OPINION OF THE COURT
Brown, J.
On this appeal we are asked to consider, in light of the [376] guideposts established by the Court of Appeals in Matter of Raquel Marie X. (76 NY2d 387, cert denied sub nom. Robert C. v Miguel T., — US —, 111 S Ct 517), the circumstances under which a natural father, who is not married to his child’s mother and who has not lived with the child or the child’s mother for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding placement of the child for adoption (see, Domestic Relations Law § 111 [1] [e]), may prevent an adoption. We find that the natural father in this case has failed to establish that his interest in the child is deserving of constitutional protection. Accordingly, we conclude that his consent to the child’s adoption is not required.
I
In or about September 1986 the petitioner became involved in an extramarital affair with a married woman. At some point in the spring or summer of 1987, the woman learned that she had become pregnant. Initially, she and the petitioner intended to live together and raise the child, but in September of 1987 the woman left the petitioner and resumed living with her husband. The child, Daniel, was born on December 15, 1987, and was turned over to the respondents four days later as the result of a prearranged private adoption.
On January 27, 1988, the petitioner commenced a proceeding in Family Court in Sullivan County, where Daniel was born, seeking custody of the child. He also sought an order of filiation, as Daniel’s birth certificate as filed indicated that the birth mother and her husband were his parents. Shortly thereafter, the petitioner moved to stay the adoption proceeding, pending in Rockland County, in light of his Sullivan County custody proceeding. Ultimately, the custody and paternity proceedings were transferred to Rockland County, where, in July of 1988, the adoption proceeding was stayed pending the petitioner’s submission to a human leucocyte antigen (hereinafter HLA) test. After the results of that test were received, indicating the probability of the petitioner’s paternity to be 99.93%, the respondents no longer pursued their claim that the petitioner lacked standing to seek custody of Daniel.
In May of 1989, following mental health evaluations, the Family Court, Rockland County, issued an order deferring determination of the respondents’ motion to dismiss the cus[377] tody proceeding “pending a full hearing by this court as to what constitutes the best interests of the infant whose adoption is at issue”. That hearing commenced in June of 1989 and was concluded in October of 1989.
By decision and order dated November 17, 1989, the Family Court dismissed the custody petition and directed that the adoption proceed. The court, in compliance with the express provisions of Domestic Relations Law § 111 (1) (e) (which set forth the conditions that must be met before the consent of the natural father of an infant who is born out of wedlock and placed for adoption at under six months of age is required), and in a stated effort to foster the rearing of children in the context of a meaningful family relationship, concluded that the petitioner’s consent for the adoption was not required and that the best interests of Daniel would be served by permitting him to remain with his prospective adoptive parents, with whom he had then been living for the first two years of his life. Upon reargument the court adhered to its original decision and this appeal ensued.
II
Domestic Relations Law § 111 lists several categories of persons whose consent to an adoption is required. Paragraph (e) of subdivision (1) thereof provides that the consent of the father of a child born out of wedlock who is under the age of six months at the time he or she is placed for adoption is only required if: “(i) such father openly lived with the child or the child’s mother for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the placement of the child for adoption; and (ii) such father openly held himself out to be the father of such child during such period; and (iii) such father paid a fair and reasonable sum, in accordance with his means, for the medical, hospital and nursing expenses incurred in connection with the mother’s pregnancy or with the birth of the child” (Domestic Relations Law § 111 [1] [e]). However, in Matter of Raquel Marie X. (76 NY2d 387, cert denied sub nom. Robert C. v Miguel T., — US —, 111 S Ct 517, supra), which was decided subsequent to the Family Court’s decision in this case and while this appeal was pending in this court, the Court of Appeals declared Domestic Relations Law § 111 (1) (e) to be unconstitutional. Specifically, the court found that, the first clause thereof, which requires that the natural father live openly with the child’s mother during the six months preced[378] ing placement, neither furthers the State’s interest in determining the existence of a significant parental concern for a relationship with the child, focusing as it does on the relationship between the parents, nor sufficiently protects the natural father’s constitutional right to develop a qualifying relationship with the child. The court stated: "This is not to say that the unwed father’s failure to form ties with his newborn child may not be sufficiently great to constitute a sort of waiver or abandonment that would give rise to a State interest in providing the child with a permanent, stable home through adoption, as well as an interest on the part of prospective adoptive parents who have committed themselves to the child. The unwed father’s right is decidedly limited in duration. Nonetheless, a father who has promptly taken every available avenue to demonstrate that he is willing and able to enter into the fullest possible relationship with his under-six-month-old child should have an equally fully protected interest in preventing termination of the relationship by strangers, even if he has not as yet actually been able to form that relationship” (Matter of Raquel Marie X., supra, at 403).
Although the Court of Appeals only considered the first clause of Domestic Relations Law § 111 (1) (e) to be constitutionally infirm, it nevertheless declared the entire paragraph unconstitutional, because "we know with certainty from the format of the existing statute as well as the contemporaneous expressions of intent that the Legislature would not have wished to have the unchallenged portions of the statute stand alone as the sole measure of an unwed father’s commitment to the child, entitling him to veto an adoption” (Matter of Raquel Marie X., supra, at 406-407). Pending the enactment by the Legislature of a new statute to replace Domestic Relations Law § 111 (1) (e), the court promulgated the following "principles gleaned from the [United States] Supreme Court decisions, which define an unwed father’s right to a continued parental relationship by his manifestation of parental responsibility” (Matter of Raquel Marie X., supra, at 408):
"In the case of newborn infants, we take this to mean that the qualifying interest of an unwed father requires a willingness himself to assume full custody of the child—not merely to block adoption by others. In this connection, any unfitness, or waiver or abandonment on the part of the father would be considered by the courts, as they would whenever custody is in issue (see, Matter of Bennett v Jeffreys, 40 NY2d 543).
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OPINION OF THE COURT
Brown, J.
On this appeal we are asked to consider, in light of the [376] guideposts established by the Court of Appeals in Matter of Raquel Marie X. (76 NY2d 387, cert denied sub nom. Robert C. v Miguel T., — US —, 111 S Ct 517), the circumstances under which a natural father, who is not married to his child’s mother and who has not lived with the child or the child’s mother for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding placement of the child for adoption (see, Domestic Relations Law § 111 [1] [e]), may prevent an adoption. We find that the natural father in this case has failed to establish that his interest in the child is deserving of constitutional protection. Accordingly, we conclude that his consent to the child’s adoption is not required.
I
In or about September 1986 the petitioner became involved in an extramarital affair with a married woman. At some point in the spring or summer of 1987, the woman learned that she had become pregnant. Initially, she and the petitioner intended to live together and raise the child, but in September of 1987 the woman left the petitioner and resumed living with her husband. The child, Daniel, was born on December 15, 1987, and was turned over to the respondents four days later as the result of a prearranged private adoption.
On January 27, 1988, the petitioner commenced a proceeding in Family Court in Sullivan County, where Daniel was born, seeking custody of the child. He also sought an order of filiation, as Daniel’s birth certificate as filed indicated that the birth mother and her husband were his parents. Shortly thereafter, the petitioner moved to stay the adoption proceeding, pending in Rockland County, in light of his Sullivan County custody proceeding. Ultimately, the custody and paternity proceedings were transferred to Rockland County, where, in July of 1988, the adoption proceeding was stayed pending the petitioner’s submission to a human leucocyte antigen (hereinafter HLA) test. After the results of that test were received, indicating the probability of the petitioner’s paternity to be 99.93%, the respondents no longer pursued their claim that the petitioner lacked standing to seek custody of Daniel.
In May of 1989, following mental health evaluations, the Family Court, Rockland County, issued an order deferring determination of the respondents’ motion to dismiss the cus[377] tody proceeding “pending a full hearing by this court as to what constitutes the best interests of the infant whose adoption is at issue”. That hearing commenced in June of 1989 and was concluded in October of 1989.
By decision and order dated November 17, 1989, the Family Court dismissed the custody petition and directed that the adoption proceed. The court, in compliance with the express provisions of Domestic Relations Law § 111 (1) (e) (which set forth the conditions that must be met before the consent of the natural father of an infant who is born out of wedlock and placed for adoption at under six months of age is required), and in a stated effort to foster the rearing of children in the context of a meaningful family relationship, concluded that the petitioner’s consent for the adoption was not required and that the best interests of Daniel would be served by permitting him to remain with his prospective adoptive parents, with whom he had then been living for the first two years of his life. Upon reargument the court adhered to its original decision and this appeal ensued.
II
Domestic Relations Law § 111 lists several categories of persons whose consent to an adoption is required. Paragraph (e) of subdivision (1) thereof provides that the consent of the father of a child born out of wedlock who is under the age of six months at the time he or she is placed for adoption is only required if: “(i) such father openly lived with the child or the child’s mother for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the placement of the child for adoption; and (ii) such father openly held himself out to be the father of such child during such period; and (iii) such father paid a fair and reasonable sum, in accordance with his means, for the medical, hospital and nursing expenses incurred in connection with the mother’s pregnancy or with the birth of the child” (Domestic Relations Law § 111 [1] [e]). However, in Matter of Raquel Marie X. (76 NY2d 387, cert denied sub nom. Robert C. v Miguel T., — US —, 111 S Ct 517, supra), which was decided subsequent to the Family Court’s decision in this case and while this appeal was pending in this court, the Court of Appeals declared Domestic Relations Law § 111 (1) (e) to be unconstitutional. Specifically, the court found that, the first clause thereof, which requires that the natural father live openly with the child’s mother during the six months preced[378] ing placement, neither furthers the State’s interest in determining the existence of a significant parental concern for a relationship with the child, focusing as it does on the relationship between the parents, nor sufficiently protects the natural father’s constitutional right to develop a qualifying relationship with the child. The court stated: "This is not to say that the unwed father’s failure to form ties with his newborn child may not be sufficiently great to constitute a sort of waiver or abandonment that would give rise to a State interest in providing the child with a permanent, stable home through adoption, as well as an interest on the part of prospective adoptive parents who have committed themselves to the child. The unwed father’s right is decidedly limited in duration. Nonetheless, a father who has promptly taken every available avenue to demonstrate that he is willing and able to enter into the fullest possible relationship with his under-six-month-old child should have an equally fully protected interest in preventing termination of the relationship by strangers, even if he has not as yet actually been able to form that relationship” (Matter of Raquel Marie X., supra, at 403).
Although the Court of Appeals only considered the first clause of Domestic Relations Law § 111 (1) (e) to be constitutionally infirm, it nevertheless declared the entire paragraph unconstitutional, because "we know with certainty from the format of the existing statute as well as the contemporaneous expressions of intent that the Legislature would not have wished to have the unchallenged portions of the statute stand alone as the sole measure of an unwed father’s commitment to the child, entitling him to veto an adoption” (Matter of Raquel Marie X., supra, at 406-407). Pending the enactment by the Legislature of a new statute to replace Domestic Relations Law § 111 (1) (e), the court promulgated the following "principles gleaned from the [United States] Supreme Court decisions, which define an unwed father’s right to a continued parental relationship by his manifestation of parental responsibility” (Matter of Raquel Marie X., supra, at 408):
"In the case of newborn infants, we take this to mean that the qualifying interest of an unwed father requires a willingness himself to assume full custody of the child—not merely to block adoption by others. In this connection, any unfitness, or waiver or abandonment on the part of the father would be considered by the courts, as they would whenever custody is in issue (see, Matter of Bennett v Jeffreys, 40 NY2d 543).
"An assertion of custody is not all that is required. The [379] Supreme Court’s definition of an unwed father’s qualifying interest recognizes as well the importance to the child, the State and all concerned that, to be sufficient, the manifestation of parental responsibility must be prompt. In reaching this determination, courts should give due weight to the remaining portions of Domestic Relations Law § 111 (1) (e), which were directed to that same objective and are unchallenged in this litigation. Perhaps most significantly, they establish the period in which the father’s manifestation of responsibility for the child is to be assessed—the six continuing months immediately preceding the child’s placement for adoption. The interim judicial evaluation of the unwed father’s conduct in this key period may include such considerations as his public acknowledgment of paternity, payment of pregnancy and birth expenses, steps taken to establish legal responsibility for the child, and other factors evincing a commitment to the child” (Matter of Raquel Marie X., supra, at 408).
A review of the facts of the case before us in light of the principles set forth by the Court of Appeals in Matter of Raquel Marie X. (supra) leads us to conclude that the petitioner failed to establish that his consent to this adoption is required. Moreover, as the best interests of Daniel would clearly be served by permitting him to remain with the only parents he has known since his birth three years ago, we agree with the Family Court’s determination that this adoption should be allowed to proceed (see, Matter of Bennett v Jeffreys, 40 NY2d 543, supra).
Keeping in mind that the operative period is the six months prior to placement, in this case June through December of 1987, it appears that prior to September of 1987, the petitioner and the natural mother lived together. Apparently, it was during this period that the natural mother made her first visit to an obstetrician, a visit toward which the petitioner paid $100. Around Labor Day the natural mother told the petitioner that she had decided to return to her husband. According to the petitioner, during the over three-month period before Daniel’s birth, he telephoned the natural mother "several times”. He also intermittently checked on her progress by calling her sister. However, he did little more. The record discloses that the petitioner provided virtually no financial support during the operative time period, nor did he make any earnest effort to do so (see, Domestic Relations Law § 111 [1] [e]; Matter of Raquel Marie X., 76 NY2d 387, 408, [380] supra). Moreover, the petitioner’s lack of financial support continued following the child’s birth.
In addition, the record is devoid of any indication that the petitioner publicly acknowledged his paternity during the six months preceding Daniel’s placement for adoption. Nor does it appear that the petitioner took any steps whatever during this period to establish his legal responsibility for the child. In this regard, it should be noted that a proceeding to establish the paternity of a child may be brought during the pregnancy of the mother (see, Family Ct Act § 517).