John Doe 1 v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: December 27, 2023
• Docket: A-3636-21
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3636-21

JOHN DOE 1,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ARCHDIOCESE OF PHILADELPHIA,

Defendant-Respondent. __________________________

Argued November 13, 2023 – Decided December 27, 2023

Before Judges Gilson, Berdote Byrne, and Bishop- Thompson.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Ocean County, Docket No. L-0108-20.

Ruxandra Maniu Laidacker argued the cause for appellant (Kline & Specter, PC, attorneys; Charles L. Becker, David Kehm Inscho, Ruxandra Maniu Laidacker, and Phillip Michael Pasquarello, on the briefs).

Nicholas M. Centrella argued the cause for respondent (Clark Hill PLC, attorneys; Nicholas M. Centrella, on the brief). PER CURIAM

Plaintiff alleges that he was sexually abused in the late 1970s and early

1980s by Father John Mulholland, a Catholic priest. 1 At the time of the alleged

abuse, Mulholland was serving as a priest in the Archdiocese of Philadelphia

(the Archdiocese). Plaintiff appeals from an order granting the Archdiocese's

motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. We affirm because

jurisdictional discovery established that the Archdiocese did not purpos efully

avail itself of any benefits in New Jersey related to Mulholland's alleged abuse

of plaintiff. Therefore, New Jersey does not have personal jurisdiction over the

Archdiocese related to this lawsuit.

I.

We discern the facts from the record developed during jurisdictional

discovery. The Archdiocese is an unincorporated, religious, non-profit

association that operates in Pennsylvania. Its principal place of administration

is in Philadelphia, and it oversees Catholic parishes in five Pennsylvania

counties. The Archdiocese does not oversee or operate any churches, parishe s,

1 Plaintiff identifies himself as "John Doe 1" in his complaint. We refer to him as plaintiff to protect privacy interests concerning allegations of child sexual abuse. See R. 1:38-3(c)(9); see also N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1(f).

A-3636-21 2 or religious facilities in New Jersey. It also does not assign priests to any

parishes in New Jersey.

The Archdiocese does not currently own any real property in New Jersey.

In the past, the Archdiocese did own several properties in New Jersey that w ere

given to it, but those properties were sold before 2013. The Archdiocese also

owned and operated two properties in Ventnor, New Jersey, which it used as

vacation homes for priests. The Ventnor properties were acquired in 1963 and

sold in 2012 and 2013.

Mulholland was ordained as a Catholic priest in the Archdiocese in 1965.

Thereafter, he served as a priest in the Archdiocese at various parishes and

facilities, all located in Pennsylvania. In 2008, the Pope "laicized" Mulholland,

which meant that he was dismissed from the clerical state. See Glossary of

Terms, The Diocese of Springfield, Mass.,

https://diospringfield.org/osevaglossaryofterms/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2023)

(defining "laicization").

Plaintiff is a resident of Pennsylvania. During his childhood, he attended

and served as an altar boy at Blessed Virgin Mary Church (Blessed Mary) in

Darby, Pennsylvania. While attending Blessed Mary, plaintiff met Mulholland,

who served as a priest at Blessed Mary from 1973 to 1977. Plaintiff asserts that

A-3636-21 3 Mulholland used his position as a priest to groom plaintiff and develop a

relationship of trust with plaintiff and his family. Plaintiff further asserts that

Mulholland then used that position of trust to gain permission from plaintiff's

parents to take plaintiff on trips, including overnight trips to a home Mulholland

owned in Mystic Island, New Jersey.

Plaintiff alleges that beginning in 1976, Mulholland engaged in various

"games" and behaviors with plaintiff that involved bondage and activities that

sexually aroused Mulholland. From approximately 1977 to 1980, when plaintiff

was a teenager, Mulholland brought plaintiff to his home in Mystic Island about

ten to twelve times. He alleges that each time, Mulholland had plaintiff engage

in "master-servant" "games" involving sexual torture.

In January 2020, plaintiff sued the Archdiocese in New Jersey. Plaintiff

contends that the Archdiocese is responsible for Mulholland's sexual abuse of

him, and he asserted causes of actions for vicarious liability, negligence,

negligent supervision, and negligent hiring and retention. Plaintiff also contends

that the Archdiocese had known of Mulholland's "proclivities" since 1968 but

did not restrict his activities with children. Instead, according to plaintiff, the

Archdiocese had moved Mulholland to other parishes in Pennsylvania, including

Blessed Mary.

A-3636-21 4 The Archdiocese moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for lack of

personal jurisdiction. The trial court initially denied that motion and directed

the parties to engage in jurisdictional discovery. Following the completion of

that discovery, the Archdiocese again moved to dismiss the complaint.

On June 28, 2022, after hearing arguments from counsel, the trial court

issued an order granting the motion and dismissing plaintiff's claims against the

Archdiocese for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff now appeals.

II.

On appeal, plaintiff makes two arguments. He contends that the

Archdiocese is subject to specific jurisdiction in New Jersey because

Mulholland was an agent of the Archdiocese. He also argues that the trial court

erred by focusing narrowly on Mulholland's abusive actions in New Jersey,

rather than considering all of Mulholland's actions and how the Archdiocese

facilitated those actions.

Personal jurisdiction is a "'mixed question of law and fact' that must be

resolved at the outset, 'before the matter may proceed.'" Rippon v. Smigel, 449

N.J. Super. 344, 359 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting Citibank, N.A. v. Est. of

Simpson, 290 N.J. Super. 519, 532 (App. Div. 1996)). We review a trial court's

findings of fact with respect to jurisdiction "to determine if those findings are

A-3636-21 5 supported by substantial, credible evidence in the record," but conclusions of

law are reviewed de novo. Id. at 358. "A trial court's interpretation of the law

and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to

any special deference." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan,

140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).

Having considered plaintiff's arguments in light of the record and

governing law, we reject them. The facts disclosed during jurisdictional

discovery established that the Archdiocese is not subject to jurisdiction in New

Jersey because it did not purposefully avail itself of activities in New Jersey

sufficient to satisfy the "minimum contacts" required for personal jurisdiction.

See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945).

We have recently published two opinions that set forth the law on when a

non-resident diocese is subject to personal jurisdiction in New Jersey for the

alleged past sexual abuse of a minor by a priest. See D.T. v. Archdiocese of

Phila., ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2023); JA/GG Doe 70 v. Diocese of

Metuchen, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2023). Like the plaintiffs in those

cases, plaintiff here concedes that he must show specific personal jurisdiction

over the Archdiocese.

A-3636-21 6 To determine whether a non-resident defendant may be subject to specific

personal jurisdiction, courts examine the "relationship among the defendant, the

forum, and the litigation." Lebel v. Everglades Marina, Inc., 115 N.J. 317, 323

(1989) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)). "In order for a

state court to exercise [specific] jurisdiction over a non[-]resident defendant, the

lawsuit 'must aris[e] out of or relat[e] to the defendant's contacts with the

forum.'" Jardim v. Overley, 461 N.J. Super. 367, 376 (App. Div. 2019) (third

and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S.

117, 127 (2014)); accord Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 106,

119 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1183 (1995); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Mont.

Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. ___, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1025 (2021).

"The 'minimum contacts' requirement is satisfied so long as the contacts

resulted from the defendant's purposeful conduct and not the unilateral activities

of the plaintiff." Lebel, 115 N.J. at 323 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.

v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980)); see also Waste Mgmt., 138 N.J. at

126 (explaining that "the existence of minimum contacts turns on the presence

or absence of intentional acts of the defendant to avail itself of some benefit of

a forum state"). The contacts "must be the defendant's own choice and not

A-3636-21 7 'random, isolated, or fortuitous.'" Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1025 (quoting Keeton v.

Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)).

Moreover, courts determine, based on the defendant's "'conduct and

connection' with the forum state . . . whether the defendant should 'reasonably

anticipate being haled into court [in the forum state].'" Bayway Refin. Co. v.

State Utils., Inc., 333 N.J. Super. 420, 429 (App. Div. 2000) (alteration in

original) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297). In making that

determination, a court "must consider the burden on the defendant, the interests

of the forum State, and the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief." Asahi Metal

Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987). So, a court weighs "the

interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of

controversies; and the shared interest of the several States in furthering

fundamental substantive social policies." Ibid. (quoting World-Wide

Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292).

Neither the Archdiocese's former ownership of properties in New Jersey

nor its supervision over Mulholland as one of its priests establishes specific

jurisdiction over the Archdiocese in New Jersey related to Mulholland's alleged

sexual abuse of plaintiff in New Jersey. There is no evidence that the

Archdiocese's former ownership of real properties in New Jersey had any

A-3636-21 8 relation to plaintiff's allegations of abuse by Mulholland. Plaintiff testified that

he was abused by Mulholland in the late 1970s and early 1980s at a private home

Mulholland owned in Mystic Island, New Jersey. The Archdiocese's former

ownership of other properties in New Jersey was not related to Mulholland's use

of the home in Mystic Island. Specific jurisdiction requires "a connection

between the forum and the specific claims at issue." Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.

v. Superior Ct., 582 U.S. 255, 265 (2017).

Moreover, there is no evidence that the Archdiocese knew of, approved,

or sanctioned Mulholland taking plaintiff to a private home in Mystic Island.

Accordingly, there is no evidence demonstrating that the Archdiocese

purposefully availed itself of any benefit or activity in New Jersey in connection

with plaintiff's allegations of abuse by Mulholland.

For the reasons we detailed in D.T., we reject plaintiff's argument that

Mulholland was acting as an agent of the Archdiocese when Mulholland

sexually abused plaintiff. ___ N.J. Super. at ___ (slip op. at 14-19). In short,

there is no evidence that Mulholland was acting within the scope of his

responsibilities as a priest when he sexually assaulted plaintiff. See Bristol-

Myers Squibb Co., 582 U.S. at 265; Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 204; Lebel, 115 N.J. at

323.

A-3636-21 9 We also reject plaintiff's argument that the Archdiocese's failure to restrict

Mulholland's activities confers personal jurisdiction over the Archdiocese in

New Jersey. For purposes of determining personal jurisdiction, which in this

matter was raised on a motion to dismiss, we accept plaintiff's allegation that

the Archdiocese knew of Mulholland's deviant sexual behaviors with children

beginning in 1968. We also accept plaintiff's contention that the Archdiocese

transferred Mulholland to other parishes in the Archdiocese to avoid a public

scandal. While that conduct, if proven, would be inappropriate and highly

irresponsible, it does not establish specific personal jurisdiction over the

Archdiocese in New Jersey. All the alleged conduct regarding transferring

Mulholland from one parish to another took place in Pennsylvania. Therefore,

that conduct does not constitute intentional acts of the Archdiocese to avail itself

of some benefit in or from New Jersey. See Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1025; Waste

Mgmt., 138 N.J. at 126.

Finally, we also reject plaintiff's argument that because the Archdiocese

knew that many of its priests were sexually abusing children, the Archdiocese's

failure to restrict Mulholland's activities conferred personal jurisdiction in New

Jersey. All the priests in the Archdiocese served in Pennsylvania, and the

Archdiocese oversaw the activities of those priests in Pennsylvania from its

A-3636-21 10 administrative headquarters in Philadelphia. While it was foreseeable that

priests would travel outside of Pennsylvania, there is no evidence that

Mulholland took plaintiff to New Jersey on trips sanctioned or sponsored by the

Archdiocese. More importantly, there is no evidence that the Archdiocese had

intentionally availed itself of any benefit in or from New Jersey in connection

with Mulholland taking plaintiff to his private home in New Jersey. In short,

even if plaintiff proved all his allegations against the Archdiocese, those proofs

would not establish personal jurisdiction over the Archdiocese in New Jersey in

connection with plaintiff's lawsuit.

Affirmed.

A-3636-21 11