John Doe 1 v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia

Opinion

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2944-22

JOHN DOE 1,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ARCHDIOCESE OF PHILADELPHIA,

Defendant-Respondent. _________________________

Argued April 28, 2025 – Decided June 4, 2025

Before Judges Gummer, Berdote Byrne, and Jacobs.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Cape May County, Docket No. L-0137-20.

Ruxandra M. Laidacker argued the cause for appellant (Kline & Specter, PC, attorneys; Charles L. Becker, David K. Inscho, Ruxandra M. Laidacker, and Philip M. Pasquarello, on the briefs).

Nicholas M. Centrella argued the cause for respondent (Clark Hill PLC, attorneys; Nicholas M. Centrella, on the briefs).

PER CURIAM Plaintiff appeals from a Law Division order dismissing his complaint for

lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiff alleges he was repeatedly sexually abused from

1968 to 1970, between the ages of fourteen through sixteen, by Father Francis

P. Rogers, a Roman Catholic priest of the Archdiocese of Philadelphia ("the

Archdiocese"). Plaintiff maintains that although the abuse occurred mostly in

Pennsylvania, he was abused by Rogers on approximately ten occasions in New

Jersey. In the complaint, plaintiff alleges the Archdiocese was civilly liable for

Rogers's sexual abuse. On appeal, plaintiff argues the Archdiocese is subject to

specific personal jurisdiction in New Jersey based on the conduct of its agent,

Rogers, in New Jersey, and, therefore, the trial court erred in granting the

Archdiocese's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

As recently expressed by our Supreme Court in a similar case, "a priest's

exploitation of his clerical role to sexually abuse a minor . . . is reprehensible"

however, the "sole issue before [us] . . . is whether our courts may exercise

personal jurisdiction over the Archdiocese in the setting of this case." D.T. v.

Archdiocese of Phila., 260 N.J. 27, 33 (2025). Because the evidence in the

record before us reflects the Archdiocese did not purposefully avail itself of any

privileges or benefits in New Jersey relating to Rogers's alleged sexual abuse of

plaintiff, and the Supreme Court's recent decision in D.T. rejects the notion that

A-2944-22 2 an agency relationship, by itself, may confer personal jurisdiction, we affirm the

trial court's order and conclude New Jersey did not have specific personal

jurisdiction over the Archdiocese in this matter.

I.

We glean the following facts from plaintiff's complaint and the record

developed through extensive jurisdictional discovery. The Archdiocese is a

Roman Catholic organization and a non-profit religious corporation authorized

to conduct business in Pennsylvania, with its principal place of business located

in Philadelphia. The Archdiocese oversees and serves parishes in five

Pennsylvania counties. It currently does not have, oversee, or operate any

offices, churches, parishes, property, or religious facilities in New Jersey. The

Archdiocese does not assign any priests to parishes outside of the five counties

it oversees in Pennsylvania. Although it owned several properties in New Jersey

in the past, the Archdiocese sold all its New Jersey properties and does not

presently own any property in the state.

In 1946, Rogers was ordained and started working with the Archdiocese

as a priest. Between his ordination and death, Rogers was assigned to parishes

within the Archdiocese. His assignments included Incarnation of Our Lord

A-2944-22 3 Parish ("Incarnation") in Philadelphia, where the Archdiocese placed him from

January 1968 to September 1971.

Before Rogers's assignment to Incarnation, the Archdiocese was aware

that he had pedophilic tendencies. In 1961, then-Chancellor of the Archdiocese

John J. Noone, "wrote a memorandum ('memo') to the file regarding reports of

Rogers'[s] [ten]-year history of sexually abusing young boys," wherein he stated

he had "received reports from a psychiatrist of Rogers's 'familiarity' with

[eighth] and [ninth] grade boys." Noone noted this "'familiar[ity]' with boys"

occurred "in at least two other assignments," including Rogers's first parish

assignment from 1946 to 1949. The memo also stated Rogers "ha[d] taken boys

out of school for trips to the seashore, occasionally overnight ones . . . ." In his

memo, Noone concluded "Rogers had committed the acts of which he was

accused regarding misconduct with young boys."

The Archbishop of Philadelphia at the time, John J. Krol, added two

handwritten notes to the memo: the first note "prescribes an immediate retreat,

a '[s]evere warning that any further complaint will call for summary

deactivation!' and 'transfer to another post'"; and the second note indicates Krol

met with Rogers on May 8, 1961, in response to these allegations, and states "1)

[two] week retreat; 2) change; and 3) [c]aveat! Must avoid slightest suspicion—

A-2944-22 4 any further complaint will provoke effective action to preclude scandal —even

civil." In 1968, Rogers was assigned to Incarnation.

Plaintiff and his family lived in Philadelphia between 1968 and 1970 and

were parishioners of Incarnation. According to plaintiff, his parents were devout

Catholics, and his mother suggested plaintiff seek out Rogers "for guidance and

support regarding a family . . . conflict" when he was fourteen years old.

Plaintiff alleged Rogers began to groom him and invited plaintiff to work for

Incarnation by counting parish collections in his rectory bedroom.

Rogers took plaintiff to his personally-owned house in Townsend's Inlet,

New Jersey, where plaintiff claims Rogers sexually abused him, between 1968

and 1970, approximately ten times. During the same two-year period, Rogers

also allegedly sexually abused plaintiff at the Incarnation rectory countless

times. In 1970, when plaintiff was sixteen years old, he distanced himself from

Rogers. In September 1971, Rogers was transferred out of Incarnation to

another parish in the Archdiocese. He retired in 1995 but was never laicized,

remaining a priest until his death in 2005.

On April 24, 2020, plaintiff filed the complaint at issue against the

Archdiocese, alleging vicarious liability for Rogers's alleged sexual abuse

committed in New Jersey, negligence, and negligent supervision, hiring, and

A-2944-22 5 retention. In response, the Archdiocese moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint

for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court adjourned the Archdiocese's

motion, consolidated this case with three other cases involving similar claims,

and ordered jurisdictional discovery. After jurisdictional discovery was

completed, the Archdiocese renewed its motion to dismiss for lack of personal

jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(b).

The trial court issued an order granting the Archdiocese's motion to

dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction with prejudice in all four consolidated

cases. The trial court found the Archdiocese had minimum contacts with New

Jersey and purposefully had availed itself of the benefits and privileges of

conducting activities in New Jersey based upon its "ownership of the property

[in New Jersey], . . . the annual, regular[,] and sizable retreats held in New

Jersey, and the trip by" another priest working for the Archdiocese "with

potential priests" in New Jersey.

However, the trial court found there was no relational link between "any

of the non-retreat[-]owned properties" and the Archdiocese's retreat center in

this case because there were no "allegations that any of the property owned by

the [Archdiocese] played any role at all in the sexual abuse of any of the

[p]laintiffs"; there were no allegations that a priest was "in New Jersey attending

A-2944-22 6 a retreat at the time any of the [p]laintiffs were abused"; and none of the

plaintiffs alleged the priests were staying at the retreat center at the time any of

the alleged abuse had occurred, or that the abuse occurred at the retreat center.

Plaintiff's appeal followed. After the Supreme Court rendered a decision

in D.T., we requested supplemental briefing from the parties regarding whether

plaintiff's claims were moot in light of D.T. Plaintiff contends the facts of his

case were distinguishable from D.T.

II.

Our review of a trial court's factual findings with respect to jurisdiction is

limited to determining whether "those findings are supported by substantial,

credible evidence in the record." D.T., 260 N.J. at 41 (quoting Rippon v. Smigel,

449 N.J. Super. 344, 358 (App. Div. 2017)). Nonetheless, "[a] trial court's

interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established

facts are not entitled to any special deference," and we review those conclusions

de novo. Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366,

378 (1995).

To determine whether a non-resident defendant may be subject to specific

personal jurisdiction, we examine "the relationship among the defendant, the

forum, and the litigation." Lebel v. Everglades Marina, Inc., 115 N.J. 317, 323

A-2944-22 7 (1989) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)). Pursuant to

"Fourteenth Amendment due process principles, a court may exercise specific

personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if there was 'some act

by which the defendant purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of

conducting activities' in the forum state, 'thus invoking the benefits and

protections of its laws.'" D.T., 260 N.J. at 32 (alteration in original) (quoting

Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).

Importantly, for specific jurisdiction to attach, a "plaintiff's claims must

also 'arise out of or relate to the defendant's contacts with the forum' state." Ibid.

(quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 582 U.S. 255, 262

(2017)); see also Jardim v. Overley, 461 N.J. Super. 367, 376 (App. Div. 2019)

("In order for a state court to exercise [specific] jurisdiction over a nonresident

defendant, the lawsuit 'must aris[e] out of or relat[e] to the defendant's contacts

with the forum.'" (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Daimler AG

v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014))). After determining there to be sufficient

minimum contacts, the court must then determine whether maintaining the

lawsuit in the forum state "'does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and

substantial justice"' in order to assert personal jurisdiction over the defendant."

A-2944-22 8 D.T., 260 N.J. at 32 (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316

(1945)).

"The minimum contacts required to establish specific 'jurisdiction often

go by the name purposeful availment.'" Id. at 43 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v.

Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 359 (2021)) (internal quotation marks

omitted). "[This] requirement is satisfied so long as the contacts resulted from

the defendant's purposeful conduct and not the unilateral activities of the

plaintiff." Doe 70 v. Diocese of Metuchen, 477 N.J. Super. 270, 281 (App. Div.

2023) (quoting Lebel, 115 N.J. at 323); see also E.T. v. Boys & Girls Club of

Hudson Cnty., 478 N.J. Super. 102, 108 (App. Div. 2024) ("A defendant's

conduct must be purposeful and not be caused by the plaintiff's unilateral

actions.").

For specific personal jurisdiction to apply, "[t]he defendant 'must take

"some act by which [it] purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting

activities within the forum State."'" D.T., 260 N.J. at 43 (second alteration in

original) (quoting Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at 359). A defendant's contacts

must reflect a deliberate decision to reach outside of its home state into the

forum state. Ibid.; see also Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at 359.

A-2944-22 9 Plaintiff claims the Archdiocese purposefully availed itself of the

privilege of conducting activities in New Jersey because the record reflects that

the Archdiocese, through Archbishop Krol, knew Rogers was taking children on

trips "to the seashore"; the Archdiocese was aware Rogers was sexually abusing

children on the overnight trips in New Jersey; the trips to New Jersey were

"religious retreats" that were "not strictly personal"; and "both [plaintiff] and

Rogers understood these trips as within the continuum of Rogers'[s] job and as

church outings arising from the relationship between a priest and parishioner ."

These contentions are belied by the record, which does not reflect the

Archdiocese was aware Rogers was taking any children to his personal home in

New Jersey and sexually abusing them there, including plaintiff. Although

plaintiff claimed in supplemental briefing "Rogers even would inform the

[p]arish pastor when traveling with [plaintiff] to New Jersey," that assertion is

not supported by any testimony or documentary evidence. Plaintiff, at his

deposition, stated he "d[id not] know" whether Incarnation's pastor "would have

known that [he was] going with Father Rogers" to New Jersey. Although "the

seashore" is mentioned in the memo, there is no evidence in the record before

us the pastor or the Archdiocese was aware that Rogers was taking plaintiff with

him on his trips to New Jersey. Nor does the record show Rogers's purpose for

A-2944-22 10 taking these trips with plaintiff was a religious one. Nothing in the record

suggests Rogers took plaintiff to a religious site or Archdiocesan -owned

property in New Jersey.

The record before us supports plaintiff's allegation Rogers's trips to

Townsend's Inlet with plaintiff were taken for the specific purpose of giving

Rogers an opportunity to sexually abuse plaintiff. When asked at his deposition

"[o]n how many of [the times that Rogers took plaintiff to his Townsend's Inlet

house] did he sexually abuse" him, plaintiff replied, "[t]en" and added, "[w]e

went there for a purpose." Plaintiff believed Rogers took him to the Townsend's

Inlet house "in order to sexually abuse" him, not for any religious reason. There

is no evidence the Archdiocese knew of, approved, or sanctioned Rogers's

conduct in taking plaintiff to his Townsend's Inlet house.

Although, "[t]he United States Supreme Court has recognized that agency

principles may play a role in determining whether a nonresident defendant is

subject to specific jurisdiction," our Supreme Court has noted the United States

Supreme Court does not "conflate questions of personal jurisdiction with the

issue of vicarious liability." D.T., 260 N.J. at 46-47. Therefore, "New Jersey

may not exercise specific jurisdiction over the Archdiocese unless the

Archdiocese purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities

A-2944-22 11 in New Jersey," and the claims before us "arose from or related to" those specific

contacts with New Jersey. Id. at 47. A plaintiff must establish that the

Archdiocese's minimum contacts with New Jersey are relevant to the claims

raised by the plaintiff "either directly or through an agent" for agency principles

to support the defendant's jurisdictional argument. Ibid. ("Accordingly, if the

Archdiocese did not establish minimum contacts with New Jersey that are

relevant to this case, either directly or through an agent, agency principles do

not support [the plaintiff's] jurisdictional argument.").

Because "determining personal jurisdiction is a separate question from

determining vicarious liability," plaintiff cannot claim the Archdiocese is

subject to New Jersey's jurisdiction solely because there may be an agency

relationship between the Archdiocese and Rogers. D.T. v. Archdiocese of

Phila., 477 N.J. Super. 370, 385 (App. Div. 2023), aff'd, 260 N.J. 27 (2025).

Our Supreme Court held conclusively "the Archdiocese did not establish such

contacts with New Jersey. . . . [T]he Archdiocese's oversight of [defendant-

priest's] work as a priest did not give rise to the necessary nexus with New

Jersey." D.T., 260 N.J. at 48. Plaintiff cannot rely on the agency relationship

to establish specific jurisdiction. Although the trial court found plaintiff had

established the Archdiocese's minimum contacts because of its property

A-2944-22 12 ownership and its hosting of retreats in New Jersey, none of these contacts were

involved in Rogers's alleged sexual abuse of plaintiff. Rogers's sexual abuse of

plaintiff did not take place in Archdiocesan-owned property, at an

Archdiocesan-held retreat, or with the Archdiocese's prior knowledge or

permission. Plaintiff's claims of Rogers's sexual abuse in New Jersey do not

"arise out of or relate to the [Archdiocese's] contacts with the forum." Id. at 44

(quoting Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at 359) (internal quotation marks omitted).

To paraphrase the Supreme Court's sound reasoning in D.T., Rogers, not the

Archdiocese, owned the house in which plaintiff was sexually abused; Rogers,

not the Archdiocese, elected to take plaintiff to New Jersey; and Rogers, not the

Archdiocese, allegedly sexually abused plaintiff. Although the Archdiocese was

aware of prior sexual-abuse allegations made against Rogers, there is no

evidence in the record to suggest the Archdiocese was aware of Rogers's sexual

abuse of plaintiff or any other child in New Jersey.

This case is distinguishable from Doe 70, where one of the defendants,

the Catholic Diocese of Richmond, was aware of a priest's sexual abuse of minor

parishioners but nonetheless encouraged and allowed the priest to go to New

Jersey to serve as a priest and the Diocese "maintained a significant degree of

control over [the priest] while he served in New Jersey." 477 N.J. Super. at 276.

A-2944-22 13 Because plaintiff failed to prove his claim "ar[o]se out of or relate[d] to

the defendant's contacts with the forum," we affirm the trial court's order

dismissing plaintiff's complaint and conclude the Archdiocese is not subject to

New Jersey's specific jurisdiction in this matter. D.T., 260 N.J. at 44 (quoting

Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at 359) (internal quotation marks omitted).

To the extent we have not addressed any of plaintiff's remaining

arguments, we are satisfied they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion. R.

2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

A-2944-22 14