John Deere Co. v. Wonderland Realty Corp.

195 N.W.2d 871, 38 Mich. App. 88, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (West) 1278, 1972 Mich. App. LEXIS 1534
CourtMichigan Court of Appeals
DecidedJanuary 21, 1972
DocketDocket 11971
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 195 N.W.2d 871 (John Deere Co. v. Wonderland Realty Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
John Deere Co. v. Wonderland Realty Corp., 195 N.W.2d 871, 38 Mich. App. 88, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (West) 1278, 1972 Mich. App. LEXIS 1534 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972).

Opinion

Quinn, P. J.

This action was submitted to the trial court for decision on stipulated facts, stipulated issues, and briefs. Plaintiff had judgment and defendant Wonderland Realty Corporation appeals.

The facts stipulated are:

“1. On July 29, 1965, at Fort Wayne, Indiana, Floren Klopfenstein, as lessee, and A. H. Heine Implement Company, as lessor, executed a certain ‘equipment lease’ a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 1. The subject of said lease was two (2) John Deere 5010 scrapers (which is a large tractor with a built-on scraper blade) and two other items of earth moving equipment. At the time of the execution of the lease the equipment was located in Fort Wayne, Indiana, and shortly thereafter it was delivered by lessor to lessee at Paulding, Ohio.
*90 “2. On August 5,1965, the said lease was assigned to plaintiff, John Deere Company. Neither A. H. Heine Implement Company nor John Deere Company knew or consented to the later removal of said equipment to Michigan. The lease agreement was never the subject of a filing or recording in any state.
“3. On September 12, 1967, defendant, Wonderland Realty Corporation, as a judgment creditor of Floren Klopfenstein (Ingham County Circuit Civil Action No. 6400-C) executed and levied against the two John Deere 5010 scrapers and the John Deere 1010 back hoe, which equipment was. then in the possession of Floren Klopfenstein in Hillsdale County, Michigan.
“4. The instant action was brought by the plaintiff to forestall sale of said equipment pursuant to defendant Wonderland’s levy of execution and to determine the respective priority of the parties’ interests in said agreement. By agreement of the parties, the equipment was valued at sixteen thousand five hundred ($16,500) dollars, which figure is substituted herein for said equipment. The agreement of the parties with respect to sale and substitution and the terms of judgment to be rendered herein is attached hereto and made a part hereof as Exhibit 2.” (A copy of the “equipment lease” is attached hereto.)

The first stipulated issue was:

“Does the ‘equipment lease’ constitute a ‘security agreement’ under the law applicable to it?”

On the basis of a finding that the instrument involved was a lease, and not a security agreement, the trial court decided for plaintiff. We reverse because in our opinion the instrument was a security agreement.

MCLA 440.1201(37); MSA 19.1201(37) provides:

*91 “ ‘Security interest’ means an, interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation. * * # Unless a lease or consignment is intended as security, reservation of title thereunder is not a ‘security interest’ but a consignment is in any event subject to the provisions on consignment sales (section 2326). Whether a lease is intended as security is to be determined by the facts of each case; however, (a) the inclusion of an option to purchase does not of itself make the lease one intended for security, and (b) an agreement that upon compliance with the terms of the lease the lessee shall become or has the option to become the owner of the property for no additional consideration or for a nominal consideration does make the lease one intended for security.”

We refer to the “equipment lease” as the agreement. Neither its label nor its form determines what the agreement is. That determination results from an examination of the entire instrument and the ascertainment of its intent and the rights created by it.

For a term of 36 months, the so-called lessee was required to pay what is termed rental of $60,592.68, payable $5,049.39 at three month intervals or $20,-197.56 annually (paragraph 1 of the agreement). The lessee could extend the term for succeeding 12 month periods at an annual rental of $1,211.85 (paragraph 3 of the agreement). At the end of the term, lessee had an option to sell the equipment as provided in paragraph 8 of the agreement with final settlement to be made as provided in paragraph 9 of the agreement (paragraph 4 of the agreement). An examination of paragraphs 8 and 9 establishes that any proceeds of sale in excess of the present value of the payments provided in paragraph 1 and *92 remaining unpaid went to the lessee. 1 At a sale, lessee could bid as high as was necessary to become the successful bidder and never pay more than he was obligated to pay under paragraph 1 of the agreement.

On termination by the lessee under paragraph 8 of the agreement, the same result is reached, namely: the lessee pays the present value of unpaid payments required by paragraph 1.

In the event of default by lessee, he agrees to surrender possession of the equipment to lessor. The latter may accept the equipment in final settlement or sell it and hold lessee for any deficiency of the amount due under paragraph 1 (paragraph 10 of the agreement).

All of the foregoing analyses connote a security interest retained by lessor to secure payment, of lessee’s obligation under the agreement. On compliance with the terms of the agreement, it permits lessee to become the owner of the equipment for no additional consideration. The agreement was a security agreement and not a lease.

Because of its decision on the first issue, the trial court never reached the remaining issues. We decline to consider them before the trial court has decided them.

Reversed and remanded with costs to defendant Wonderland Realty.

All concurred.

*93 APPENDIX

EQUIPMENT LEASE

LESSOR: LESSEE:

A. H. Heine Imp. Co. Floren Klopfenstein

(Name) (Name)

Ft. Wayne, Ind. Paulding, Ohio, RR #2

(Mailing Address) (Mailing Address)

(City) (State or Province) (City) (State or Province)

DESCRIPTION OE UNITS (Give Serial No,)

1 John Deere Model 5010 Scraper #37T6864

1 John Deere Model 5010 Scraper #373R008227

1 John Deere Model 1010 Wheel loader #56786

1 John Deere Model 92 Backhoe #422

1. TERM; RENTAL

Lessor hereby leases the above units to Lessee for a term of 36 months from the date of this lease. A rental payment of $5049.39, shall be made at the beginning of each 3 month portion of the above stated term for a total of 12 rental payments. Advance rentals of $5049.39, receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, shall be applied to the first rental period and any excess applied to the last rental period(s).

2. ASSIGNMENT BY LESSOR

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195 N.W.2d 871, 38 Mich. App. 88, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (West) 1278, 1972 Mich. App. LEXIS 1534, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/john-deere-co-v-wonderland-realty-corp-michctapp-1972.