Jogger Mfg. Corp. v. Roquemore

118 F.2d 867, 48 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 614, 1941 U.S. App. LEXIS 4122
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedMarch 6, 1941
DocketNo. 7274
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 118 F.2d 867 (Jogger Mfg. Corp. v. Roquemore) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jogger Mfg. Corp. v. Roquemore, 118 F.2d 867, 48 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 614, 1941 U.S. App. LEXIS 4122 (7th Cir. 1941).

Opinion

EVANS, Circuit Judge.

Defendant denied infringement of plaintiff’s two patents, Nos. 1,694,638 and 1,-863,465, which cover a jogger, which is a device attached to a multigraph or a print[868]*868ing press and which stacks the papers coming through in even piles. Mechanical joggers have been used in connection with printing machines for many years, and one patent set out in the record goes back to 1879. When these patents were issued, plaintiff was engaged in the manufacture of joggers for its customers, among whom was American Multigraph Company, whose successor was Addressograph Multigraph Corporation. Both are hereinafter referred to as M Company.

Plaintiff sold its business to M Company, and executed an exclusive license, for the life of the patents, to make two types of joggers. M Company sold joggers with its machines. One was sold to defendant, who contends that this j ogger which it later sold was within the scope of the license from plaintiff to M Company.

The defense of infringement is double-barreled. It is argued: (a) "The M Co. was licensed by plaintiff to make the machine such as was sold. If so there was obviously no infringement, (b) The machine sold did not, in fact, infringe either patent.

There was an additional defense, partial or complete, — plaintiff’s laches.

The court found against defendant on both infringement contentions, and entered the usual decree of accounting and injunction.

The first argument on infringement turns on the scope of the language in the license contract of August 10, 1931:

“To make, use, and sell joggers known as Models 112 and 1121 and embodying the invention of said patent or any reissue thereof.”

What was meant by the words “Models 112 and 1121”?

The aforesaid agreement was executed after negotiations wherein plaintiff sought to sell its business to M Company, which was built around the two patents.

In addition to granting an exclusive license for the life of the patent, plaintiff sold

“its drawings * * * parts, castings, jigs, tools and dies now existing and either used or usable in the manufacture of Models 112 and 1121 joggers.”

Plaintiff seeks to hold M Company and its customers to joggers whose size corresponds exactly with Models 112 and 1121, whereas M Company contends that joggers were of two classes, one for use in the office equipment field and the other for the commercial printing field. Its license covered the first named' field (the office equipment) with two exceptions provided in the last clause of paragraph one. M Company was engaged in the office equipment field only, and it had ordered joggers from the plaintiff for its multigraphs, to which the joggers were attached. It sold two multigraphs principally, Nos. 66 and 86, and joggers 112 and 1121 were the proper size and width to be attached to these machines. M Company also made a third multigraph model known by it as 57, but its sales were so small that the joggers which plaintiff made for it had not yet been given a number.

Plaintiff’s argument of infringement is based on difference in sizes only. All the joggers are the same, but the dimensions differ. The one sold by defendant differed from jogger models 112 and 1121. It was made by M Company for a different multigraph.

Three paragraphs of the agreement are herewith set forth:

“Whereas, Multigraph is desirous of obtaining a license to manufacture certain devices or joggers known as Models No. 112 and 1121, and covered by the aforesaid patent and application for Letters Patent, to be applied to their products as from time to time manufactured.

“Whereas, The said jogger is desirous of licensing the said Multigraph to manufacture, use and sell two types of joggers known as Models No. 112 and 1121 for attachment to the products from time to time manufactured and sold by Multigraph; and

* * * * * *

“1. Jogger hereby grants unto Multigraph the exclusive license to make, use and sell joggers known as models 112 and 1121 and embodying the invention of this patent or any re-issue thereof, and of any patent that may be issued on said application or any division, renewal or reissue thereof, and of any patents that may hereafter be owned by Jogger on any improvements thereof, or substitutions therefor, throughout the United States and foreign countries, and to the full end of the term of each of said patents, provided, however, that Multigraph shall have no right to manufacture said Joggers for M-24 and Multicolor type presses

[869]*869M Company emphasizes the language “to be applied to their products as from time to time manufactured.”

Still more significant is the last clause of paragraph 1,

“provided, however, that Multigraph shall have no right to manufacture said Joggers for M-24 and Multicolor type presses.”

We feel justified in finding (from a reading of the entire contract), as well as from the purpose and object of the agreement, that plaintiff was selling its business and granting an exclusive license to the defendant to make and sell joggers known as Models 112 and 1121, to be used by M Company “to be applied to their products as from time to time manufactured.” In other words, M Company was not restricted to its so-called models 66 and 86, but, as and- when the trade demanded different sizes, it could and would produce such multigraphs, and it was licensed by plaintiff to make, use, and sell models to be attached to such multigraphs in the office equipment field. It is' significant that instead of specific joggers, the license to make which was granted, the parties used the terms “models,” “types,” and “known as models.”

Most significant is the fact that after granting to M Company the exclusive license to make joggers in paragraph 1, it excepted therefrom, in the same paragraph, <<j°gg'ers f°r M-24 and Multicolor type presses.” If M Company were restricted to a jogger of the exact sizes and dimensions of 112 and 1121, why except joggers which were not identical therewith? Yet joggers for M-24 and Multicolor type presses were excepted. If said grant were limited to the exact structures of 112 and 1121, the parties would not except two other known makes, neither of which was of the dimensions of 112 or 1121. Then, too, it approaches the absurd to assume the parties restricted M Company to machines of the exact dimensions it used as attachments to its multigraph models 66 and 86, when, at the time, M Company had an additional model 57 and was preparing for the trade two or three other models which were not of the same dimensions and which were by it later numbered 206, 296, and 300.

These different models called for different sized attachments. The frame in which the jogger was situated, which was the distinctive type of multigraph 66 and 86 for joggers 112 and 1121, was unpatented and unpatentable. The jogger operated the same in all models, but the attachment looked better and probably spaced better when its dimensions were like those of the multigraph.

There is a fatal inconsistency between the provision which followed the word “provided” and a construction of the contract which limited M Company to joggers of the exact dimensions of 112 and 1121. In other words, joggers for M-24 could not be used with the specific joggers known as 112 and 1121.

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Bluebook (online)
118 F.2d 867, 48 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 614, 1941 U.S. App. LEXIS 4122, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jogger-mfg-corp-v-roquemore-ca7-1941.