FILED May 12 2026, 9:05 am
CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana Joel Thomas Meyer, Appellant-Defendant
v.
State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
May 12, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 24A-CR-3025 Appeal from the Madison Circuit Court The Honorable Angela Warner Sims, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 48C01-2209-F1-2768
Opinion by Judge Scheele Judge May concurs. Chief Judge Tavitas concurs in part and concurs in result in part.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-3025 | May 12, 2026 Page 1 of 24 Scheele, Judge.
Case Summary [1] Throughout the evening and early morning hours of September 16 and 17,
2022, Joel Thomas Meyer drunkenly attacked his fiancée, G.Y., beating her
severely. He then slit his forearm with a knife and went outside, leaving a pool
of blood in his driveway before returning into the house. Neighbors called
police. Responding officers knocked on Meyer’s door and spoke with him, first
through his front door and later, with his consent, through the back door.
Concerned about his and G.Y.’s well-being, officers eventually entered the
home, where they found both Meyer and G.Y. seriously injured. Meyer was
charged with and convicted of Level 1 felony attempted murder and Level 3
felony criminal confinement.
[2] He now appeals his convictions, arguing the officers’ warrantless entry into his
home violated the state and federal constitutions and there is insufficient
evidence to support the convictions. We affirm his convictions but remand for
correction of the abstract of judgment and sentencing order. 1
Facts and Procedural History [3] Meyer and G.Y. met at a rehabilitation facility in May 2021 and began dating a
few months later. Both had struggled with alcoholism for years, and Meyer, a
1 We held an oral argument at the Indiana State House on March 17, 2026. We thank counsel for the high quality of their arguments.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-3025 | May 12, 2026 Page 2 of 24 veteran, also suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). In February
2022, Meyer purchased a home in Pendleton and G.Y. moved in with him. By
this point, the relationship had grown toxic. The two relapsed frequently and
spent time in various rehabs. Meyer was often verbally and physically abusive
and controlling, including demanding G.Y. sign a contract agreeing to “literally
do whatever [Meyer] asks so long it’s not immoral or illegal[.]” Tr. Vol. I p.
199.
[4] On September 16, G.Y. picked Meyer up from the hospital, where he had been
admitted for several days to “detox” from alcohol. Tr. Vol. II p. 198. On the
way home, they stopped at a liquor store and Meyer purchased alcohol. Once
home, they began drinking and fighting. By the afternoon, the fighting
escalated. Meyer began filming G.Y. on his phone, verbally degrading her
while she cried and “making her crawl on her knees to him to apologize.” Tr.
Vol. I p. 246. Meyer then took an Uber to the liquor store to purchase more
alcohol. When he returned, the two continued arguing and it became
“physical[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 11. In one instance, Meyer got angry and “forcefully
removed” an engagement ring from G.Y.’s hand. Id. at 41. Another time, while
in the living room, Meyer pushed G.Y. to the floor and got “on top of” her. Id.
at 11. He “pinned down [her] arms and his legs were on the top parts of [her]
thigh,” and she felt a “piercing pain from his leg[.]” Id. He told her to leave and
she agreed, going to pack a bag and calling an Uber. However, she canceled the
Uber because Meyer “got in the way of the door” and “wouldn’t let [her]
leave.” Id. at 14.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-3025 | May 12, 2026 Page 3 of 24 [5] There was then a “period of de-escalation[.]” Id. at 15. Later that evening,
“things got more physical.” Id. Multiple times, Meyer grabbed G.Y. by the hair
and dragged her around the house or pinned her to the floor with his hand on
her throat. These attacks happened predominantly in the living room. Later, the
two were in the bedroom and Meyer “slamm[ed]” her “shoulder,” “back[,]”
and “head” against the bed’s headboard. Id. at 18. He began punching her in
those areas, including “blows to the head” and left shoulder near where she had
a pacemaker. Id.
[6] At some point the attacks ended, and G.Y. was lying in bed in “the worst pain”
she had ever been in. Id. at 20. She heard Meyer leave the home, and he
returned around 4 a.m. with more alcohol. Sometime after, he came into the
bedroom “with a butcher knife and cut his arms.” Id. at 22. G.Y., although very
injured, got up and tried to stop the bleeding. Meyer was drunk and angry and
started pushing and hitting her again. He held her against the bed and smeared
his blood over her. He then threw her to the floor and got on top of her, and at
that point she lost consciousness. When she awoke, she was alone and got back
into bed.
[7] Around this time, Meyer sent a text to a friend stating, “I’m about to go to jail
for a long time[.]” Ex. Vol. I p. 162. He sent other texts saying, “Beat her down
tonight and don’t even remember” and “I blacked out and beat the shut [sic]
out her[.]” Id. at 164, 166. At 7:50 a.m., Meyer exited the front door, dressed
only in underwear and covered in blood. He laid in the driveway for about ten
minutes before going back inside. A neighbor saw him and called 9-1-1.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-3025 | May 12, 2026 Page 4 of 24 [8] Officer Scott Bertram of the Pendleton Police Department (PPD) was
dispatched to the home. Due to previous interactions with Meyer, PPD had
advised all officers to respond in pairs to his house because he was “a ticking
time bomb.” Supp. Ex. Vol. I p. 7. Officer Bertram had been to the home
previously and knew Meyer was a combat veteran, suffered from PTSD, was
often intoxicated, and that he and G.Y. had “potential domestic violence
issues[.]” Supp. Tr. Vol. I p. 55. When Officer Bertram arrived, he saw a “large
pool of blood” in the driveway and droplets of blood leading to the front door.
Id. at 12. He went to the front doorstep and saw an earring on the ground in
front of the door.
[9] He knocked and began speaking with Meyer through the closed front door.
Officer Bertram repeatedly asked Meyer if he needed help and if an ambulance
could assist him, but Meyer refused. Officer Bertram went back to the driveway
area to confer with the other officers. Dispatch attempted to call both Meyer
and G.Y. multiple times, but neither answered. The officers also confirmed
G.Y.’s car was in the driveway.
[10] Officer Bertram then went back and knocked on the door again. Meyer twice
told Officer Bertram to “[c]ome in” and Officer Bertram tried but the door was
locked. Id. at 21; State’s Ex. 11, 007, 0:12-0:14. Meyer gave Officer Bertram the
front door code, but it did not work. Meyer then told Officer Bertram to “f*ck
off” to which Officer Bertram replied, “I can do that but I have to see your
girlfriend to make sure she’s okay as well.” State’s Ex. 11, 008, 0:08-0:18.
Officer Bertram continued talking to Meyer through the door, asking him if he
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-3025 | May 12, 2026 Page 5 of 24 or G.Y. would come out to receive medical assistance. At one point, Officer
Bertram asked Meyer to come to the door so they could see him, and Meyer
replied that he couldn’t stand. Officer Bertram suggested they go to the back
door because it is glass so they could see him, and Meyer agreed.
[11] Officers went to the back door and knocked, calling out for Meyer and asking
about G.Y. Although the door was glass, the blinds were drawn, so officers
could not see inside. Officer Bertram opened the sliding glass door a few inches
and continued talking to Meyer through the door. During the conversation, the
officers heard noises, including someone “moaning or groaning” and later a
sound “like skin slapping against a mat or floor . . . [l]ike someone is falling.”
Supp. Tr. Vol. I pp. 33, 32. One of the officers again asked Meyer about G.Y.,
and for the first time Meyer confirmed she was in the home. At that point,
officers entered through the back door.
[12] Officers found Meyer lying in the living room and G.Y. lying in a bed in the
bedroom. Both were covered in blood, as was the house, with large amounts in
the living room near Meyer and in the bed. Clumps of G.Y.’s hair were found
on the living room floor. Both G.Y. and Meyer were taken to the hospital. G.Y.
suffered a subarachnoid hemorrhage—a “small [brain] bleed” that did not
require medical intervention—as well as significant bruising and swelling
throughout her face and body and various abrasions, particularly to her mouth.
Tr. Vol. IV p. 18.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-3025 | May 12, 2026 Page 6 of 24 [13] The State charged Meyer with Level 1 felony attempted murder, Level 3 felony
aggravated battery, and Level 3 felony criminal confinement. Meyer filed a
motion to suppress, arguing the warrantless entry into his home violated the
federal and state constitutions. A hearing was held on that motion on August
20, 2024. 2 The trial court issued an order denying the motion to suppress,
finding the officers were justified in continuing the knock and talks after being
told by Meyer to “f*ck off” and in the warrantless entry due to exigent
circumstances. See App. Vol. III pp. 67-68.
[14] A bench trial was held in September 2024. The State presented a variety of
evidence, including Meyer’s text messages, phone videos of him verbally
degrading G.Y. and pushing her down, videos from his surveillance system
showing his movements outside the home, as well as pictures and videos from
law enforcement taken after the warrantless entry and at the hospital. G.Y.
testified and acknowledged that she could not give the exact timeline of the
attack. She testified they were drinking and arguing most of the afternoon, and
Meyer’s physical abuse began in the early evening but got worse throughout the
night. She confirmed he hit her frequently on her left shoulder near her
pacemaker, that he knew her pacemaker was there, and he knew if it was
damaged she could die. She further testified as to her injuries, including the
2 Meyer filed a second motion to suppress, arguing statements he made to officers on scene prior to being given Miranda warnings should be suppressed. A separate hearing was held on that motion on August 30, 2024, and the trial court issued an order denying that motion.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-3025 | May 12, 2026 Page 7 of 24 severe bruising to her arms and legs, which she stated took several weeks to
heal and were “[e]xtremely painful.” Tr. Vol. II p. 76.
[15] The trial court found Meyer guilty as charged and entered judgment of
conviction on all three counts. See Tr. Vol. VI p. 121. At sentencing, the court
found the aggravated battery conviction “merged” into the attempted murder
conviction. Id. at 132. 3 The court sentenced Meyer to forty years on the Level 1
felony and ten years on the Level 3 felony, to be served consecutively, for an
aggregate of fifty years in the Indiana Department of Correction. Meyer now
appeals.
Discussion and Decision I. Admission of Evidence
[16] Meyer argues law enforcement’s warrantless entry of his home violated the
federal and state constitutions and thus the court erred in admitting any
evidence obtained from the entry. We review a trial court’s ruling on the
admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Speers v. State, 999 N.E.2d
850, 852 (Ind. 2013). “But where, as here, a constitutional violation is alleged,
the proper standard of appellate review is de novo.” Id.
[17] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1,
Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution protect citizens from unreasonable
3 The abstract of judgment and sentencing order similarly reflect that the conviction for Level 3 felony aggravated battery was merged. App. Vol. III pp. 150-52
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-3025 | May 12, 2026 Page 8 of 24 searches and seizures. Holder v. State, 847 N.E.2d 930, 935 (Ind. 2006). “In spite
of the similarity in structure of the federal and state constitutional provisions,
interpretations and applications vary between them.” Id. Because Meyer has
alleged violations under the federal and state constitutions, each supported by
separate analyses, we examine each of his claims independently. See id.
A. Fourth Amendment
[18] Meyer first argues the officers violated the Fourth Amendment by (1)
continuing to conduct knock and talks after he told them to “f*ck off,” and (2)
by entering his home through the back door. The State contends neither of these
actions violated the Fourth Amendment under the emergency-aid exception.
We agree.
[19] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
It is a “basic principle of Fourth Amendment law . . . that searches and seizures
inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.” Kentucky v.
King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011) (internal quotations and citation omitted). “In
addition, the Supreme Court has held that the curtilage—the area ‘immediately
surrounding and associated with the home’—is ‘part of the home itself for
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-3025 | May 12, 2026 Page 9 of 24 Fourth Amendment purposes.’” J.K. v. State, 8 N.E.3d 222, 229 (Ind. Ct. App.
2014) (quoting Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013)). As such, warrantless
entry onto one’s curtilage is also presumptively unreasonable. Id.
[20] However, “law enforcement officers are not strictly prohibited from entering a
person’s curtilage.” Id. “It is generally accepted that law enforcement officers
enjoy a limited invitation to approach a home through ordinary routes of
ingress and egress open to visitors.” Id. Like other private citizens, an officer
may knock on a door and request to speak with an occupant. Id. (citing Jardines,
569 U.S. at 8). “This implicit license typically permits the visitor to approach
the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, and
then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave.” Jardines, 569 U.S. at 8.
“Conduct that occurs on one’s curtilage that is beyond a traditional ‘knock and
talk’ is subject to Fourth Amendment protection.” J.K., 8 N.E.3d at 229.
[21] The Supreme Court has also recognized that the presumption a warrantless
entry is unreasonable “may be overcome in some circumstances because the
ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. Accordingly,
the warrant requirement is subject to certain reasonable exceptions.” King, 563
U.S. at 459 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
A well-recognized exception is the existence of exigent circumstances. [Collins v. State, 822 N.E.2d 214, 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied]. Under this exception, police officers may enter a residence if the situation suggests a reasonable belief of risk of bodily harm or death, a person in need of assistance, a need to protect private property, or actual or imminent
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-3025 | May 12, 2026 Page 10 of 24 destruction or removal of evidence before a search warrant may be obtained. Scott v. State, 803 N.E.2d 1231, 1235-36 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). “However, a police officer’s subjective belief that exigent circumstances exist is insufficient to support a warrantless search.” United States v. Richardson, 208 F.3d 626, 629 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 910, 121 S.Ct. 259, 148 L.Ed.2d 188 (2000). Rather, “as is normally the case for Fourth Amendment inquiries, the test is objective: ‘the government must establish that the circumstances as they appear at the moment of entry would lead a reasonable, experienced law enforcement officer to believe that someone inside the house, apartment, or hotel room required immediate assistance.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Arch, 7 F.3d 1300, 1304 (7th Cir. 1993)). In this light, “[o]fficers do not need ironclad proof of ‘a likely serious, life-threatening’ injury to invoke the emergency aid exception.” Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49, 130 S.Ct. 546, 175 L.Ed.2d 410 (2009).
Jones v. State, 54 N.E.3d 1033, 1036-37 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied.
[22] Officer Bertram first made contact with Meyer by knocking on his front door
and speaking to him through it. This is a knock and talk through the normal
route of ingress and thus does not constitute an unreasonable search. See Warren
v. State, 73 N.E.3d 203, 207 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). However, “occupants have no
obligation to open the door or to speak to police. And when the knock is not
answered, officers generally must leave and secure a warrant if they want to
pursue the matter.” Id. As such, Meyer argues that, after he told Officer
Bertram to “f*ck off,” the officer’s continued attempts to knock on the door and
speak to him violated the Fourth Amendment.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-3025 | May 12, 2026 Page 11 of 24 [23] Continuing or intensifying knock-and-talk attempts can be reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment where there is evidence a person inside may be in need of
aid. See id. at 208. When he continued his knock-and-talk attempts, Officer
Bertram knew the following: Meyer had a history of alcohol abuse and
domestic violence with G.Y.; a neighbor had reported Meyer was injured; there
was a large amount of blood in the driveway and leading up to the door; G.Y.’s
car was in the driveway but she would not answer her cell phone; and Meyer
would not answer questions about her welfare. Given this information, it was
reasonable for Officer Bertram to continue his knock-and-talk attempts to
determine if Meyer or G.Y. needed help. See Holder, 847 N.E.2d at 938
(reasonable for officers to expand knock-and-talk attempts to the home’s
windows, even after the occupants did not answer the front door, where officers
had legitimate reason to believe the occupants were in danger).
[24] Next, Officer Bertram went to the back door with Meyer’s consent. Once there,
he opened the door slightly to continue speaking with Meyer. Meyer confirmed
G.Y. was in the house and officers heard “moaning or groaning” and later a
sound “like skin slapping against a mat or floor . . . [l]ike someone is falling.”
Supp. Tr. Vol. I pp. 33, 32. Officers then entered the home. Meyer argues the
officers opening the door and eventually entering the home violated the Fourth
Amendment.
[25] The State again cites the emergency aid exception and likens this case to Fisher,
558 U.S. at 45. There, officers responded to Fisher’s home after reports of a
disturbance. The exterior of the home was in “chaos,” with three broken
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-3025 | May 12, 2026 Page 12 of 24 windows and a damaged truck with blood on the hood in the driveway. Id. at
45. Through a window, officers saw Fisher yelling and throwing things. Officers
knocked on the door, but Fisher refused to answer and instead yelled profanities
at them. Officers could see Fisher had a cut on his hand, but he refused their
attempts to get him medical attention. Eventually, officers entered the home,
and Fisher was subsequently arrested for assaulting one of them. Fisher
challenged the entry under the Fourth Amendment, and the United States
Supreme Court held the entry was reasonable under the emergency aid
exception. Specifically, the Court noted the “tumultuous situation” when
officers arrived, including the blood outside and Fisher’s “violent behavior
inside.” Id. at 48. The Court ultimately concluded “it was reasonable to believe
that Fisher had hurt himself (albeit nonfatally) and needed treatment that in his
rage he was unable to provide, or that Fisher was about to hurt, or had already
hurt, someone else.” Id. at 49.
[26] The same can be said here. Officers arrived and encountered a clearly
tumultuous situation—specifically a large pool of blood in the driveway—and a
neighbor had reported Meyer was injured. Officers also knew that Meyer was in
the home, that G.Y.’s car was present but she was not answering her phone,
and that the two had a history of alcohol abuse and domestic violence. Officers
attempted to render aid to Meyer and get information on G.Y., but Meyer
refused any help and would not answer questions on G.Y.’s welfare. As officers
continued to investigate, additional information added to their concerns. At one
point, Meyer tells them he cannot stand, prompting them to go to the back
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-3025 | May 12, 2026 Page 13 of 24 door, which they open to continue speaking with him. As in Fisher, based on
these circumstances it was reasonable for officers to believe Meyer had hurt
himself or G.Y. This belief was compounded when, after opening the back
door, officers got confirmation from Meyer that G.Y. was there and heard
sounds associated with injury. Thus, the search was reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment, and the trial court did not err in admitting evidence from
the search.
B. Article 1, Section 11
[27] Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution guarantees:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
“The legality of a governmental search under the Indiana Constitution turns on
an evaluation of the reasonableness of the police conduct under the totality of
the circumstances.” Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 359 (Ind. 2005). This
determination turns on the balance of three factors: “1) the degree of concern,
suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion
the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities,
and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs.” Id. at 361.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-3025 | May 12, 2026 Page 14 of 24 [28] As to the first factor, we agree with Meyer that the officer’s degree of concern,
suspicion, or knowledge that a violation had occurred was low. Officers
ultimately entered the home not due to any concern or suspicion of illegality,
but out of concern for its occupants. In Carpenter v. State, 18 N.E.3d 998, 1002
(Ind. 2014), our Supreme Court held that, where officers entered the curtilage of
a home “not based upon any concern, suspicion, or knowledge that anything
illegal was going on inside the home” but rather to “determine if any person
needed help[,]” that this “weigh[ed] against the legality of the search.”
[29] As to the second factor, generally a warrantless entry into a home is considered
a large intrusion. Barker v. State, 96 N.E.3d 638, 654 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans.
denied. However, the intrusion may be mitigated where police “carefully tailor[]
their tactics.” Watkins v. State, 85 N.E.3d 597, 602 (Ind. 2017). Here, the officers
spent over thirty minutes attempting to aid Meyer without entering the home.
As their concerns for him and G.Y. grew, the officers first went to the back door
with Meyer’s consent, opening the unlocked door and eventually entering. See
Brown v. State, 62 N.E.3d 1232, 1237 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (officer intrusion into
a home lessened where they “were careful in matching their escalating conduct
to the escalating urgency of the situation confronting them”), trans. denied.
Thus, while officers here did enter a private home, their limited actions of
opening and entering through an unlocked door to render aid to multiple people
lessens the degree of intrusion. See Snow v. State, 118 N.E.3d 50, 60 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2019) (degree of intrusion of officers entering a private home lessened
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-3025 | May 12, 2026 Page 15 of 24 where the entry was “limited . . . to ensur[ing] no one in the residence was in
need of aid”), trans. denied.
[30] Finally, we agree with the State that law enforcement needs were high.
“[P]olice officers have a caretaking function as well as an investigatory
function.” Barker, 96 N.E.3d at 654. “It is because of concerns among citizens
about safety, security, and protection that some intrusions upon privacy are
tolerated, so long as they are reasonably aimed toward those concerns.” Holder,
847 N.E.2d at 940. As detailed above, when Officer Bertram conducted the
knock and talks, he knew Meyer had a history of alcohol abuse and domestic
violence with G.Y.; a neighbor had reported Meyer was injured; there was a
large amount of blood in the driveway and leading up to the door; G.Y.’s car
was in the driveway but she would not answer her cell phone; and Meyer
would not answer questions about her welfare. As he continued to speak with
Meyer, he learned Meyer could not stand, that G.Y. was in the home, and
heard sounds associated with possible injury. Through his caretaking function,
Officer Bertram had a high need to ensure the safety of both Meyer and G.Y.
[31] Under the totality of the circumstances, particularly the high level of law
enforcement needs and their attempts to lessen the intrusion, we conclude the
search was reasonable. See Montgomery v. State, 904 N.E.2d 374, 383 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2009) (officers acted reasonably in entering hotel room where they had
reason to believe there was an emergency and were primarily motivated by
intent to give assistance), trans. denied. Meyer’s rights under Article 1, Section
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-3025 | May 12, 2026 Page 16 of 24 11 of the Indiana Constitution were not violated, and the court did not err in
admitting evidence from the warrantless entry.
II. Sufficiency of Evidence
A. Attempted Murder
[32] Meyer next challenges the sufficiency of evidence for his attempted murder
conviction. To convict Meyer of Level 1 felony attempted murder, the State
was required to prove that, acting with the specific intent to kill, he engaged in
conduct that constituted a substantial step toward the killing of another
person. See Ind. Code §§ 35-42-1-1(1) (2018), 35-41-5-1(a) (2014).
Intent [to kill] may be inferred from the nature of the attack and the circumstances surrounding the crime. The duration, brutality, and relative strengths of the defendant and victim may also indicate an intent to kill. Additionally, where blows of magnitude are repeated, a jury could conclude that the defendant had an intent to kill.
Nunn v. State, 601 N.E.2d 334, 339 (Ind. 1992) (citations omitted); see also Tancil
v. State, 956 N.E.2d 1204, 1209-10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. Meyer
argues the evidence presented at trial merely showed intent to batter, not
specific intent to kill.
[33] Both parties point to Tancil, in which we upheld the defendant’s attempted
murder conviction. There, the defendant, who was six-feet tall and two hundred
pounds, chased his girlfriend down the street, yelling threats to kill her. When
he reached her, he carried her to a nearby wooded area and repeatedly punched
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-3025 | May 12, 2026 Page 17 of 24 her in the head, face, and body. When officers found them, the victim appeared
to be dead, and the defendant indicated to officers he’d be “going away for a
long time.” Id. at 1205. The victim suffered a brain injury, significant facial
swelling and bruising, bits of her hair had been pulled out, and she spent three
days in the hospital. However, she escaped any permanent or life-threatening
injuries. The defendant was convicted of attempted murder. On appeal, he
argued there was insufficient evidence of his intent to kill. Relying on Nunn, we
affirmed, noting not only the threat to kill, but also “evidence regarding the
attack and its aftermath[,]” including the size of the defendant and victim, the
length and severity of the attack, and her serious, albeit not life-threatening,
injuries. Id. at 1210.
[34] Meyer attempts to distinguish Tancil by emphasizing that he did not verbalize a
threat to kill. While such a threat is strong evidence of intent to kill, it is not
required. Rather, we look to all the circumstances of the attack. Similar to
Tancil, here Meyer—a combat veteran—severely beat G.Y., to the point where
responding officers thought she may be dead; he indicated to others afterward
that he would likely be incarcerated for a long period of time; and miraculously
G.Y.’s injuries, while severe, did not rise to the level of life-threatening. But
unlike Tancil, here the attack went on throughout the night, and included Meyer
dragging G.Y. around by her hair, holding her down with his body, slamming
her head against a headboard, verbally degrading her, and repeatedly hitting
and punching her. Meyer also focused parts of his attack on G.Y.’s left shoulder
and chest, where he knew her pacemaker to be located, and he knew damage to
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-3025 | May 12, 2026 Page 18 of 24 the pacemaker could kill her. The nature and circumstances of the attack,
especially the duration and brutality, sufficiently show a specific intent to kill.
B. Criminal Confinement
[35] Meyer also challenges the sufficiency of evidence for his Level 3 felony criminal
confinement conviction. To convict Meyer of Level 3 felony criminal
confinement, the State had to prove he knowingly or intentionally confined
G.Y. without her consent and that it resulted in serious bodily injury to G.Y.
See Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3(b)(3)(B) (2019). Meyer does not challenge that he
confined G.Y. but instead contends that the confinement did not result in
serious bodily injury. “Serious bodily injury” means bodily injury that creates a
substantial risk of death or that causes, among other things, extreme pain,
unconsciousness, or permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function
of a bodily member or organ. See Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-292 (2012).
[36] Here, the trial court determined Meyer committed Level 3 felony criminal
confinement by confining G.Y. “throughout the evening hours into the early
morning hours” and that as a result she sustained various injuries to her hands,
arms, and legs and experienced pain. Tr. Vol. VI p. 132. Meyer argues these
injuries are “bruises . . . which [do not] arise to the level of serious bodily
injury.” Appellant’s Br. p. 22. But whether bodily injury is “serious” is a
question of degree and, therefore, reserved for the finder of fact. Whitlow v.
State, 901 N.E.2d 659, 661 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “[T]here is no bright-line test
to distinguish between pain and extreme pain[.]” Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d
133, 141 n.17 (Ind. 2012). We have previously found sufficient evidence of Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-3025 | May 12, 2026 Page 19 of 24 extreme pain, and thus serious bodily injury, where the victim was struck
repeatedly, causing marks and leaving her in pain “she had never felt anything
close to” before. See Whitlow, 901 N.E.2d at 660; see also Buckner v. State, 857
N.E.2d 1011, 1018 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (sufficient evidence of serious bodily
injury where defendant repeatedly struck victim with his hands and fists,
causing her severe pain and leaving marks on her body).
[37] Here, G.Y. testified as to an ongoing attack by Meyer in which he repeatedly
held her down and laid on top of her, pinned her to the ground, and dragged
her around by her hair. She later identified pictures of her arms, showing
extensive bruising, and stated those were caused by Meyer holding her down.
She also identified pictures of the deep bruising on her thighs and testified these
were from when Meyer held her down and that the bruising lasted several
weeks. She defined the pain from Meyer holding her down specifically as
“piercing[,]” “sharp[,]” and “[e]xtremely painful.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 11, 64, 76.
This is sufficient evidence from which the trial court could determine G.Y.
experienced extreme pain and thus serious bodily injury.
III. Conclusion
[38] We therefore affirm Meyer’s convictions for Level 1 felony attempted murder
and Level 3 felony criminal confinement.
[39] However, we remand for a correction in the court’s abstract of judgment and
sentencing order, which state that Count II: Level 3 felony aggravated battery
should be “merged” into Count I: Level 1 felony attempted murder. See App.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-3025 | May 12, 2026 Page 20 of 24 Vol. III pp. 150-52. “A trial court’s act of merging, without also vacating the
conviction, is not sufficient to cure a double jeopardy violation.” Gregory v.
State, 885 N.E.2d 697, 703 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). We therefore remand this
cause to the trial court with an order to vacate Meyer’s conviction for
aggravated battery. 4
May, J., concurs. Tavitas, C.J., concurs in part and concurs in result in part.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Jennifer Jones Auger Law Office of Jennifer Auger Franklin, Indiana
Andrew J. Baldwin Baldwin, Perry, & Wiley, P.C. Franklin, Indiana
Kinsey H. Chaney Certified Legal Intern Baldwin, Perry, & Wiley, P.C. Franklin, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General
Justin F. Roebel Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
4 Meyer also argues (1) there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for aggravated battery and (2) his convictions for aggravated battery and criminal confinement violate substantive double jeopardy. Because we are remanding for vacation of the aggravated battery conviction, we need not address these arguments.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-3025 | May 12, 2026 Page 21 of 24 Tavitas, Chief Judge, concurring in part and concurring in result in part.
[40] I fully concur in the majority’s holding that sufficient evidence supports
Meyer’s convictions and that the entry into his home did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. And, although I agree that the entry into Meyer’s home was
reasonable under Article 1, Section 11, I write separately because I respectfully
disagree with the majority’s analysis of the first Litchfield factor.
[41] Our analysis under Article 1, Section 11 begins with the general rule that a
warrant is required for entry into a home. See Carpenter v. State, 18 N.E.3d 998,
1002 (Ind. 2014) (“[W]arrantless searches of a home are presumptively
unreasonable.”). One of the exceptions to the warrant requirement is the
existence of “exigent circumstances.” Willis v. State, 780 N.E.2d 423, 428 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2002) (citing Hawkins v. State, 626 N.E.2d 436, 438-39 (Ind.
1993)). Here, the police entered due to the existence of exigent circumstances
to render aid. Applying the Litchfield factors to these exigent
circumstances shows that the officers’ actions were reasonable under the totality
of the circumstances.
[42] The first Litchfield factor is the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that
a “violation” has occurred. 824 N.E.2d at 361. Here, however, the police did
not enter Meyer’s home due to any degree of suspicion that a crime had been
committed. Instead, they entered the home because of a concern that someone
was seriously injured and in need of immediate aid. Even though such
circumstances do not fit precisely within the first Litchfield factor, our Supreme
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-3025 | May 12, 2026 Page 22 of 24 Court has held that Article 1, Section 11 “allows warrantless entry into a
home when an officer has objectively reasonable grounds to believe immediate
aid is needed inside.” Carpenter, 18 N.E.3d at 1002; see also Wilford v. State, 50
N.E.3d 371, 375 (Ind. 2016) (noting that police officers are not only expected to
enforce criminal laws but also “aid those in distress . . . and provide an infinite
variety of other services to preserve and protect community safety.”). And this
Court has previously recognized that, in the context
of rendering emergency aid, the first Litchfield factor is properly considered
as “the degree of concern that emergency medical assistance was needed.” Randall
v. State, 101 N.E.3d 831, 841 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (emphasis
added) (citing M.O. v. State, 63 N.E.3d 329, 333 (Ind. 2016)).
[43] The majority’s analysis of the first Litchfield factor, relying
on Carpenter, is incorrect because the majority misreads Carpenter. The majority
relies on Carpenter to hold that, if a person is in need of aid, this “weighs against
the legality of the search.” Supra, p. 15 (quoting Carpenter, 18 N.E.3d at
1002). But Carpenter involved a bloody dog in a fenced-in yard. No person was
in danger, the dog was alive, and there was no urgent need to act; in short, there
were no exigent circumstances at all. Carpenter’s statement that the first
factor “weigh[ed] against” the legality of the search was based on these non-
exigent circumstances.
[44] In contrast, here, a neighbor observed Meyer lying on his driveway in a pool of
blood. The neighbor’s wife called 911, and Meyer staggered back into his
home. When the responding officers arrived, they found a large amount of
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-3025 | May 12, 2026 Page 23 of 24 blood in the driveway and a blood trail leading to the front door. G.Y.’s
car was in the driveway, and G.Y. did not respond to calls to her phone. Meyer
had a known history of alcohol abuse and domestic violence with G.Y., which
increased the officers’ concern for her safety. When one of the officers knocked
on Meyer’s door, Meyer was barely intelligible. Still, Meyer initially gave the
officers the code to the door, which did not work. Meyer then told the officers
to “f*ck off.” State’s Ex. 11, 008. When the officers responded that they still
needed to check on G.Y., Meyer gave incoherent responses.
[45] These exigent circumstances weigh in favor of, not against, a finding that the
officers’ actions were reasonable under the totality of the
circumstances. See Randall, 101 N.E.3d at 841-42 (holding that warrantless
seizure of defendant was reasonable under Litchfield factors where police
observed defendant slumped over the steering wheel of a car with its door open
in a hospital parking lot; degree of intrusion was minimal because officer simply
told defendant to return to his vehicle; and law enforcement need, though
relatively low, did not overcome the balance favoring the brief seizure), trans.
denied.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-3025 | May 12, 2026 Page 24 of 24