John Broos v. United States

CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedJuly 16, 2015
Docket15-6013
StatusPublished

This text of John Broos v. United States (John Broos v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
John Broos v. United States, (bap8 2015).

Opinion

United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________

No. 15-6013 ___________________________

In re: John Lloyd Broos; Carol Jean Broos

lllllllllllllllllllllDebtors

------------------------------

John Lloyd Broos; Carol Jean Broos

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee ____________

Appeal from United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Minnesota - St. Paul ____________

Submitted: July 6, 2015 Filed: July 16, 2015 ____________

Before SCHERMER, NAIL, and SHODEEN, Bankruptcy Judges. ____________

SCHERMER, Bankruptcy Judge John Lloyd Broos and Carol Jean Broos (Debtors) appeal from the Bankruptcy Court’s1 order substituting the named defendants, several employees of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), for the United States, and dismissing their complaint. The Debtors’ complaint alleged violations of 26 U.S.C. § 7433 and 11 U.S.C. § 524. We have jurisdiction over this appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 158(b). We affirm.

ISSUES

1. Was it proper to substitute the United States as the defendant?

2. Was it proper to deny the Debtors’ request for entry of default judgment?

3. Did the Debtors have standing to bring an action for damages without first following the remedies under 26 U.S.C. § 7433?

BACKGROUND

On July 21, 2009, the Debtors filed a petition for Chapter 7 relief. On their schedules, the Debtors listed the IRS as an unsecured creditor holding a claim in the amount of $249,085. They received a discharge on October 21, 2009.

Following the close of their Chapter 7 case, several IRS employees including, Tim Sherrill, Bart Brellenthin, G.J. Carter-Louis, V.A. Ris, and Michael W. Cox (IRS employees), issued IRS levies and filed Notices of Federal Tax Liens with respect to the Debtors’ federal tax debt.

1 The Honorable Gregory F. Kishel, Chief Judge, United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Minnesota.

2 The Debtors filed their adversary proceeding, naming each IRS employee as a defendant. The complaint alleges that the IRS employees violated 26 U.S.C. § 7433 by issuing levies and filing the Notices of Federal Tax Liens. As a result, the Debtors seek actual and punitive damages.

The United States, believing itself to be the proper party defendant, filed a motion to dismiss. The Bankruptcy Court subsequently entered an order substituting the United States as the sole defendant, denying the Debtors’ request for default judgment, and dismissing the Debtors’ complaint. The Debtors timely appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the Bankruptcy Court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. Wilson v. Walker (In re Walker), 528 B.R. 418, 427 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2015) (citing Heide v. Juve (In re Juve), 761 F.3d 847, 851 (8th Cir.2014)). All three issues before us involve purely legal questions. Therefore, we exercise de novo review with respect to all three.

DISCUSSION

1. Substitution of the United States was Proper because the United States is the Proper Party Defendant

In general, a private litigant may not sue the United States or any of its officers and employees without a waiver of sovereign immunity. United States v. Nordic Vill. Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33-34(1992). Section 7433 of the Internal Revenue Code provides such a waiver. It permits suits against the United States only:

If, in connection with any collection of Federal tax with respect to a taxpayer, any officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service

3 recklessly or intentionally, or by reason of negligence, disregards any provision of this title, or any regulation promulgated under this title, such taxpayer may bring a civil action for damages against the United States ... (emphasis added).

26 U.S.C. § 7433(a).

Individual federal employees may not be sued for actions taken in the performance of their official duties. See Searcy v. Donelson, 204 F.3d 797, 798 (8th Cir. 2000) (collecting cases). Sovereign immunity still applies in such cases. Id. As a result, the Debtors may not bring suit against the IRS employees under § 7433 because the actions that the Debtors allege violated § 7433–the issuance of levies and filing of notices of federal tax liens–were performed in the IRS employees’ official capacities as tax collectors.

The issuance of levies and the filing of notices of federal tax liens are actions to collect federal tax debt. “Official-capacity suits typically involve either allegedly unconstitutional state policies or unconstitutional actions taken by state agents possessing final authority over a particular decision.” Nix v. Norman, 879 F.2d 429, 431 (8th Cir. 1989). Actions to collect federal tax debt do not fit either description. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine what actions would be included in the IRS employees’ official duties if not the ones at issue here. We conclude that the claims brought against the IRS employees are barred by sovereign immunity because the employees were acting in their official capacities. As a result, the United States is the proper party defendant and substitution of the United States for the IRS employees as the party defendant was proper.

2. The Debtors were not Entitled to Default Judgment

The Debtors argue that they are entitled to default judgment against either the IRS employees or the United States. Default judgment is appropriate “[w]hen a party

4 against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise...” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7055. Default judgment may only be entered against the United States, its officers, or its agencies “if the claimant establishes a claim or right to relief by evidence that satisfies the court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(d); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7055.

The Debtors are not entitled to default judgment against the IRS employees or the United States. Since the IRS employees were not the proper party defendants, an entry of default judgment against the IRS employees would be inappropriate under Rule 7055 because they are not parties to this proceeding and the Debtors have no right to relief. An entry of default judgment against the United States is improper as well. The United States did not fail “to plead or otherwise defend” its position because it timely entered its appearance before the Bankruptcy Court.

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John Broos v. United States, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/john-broos-v-united-states-bap8-2015.