John Francis Devine v. United States

278 F.2d 552, 1960 U.S. App. LEXIS 4635
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedMay 6, 1960
Docket16554
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 278 F.2d 552 (John Francis Devine v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
John Francis Devine v. United States, 278 F.2d 552, 1960 U.S. App. LEXIS 4635 (9th Cir. 1960).

Opinion

BARNES, Circuit Judge.

Appellant was convicted by a jury on three counts of violating Title 18 U.S.C. § 1702, which provides in pertinent part:

“Whoever takes any letter * * which has been in any post office * * * before it has been delivered to the person to whom it was directed, with design to obstruct the correspondence * * * shall be * * * imprisoned not more than five years * * * ”

The court sentenced appellant to five years on each count, to run concurrently. Timely appeal is taken here, and this Court has jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

Count I charged appellant with taking on February 21, 1959 a letter addressed to Hays Company, 311 East Fourth Street, Los Angeles 13, California. Count II charged appellant with taking on February 21, 1959 a letter addressed to Irving Blitz & Associates, 421 South Wall Street, Los Angeles 13, California. Count III charged appellant with taking on February 21, 1959 a letter addressed to Philip Jaffe, 338 East Fourth Street, Los Angeles 13, California.

The evidence against appellant was overwhelming as to his guilt in taking letters, once in United States mail, from the places to which they were addressed. 1 *553 Despite this evidence, appellant seeks reversal. Two errors are charged:

1. The insufficiency of the evidence (a) to sustain the elements of the crime, and (b) to overcome the presumption of appellant’s innocence.

2. Prejudicial misconduct on the part of government counsel.

*554 The basis of the first point is not that the mail allegedly (and for the purpose of this argument, admittedly) taken by appellant had not already been delivered to the persons named in the indictment, i. e.y The Hays Company (Count I), Irving Blitz & Associates (Count II), and Philip Jaffe (Count III), but that there was no sufficient proof of nondelivery to the person to whom it was directed, inasmuch as appellant may have been an authorized agent of the firm’s or persons named as the respective addressees.

Appellant's counsel admits that Section 1702 contemplates a manual delivery of mail to the addressee, and, of course, this is the law. Rosen v. United States, 1918, 245 U.S. 467, 38 S.Ct. 148, 62 L.Ed. 406; Maxwell v. United States, 8 Cir., 1956, 235 F.2d 930. The jury was properly so instructed. But, says appellant, there is no proof that appellant was not one of the persons to whom the mail was directed, or not an authorized agent of one of them (i. e.y a partner or employee of “Hays Co.” or an associate or employee of “Blitz & Associates,” or an employee of Philip Jaffe). The addressees, says appellant, were “companies” or groups made up of a number of persons whose identities remained “throughout the trial unidentified and unknown” and hence “as a matter of law must include the appellant.”

Such a position entirely overlooks, among other things, the testimony of appellant himself that he was an unemployed cook; that at the date of his arrest he had not worked for anyone for some time; that he was looking desperately for work on February 21, 1959; and that he had, not worked at any time in 1959. When counsel for the government sought to elicit whether appellant had ever had any connection with the Hays Company (Count I), appellant’s counsel objected. The objection was sustained. Presumably any attempt to ob *555 tain similar information from the appellant would have met like objection and a similar ruling.

But the record is not bare of all testimony from which inferences could have been drawn by the jury. When shown a photograph of the entrance to Jaffe’s place of business, appellant did not recognize it. He would not say whether or not it was there he had stopped to shuffle and stoop, because he did not know or recognize the premises shown in the photograph. Further, to avail appellant anything of value from this line of defense would require us to hold as a matter of law that for the few days elapsing between the date of the checks and appellant’s arrest, there was no proof that appellant was not an employee of Jaffe, and of Irving Blitz & Associates, and of Hayes Company, as well as Western Frame Company. During this precise time appellant had denied he was employed anywhere, and this is evidence he was not employed by Jaffe, or Blitz, or Hays. Appellant’s name appeared on the United States Rubber Company check where the name Western Frame Company had been erased. Could the jury have inferred that such removal, and the signing of his own name on the reverse side of the check, were part of his duties as an authorized representative of West-em Frame Company? The opposite inference would arise. No attempt was made specifically by the appellant, when he testified, to claim or prove he had not endorsed such check, or had not changed the name of the payee.

We must also keep in mind the defense relied upon by appellant. He did not attempt in any way to show he was an employee, or an authorized agent of any of the companies or individuals involved, authorized to accept mail. His sole defense was that he had never before seen the damning documents, allegedly found on him, or seen to have been discarded by him.

We therefore cannot say the evidence produced in this case was entirely consistent with appellant’s innocence, nor as consistent with his innocence as with his guilt. Thus, several of the cases relied upon by appellant have no bearing on this case, for their legal principles do not come into play. We find credible evidence that appellant was neither an addressee, nor an authorized agent of an addressee, of the letters taken from the mail.

The second error urged is that the court refused to grant a mis-trial based on the alleged prejudicial misconduct of the prosecution. 2

*556 It should first be noted that no motion was made by appellant for a mis-trial. Counsel for appellant was alert, and objected to the reference to “this” before “it” had even been described for the record. The court sustained this objection; admonished the prosecution not to refer to anything not in evidence, and the prosecution dropped the subject.

Despite such favorable ruling, appellant’s counsel himself brought up the subject in his own argument to the jury, described “it” as a “brand new coat hanger,” and argued that no such instrument had been found on appellant at his arrest. 3

Because appellant at no time moved for a mis-trial, he has waived his point, if he at any time had one.

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Bluebook (online)
278 F.2d 552, 1960 U.S. App. LEXIS 4635, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/john-francis-devine-v-united-states-ca9-1960.