John Hilaire v. Cohen, Burns, Hard, & Paul, LLC et al.

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

John Hilaire,

Plaintiff, Civil No. 3:26-cv-00462-VAB

v.

Cohen, Burns, Hard, & Paul, LLC et al.,

Defendants. August 27, 2026

RECOMMENDED RULING ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND INITIAL REVIEW OF THE COMPLAINT

The plaintiff, John Hilaire, lost a debt collection case in the Connecticut Superior Court in 2019.1 He has now sued the company that won the judgment against him, along with a law firm and one of its individual lawyers, for alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (“CUTPA”).2 Mr. Hilaire says that the company did not properly prove its ownership of the debt it sought to collect, and that all three defendants violated the FDCPA and CUTPA in pursuing and obtaining a judgment on an allegedly unproven debt.3 Contemporaneously with his complaint, he filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, or “IFP.”4

1 Order Regarding Motion for Judgment, Docket No. 117.10; Judgment, Docket No. 117.20; Absolute Resolutions Investments, LLC v. Hilaire, No. FBT-CV-18-6069848-S (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 30, 2019). This Court may take judicial notice of state court records. See Mangiafico v. Blumenthal, 471 F.3d 391, 398 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating that “docket sheets are public records of which the court could take judicial notice”). 2 See generally Complaint, Docket No. 1. 3 Complaint, Docket No. 1, at paras. 11-21. 4 Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, Docket No. 2. When a plaintiff requests leave to proceed IFP, the court ordinarily conducts two inquiries. First, it reviews the plaintiff’s financial affidavit to determine whether he is unable to pay the fee.5 Second, to ensure that the plaintiff is not abusing the privilege of filing a free lawsuit, the court examines his complaint to determine whether, among other things, it is “frivolous or malicious” or “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.”6 And in all cases—not just those in

which the plaintiff seeks leave to proceed IFP—the court must determine whether it has jurisdiction over the case’s subject matter.7 If the complaint does not support subject matter jurisdiction, or is frivolous or malicious, or “fails to state a claim,” the court must dismiss the case.8 United States District Judge Victor A. Bolden referred Mr. Hilaire’s case to me, United States Magistrate Judge Thomas O. Farrish, to conduct these inquiries.9 I have thoroughly reviewed the complaint, the IFP motion, and the accompanying financial affidavit. In the first step of the analysis, I recommend that the IFP motion be denied on the current record because Mr. Hilaire has not sufficiently demonstrated that he is unable to pay the filing fee.10 In the second step, I recommend that the complaint be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; as “frivolous” under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) because “a dispositive defense” of statute of limitations “clearly exists ‘on the face of the complaint[;]’”11 and for failure to state a claim. I further recommend, however, that the dismissal be without prejudice.

5 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 6 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 7 See Rule 12(h)(3), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 8 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 9 Order of Referral, Docket No. 10. 10 See discussion in Section II below. 11 Gupte v. Uber Technology, No. 3:24-cv-2037 (VAB) (TOF), 2025 WL 904741, at *3 (D. Conn. Mar. 24, 2025) (quoting Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1995), report and recommendation adopted, slip op. (D. Conn. Apr. 18, 2025). I. BACKGROUND The following facts are taken from Mr. Hilaire’s complaint,12 and from those Superior Court documents of which the Court may take judicial notice. In 2015, Mr. Hilaire borrowed $23,750.00 from WebBank, a Utah lender.13 WebBank allegedly sold the loan to Prosper Funding,

LLC (“Prosper”), and Prosper allegedly conveyed the loan to Absolute Resolution Investments, LLC (“Absolute”) in 2017.14 On December 11, 2017, Absolute filed suit against Mr. Hilaire in the Superior Court, Judicial District of Fairfield at Bridgeport, asserting that he had failed to pay $21,891.89 that he owed.15 Absolute also sought to recover “contractual interest, statutory interest, attorney fees and cost[s].”16 On July 19, 2018, the Superior Court defaulted Mr. Hilaire for failure to plead.17 Absolute then filed a motion for judgment after default on August 24, 2018.18 Two weeks later, Mr. Hilaire

12 Mr. Hilaire’s well-pleaded factual allegations—in other words, the allegations that are not merely conclusory—are assumed to be true for purposes of this review. Staton v. Holzbach, No. 3:20-cv-631 (SRU), 2020 WL 6119382, at *1 n.4 (D. Conn Oct. 16, 2020). If Mr. Hilaire’s case were to pass initial review, he would of course bear the burden to prove his factual claims at a later stage. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Brown, No. 3:25-cv-1495 (OAW) (TOF), 2026 WL 2322825, at *1 n.5 (D. Conn. Aug. 11, 2026). He should not infer, from the fact that the Court is assuming the truth of his well-pleaded factual allegations at this initial stage, that he has been relieved of his burden of proving those facts if any later stages are reached. 13 Exhibits, Docket No. 118.00, pp. 2-6, Absolute Resolutions Investments, LLC v. Hilaire, No. FBT-CV-18-6069848-S (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 29, 2019). 14 Complaint, Absolute Resolutions Investments, LLC v. Hilaire, No. FBT-CV-18-6069848- S (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 11, 2017) at paras. 5-6. 15 Complaint, Absolute Resolutions Investments, LLC v. Hilaire, No. FBT-CV-18-6069848- S (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 11, 2017) at para. 8. 16 Complaint, Absolute Resolutions Investments, LLC v. Hilaire, No. FBT-CV-18-6069848- S (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 11, 2017) at para. 8. 17 Notice of Entry of Default, Docket No. 103.00, Absolute Resolutions Investments, LLC v. Hilaire, No. FBT-CV-18-6069848-S (Conn. Super. Ct. July 19, 2018). 18 Motion for Judgment After Default, Docket No. 104.00, Absolute Resolutions Investments, LLC v. Hilaire, No. FBT-CV-18-6069848-S (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 24, 2018). filed a pro se response asserting that the loan account at issue was “not [his] account.”19 Evidently interpreting this brief response as a pleading that cured the default, Judge Edward Stodolink denied Absolute’s motion for default judgment on September 11, 2018.20 On March 19, 2019, Absolute claimed the case to the trial list.21 The court scheduled a

pretrial conference for April 25, 2019, but Mr. Hilaire failed to appear and another default entered against him.22 Judge Stodolink then held a hearing on April 30, 2019, at which Absolute presented an affidavit of debt; the WebBank promissory note; a bill of sale purporting to document the transfer of certain loans from WebBank to Prosper on April 25, 2017; another bill of sale purporting to document the assignment of Prosper’s interests in “certain charged-off loans” to Absolute on May 8, 2017; a spreadsheet page purporting to show that Mr. Hilaire’s loan was among the loans that were transferred; and a spreadsheet claiming to show the loan’s payment history, interest accruals, and so forth.23 After the hearing, Judge Stodolink entered judgment in Absolute’s favor in the amount of $22,335.89.24 The court ordered Mr. Hilaire to pay $35.00 per week toward the judgment.25

19 Response to Motion for Judgment, Docket No. 107.00, Absolute Resolutions Investments, LLC v. Hilaire, No. FBT-CV-18-6069848-S (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 2018). 20 Order on Motion for Judgment After Default, Docket No. 104.10, Absolute Resolutions Investments, LLC v. Hilaire, No. FBT-CV-18-6069848-S (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 11, 2018). 21 Certificate of Closed Pleadings and Claim for Trial List, Docket No. 114.00, Absolute Resolutions Investments, LLC v. Hilaire, No. FBT-CV-18-6069848-S (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 19, 2019). 22 See Motion for Judgment After Default, Docket No. 117.00, Absolute Resolutions Investments, LLC v. Hilaire, No. FBT-CV-18-6069848-S (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 29, 2019). 23 Exhibits, Docket No. 118.00, Absolute Resolutions Investments, LLC v. Hilaire, No. FBT- CV-18-6069848-S (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 29, 2019). 24 Order Regarding Motion for Judgment, Docket No. 117.10; Judgment, Docket No. 117.20; Absolute Resolutions Investments, LLC v. Hilaire, No. FBT-CV-18-6069848-S (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 30, 2019). 25 Order Regarding Motion for Judgment, Docket No. 117.10; Judgment, Docket No. 117.20; Absolute Resolutions Investments, LLC v. Hilaire, No. FBT-CV-18-6069848-S (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 30, 2019). Absolute notified Mr. Hilaire of the judgment on May 1, 2019,26 and Mr. Hilaire did not appeal within the twenty-day period specified in Section 63-1 of the Connecticut Practice Book. On June 4, 2019, Absolute applied for a writ of execution, claiming that he had defaulted on his $35.00 weekly payments.27 Between 2019 and 2022, Mr. Hilaire allegedly paid $560.00 toward

the judgment; but with $21,891.89 still asserted to be outstanding, Absolute applied for another writ of execution on July 14, 2022.28 The docket does not say whether Absolute collected on the second writ of execution, but as of this writing, no satisfaction of judgment has been filed. On October 6, 2025—over six years after the judgment entered—Mr. Hilaire filed a pro se motion to open the judgment, claiming that it had “entered without subject matter jurisdiction” because Absolute “lacked standing and prosecuted the case in violation of federal law governing consumer credit and debt collection.”29 In a supporting memorandum of law, he argued that the alleged Prosper-Absolute bill of sale was trumped by Prosper’s “SEC-filed Prospectus and governing securitization documents,” which, in his view, “expressly state[d] that borrower loans are transferred without recourse and that noteholders and subsequent assignees possess no direct

enforcement rights against borrower members.”30 As an alternative to opening the judgment, Mr. Hilaire asked the Superior Court for leave to remove the case to this court, because the case

26 Notice of Judgment, Docket No. 119.00, Absolute Resolutions Investments, LLC v. Hilaire, No. FBT-CV-18-6069848-S (Conn. Super. Ct. May 2, 2019). 27 Application for Writ of Execution, Docket No. 120.00, Absolute Resolutions Investments, LLC v. Hilaire, No. FBT-CV-18-6069848-S (Conn. Super. Ct. June 5, 2019). 28 See Application for Writ of Execution, Docket No. 122.00, Absolute Resolutions Investments, LLC v. Hilaire, No. FBT-CV-18-6069848-S (Conn. Super. Ct. July 22,, 2019). 29 Motion to Open Judgement, Docket No. 124, Absolute Resolutions Investments, LLC v. Hilaire, No. FBT-CV-18-6069848-S (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 6, 2025). 30 Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion, Docket No. 125.00, at pp. 2-3, Absolute Resolutions Investments, LLC v. Hilaire, No. FBT-CV-18-6069848-S (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 6, 2025) (emphasis in original). presented federal questions under the Truth in Lending Act and other statutes.31 Absolute filed an objection,32 and Judge Charles Reed denied the motion in a brief postcard order on November 10, 2025.33 On November 13, 2025, Mr. Hilaire filed a motion for articulation, asking the court to explain the basis for its decision.34 He also filed a “demand for delegation of attorney authority,”

in which he claimed to have reason to believe that Absolute’s lawyers had appeared in the case without authority to do so.35 On December 1, 2025, he filed a motion to reargue or reconsider.36 All three of these motions remain sub judice. Mr. Hilaire still has not appealed any aspect of the Superior Court proceeding to the Connecticut Appellate Court. On March 27, 2026, Mr. Hilaire filed this federal court action.37 He sued Absolute; Cohen, Burns, Hard & Paul, LLC, the firm that appeared for Absolute in the Superior Court; and Neil Paul, the individual attorney who signed Absolute’s pleadings.38 Mr. Hilaire contends that these defendants violated the FDCPA and CUTPA when they “represented to the court that they possessed the right to enforce a promissory note originally issued by a third-party lender.”39 He

31 Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion, Docket No. 125.00, at pp. 4-5, Absolute Resolutions Investments, LLC v. Hilaire, No. FBT-CV-18-6069848-S (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 6, 2025). 32 Objection to Defendant’s Motion to Reopen or Remove Case to Federal Court, Docket No. 127.00, Absolute Resolutions Investments, LLC v. Hilaire, No. FBT-CV-18-6069848-S (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 14, 2025). 33 Order, Docket No. 124.10, Absolute Resolutions Investments, LLC v. Hilaire, No. FBT- CV-18-6069848-S (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 10, 2025). 34 Motion for Articulation, Docket No. 131.00, Absolute Resolutions Investments, LLC v. Hilaire, No. FBT-CV-18-6069848-S (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 13, 2025). 35 Demand for Delegation of Authority, Docket No. 132.00, Absolute Resolutions Investments, LLC v. Hilaire, No. FBT-CV-18-6069848-S (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 13, 2025). 36 Motion to Reargue/Reconsider, Docket No. 133.00, Absolute Resolutions Investments, LLC v. Hilaire, No. FBT-CV-18-6069848-S (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec.1, 2025). 37 Complaint, Docket No. 1. 38 Complaint, Docket No. 1. 39 Complaint, Docket No. 1, at p. 1. says that these representations were false because “the documents relied upon by Defendants, including generalized bills of sale, account summaries, and assignment language referencing ‘charged-off loans,’ ‘receivables,’ and ‘participation interests,’ failed to establish that Defendants ever acquired Plaintiff’s specific promissory note or lawful authority to enforce it.”40 He adds

that, “[a]s a result of Defendants’ conduct, [he] was subjected to an unlawful judgment, adverse credit reporting, and ongoing harm.”41 Importantly for this review, his complaint contains no allegations of wrongful conduct post-dating 2019.42 Contemporaneously with his complaint, Mr. Hilaire moved for leave to proceed IFP.43 Judge Bolden then referred the case to me for a ruling on the IFP application and an initial review of the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.44 I have carefully considered both the application and the complaint. In Section II below, I will explain why I believe Mr. Hilaire has not yet proven an entitlement to IFP status. And in Section III, I will explain why his complaint should be dismissed. II. IN FORMA PAUPERIS APPLICATION When a plaintiff files a complaint in federal court, typically he must pay filing and

administrative fees totaling $405.00.45 District courts may nevertheless authorize commencement of an action “without prepayment of fees . . . by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement . . . that the person is unable to pay such fees.”46 When a court allows a plaintiff to

40 Complaint, Docket No. 1, at p. 1. 41 Complaint, Docket No. 1, at p. 2. 42 See generally Complaint, Docket No. 1. 43 Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, Docket No. 2. 44 Order of Referral, Docket No. 9. 45 28 U.S.C. § 1914. The filing fee is $350.00 and the administrative fee is $55.00. 46 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1); see also Coleman v. Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532, 534(2015) (stating that plaintiffs who qualify for IFP status “may commence a civil action without prepaying fees or paying certain expenses”). proceed this way, he is said to be proceeding “in forma pauperis,” which is a Latin phrase meaning “in the manner of a pauper” or poor person.47 To qualify as “unable to pay,” the plaintiff does not have to demonstrate absolute destitution, but he does need to show that “paying such fees would constitute a serious hardship.”48

The United States Supreme Court has said that a plaintiff makes a “sufficient” showing of inability to pay when his application demonstrates that he “cannot because of his poverty pay or give security for the costs and still be able to provide himself and his dependents with the necessities of life.”49 In this case, Mr. Hilaire filed an application on the standard District of Connecticut form, but his answers to the form’s questions are rife with cagy qualifications that leave the reader unsure of his true financial picture.50 Take, for example, his answers to the questions in Sections A and B—the questions about his income and assets. When asked to state his income, he said only that his “[l]ast non-employee compensation was for $650 on 1/27/2026,”51 leaving the reader to wonder whether other forms of income have been omitted. When asked whether he owned any real

property, he said only that he did “not own any income producing real property.”52 And when asked to identify his assets, he says that he “maintains no funds in a bank account,” but he does not say whether he has other types of accounts, e.g., brokerage, cryptocurrency, etc.53

47 Anderson v. Davis, No. 3:26-cv-400 (SVN) (TOF), 2026 WL 2268253, at *2 n.23 (D. Conn. Aug. 6, 2026) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed.) at p. 794), report and recommendation adopted, slip op. (D. Conn. Aug. 24, 2026). 48 Fiebelkorn v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 59, 62 (2007); see also Potnick v. Eastern State Hospital, 701 F.2d 243, 244 (2d Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (stating that “no party must be made to choose between abandoning a potentially meritorious claim or foregoing the necessities of life”). 49 Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948). 50 Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, Docket No. 2. 51 Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, Docket No. 2 , at p. 3 (emphasis added). 52 Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, Docket No. 2, at p. 4 (emphasis added). 53 Attachment to Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, Docket No. 2, at p. 1. The lack of clarity continues in Section C, the section in which Mr. Hilaire was asked about his monthly obligations. He claims to spend $1,200.00 each month on rent, and to have no mortgage, leading the reader to believe that he is a renter rather than a homeowner.54 But he then says that he has dispute over an alleged $120,000.00 debt to U.S. Bank Trust,55 and in a two-page

attachment to his form application, he adds that he “lives in the property that is the subject to a pending federal dispute”—all of which suggests he was a homeowner at the time of his application, just one who was not then paying his mortgage.56 He then says that his utility bills “are currently subject to medical protection status,”57 and he evidently wants the reader to believe that this fact suggests indigency; but “medical protection status” is determined with respect to medical rather than financial criteria, and accordingly this claim says little if anything about his ability to pay the filing fee.58 He discloses that someone named Nerland Calixte contributes $520.00 to his $1,575.00 in monthly expenses, but he says nothing about Ms. Calixte’s resources or ability to pay the filing fee. Mr. Hilaire then closes out Section C with yet another carefully-qualified response: when asked to “[p]rovide any other information that will help explain why [he] cannot pay the cost

of these proceedings,” he responded that he “currently has no employment income.”59 Mr. Hilaire has filed ten federal cases since November of 2025, and his filings in other cases shed light on these qualifications. In Hilaire v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC, he explained that

54 Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, Docket No. 2, at p. 5. 55 Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, Docket No. 2, at p. 5. 56 Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, Docket No. 2, at p. 8. As will be shown in footnote 64 below, Mr. Hilaire’s trust did indeed own the home in which he lived as of the date of his application. 57 Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, Docket No. 2, at p. 8. 58 See United Illuminating, Medical Protection, available at www.uinet.com/account/ waystopay/help-with-bill/medical%20protection (last visited August 25, 2026) (explaining that eligibility for “medical protection” is determined with reference to medical, rather than financial, criteria). 59 Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, Docket No. 2, at p. 6 (emphasis added). he does not believe himself to be a “person,” because a federal appellate court allegedly held that “[a] ‘person’ is ‘a variety of entities other than human beings.’”60 Citing 1 U.S.C. § 1, he contended that only “corporations, companies, firms, partnerships, and associations” qualify as “persons” under the law, and that flesh-and-blood human beings evidently do not.61 He then

reasoned that, because Black’s Law Dictionary uses the word “person” in the course of defining the word “employee,” a non-person like him cannot have an “employer” or “wages,” even though he concedes that he “exchange[s his] labor . . . for compensation.”62 He then bootstrapped these implausible theories into a conclusion that he is “not receiving ‘income’ within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code.”63 In other words, Mr. Hilaire’s Nationstar filing provides ample reason to believe that his statements about his income in this case are not genuine statements about his earnings, but rather prevarications arising from meritless “tax protester” beliefs. There are other reasons to question whether Mr. Hilaire has been completely candid about his financial picture. To begin with, at the time he filed his motion, his trust was the record owner

60 Affidavit of Non-Income Status and Notice to the Clerk of Free Access to the Courts, Docket No. 2, at p. 6, Hilaire v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC, No. 3:26-cv-15 (VAB) (D. Conn.). Mr. Hilaire cited “Church of Scientology v. U.S. Department of Justice, 612 F.2d 417 (1979)” for this proposition, but he has misleadingly edited his quote from the case. The full sentence reads: “The word ‘person’ in legal terminology is perceived as a general word which normally includes in its scope a variety of entities other than human beings.” Church of Scientology of California v. U.S. Department of Justice, 612 F.2d 417, 425 (9th Cir. 1979) (emphasis added). In the context of that case, the term “person” clearly encompassed both flesh-and-blood human beings as well as other legal “entities.” 61 Affidavit of Non-Income Status and Notice to the Clerk of Free Access to the Courts, Docket No. 2, at p. 6, Hilaire v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC, No. 3:26-cv-15 (VAB) (D. Conn.) (citing 1 U.S.C. § 1). This is, of course, another mistaken citation. 1 U.S.C. § 1 provides that, “[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise . . . the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporations, companies,” etc. The statute does not say that the term “person” is limited to corporations and other juridical persons. 62 Affidavit of Non-Income Status and Notice to the Clerk of Free Access to the Courts, Docket No. 2, at p. 6, Hilaire v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC, No. 3:26-cv-15 (VAB) (D. Conn.). 63 Affidavit of Non-Income Status and Notice to the Clerk of Free Access to the Courts, Docket No. 2, at p. 7, Hilaire v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC, No. 3:26-cv-15 (VAB) (D. Conn.). of the house in which he lived, yet he did not disclose it. The Bridgeport assessor’s office appraised the value of the home at $301,896.00.64 Moreover, he claimed to be essentially penniless in the IFP application that he filed in the second of his ten cases, on January 5, 2026;65 but then he paid the full $405.00 filing fee in his third case just twenty-four days later.66

Finally and more fundamentally, Mr. Hilaire’s application makes no sense. No one can live for very long on no income, no assets, and no savings. And when an IFP applicant claims to do just that, courts typically conclude that his application “must be incomplete and, by extension, do[es] not support in forma pauperis status.”67 Here, Mr. Hilaire has been claiming to live on no income, no liquid assets, and no more than $150.00 in savings for nearly a year and a half.68 “The question of whether a plaintiff qualifies for IFP status is one that lies ‘within the discretion of the district court,’” and in exercising that discretion, courts are not required to accept such implausible

64 Field Card, available at https://gis.vgsi.com/bridgeportct/Parcel.aspx?Pid=31626 (last visited August 23, 2026) [https://perma.cc/B8RZ-8Q78]. The court may take judicial notice of online municipal assessors’ records. See Giraldo v. Kessler, 694 F.3d 161, 164 (2d Cir. 2012) (stating that district courts may “take judicial notice of relevant matters of public record”); Witt v. Stefonski, No. 3:22-cv-1489 (KAD) (TOF), 2022 WL 22863353, at *2 n.1 (D. Conn. Dec. 28, 2022) (taking judicial notice of municipal assessor’s online valuation records), report and recommendation approved and adopted, slip op. (D. Conn. Feb. 3, 2023). On March 27, 2026, the date of Mr. Hilaire’s IFP motion, the house was owned by the “Hilaire John Living Estate Trust.” It was sold to Soundview LLC for $190,000.00 on April 8, 2026. 65 Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs, Hilaire v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC, No. 3:26-cv-15 (VAB), Docket No. 2. 66 Notation of Receipt of Filing Fee, Hilaire v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC, No. 3:26-cv-149 (VAB) (D. Conn. Jan. 29, 2026). 67 Jessie C. v. Kijakazi, No. 3:22-cv-609 (SRU) (TOF), 2022 WL 2068993, at *1 (D. Conn. May 2, 2022); see also Pierre v. City of Rochester, No. 16-cv-6428 (CJS), 2018 WL 10072449, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2018). 68 Compare Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs, Docket No. 2, Hilaire v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC, No. 3:26-cv-15 (VAB) (D. Conn.) (affidavit dated January 5, 2026 claiming to have earned $0.00 in income from any source in the previous twelve months) with Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, Docket No. 2, Hilaire v. Navy Federal Credit Union, No. 3:26-cv-747 (claiming, on May 15, 2026, no income in 2026 other than the $650.00 in “non-employee compensation” disclosed in this case). claims even where, as here, the plaintiff signed them under penalty of perjury.69 In this case, it seems much likelier that Mr. Hilaire has resources, but has chosen not to disclose them on account of his meritless belief that he is not a “person” and therefore not capable of being an “employee” who earns “income.”

I recognize that Mr. Hilaire was granted leave to proceed IFP on an essentially identical application in five other cases.70 But I respectfully submit that the better course is to deny his motion as it is currently presented, and to advise him that, if he wishes to proceed without paying $405.00 in filing and administrative fees, he must fill out another application with the “particularity, definiteness and certainty” that the law requires.71 This would entail filing another application, the accuracy of which does not depend on fanciful theories about the definitions of “person,” “employee,” “income,” and so forth. Other IFP plaintiffs with questionable affidavits have been directed to better explain themselves,72 and Mr. Hilaire should do likewise. III. REVIEW OF THE COMPLAINT UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915 When a plaintiff neither pays the filing fee nor demonstrates that he is unable to do so,

some courts dismiss his case for that reason alone—in other words, without proceeding to the

69 In re Keita, No. 22-cv-6769 (ENV), 2024 WL 1259352, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2024), appeal docketed sub nom. Keita v. Ford, No. 26-1020 (2d Cir. Apr. 20, 2026). 70 Hilaire v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC, No. 3:26-cv-15 (VAB) (MEG), slip op. (D. Conn. Apr. 2, 2026), report and recommendation adopted, slip op. (D. Conn. May 7, 2026); Hilaire v. Equifax Information Services, No. 3:26-cv-519 (VAB) (RAR), slip op. (D. Conn. May 4, 2026); Hilaire v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., No. 3:26-cv-520 (VAB) (RMS), slip op. (D. Conn. Apr. 22, 2026); Hilaire v. American Express National Bank, No. 3:26-cv-650 (VAB) (RAR), slip op. (D. Conn. May 28, 2026); Hilaire v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 3:26-cv-670 (VAB) (SDV), slip op. (D. Conn. June 17, 2026). 71 Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015). 72 E.g., Miro v. City of Bridgeport, No. 3:20-cv-346 (VAB) (TOF), 2020 WL 12893928, at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 25, 2020) (directing plaintiff to better explain her income), report and recommendation adopted, slip op. (D. Conn. Apr. 15, 2020). second step of the Section 1915 analysis.73 Other courts have held that it is more efficient to conduct both inquiries at once.74 Although Mr. Hilaire has not gotten past the first inquiry, I will conduct the second inquiry now. A. Applicable Legal Principles A motion for IFP status “comes with a consequence.”75 The same statute that authorizes

courts to grant IFP status to qualifying plaintiffs also directs them to review complaints to ensure that those plaintiffs are not abusing that right. Because IFP plaintiffs lack “an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious or repetitive lawsuits,” the statute instructs courts to review their complaints and dismiss certain types of obviously unmeritorious claims.76 Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) instructs federal district courts to dismiss IFP complaints if any of three circumstances apply. First, the statute directs courts to dismiss complaints if they are “frivolous or malicious.” An “action is frivolous for § 1915(e) purposes if it has no arguable basis in law or fact, as is the case if it is based on an ‘indisputably meritless legal theory.’”77 As noted above, a complaint is

also “frivolous” for purposes of Section 1915 if “a dispositive defense clearly exists ‘on the face of the complaint.’”78

73 E.g., Richardson v. Napoli, No. 9:09-cv-1440 (TJM) (DEP), 2010 WL 1235383 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2010). 74 E.g., Zografidis v. Richards, No. 3:22-cv-631 (AVC) (TOF), 2022 WL 21756775, at *1 (D. Conn. July 6, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, slip op. (D. Conn. Oct. 7, 2022), aff’d, No. 22-3187, 2023 WL 7538211 (2d Cir. Nov. 14, 2023), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 153 (2024). 75 Ortiz v. Tinnerello, No. 3:22-cv-1318 (AWT) (TOF), 2023 WL 11842871, at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 22, 2023), report and recommendation accepted, slip op. (D. Conn. July 26, 2023). 76 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). 77 Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 759 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 324, 325-27 (1989)). 78 Gupte v. Uber Technology, No. 3:24-cv-2037 (VAB) (TOF), 2025 WL 904741, at *3 (D. Conn. Mar. 24, 2025) (quoting Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1995), report and recommendation adopted, slip op. (D. Conn. Apr. 18, 2025). Second, the statute instructs federal district courts to dismiss IFP complaints that “fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted.”79 A complaint fails to state a claim when it lacks “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”80 “‘Facial plausibility,’ in turn, requires the pleading of ‘factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’”81 In determining

whether the plaintiff has pled enough factual information to add up to a legally meritorious claim, courts follow a “two-pronged approach.”82 They begin by “identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.”83 Then, if the complaint contains “well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”84 Third, the IFP statute directs district courts to dismiss any claims that “seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”85 In determining whether a pro se plaintiff’s complaint implicates one of these three bases for dismissal, the Court construes his pleadings liberally and holds them to a less stringent standard

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.86 The law “is not meant to be a series of traps and travails” for pro se litigants, and because it does not aim “to dismiss potentially meritorious arguments because of the particularities of federal practice,” pro se plaintiffs like Mr. Hilaire are

79 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 80 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 81 Hamm v. Baio, No. 3:22-cv-401 (OAW) (TOF), 2023 WL 2867070, at *2 (D. Conn. Jan. 10, 2023) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)), report and recommendation adopted, slip op. (D. Conn. Feb. 27, 2023). 82 Robb v. Connecticut Board of Veterinary Medicine, 157 F. Supp. 3d 130, 137-38 (D. Conn. 2016) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)). 83 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 84 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 85 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). 86 Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). given a “special solicitude” in the form of a “liberal construction of pleadings [and] motion papers[.]”87 In essence, complaints submitted by parties who are unrepresented by an attorney are not scrutinized in the same manner as those submitted by a licensed attorney. This liberality has its limits, however. First and foremost, even a pro se plaintiff must

plead enough facts to plausibly state a non-frivolous claim upon which relief can be granted. As Judge Covello once wrote, “[a]lthough courts still have an obligation to liberally construe a pro se complaint,” the complaint “must include sufficient factual allegations to meet the standard of facial plausibility.”88 Furthermore, in determining whether the plaintiff has pled enough facts to render his claim plausible, courts cannot fill holes in his complaint by “invent[ing] factual allegations that he has not pled.”89 Before considering whether a complaint is subject to dismissal for one of the three reasons outlined in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), however, the Court must first satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction over the case. The liberal construction due to pro se pleadings “does not stretch so far as to cause a court to hear a case that is outside its jurisdiction,”90 and “[w]here jurisdiction is

lacking . . . dismissal is mandatory.”91 I will therefore first address whether the Court has jurisdiction over Mr. Hilaire’s claims, and then I will consider whether his complaint implicates any of the bases for dismissal in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

87 Rosa v. Doe, 86 F.4th 1001, 1007 (2d Cir. 2023) (citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). 88 Vega v. Univ. of Conn. Med. Ctr., No. 3:11-cv-1864 (AVC), 2012 WL 1825381, at *1 (D. Conn. May 16, 2012) (citation omitted). 89 Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010). 90 Hamm v. Baio, No. 3:22-cv-401 (OAW) (TOF), 2023 WL 2867070, at *2 (D. Conn. Jan. 10, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, slip op. (D. Conn. Feb. 27, 2023). 91 Yong Qin Luo v. Mikel, 625 F.3d 772, 775 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Jurisdiction is “[a] court’s power to decide a case.”92 It is a term that encompasses several concepts, including “subject matter jurisdiction” and “personal jurisdiction.” When a court asks itself whether it has “subject matter jurisdiction” over a case, it is asking whether it has the power to hear the type of claim that the plaintiff has brought.93 By contrast, when a court considers

whether “personal jurisdiction” exists, it asks itself whether it has power over the parties.94 Like all federal courts, this Court is a court of “limited” subject matter jurisdiction, meaning that it cannot hear just any case.95 In this respect, the federal courts are unlike the Connecticut state courts. The Connecticut Superior Court is a “court of general jurisdiction,” meaning that it can decide a very wide array of cases.96 But federal courts “possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.”97 Leaving aside some other case types that are not relevant here, Congress has authorized the federal district courts to hear and decide two principal types of claims. First, federal courts may hear claims that “aris[e] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”98 This is

known as the “federal question” form of subject matter jurisdiction, because such a case raises questions about compliance with federal law. Second, federal courts may decide cases between “citizens of different States” “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000.”99 This is known as “diversity” jurisdiction, because when the plaintiff and the defendant

92 Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004), at p. 867. 93 Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004), at p. 870. 94 Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004), at p. 870. 95 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). 96 State v. Butler, 348 Conn. 51, 76 (2023) (D’Auria, J., concurring). 97 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). 98 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 99 28 U.S.C. § 1332. are citizens of different states, their citizenship is said to be “diverse” from each other. In this case, Mr. Hilaire seeks to invoke the court’s “federal question” jurisdiction.100 Importantly for this case, federal district courts do not have jurisdiction over “cases that are, in substance, appeals from judgments of a state court.”101 This principle is called the “Rooker-

Feldman doctrine,” because it is based on two United States Supreme Court cases: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.102 and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman.103 Justice Clarence Thomas recently explained the Rooker-Feldman principle in simple terms: When you lose in trial court, you go to an appeals court. . . . [P]arties who lose in state trial court do not get to appeal to a federal trial court. Instead, they may take their appeal to a state appeals court and, if a federal statute allows, ultimately seek review in [the United States Supreme Court].104 This principle arises out of the fact that Article III of the United States Constitution confers “appellate jurisdiction” solely on the United States Supreme Court, not on federal district courts like this one.105 As noted, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine only applies when the plaintiff’s claim is essentially an appeal from a state court judgment. As the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he Rooker–Feldman doctrine is confined to cases of the kind from which it acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered

100 Complaint, Docket No. 1, at para. 1. 101 Ortiz v. Tinnerello, No. 3:22-cv-1318 (AWT) (TOF), 2023 WL 11842871, at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 22, 2023), report and recommendation accepted, slip op. (D. Conn. July 26, 2023). 102 Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). 103 District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 46 U.S. 462 (1983). 104 T.M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corp., 608 U.S. __, 146 S. Ct. 1739, 2026 WL 1751823, at *11 (June 18, 2026) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 105 Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923) (“The jurisdiction possessed by the District Courts is strictly original.”); Lewis v. DOC’s U.S. State of Connecticut, Inc., No. 3:23-mc- 116 (VDO) (TOF), 2024 WL 5088764, at *4 (D. Conn. Mar. 20, 2024) (explaining the differences between “original” and “appellate” jurisdiction, and why the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut possesses only “original” jurisdiction). before the federal district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”106 To determine whether a plaintiff’s federal complaint invokes the Rooker-Feldman principle, courts in the Second Circuit examine four factors: (1) whether the plaintiff lost in state court; (2) whether he is “complain[ing] of injuries caused by [a] state-court

judgment,” (3) whether he is “invit[ing] district court review and rejection” of the state court judgment, and (4) whether the state court judgment was rendered before the plaintiff brought his claim in federal court.107 To be sure, the scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is “narrow.”108 But when these four factors apply, a federal district court lacks jurisdiction over the case and dismissal is required.109 In this case, all four elements of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine are satisfied. First, Mr. Hilaire clearly lost to Absolute in state court.110 Second, he is plainly “complain[ing] of injuries caused by [a] state court judgment.” He complains that a lien was placed on his home “based upon the judgment,” and he says he was damaged by “the entry of a judgment” as well as “harm to [his] credit reputation, and ongoing financial injury.”111 Third, he invites “district court review and

rejection” of the state court judgment when he asks for “a declaration that . . . Defendants did not

106 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). 107 Hoblock v. Albany County Board of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by T.M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corp., 608 U.S. __, 146 S. Ct. 1739, 2026 WL 1751823 (June 18, 2026). 108 T.M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corp., 608 U.S. __, 146 S. Ct. 1739, 2026 WL 1751823, at * (June 18, 2026). 109 Modikhan v. BAC Home Loan Servicing LP, No. 25-cv-4658 (EK) (JAM), 2026 WL 1802902, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 23, 2026) (applying four-factor test from Hoblock, even after one of Hoblock’s other holdings was abrogated by T.M., and dismissing case because “the Rooker- Feldman doctrine . . . bars the Court from reviewing the state court’s eviction orders”). 110 Order Regarding Motion for Judgment, Docket No. 117.10; Judgment, Docket No. 117.20; Absolute Resolutions Investments, LLC v. Hilaire, No. FBT-CV-18-6069848-S (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 30, 2019). 111 Complaint, Docket No. 1, at paras. 31-32. possess the legal right to enforce Plaintiff’s alleged obligation at the time the [state court] action was commenced.”112 And the state court judgment was rendered years before Mr. Hilaire filed his complaint in this case.113 To be sure, FDCPA claims arising out of state court proceedings often avoid the operation

of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Put differently, FDCPA claims often attack “abusive debt collection practices in violation of [the statute] without having to question the validity of a state court . . . judgment involving [the] debt.”114 But this is not such a case. Nearly every word of Mr. Hilaire’s complaint invites review of Judge Stodolink’s determination that Absolute was the owner of the debt and was entitled to collect on it. For example, when Mr. Hilaire claims that the defendants engaged in “false, deceptive, or misleading representations” in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, the “representations” that he cites are the representations “that Defendant Absolute . . . was the lawful owner of the alleged debt and entitled to enforce the promissory note;” “that Defendants had standing to enforce the alleged obligation[;]” that they “[took] or maintain[ed] an action [they had] no legal right to take[;]” and so forth.115 And when he claims that the defendants

used “unfair and unconscionable means” to collect the debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692f, he

112 Complaint, Docket No. 1., at p. 12. 113 Compare Order Regarding Motion for Judgment, Docket No. 117.10; Judgment, Docket No. 117.20; Absolute Resolutions Investments, LLC v. Hilaire, No. FBT-CV-18-6069848-S (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 30, 2019) with Complaint, Docket No. 1 (Mar. 27, 2026). 114 Smith v. Bendett & McHugh, P.C., No. 3:22-cv-239 (JAM), 2023 WL 372784, at *5 (D. Conn. Jan. 23, 2023); see also McCrobie v. Palisades Acquisition XVI, LLC, 664 Fed. App’x 81 (2d Cir. 2016) (summary order) (holding that an FDCPA claim challenging allegedly deceptive conduct in post-judgment execution proceedings did not attack the validity of the judgment and, therefore, was not foreclosed by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Sykes v. Mel S. Harris & Associates LLC, 780 F.3d 70, 94-95 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that, where “the plaintiffs asserts claims independent of the state court judgments and do not seek to overturn them[,]” “claims sounding under the FDCPA . . . speak not to the propriety of the state court judgments, but to the fraudulent course of conduct that defendants pursued in obtaining such judgments”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 115 Complaint, Docket No. 1, at pp. 9-10. cites their “[i]nitiating and prosecuting a collection action without lawful standing or the legal right to enforce the alleged obligation;” “[o]btaining a judgment against [him] based on insufficient and misleading documentation purporting to establish ownership of the debt;” and “[u]sing the judicial process as a means of collection in the absence of competent evidence establishing entitlement to enforce the alleged obligation.”116

Mr. Hilaire does hint at some claims that might arguably avoid the operation of the Rooker- Feldman doctrine, but those claims are not plausibly pled, even applying the liberal construction due to pro se pleadings. He says that, “[i]n connection with their debt collection litigation activities, Defendants failed to include the disclosure required by 15 U.S.C. 1692e(11), namely, that communications were from a debt collector and that any information obtained would be used for the purpose of collecting a debt.”117 But this is merely conclusory.118 Courts have routinely required plaintiffs who seek to bring a claim under Section 1692e to identify the specific communications that allegedly trigger the law’s disclosure requirements, even when the plaintiffs

116 Complaint, Docket No. 1, at pp. 10-11. 117 Complaint, Docket No. 1, at para. 25. The law distinguishes between creditors and debt collectors, the latter being subject to the FDCPA, but not the former. See George v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, No. 16-CV-261 (MKB), 2017 WL 3316065, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2017). For purposes of this opinion, the defendants are assumed to be debt collectors. But Mr. Hilaire will need to plausibly allege that this is true in any subsequent, amended complaint seeking to bring a claim under the FDCPA. See Rivas v. Levine Law Group, No. 15-21351-CIV (MCG), 2015 WL 5097119, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 31, 2015). 118 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A ‘conclusory’ allegation is one that ‘expresses a factual inference without stating the underlying facts on which the inference is based.’” Reid v. Lokay, No. 3:25-cv-997 (KAD) (TOF), 2025 WL 3521362, at *3 (D. Conn. Dec. 9, 2025) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) at p. 308), report and recommendation accepted and adopted, slip op. (D. Conn. Jan. 5, 2026). For example, “the defendant violated the plaintiff’s rights” is a conclusory allegation because it states a legal conclusion—rights were violated—without explaining the facts that support that conclusion, or how those rights were violated. are pro se.119 Because Mr. Hilaire’s complaint implicates the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and because it does not plausibly allege any claims that avoid the operation of the doctrine, I recommend that it be dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. C. Frivolousness and Failure to State a Claim When jurisdiction is found to be lacking, ordinarily the analysis stops there.120 In this case,

however, I will continue with the rest of the Section 1915 analysis, for Judge Bolden’s consideration in the event that he disagrees with my jurisdictional analysis. If Judge Bolden concludes that the court has jurisdiction, I would nevertheless recommend that Mr. Hilaire’s complaint be dismissed as “frivolous.” As noted above, one of the things that can make a complaint “frivolous” is when “a dispositive defense clearly exists ‘on the face of the complaint.’”121 In this case, Mr. Hilaire’s claims are clearly barred by the relevant statutes of limitations. The FDCPA requires any “action to enforce any liability created by [the statute]” to be filed “within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.”122 CUTPA provides that “[a]n action under this section may not be brought more than three years after the occurrence of a

violation[.]”123 Mr. Hilaire’s complaint contains no non-conclusory allegations of FDCPA- violative conduct occurring less than one year before he commenced this federal court suit, nor does it contain any non-conclusory allegations of CUTPA-violative conduct occurring less than

119 E.g., Goodman v. Board of Managers of Harborview Condominium, No. 22-CV-1813 (CS), 2023 WL 6977450, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2023) (collecting cases); see also Rivas v. Levine Law Group, No. 15-21351-CIV (MGC), 2015 WL 5097119, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 31, 2015) (dismissing claims that were a “jumble of minimal facts and multiple conclusions”). 120 Progressive Casualty Insurance Co. v. Vargas, No. 3:23-cv-1370 (SVN) (TOF), 2024 WL 4163496, at *11 (D. Conn. Sept. 11, 2024). 121 Gupte v. Uber Technology, No. 3:24-cv-2037 (VAB) (TOF), 2025 WL 904741, at *3 (D. Conn. Mar. 24, 2025) (quoting Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1995), report and recommendation adopted, slip op. (D. Conn. Apr. 18, 2025). 122 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). 123 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110g(f). three years before. Of course, a statute of limitation is ordinarily raised as an affirmative defense by the defendant once he appears in the case.124 But “where it is clear from the face of the complaint that a claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, the claim is subject to dismissal” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).125 That is the case here.

IV. CONCLUSION In summary, I first recommend that Mr. Hilaire’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis be denied on the current record, without prejudice to a renewed motion supported by a much more complete and careful application. Any such motion must (a) carefully identify all of Mr. Hilaire’s income and assets, which shall include (but not be limited to) an explanation of the ownership of 85 Victory Avenue and the whereabouts of the proceeds of the April 2026 sale; (b) carefully identify the income and assets of any other person who provides him with support;126 (c) if his expenses exceed his income, candidly explain how he supports himself; and (d) be signed under penalty of perjury. If he would rather pay the filing fee than file another in forma pauperis motion, he may do so.

124 Zografidis v. Richards, No. 3:22-cv-631 (AVC) (TOF), 2022 WL 21756775, at *7 (D. Conn. July 6, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, slip op. (D. Conn. Oct. 7, 2022), aff’d, No. 22-3187, 2023 WL 7538211 (2d Cir. Nov. 14, 2023), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 153 (2024). 125 Wrobleski v. Miller, No. 3:19-cv-876 (GLS) (ML), 2019 WL 6496723, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2019), report and recommendation adopted in part and rejected in part, No. 3:19-cv-876 (GLS) (ML), 2020 WL 219221 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2020). 126 See Fridman v. City of New York, 195 F. Supp. 2d 534, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“In assessing an application to proceed in forma pauperis, a court may consider the resources that the applicant has or can get from those who ordinarily provide the applicant with the necessities of life, such as from a spouse, parent, adult sibling or other next friend.”) (Internal quotation marks omitted.). As noted in Section II above, Mr. Hilaire says that Nerland Calixte contributed $520.00 toward his $1,575.00 in monthly expenses. (See Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, Docket No. 2, at p. 3.) Any renewed application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis must therefore include details about Ms. Calixte’s financial resources and ability to pay the filing fee. Next, I recommend that Mr. Hilaire’s complaint be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction or, in the alternative, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) as “frivolous” and for failure to state a claim. I further recommend, however, that the dismissal be without prejudice, because (a) dismissals for lack of jurisdiction should be without prejudice;127 (b) dismissal on statute of limitations grounds

is ordinarily not entered with prejudice without first giving the plaintiff notice and an opportunity to be heard;128 and (c) in any event, pro se plaintiffs are usually permitted at least one chance to fix the defects in their complaint.129 If my recommendation were to be accepted, this would mean that Mr. Hilaire could attempt to cure the defects identified in this recommended ruling by filing an amended complaint. This has been a recommended ruling by a magistrate judge.130 If Mr. Hilaire wishes to object to my recommendation, he must file that objection with the Clerk of the Court by September 15, 2026.131 If he fails to file a timely objection, his failure “operates as a waiver of any further judicial review[.]”132 In particular, failure to file a timely objection operates as a waiver of the right to seek appellate review in the Court of Appeals.133

127 Seaweed, Inc. v. DMA Product & Design Marketing LLC, 219 F. Supp. 2d 551, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“A dismissal for lack of jurisdiction does not operate on the merits and therefore should not issue with prejudice.”). 128 See Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 2007); Zografidis v. Richards, No. 3:22- cv-631 (AVC) (TOF), 2022 WL 21756775, at *7 (D. Conn. July 6, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, slip op. (D. Conn. Oct. 7, 2022), aff’d, No. 22-3187, 2023 WL 7538211 (2d Cir. Nov. 14, 2023), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 153 (2024). 129 See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000). 130 Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1); D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 72.1(C). 131 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) (stating that objections to magistrate judge recommendations shall be filed within fourteen days); D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 72.2(a) (allowing five additional days for persons who, like Mr. Hilaire, will receive the recommendation from the Clerk of the Court via mail). 132 Small v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 892 F.2d 15, 16 (2d Cir. 1989). 133 Small v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 892 F.2d 15, 16 (2d Cir. 1989); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; Fed. R. Civ. P. 6; Impala v. U.S. Department of Justice, 670 F. App’x 32 (2d Cir. 2016) (summary order). /s/ Thomas O. Farrish Hon. Thomas O. Farrish United States Magistrate Judge