IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 52658
JOEL GUERRERO, )
) Filed: August 17, 2026 Petitioner-Appellant, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED STATE OF IDAHO, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT ) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY Respondent. )
)
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Jason D. Scott, District Judge.
Judgment summarily dismissing petition for post-conviction relief, affirmed.
Waldron Legal, PLLC; Maya P. Waldron, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; T. Michael MacEgan, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
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TRIBE, Chief Judge Joel Guerrero appeals from the district court’s judgment summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Guerrero pled guilty to rape, Idaho Code § 18-6101. In exchange for his guilty plea, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges in this case and dismiss another case in its entirety.1 Before entering his guilty plea, Guerrero completed a guilty plea advisory form acknowledging that the maximum sentence was life imprisonment and that no one promised him a particular sentence. During the change of plea hearing, the trial court similarly advised Guerrero
1 According to the plea agreement, the State dismissed the following: the repeat sexual offender enhancement; forcible penetration by use of a foreign object; kidnapping in the first degree; and a separate case of five counts of video voyeurism.
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that the maximum possible penalty was life imprisonment and confirmed that Guerrero understood it retained the authority to impose any lawful sentence, notwithstanding the State’s recommendation. The trial court also asked Guerrero if anyone told him the trial court would “go easy” on him if he pled guilty. Guerrero answered, “No, sir.” Guerrero further acknowledged that no one promised him anything beyond the State’s promises in the plea agreement. The trial court later sentenced Guerrero to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Guerrero filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence, which the trial court denied. Guerrero appealed, and this Court affirmed his sentence and the denial of his I.C.R. 35 motion in an unpublished opinion.2 Guerrero filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during plea negotiations. Guerrero specifically alleged trial counsel advised Guerrero that, “at worst,” he would receive a twenty-year determinate sentence before becoming eligible for parole and failed to advise him that he could receive a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Guerrero asserted that, had he known such a sentence was possible, he would have insisted on going to trial. In support of his petition, Guerrero submitted his own declaration and a declaration from his sister. In her declaration, Guerrero’s sister similarly stated she understood from conversations with trial counsel that Guerrero would be eligible for parole after approximately fifteen years.
The State answered Guerrero’s petition and filed a motion for summary dismissal, arguing that his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim was disproved by the record of the underlying criminal proceedings and unsupported by admissible evidence sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact. At the summary dismissal hearing, the district court orally granted the State’s motion and determined that Guerrero’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim was disproved by the record of the underlying criminal case. The district court later entered a written order further explaining its reasoning and dismissed Guerrero’s petition for post-conviction relief. Guerrero appeals.
2 See State v. Guerrero, Docket No. 49591 (Ct. App. June 28, 2023).
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II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal from an order of summary dismissal, we apply the same standards utilized by the trial courts and examine whether the petitioner’s admissible evidence asserts facts which, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675, 227 P.3d 925, 929 (2010); Sheahan v. State, 146 Idaho 101, 104, 190 P.3d 920, 923 (Ct. App. 2008). Over questions of law, we exercise free review. Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d 1066, 1069 (2009); Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 370, 33 P.3d 841, 844 (Ct. App. 2001).
III.
ANALYSIS
Guerrero argues the district court erred in summarily dismissing his claim because nothing in the record rebutted the allegation in his post-conviction petition that he was never advised, and did not understand, that he could be sentenced to a fixed life sentence if he pled guilty. Guerrero contends the district court improperly discounted his allegation based on what the trial court believed Guerrero should have understood from the plea proceedings. Guerrero further asserts that, because the district court did not address prejudice, this Court should decline to do so on appeal, but if it does, he sufficiently alleged prejudice by asserting that, had he known a fixed life sentence was possible, he would have rejected the plea agreement and insisted on going to trial and that the plea colloquy did not cure trial counsel’s deficient advice. The State responds that Guerrero’s claim is disproved by the record of the underlying criminal proceedings and unsupported by admissible evidence sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact. The State further responds that Guerrero failed to establish prejudice because his allegation was insufficient to show he would have rejected the plea agreement and, in any event, the trial court’s plea colloquy cured any prejudice resulting from trial counsel’s alleged deficient advice.
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding that is civil in nature. I.C.
§ 19-4907; Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 249, 220 P.3d at 1068; State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 921, 828 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Ct. App. 1992). Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the petitioner must prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271, 61 P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 2002). A petition for post-conviction relief differs
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from a complaint in an ordinary civil action. Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 56, 106 P.3d 376, 382 (2004). A petition must contain much more than a short and plain statement of the claim that would suffice for a complaint under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(1). Rather, a petition for post-conviction relief must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner, and affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached or the petition must state why such supporting evidence is not included with the petition. I.C. § 19-4903. In other words, the petition must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations or the petition will be subject to dismissal. Wolf v. State, 152 Idaho 64, 67, 266 P.3d 1169, 1172 (Ct. App. 2011).
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief, either pursuant to a motion by a party or upon the court’s own initiative, if it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When considering summary dismissal, the district court must construe disputed facts in the petitioner’s favor, but the court is not required to accept either the petitioner’s mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the petitioner’s conclusions of law. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct. App. 1986). Moreover, the district court, as the trier of fact, is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary disposition; rather, the district court is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidence. Hayes v. State, 146 Idaho 353, 355, 195 P.3d 712, 714 (Ct. App. 2008). Such inferences will not be disturbed on appeal if the uncontroverted evidence is sufficient to justify them. Id.
Claims may be summarily dismissed if the petitioner’s allegations are clearly disproven by the record of the criminal proceedings, if the petitioner has not presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential element of the claims, or if the petitioner’s allegations do not justify relief as a matter of law. Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 521, 236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010); DeRushé v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 603, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009). Thus, summary dismissal of a claim for post-conviction relief is appropriate when the court can conclude, as a matter of law, that the petitioner is not entitled to relief even with all disputed facts construed in the petitioner’s favor.
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For this reason, summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition may be appropriate even when the State does not controvert the petitioner’s evidence. See Roman, 125 Idaho at 647, 873 P.2d at 901.
Conversely, if the petition, affidavits, and other evidence supporting the petition allege facts that, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief, the post-conviction claim may not be summarily dismissed. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004); Sheahan, 146 Idaho at 104, 190 P.3d at 923. If a genuine issue of material fact is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted to resolve the factual issues. Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 272, 61 P.3d at 629.
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the post-
conviction procedure act. Murray, 121 Idaho at 924-25, 828 P.2d at 1329-30. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petitioner must show that the attorney’s performance was deficient and that the petitioner was prejudiced by the deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313, 316, 900 P.2d 221, 224 (Ct. App. 1995). To establish a deficiency, the petitioner has the burden of showing that the attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). Where, as here, the petitioner was convicted upon a guilty plea, to satisfy the prejudice element, the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he or she would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Plant v. State, 143 Idaho 758, 762, 152 P.3d 629, 633 (Ct. App. 2006). This Court has long adhered to the proposition that tactical or strategic decisions of trial counsel will not be secondguessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 231, 233, 880 P.2d 261, 263 (Ct. App. 1994). A. Deficient Performance Guerrero argues the district court erred in summarily dismissing his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim because the record does not conclusively refute Guerrero’s allegation that trial counsel failed to advise Guerrero that the trial court could impose life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Guerrero contends he reasonably understood that, based on trial counsel’s advice, pleading guilty eliminated the possibility of a fixed life sentence and capped
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Guerrero’s sentencing exposure at twenty-years determinate before parole eligibility. The State responds that Guererro failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding deficient performance.
To establish deficient performance, Guerrero must show that trial counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. See Aragon, 114 Idaho at 760, 760 P.2d at 1176. Before entering his guilty plea, Guerrero acknowledged by signing a guilty plea advisory form that the maximum penalty for rape was life imprisonment, the trial court was not bound by the plea agreement or the State’s sentencing recommendation, the trial court could impose any lawful sentence up to the statutory maximum of life, and no one had promised him a particular sentence. During the plea colloquy, the trial court again advised Guerrero that the maximum sentence was life imprisonment and confirmed that he understood that the trial court could impose any lawful sentence, notwithstanding the State’s recommendation. The trial court also asked Guerrero if anyone told him the trial court would “go easy” on him if he pled guilty, and he answered, “No, sir.” These sworn acknowledgments directly contradict Guerrero’s later allegation that he believed pleading guilty foreclosed the possibility of a fixed life sentence or guaranteed a sentence no greater than twenty-years determinate. That the trial court did not use the phrase “fixed life” or “life without the possibility of parole” does not compel a different conclusion. The trial court’s advisements regarding the possibility of life in prison, and Guerrero’s acknowledgment of that possibility, refute his after-the-fact claim that he did not understand that he could be subject to a fixed life sentence. In short, Guerrero’s post-conviction allegation is inconsistent with his sworn statements made during the plea proceedings and does not create a genuine issue of material fact.
The district court also rejected Guerrero’s argument that the trial court relied on what Guerrero should have known, rather than what he actually understood. Instead, the trial court relied on Guerrero’s own express acknowledgments during the plea proceedings that he understood the trial court retained the authority to impose any lawful sentence up to the statutory maximum, rather than speculation about what Guerrero should have understood.
The declarations submitted in support of Guerrero’s petition likewise failed to create a genuine issue of material fact. Guerrero’s sister’s declaration largely described her own understanding of the plea agreement and her conversations with trial counsel, rather than
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Guerrero’s actual understanding when he entered his guilty plea. Moreover, Guerrero did not present an affidavit or testimony from trial counsel supporting the alleged sentencing advice. See Hernandez v. State, 171 Idaho 663, 668, 525 P.3d 318, 323 (2023). To the extent the declarations repeated out-of-court statements allegedly made by trial counsel, those assertions were hearsay and, therefore, insufficient to defeat summary dismissal. See Takhsilov v. State, 161 Idaho 669, 674-75, 389 P.3d 955, 960-61 (2016) (explaining that hearsay offered in support of a post-conviction petition does not constitute admissible evidence required to avoid dismissal).
Further, even assuming trial counsel advised Guerrero that he would likely receive a sentence no greater than twenty-years determinate, such an inaccurate sentencing prediction does not establish deficient performance under these circumstances. Guerrero repeatedly acknowledged that the trial court retained the authority to impose any lawful sentence up to the statutory maximum of life. Because Guerrero’s allegation was disproved by the record and otherwise insufficient to establish deficient performance, the district court properly summarily dismissed Guerrero’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim on that basis. B. Prejudice With respect to the prejudice prong of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Guerrero asserts this Court should decline to analyze it because the district court did not do so in the first instance. Alternatively, Guerrero argues he sufficiently alleged prejudice by asserting he would not have pled guilty had he known he remained subject to a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Guerrero contends the trial court’s plea colloquy did not cure trial counsel’s alleged deficient advice because the colloquy only generally addressed the trial court’s sentencing discretion and did not specifically advise Guerrero that he could receive a sentence of life without the possibility of parole after pleading guilty. The State responds that Guerrero’s assertions of prejudice are conclusory and unsupported by facts demonstrating he would rationally have rejected the plea agreement and proceeded to trial. Although the district court did not expressly analyze the prejudice prong given that it concluded trial counsel was not deficient, a conclusion with which we agree, consideration of the prejudice prong also shows Guerrero’s claim was subject to dismissal on this prong as well.
To establish prejudice in the plea context, a petitioner must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the petitioner would not have pled guilty
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and would have, instead, proceeded to trial. Ridgley, 148 Idaho at 676, 227 P.3d at 930. The plea agreement resulted in dismissal of multiple serious charges, which included kidnapping, forcible penetration by use of a foreign object, a repeat sexual offender enhancement, and multiple video voyeurism charges in a separate case. Several of those charges carried a potential life sentence, and the repeat sexual offender enhancement substantially increased Guerrero’s sentencing exposure. Against that backdrop, Guerrero did not allege facts explaining why he would have rejected the plea agreement and proceeded to trial. His bare assertion that he would have insisted on going to trial was, therefore, conclusory and insufficient. See Bracali-Gambino v. State, 172 Idaho 780, 786-87, 537 P.3d 21, 27-28 (2023) (holding that, because the petitioner failed to explain why he would have rejected a plea offer and proceeded to trial but for counsel’s alleged deficient performance, his prejudice claim was conclusory and insufficient to avoid summary dismissal).
Even assuming trial counsel misadvised Guerrero regarding his sentencing exposure, any misunderstanding was cured during the plea colloquy. The trial court expressly advised Guerrero that it retained the authority to impose any lawful sentence up to the statutory maximum regardless of the State’s sentencing recommendation. Guerrero confirmed that he understood and denied receiving any promises regarding sentencing outside of the plea agreement. Accordingly, Guerrero failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding prejudice, and summary dismissal of his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim was proper.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The plea proceedings disprove Guerrero’s allegation that he believed pleading guilty limited the trial court’s sentencing authority. Guerrero failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact supporting his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Accordingly, the district court’s judgment summarily dismissing Guerrero’s petition for post-conviction relief is affirmed.
Judge LORELLO and Judge FLEMING, CONCUR.