Southern District of Texas ENTERED August 03, 2026 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Nathan Ochsner, Clerk SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION JOHN ELDRIDGE MURPHY, § . (TDCJ # 02378001), § Petitioner, vs. CIVIL ACTION NO. H-26-5756 ERIC GUERRERO, : Respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER The petitioner, John Eldridge Murphy, (TDCJ #02378001), is an inmate in custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Correctional Institutions Division. He has filed a petition, apparently under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his state-court judgment of conviction. (Dkt. 1). Under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings in the United States District Courts, the Court _
is required to review a petition for federal habeas corpus relief □□□ dismiss it if “[i]t plainly appears from the petition . . . that the petitioner is not entitled torelief.” After considering Murphy’s petition, all matters of record, and the law, the Court □
dismisses his petition for the reason erplaned below. I. BACKGROUND Murphy is currently incarverated based on a conviction for assault on a family or household member by one with previous convictions. See Inmate Search,
www.tdcj.texas.gov (visited Aug. 1, 2026). He has filed a pleading titled as a “petition,” in which he seeks “Redress for Improper Conditions of Confinement, to Challenge the of Confinement under 14th and 5th Amendment Due Process Clauses.” (Dkt. 1, p. 1). His allegations are difficult to decipher, but he generally alleges that he was arrested for assault and domestic violence in two separate cases, but that the arrests were untimely mer Texas law. (Jd. at 2). He also seems to allege that he was arrested for violating a protective order that had expired. (Jd). He asserts that he is innocent of those charges and therefore his current detention, which is based in part on those convictions, constitutes “terrorism.” (/d. at 3). As relief, he seeks his immediate release from TDCJ custody. (Jd. at 1). Il. DISCUSSION A. Habeas Corpus Claims Murphy’s petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2254; see also Woodford v. Garceau, 5 38 US.
202, 207 (2003); Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 335-36 (1997). “Under AEDPA, a state prisoner always gets one chance to bring a federal habeas challenge to his conviction.” Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504, 509 (2020) (citing Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 333-34 (2010)). However, to file a second or successive petition, the petitioner “must first obtain leave from the court of appeals based on a ‘prima facie showing’ that his petition satisfies [AEDPA]’s gatekeeping 2/7
requirements.” Jd. A prisoner may not bring claims “presented in a prior application,” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), and “may bring a new claim only . if [the petition] relies on a new and retroactive rule of constitutional law ot if it alleges previously undiscoverable facts that would establish his innocence.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)). A district court cannot consider any claim, even a new one, in a second or successive petition without an order from the court of appeals authorizing the district court to do so. See §2244(b)(3)(A). Absent such authorization, the action must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Court records show that Murphy filed a previous petition for writ of habeas
corpus, which was denied on its merits. See Murphy v. Guerrero, No. 4:24-cv-1262 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 2,2025). Review of that petition shows that it raised the same claims concerning the validity of his underlying convictions and their effect on his current . conviction that are raised in this petition. Thus, because Murphy has challenged this
same conviction in a previous federal habeas corpus petition and because the same issues he raises here were also raised in that petition, his current petition is
successive. He must therefore seek authorization from the Fifth Circuit before this Court may consider it. See 28 U.S.C. §2244(b)(3)(A). This Courthasnorecordof an order from the Fifth Circuit authorizing Murphy to file a successive petition, and he has not alerted the Court to the existence of such an order. Because Murphy has not obtained such authorization, his current petition must be dismissed as successive. 3/7
B. Civil-Rights Claims
In addition to. his claims ehalleneine the validity of his conviction and sentence, Murphy briefly states that TDCI officials are denying him access to the courts, denyinghim due process, and violating his equal protection rights. (Dkt. 1, p.3). Heallegesno facts in support of these claims, and the only relief seeks for these alleged violations is release from confinement. Federal law provides two distinct avenues for relief for claims of unconstitutional treatment at the hands of state officials: a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking release from custody, and a civil-rights action seeking □ equitable or monetary relief. See Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) (per curiam); see also Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 480 (1994). Both types of proceedin gs “provide a federal forum for claims of unconstitutional treatment at the hands of state officials, but they differ in their scope and operation.” Heck, 512 US. 480. Habeas corpus petitions challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence and are “the exclusiveremedy for a state prisoner who challenges thefact or duration _ of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release.” Id. at 481 (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973)). Civil-rights actions challenge □□□ □ conditions of confinement and seek either injunctive relief to end the condition or
money damages to compensate for the violations. Muhammad, 540 U.S. at 750 (citing Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500). Unconstitutional conditions of confinement, no 4/7
matter howserious they may be, do not warrant release from custody. See Spencer v. Bragg, 310 F. App’x 678, 679 (Sth Cir. 2009) (per curiam). Murphy alleges no facts to support what appear to be claims for denial of
access to the courts, due process violations, and violations of the Equal Protection Clause. Further, those claims, such as they are, challenge the conditions of his confinementrather than its fact or duration. They must therefore be raised in a civil- rights action under §1983 rather than a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking release. These claims are improperly raised in this action and will be dismissed. Such dismissal is without prejudice to Murphy bringing these claims in a separate civil-rights action should he wish to pursue one. Ill. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
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Southern District of Texas ENTERED August 03, 2026 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Nathan Ochsner, Clerk SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION JOHN ELDRIDGE MURPHY, § . (TDCJ # 02378001), § Petitioner, vs. CIVIL ACTION NO. H-26-5756 ERIC GUERRERO, : Respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER The petitioner, John Eldridge Murphy, (TDCJ #02378001), is an inmate in custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Correctional Institutions Division. He has filed a petition, apparently under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his state-court judgment of conviction. (Dkt. 1). Under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings in the United States District Courts, the Court _
is required to review a petition for federal habeas corpus relief □□□ dismiss it if “[i]t plainly appears from the petition . . . that the petitioner is not entitled torelief.” After considering Murphy’s petition, all matters of record, and the law, the Court □
dismisses his petition for the reason erplaned below. I. BACKGROUND Murphy is currently incarverated based on a conviction for assault on a family or household member by one with previous convictions. See Inmate Search,
www.tdcj.texas.gov (visited Aug. 1, 2026). He has filed a pleading titled as a “petition,” in which he seeks “Redress for Improper Conditions of Confinement, to Challenge the of Confinement under 14th and 5th Amendment Due Process Clauses.” (Dkt. 1, p. 1). His allegations are difficult to decipher, but he generally alleges that he was arrested for assault and domestic violence in two separate cases, but that the arrests were untimely mer Texas law. (Jd. at 2). He also seems to allege that he was arrested for violating a protective order that had expired. (Jd). He asserts that he is innocent of those charges and therefore his current detention, which is based in part on those convictions, constitutes “terrorism.” (/d. at 3). As relief, he seeks his immediate release from TDCJ custody. (Jd. at 1). Il. DISCUSSION A. Habeas Corpus Claims Murphy’s petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2254; see also Woodford v. Garceau, 5 38 US.
202, 207 (2003); Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 335-36 (1997). “Under AEDPA, a state prisoner always gets one chance to bring a federal habeas challenge to his conviction.” Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504, 509 (2020) (citing Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 333-34 (2010)). However, to file a second or successive petition, the petitioner “must first obtain leave from the court of appeals based on a ‘prima facie showing’ that his petition satisfies [AEDPA]’s gatekeeping 2/7
requirements.” Jd. A prisoner may not bring claims “presented in a prior application,” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), and “may bring a new claim only . if [the petition] relies on a new and retroactive rule of constitutional law ot if it alleges previously undiscoverable facts that would establish his innocence.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)). A district court cannot consider any claim, even a new one, in a second or successive petition without an order from the court of appeals authorizing the district court to do so. See §2244(b)(3)(A). Absent such authorization, the action must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Court records show that Murphy filed a previous petition for writ of habeas
corpus, which was denied on its merits. See Murphy v. Guerrero, No. 4:24-cv-1262 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 2,2025). Review of that petition shows that it raised the same claims concerning the validity of his underlying convictions and their effect on his current . conviction that are raised in this petition. Thus, because Murphy has challenged this
same conviction in a previous federal habeas corpus petition and because the same issues he raises here were also raised in that petition, his current petition is
successive. He must therefore seek authorization from the Fifth Circuit before this Court may consider it. See 28 U.S.C. §2244(b)(3)(A). This Courthasnorecordof an order from the Fifth Circuit authorizing Murphy to file a successive petition, and he has not alerted the Court to the existence of such an order. Because Murphy has not obtained such authorization, his current petition must be dismissed as successive. 3/7
B. Civil-Rights Claims
In addition to. his claims ehalleneine the validity of his conviction and sentence, Murphy briefly states that TDCI officials are denying him access to the courts, denyinghim due process, and violating his equal protection rights. (Dkt. 1, p.3). Heallegesno facts in support of these claims, and the only relief seeks for these alleged violations is release from confinement. Federal law provides two distinct avenues for relief for claims of unconstitutional treatment at the hands of state officials: a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking release from custody, and a civil-rights action seeking □ equitable or monetary relief. See Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) (per curiam); see also Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 480 (1994). Both types of proceedin gs “provide a federal forum for claims of unconstitutional treatment at the hands of state officials, but they differ in their scope and operation.” Heck, 512 US. 480. Habeas corpus petitions challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence and are “the exclusiveremedy for a state prisoner who challenges thefact or duration _ of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release.” Id. at 481 (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973)). Civil-rights actions challenge □□□ □ conditions of confinement and seek either injunctive relief to end the condition or
money damages to compensate for the violations. Muhammad, 540 U.S. at 750 (citing Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500). Unconstitutional conditions of confinement, no 4/7
matter howserious they may be, do not warrant release from custody. See Spencer v. Bragg, 310 F. App’x 678, 679 (Sth Cir. 2009) (per curiam). Murphy alleges no facts to support what appear to be claims for denial of
access to the courts, due process violations, and violations of the Equal Protection Clause. Further, those claims, such as they are, challenge the conditions of his confinementrather than its fact or duration. They must therefore be raised in a civil- rights action under §1983 rather than a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking release. These claims are improperly raised in this action and will be dismissed. Such dismissal is without prejudice to Murphy bringing these claims in a separate civil-rights action should he wish to pursue one. Ill. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Habeas corpus actions under § 2254 require a certificate of appealability to proceed on appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003). Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases requires a district court to issue or deny a certificate of appealability when entering a final order that is adverse to the petitioner. To be entitled to a certificate of appealability, the petitioner must make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), which requires a petitioner to demonstrate “that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wron g.” Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 276 (2004) (quoting Slack 5/7
v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). When the denial of relief is based on procedural grounds, the petitioner must show not only that “jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right,” but also that they “would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. A district court may deny a certificate of appealability, sua sponte, without requiring further briefing or argument. See Alexander v. Johnson, 211 F.3d 895, 898 (Sth Cir. 2000) (per curiam). Because Murphy has not shown that reasonable jurists would find the Court’s resolution of the constitutional issues debatable or wrong, this Court will not issue □ certificate of appealability. IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS as follows: 1. Murphy’s petition for writ of habeas corpus (Dkt. 1) is DISMISSED without prejudice as successive.
2. Murphy’s claims appearing to seek release based on conditions of confinement are DISMISSED without prejudice to him pursuing them in a separate action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
3. Any pending motions are DENIED as moot.
4. A certificate of appealability is DENIED. 6/7 .
The Clerk will provide a copy of this Order to the petitioner.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on □□ lug. 3 , 2026.
. DAVID HITTNER □ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE