John Doe v. Regents of The University of California

District Court, S.D. California·Decided January 4, 2024·No. 3:22-cv-01506·Unknown

Opinion

JOHN DOE, Case No.: 22-cv-01506-JLS-VET

Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART v. JOINT MOTION TO EXTEND CERTAIN DEADLINES IN THE SCHEDULING ORDER CALIFORNIA, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, [Doc No. 39]

Defendants.

Before the Court is the Parties’ Stipulation to Extend Certain Deadlines in the Scheduling Order Regulating Discovery and Other Pre-Trial Proceedings (the “Joint Motion”).1 Doc. No. 39. Therein, the parties propose extending eight dates or deadlines. Id. at 4. Based on a review of the Joint Motion and the record, the Court GRANTS IN PART the Joint Motion.

1 Pursuant to Civ. Loc. R. 7.2, the Court construes the Parties’ Stipulation as a “Joint Motion.” See Civ. Loc. R. 7.2 (“Any stipulation for which court approval is sought must In determining whether to modify a scheduling order, the Court considers the “good cause” standard set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4). Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). Pursuant to Rule 16(b)(4), a “schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Id. (emphasis added); Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002) (“the pretrial scheduling order can only be modified upon a showing of good cause”). Rule 16(b)(4)’s “good cause” standard “primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the amendment.” Learjet, Inc. v. Oneok, Inc. (In re W. States Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust Litig.), 715 F.3d 716, 737 (9th Cir. 2013). “The district court may modify the pretrial schedule ‘if it cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.’” Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee’s notes on the 1983 amendment); see also Zivkovic, 302 F.3d at 1087; 6A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1522.1 at 231 (2d ed. 1990) (“good cause” means scheduling deadlines cannot be met despite party’s diligence). “[C]arelessness is not compatible with a finding of diligence and offers no reason for a grant of relief.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. The focus of the inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking modification. Id. “If the moving party was not diligent, the inquiry should end.” Id.; Branch Banking & Tr. Co. v. D.M.S.I., LLC, 871 F.3d 751, 764 (9th Cir. 2017) (same). Further, Civil Local Rule 16.1(b) requires that all counsel “proceed with diligence to take all steps necessary to bring an action to readiness for trial.” Civ.LR 16.1(b). Similarly, this Court’s Civil Chambers Rules require that any motion to continue a scheduling order deadline include a showing of good cause, supported by a “declaration from counsel that details steps taken by the parties to meet current deadlines and reasons why the parties can no longer meet those deadlines.” J. Torres Civ. Chambers R. VI.D. The parties’ Joint Motion states that additional time is necessary to take and schedule the deposition of a Rule 30(b)(6) witness. Doc. No. 39. Specifically, Plaintiff noticed said deposition for November 30, 2023, but following subsequent meet and confer discussions, learned that the relevant Rule 30(b)(6) witness is not available until an unspecified date in January 2024. Id. Citing to this scheduling conflict, the Parties seek extending those dates and deadlines occurring prior to October 2024 by 45 to 90 days. Id. This is the Parties’ first request for an extension. Id. Pursuant to the operative Scheduling Order, the parties had over seven months to conduct all fact discovery, including working to schedule and take the deposition of any Rule 30(b)(6) witnesses. Doc. No. 36. The Parties seek an additional ninety (90) days to complete fact discovery. Doc. No. 39. However, other than the need to complete a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, the Parties do not identify any other delays or discovery issues that necessitate extending fact discovery by 90 days.2 Id. Moreover, while the Court understands that corporate representatives may have limited availability, the Parties affirmatively represent that the relevant Rule 30(b)(6) witness Plaintiff seeks to depose is available in January 2024. Id. at 3. As such, the deposition can presumably occur on or before the close of fact discovery on January 31, 2024.3 Absent additional facts, the parties fail to demonstrate the requisite diligence and corresponding good cause to support extending fact discovery and subsequent deadlines as requested. Nevertheless, to accommodate any discovery disputes that may arise during the course of the referenced Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, the Court finds good cause to grant a partial extension of the requested deadlines. Therefore, the Court will modify the Scheduling Order to provide a limited extension for the requested deadlines. The Parties

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John Doe v. Regents of The University of California, (S.D. Cal. 2024).

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