John Doe v. Regents of The University of California

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedJanuary 4, 2024
Docket3:22-cv-01506
StatusUnknown

This text of John Doe v. Regents of The University of California (John Doe v. Regents of The University of California) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
John Doe v. Regents of The University of California, (S.D. Cal. 2024).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOHN DOE, Case No.: 22-cv-01506-JLS-VET

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART 13 v. JOINT MOTION TO EXTEND CERTAIN DEADLINES IN THE 14 REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF SCHEDULING ORDER CALIFORNIA, and DOES 1 through 10, 15 inclusive, [Doc No. 39] 16

Defendants. 17

19 20 Before the Court is the Parties’ Stipulation to Extend Certain Deadlines in the 21 Scheduling Order Regulating Discovery and Other Pre-Trial Proceedings (the “Joint 22 Motion”).1 Doc. No. 39. Therein, the parties propose extending eight dates or deadlines. 23 Id. at 4. Based on a review of the Joint Motion and the record, the Court GRANTS IN 24 PART the Joint Motion. 25

26 27 1 Pursuant to Civ. Loc. R. 7.2, the Court construes the Parties’ Stipulation as a “Joint Motion.” See Civ. Loc. R. 7.2 (“Any stipulation for which court approval is sought must 28 1 I. LEGAL STANDARD 2 In determining whether to modify a scheduling order, the Court considers the “good 3 cause” standard set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4). Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 16(b)(4). Pursuant to Rule 16(b)(4), a “schedule may be modified only for good cause and 5 with the judge’s consent.” Id. (emphasis added); Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 6 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002) (“the pretrial scheduling order can only be modified upon a 7 showing of good cause”). Rule 16(b)(4)’s “good cause” standard “primarily considers the 8 diligence of the party seeking the amendment.” Learjet, Inc. v. Oneok, Inc. (In re W. States 9 Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust Litig.), 715 F.3d 716, 737 (9th Cir. 2013). “The district 10 court may modify the pretrial schedule ‘if it cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence 11 of the party seeking the extension.’” Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 12 609 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee’s notes on the 1983 13 amendment); see also Zivkovic, 302 F.3d at 1087; 6A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal 14 Practice and Procedure § 1522.1 at 231 (2d ed. 1990) (“good cause” means scheduling 15 deadlines cannot be met despite party’s diligence). “[C]arelessness is not compatible with 16 a finding of diligence and offers no reason for a grant of relief.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. 17 The focus of the inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking modification. Id. 18 “If the moving party was not diligent, the inquiry should end.” Id.; Branch Banking & Tr. 19 Co. v. D.M.S.I., LLC, 871 F.3d 751, 764 (9th Cir. 2017) (same). 20 Further, Civil Local Rule 16.1(b) requires that all counsel “proceed with diligence 21 to take all steps necessary to bring an action to readiness for trial.” Civ.LR 16.1(b). 22 Similarly, this Court’s Civil Chambers Rules require that any motion to continue a 23 scheduling order deadline include a showing of good cause, supported by a “declaration 24 from counsel that details steps taken by the parties to meet current deadlines and reasons 25 why the parties can no longer meet those deadlines.” J. Torres Civ. Chambers R. VI.D. 26 II. PARTIES’ JOINT MOTION TO EXTEND 27 The parties’ Joint Motion states that additional time is necessary to take and schedule 28 the deposition of a Rule 30(b)(6) witness. Doc. No. 39. Specifically, Plaintiff noticed said 1 deposition for November 30, 2023, but following subsequent meet and confer discussions, 2 learned that the relevant Rule 30(b)(6) witness is not available until an unspecified date in 3 January 2024. Id. Citing to this scheduling conflict, the Parties seek extending those dates 4 and deadlines occurring prior to October 2024 by 45 to 90 days. Id. This is the Parties’ first 5 request for an extension. Id. 6 III. ANALYSIS 7 Pursuant to the operative Scheduling Order, the parties had over seven months to 8 conduct all fact discovery, including working to schedule and take the deposition of any 9 Rule 30(b)(6) witnesses. Doc. No. 36. The Parties seek an additional ninety (90) days to 10 complete fact discovery. Doc. No. 39. However, other than the need to complete a Rule 11 30(b)(6) deposition, the Parties do not identify any other delays or discovery issues that 12 necessitate extending fact discovery by 90 days.2 Id. Moreover, while the Court 13 understands that corporate representatives may have limited availability, the Parties 14 affirmatively represent that the relevant Rule 30(b)(6) witness Plaintiff seeks to depose is 15 available in January 2024. Id. at 3. As such, the deposition can presumably occur on or 16 before the close of fact discovery on January 31, 2024.3 17 Absent additional facts, the parties fail to demonstrate the requisite diligence and 18 corresponding good cause to support extending fact discovery and subsequent deadlines as 19 requested. Nevertheless, to accommodate any discovery disputes that may arise during the 20 course of the referenced Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, the Court finds good cause to grant a 21 partial extension of the requested deadlines. Therefore, the Court will modify the 22 Scheduling Order to provide a limited extension for the requested deadlines. The Parties 23

24 25 2 The Court notes that other than a reference to issuing “numerous subpoenas to Plaintiff’s medical providers” and the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, the Parties make no 26 reference to any other fact discovery. Doc. No. 39. 27 3 The Court further notes that Defendant has had notice since November 3, 2023 of Plaintiff’s intent to depose a Rule 30(b)(6) witness. Accordingly, Defendant has had 28 1 are advised that any further extension is strongly disfavored absent facts, supported by a 2 declaration from counsel, that demonstrate the diligence of the Parties in meeting current 3 deadlines and the reasons why the Parties cannot meet those deadlines. 4 IV. MODIFIED SCHEDULING ORDER 5 Good cause appearing, the Court GRANTS IN PART the Parties’ Joint Motion and 6 ORDERS as follows: 7 1. All fact discovery shall be completed by all parties by March 1, 2024. 8 “Completed” means that all discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 30-36, and discovery 9 subpoenas under Fed. R. Civ. P. 45, must be initiated a sufficient period of time in advance 10 of the cut-off date, so that it may be completed by the cut-off date, taking into account 11 the times for service, notice, and response as set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil 12 Procedure. Counsel shall promptly and in good faith meet and confer regarding all 13 discovery disputes in compliance with Local Rule 26.1(a). The Court expects counsel to 14 make every effort to resolve all disputes without court intervention through the meet and 15 confer process. If the parties reach an impasse on any discovery issue, counsel shall follow 16 the procedures governing discovery disputes set forth in Judge Torres’ Civil Chambers 17 Rules. A failure to comply in this regard will result in a waiver of a party’s discovery 18 issue. Absent an order of the Court, no stipulation continuing or altering this requirement 19 will be recognized by the Court. 20 2. The MSC currently set for February 15, 2024 at 9:00 a.m.

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John Doe v. Regents of The University of California, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/john-doe-v-regents-of-the-university-of-california-casd-2024.