Joel Garcia v. Warden, FCI Terminal Island

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedOctober 6, 2025
Docket2:25-cv-08928
StatusUnknown

This text of Joel Garcia v. Warden, FCI Terminal Island (Joel Garcia v. Warden, FCI Terminal Island) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Joel Garcia v. Warden, FCI Terminal Island, (C.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOEL GARCIA, NO. CV-25-08928-SRM (AGR) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY 13 THIS ACTION SHOULD NOT BE v. 14 DISMISSED

15 WARDEN, FCI TERMINAL ISLAND,

16 Defendant.

18 Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 19 by a Person in Federal Custody (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Dkt. 20 No. 1)1 For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner is ordered to show cause, in 21 writing, on or before November 6, 2025, why the Court should not dismiss the 22 Petition for lack of jurisdiction. 23

25 26 27 1 Page citations are to the page numbers assigned by the CM/ECF in the 28 header of the document. 1 I. 2 PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 3 The court takes judicial notice of Petitioner’s criminal case in United States 4 v. Joel Garcia, SA-11-CR-873 XR (W.D. Tex.). Fed. R. Evid. 201. 5 On January 8, 2013, the Court in the Western District of Texas accepted Petitioner’s guilty plea. (Id., Dkt. No. 62.) On August 2, 2013, Judgment was 6 entered on the docket. According to the Judgment, Petitioner pled guilty to Count 7 1 of the Indictment for violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) 8 (conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine). Relevant here, 9 Petitioner was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 144 months followed by a 10 five-year term of supervised release. (Id., Dkt. No. 85.) On May 15, 2015, the 11 Court entered an order granting a motion for sentence reduction and reduced the 12 term of imprisonment to 120 months, with all other provisions of the Judgment 13 remaining in effect. (Id., Dkt. Nos. 98-99.) 14 On July 21, 2025, Petitioner filed, pro se, a motion for reduction of 15 sentence. In summary, Petitioner requested a two-point reduction as a zero point 16 offender under Amendment 821, U.S.S.G. § 4C.1.1. (Id., Dkt. No. 102.) 17 The Court denied the motion by Order filed August 19, 2025. (Id., Dkt. No. 18 103.) “Defendant is not eligible under Part A of Amendment 821 because status 19 points were not assessed in this case. [¶] Defendant is not eligible under Part B 20 of Amendment 821 because Defendant received an adjustment under § 3B1.1 21 (Aggravating Role). USSG § 4C1.1(a)(10).” (Id., Dkt. No. 103.) 22 On September 19, 2025, Petitioner filed, pro se, a motion to vacate, set 23 aside, or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Id., Dkt. No. 104.) On September 30, 2025, the Court issued an order to show cause why the motion 24 should not be dismissed as time barred. (Id., Dkt. No. 105.) 25 Meanwhile, on September 14, 2025, Petitioner signed and constructively 26 filed a Petition in this court under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The Petition acknowledges 27 the recent filing of a § 2255 motion in the Western District of Texas and states 28 1 that the § 2241 petition “is my only valid relief if 2255 turned down.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 2 4.) The Petition asserts four grounds for relief.2 Ground One and part of Ground 3 Three allege that Petitioner incorrectly received a 12-level enhancement for 4 conspiracy. Ground Two and part of Ground Three allege that Petitioner 5 incorrectly received an aggravating role adjustment as manager or supervisor, presumably under USSG § 3B1.1. Ground Four alleges ineffective assistance of 6 counsel based on counsel’s refusal to file an appeal raising these issues. (Dkt. 7 No. 1 at 6-7.) 8 II. 9 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 10 “[A] federal prisoner who collaterally attacks his sentence ordinarily must 11 proceed by a motion in the sentencing court under § 2255, rather than by a 12 petition for a writ of habeas corpus under § 2241.” Jones v. Hendrix, 599 U.S. 13 465, 469 (2023); Stephens v. Herrera, 464 F.3d 895, 897 (9th Cir. 2006); see 28 14 U.S.C. § 2255(e). 15 The “escape hatch” exception permits a federal prisoner to file a habeas 16 corpus petition pursuant to § 2241 to contest the legality of a sentence only when 17 a § 2255 motion “’is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.’” 18 Jones, 599 U.S. at 469 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e)). This court has jurisdiction 19 only if Petitioner’s challenge to the legality of his sentence is properly brought 20 under § 2241. A motion under § 2255 must be brought in the sentencing court, 21 which is the Western District of Texas. See Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 22 861, 865 (9th Cir. 2000). 23 The “escape hatch” exception does not apply merely because a § 2255 motion is barred by the statute of limitations. See Jones, 599 U.S. at 470 24 (limitation on second or successive motions does not render § 2255 motion 25 inadequate or ineffective). The Ninth Circuit has held that a remedy under § 2255 26 is inadequate or ineffective when the federal prisoner “’(1) makes a claim of actual 27 2 The Petition does not attach the Court’s sentencing calculation and 28 reasoning in the Western District of Texas. 1 innocence, and (2) has not had an unobstructed procedural shot at presenting 2 that claim.’” Allen v. Ives, 950 F.3d 1184, 1188 (9th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). 3 For purposes of actual innocence, a petitioner must show that “in light of all 4 the evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have 5 convicted him.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998); Allen, 950 F.3d at 1188 (applying Bousley in § 2241 context). Petitioner does not allege or 6 show that he is actually innocent. Rather, the Petition challenges the sentencing 7 court’s application of sentencing guidelines. See Marrero v. Ives, 682 F.3d 1190, 8 1195 (9th Cir. 2012) (legal argument that petitioner was wrongly classified as 9 career offender in applying sentencing guidelines was not sufficient for claim of 10 actual innocence); compare Allen, 950 F.3d at 1188 (petitioner claiming actual 11 innocence of qualifying crime for career offender status could proceed under § 12 2241). 13 In determining whether Petitioner had an unobstructed procedural shot to 14 pursue his claim, the court examines “(1) whether the legal basis for petitioner’s 15 claim did not arise until after he had exhausted his direct appeal and first § 2255 16 motion; and (2) whether the law changed in any way relevant to petitioner’s claim 17 after that first § 2255 motion.” Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir. 18 2008). As discussed above, Petitioner’s criminal judgment was entered on the 19 docket on August 2, 2013. Petitioner did not appeal and did not file a first § 2255 20 motion until September 19, 2025 in the sentencing court. In the Petition before 21 this court, Grounds One, Two and Three are based on legal arguments regarding 22 application of sentencing guidelines to Petitioner’s convictions that existed at the 23 time of sentencing and entry of judgment.

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Related

Bousley v. United States
523 U.S. 614 (Supreme Court, 1998)
Oscar Cruz v. Melecio
204 F.3d 14 (First Circuit, 2000)
Edwin Marrero v. Richard Ives
682 F.3d 1190 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Harrison v. Ollison
519 F.3d 952 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
Michael Allen v. Richard Ives
950 F.3d 1184 (Ninth Circuit, 2020)

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Joel Garcia v. Warden, FCI Terminal Island, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/joel-garcia-v-warden-fci-terminal-island-cacd-2025.