons for denying a request to call witnesses, the fact that the board did not do so at the first hearing did not constitute grounds for relief under section 1983. The court dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
In Wolff v. McDonnell the Supreme Court outlined the due process rights which an inmate, facing sanctions such as solitary confinement or loss of good time credits, may have. Among them is the right to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense at disciplinary hearings “when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals.” 418 U.S. at 566, 571 n. 19, 94 S.Ct. at 2979; accord, Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 320-21, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976). Because calling or gathering statements from witnesses may cause disruption or interfere “with the swift punishment that in individual cases may be essential to carrying out the correctional program of the institution, . [p]rison officials must have the necessary discretion to keep the hearing within reasonable limits and to refuse to call witnesses that may create a risk of reprisal or undermine authority, as well as to limit access to other inmates to collect statements or to compile other documentary evidence.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566, 94 S.Ct. at 2979-80. The Court also held that a disciplinary board need not state its reason for “refusing to call a witness, whether it be for irrelevance, lack of necessity, or the hazards presented in individual cases”, but urged the board to do so. Id.
To state a claim, then, which will survive a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, it is not sufficient merely to allege that complainant’s requests to call witnesses or submit written statements at a prison disciplinary hearing were denied, even if it is additionally alleged that the disciplinary board did not express its reasons for the denial. To state a valid claim, it must be alleged that the inmate’s requests were denied for reasons not having to do with institutional security or correctional goals, and that the prison officials, in ruling as they did, clearly abused their considerable discretion in such matters. Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, 418 U.S. at 566-67, 94 S.Ct. 2963. See Hayes v. Walker, 555 F.2d 625, 629-30 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 959, 98 S.Ct. 491, 54 L.Ed.2d 320 (1977).
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COFFIN, Chief Judge.
Appellant, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from the dismissal of his civil rights complaint, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The complaint alleges that appellant was denied due process during two disciplinary proceedings because his requests for legal assistance and for leave to call witnesses (or alternatively to submit statements from witnesses) were denied and because he was placed in solitary confinement for three days in violation of prison regulations. With respect to his solitary confinement and requests for legal assistance, we affirm the decision of the district court on the grounds stated in the court’s thoughtful opinion. The denials of appellant’s requests to call witnesses or submit written statements will be the focus of this opinion.
Appellant’s verified complaint alleges that on May 19, 1978, he was transferred from the general prison population to segregation. The next day he received a disciplinary report charging him with disobeying a corrections officer and disruptive conduct and describing the two incidents out of which the charges stemmed. On May 31, appellant was brought before the disciplinary board for a hearing at which he requested permission to call witnesses or, alternatively, to submit written statements from witnesses. These requests were denied by the chairman, who did not state his reasons for the denial. The chairman read the disciplinary report, noted appellant’s plea of not guilty, accepted the disciplinary report as true, found appellant guilty, and sentenced him to thirty days isolation and ninety days loss of good time credits. Appellant appealed to the superintendent of the prison, which appeal was subsequently denied.
On June 5, 1978, appellant, apparently having been returned to the general population, received another disciplinary report, this time charging him with encouraging a riot, making threats, and conduct disruptive of security, and, again, describing the offending incident. Three days later, appellant was transferred to segregation. On June 20, he received notice that a disciplinary hearing was scheduled for Juné 22. At the hearing appellant requested that an inmate witness, who also was in segregation and who, he maintained, “clearly [would present] no rational threat to the good order and security of the institution if allowed to testify on [appellant’s] behalf” be allowed to attend. This request, along with appellant’s request for staff legal assistance, were denied by the chairman, on the grounds that they were “irrelevant”. Appellant pleaded not guilty, but the board, “[b]ased upon [the] disciplinary report and no additional evidence offered”, found him guilty and sentenced him to fifteen days in [995]*995isolation. An appeal was filed with the superintendent which was still pending when this suit was commenced.
Prison regulations permit inmates to call witnesses, if it “will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals”, and to present “relevant, noncumulative documentary evidence” in their defense. The district court stated that “[presumably, [appellant’s] requests were denied for . . . reasons [consistent with these regulations]” and that the regulations conformed with the due process requirements for disciplinary hearings established in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). Furthermore, the court reasoned, since neither Wolff nor the regulations required the disciplinary board to state its reasons for denying a request to call witnesses, the fact that the board did not do so at the first hearing did not constitute grounds for relief under section 1983. The court dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
In Wolff v. McDonnell the Supreme Court outlined the due process rights which an inmate, facing sanctions such as solitary confinement or loss of good time credits, may have. Among them is the right to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense at disciplinary hearings “when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals.” 418 U.S. at 566, 571 n. 19, 94 S.Ct. at 2979; accord, Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 320-21, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976). Because calling or gathering statements from witnesses may cause disruption or interfere “with the swift punishment that in individual cases may be essential to carrying out the correctional program of the institution, . [p]rison officials must have the necessary discretion to keep the hearing within reasonable limits and to refuse to call witnesses that may create a risk of reprisal or undermine authority, as well as to limit access to other inmates to collect statements or to compile other documentary evidence.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566, 94 S.Ct. at 2979-80. The Court also held that a disciplinary board need not state its reason for “refusing to call a witness, whether it be for irrelevance, lack of necessity, or the hazards presented in individual cases”, but urged the board to do so. Id.
To state a claim, then, which will survive a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, it is not sufficient merely to allege that complainant’s requests to call witnesses or submit written statements at a prison disciplinary hearing were denied, even if it is additionally alleged that the disciplinary board did not express its reasons for the denial. To state a valid claim, it must be alleged that the inmate’s requests were denied for reasons not having to do with institutional security or correctional goals, and that the prison officials, in ruling as they did, clearly abused their considerable discretion in such matters. Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, 418 U.S. at 566-67, 94 S.Ct. 2963. See Hayes v. Walker, 555 F.2d 625, 629-30 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 959, 98 S.Ct. 491, 54 L.Ed.2d 320 (1977).
With regard to the first disciplinary hearing, the complaint merely states that appellant’s requests to call witnesses or sub[996]*996mit statements were denied and that the board chairman did not state his reasons for the denial. In view of Wolff, these allegations do not state a claim under § 1983, upon which relief can be granted.
With regard to the second hearing, the complaint states that appellant asked to call as a witness an inmate who did not pose a security risk because like appellant he was in segregation. “This request, as well as [appellant’s] request for staff [legal] assistance was denied by the chairman, being in his opinion ‘irrelevant.’ ” Wolff states that “[p]rison officials must have the necessary discretion to keep the hearing within reasonable limits”, and may deny a request when they think a witness’ testimony will be irrelevant or unnecessary. Furthermore, no facts are alleged in the complaint from which the district court could have reasonably inferred that the denial was in fact for an inappropriate reason. Thus, the allegations pertaining to the second hearing also do not state a Rule 12(bX6) claim under § 1983.
In his appellate brief, appellant alleges facts pertaining to his request to call a witness at the second hearing which were not included in his complaint, namely, that the witness was a principal in the incident being investigated and that the real reasons the board chairman denied his requests were arbitrariness, appellant’s indigency and “the policies of the commissioner.” Our scope of review of facts, however, is limited to those contained in the district court record and, since this appeal is from the dismissal of a complaint, “our focus is limited to the allegations” contained therein. Litton Industries, Inc. v. Hernandez Colon, 587 F.2d 70, 74 (1st Cir. 1978). Appellant should have included these additional facts in his complaint or at least, upon learning by way of the dismissal of his complaint that he had failed to indicate that his requests were denied for improper reasons, have included them in a motion to amend his complaint or for reconsideration.
Accordingly, the judgment below is affirmed.
We cite Hayes only for the proposition that, despite the broad discretion prison officials have to deny requests to call witnesses or to submit statements, these denials are still subject to a limited judicial review for abuse of discretion.