Joe Manis v. USDA

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: August 18, 2025
• Docket: 24-1367
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-1367

JOE MANIS,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE; BROOKE L. ROLLINS, in her official capacity as the Secretary of Agriculture; MICHAEL WATSON, in his official capacity as Administrator of the Animal & Plant Health Inspection Service,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., District Judge. (1:24-cv-001750-WO-JLW)

Argued: December 10, 2024 Decided: August 18, 2025

Before KING, WYNN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: Joshua Martin Robbins, PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION, Arlington, Virginia, for Appellant. Graham W. White, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Thomas B. Kakassy, Gastonia, North Carolina; Allison D. Daniel, PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION, Arlington, Virginia, for Appellant. Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Joshua M. Salzman, Civil Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, USCA4 Appeal: 24-1367 Doc: 66 Filed: 08/18/2025 Pg: 2 of 12

Washington, D.C.; Sandra J. Hairston, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

Joe Manis (“Appellant”) sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin United States

Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) proceedings charging him with violating the Horse

Protection Act (“HPA”). Because Appellant fails to make an adequate showing of

irreparable harm, we affirm the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction.

I.

A.

Tennessee Walking Horses are known for their distinctive, smooth gaits. These

horses are entered into horse shows and competitions featuring their gaits. The distinctive

walking patterns are “achieved through selective breeding and training with equipment.”

Stamper v. Sec’y of Agriculture, 722 F.2d 1483, 1484 (9th Cir. 1984). Unfortunately, the

distinctive gaits can also be replicated through abuse of the horse. Making the forelimbs

of the horse “sore” by inflicting pain requires the horse to quickly lift its feet when it walks,

which mimics the desired gait. Id. In response to this practice of abuse, and to ensure

fairness in Tennessee Walking Horse competitions, Congress enacted the 1970 HPA. 15

U.S.C. § 1821 et seq.

The HPA makes it illegal to show or exhibit any horse which is “sore.” 15 U.S.C.

§ 1824(2). The HPA is enforced through inspections at horse shows. A horse found to be

“sore” is disqualified from the competition and the liable individuals may be banned from

further participation in horse competitions.

The USDA has the authority to initiate civil enforcement proceedings to ensure

compliance with the HPA. The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (“APHIS”) is

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an arm of the USDA tasked with carrying out enforcement of the HPA. After notice and a

hearing, the Secretary of Agriculture (“Secretary”) can impose civil monetary penalties and

disqualify violators from the walking horse industry. The Secretary is permitted to delegate

this authority and create the position of the Judicial Officer ∗ pursuant to 7 U.S.C.

§ 6912(a)(1) (“[T]he Secretary may delegate to any agency, office, officer, or employee of

the Department the authority to perform any function transferred to the Secretary.”).

Pursuant to this authority, the Secretary has directed that HPA violation proceedings be

conducted through the USDA in-house adjudication process, and has delegated his decision

making authority to the USDA’s Judicial Officer. Despite this delegation, the Secretary

can choose to exercise adjudicatory authority himself and can revoke authority previously

delegated to the Judicial Officer. See 7 C.F.R. § 2.12 (“No delegation of authority by the

Secretary or a general officer contained in this part shall preclude the Secretary or general

officer from exercising any of the authority so delegated.”).

In order to begin the administrative hearing process, a complaint must be filed with

the USDA alleging a violation of the HPA. The respondent then has twenty days to answer

the complaint. 7 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). Any party to the proceeding is then entitled to a hearing

before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) upon request. Id. § 1.141(a). ALJs are

appointed pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 3105 and exercise their decision making authority through

∗ “The Judicial Officer is delegated authority by the Secretary of Agriculture to act as final deciding officer in USDA adjudicatory proceedings.” U.S. Department of Agriculture, Office of the Judicial Officer, (Aug. 01, 2025), https://www.usda.gov/about- usda/general-information/staff-offices/office-hearings-and-appeals/office-judicial-officer [https://perma.cc/62GW-EUU9].

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a designation by the Secretary pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C.

§ 556(b)(3). An ALJ’s decision becomes final if no party appeals the decision within 30

days.

A party has one appeal as of right from the ALJ’s decision to the USDA Judicial

Officer. The decision of the Judicial Officer is final for purposes of administrative review

with the USDA and cannot be appealed to the Secretary or any other USDA employee.

Nevertheless, a party may petition the Judicial Officer for a rehearing or reconsideration of

their decision, but rehearing or reconsideration is not required.

After exhausting administrative review, a party can pursue review of the decision

of the Judicial Officer outside of the agency scheme -- in the United States courts of appeal,

at which factual findings can be set aside only if found to be unsupported by substantial

evidence.

B.

On May 19, 2023, APHIS filed an administrative complaint against Appellant

alleging that he violated the HPA by allowing entry of a “sore” horse into a Virginia horse

show. On June 1, 2023, Appellant answered the complaint and requested that the case

either be dismissed or adjudicated through a full hearing on the merits. On February 22,

2024, Appellant moved before the ALJ to dismiss the administrative proceedings, arguing

that the HPA administrative adjudication process suffered from various constitutional

defects. Appellant indicated his intent to pursue his constitutional challenge to the

administrative process through a collateral district court proceeding. Because of this

imminent collateral challenge, Appellant requested that the administrative hearing be

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stayed pending resolution of the collateral proceeding. The ALJ denied the motion to

dismiss and declined to stay the case.

On March 1, 2024, Appellant filed a collateral complaint in the Middle District of

North Carolina alleging that the USDA administrative process violated the Constitution in

four ways. First, Appellant asserts that the process violates the Appointments Clause of

Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution because the Judicial Officer exercises

principal officer authority without appointment by the President or confirmation by the

Senate. Second, Appellant asserts that USDA ALJs are unconstitutionally protected from

removal by two layers of tenure protection, in violation of Article II, Section 3 of the

Constitution. USDA ALJs can only be removed for good cause, which must be determined

by the tenure protected Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”). Therefore, the

President cannot determine what constitutes good cause for removing an ALJ without first

finding that the good cause determination of the MSPB is so unreasonable that it constitutes

sufficient cause for removal. Appellant argues that these two layers of protection prevent

the President from fulfilling his Article II obligation to take care that the laws are faithfully

executed. Third, Appellant alleges that adjudication of violations of the HPA requires a

jury trial pursuant to the Seventh Amendment. Fourth, Appellant claims that the USDA

HPA adjudication process violates Article III of the Constitution because it adjudicates

private rights before an agency and not in an Article III court.

Appellant then filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary

injunction of the USDA proceedings. The district court denied both of Appellant’s requests

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in separate opinions, concluding that Appellant failed to demonstrate a sufficient likelihood

of success on the merits as to all four of the asserted constitutional challenges.

Appellant filed this timely appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), challenging

the denial of the preliminary injunction. We heard oral argument on this appeal on

December 10, 2024.

Thereafter, on February 1, 2025, the USDA ALJ ruled that Appellant violated the

HPA and imposed a $10.00 civil penalty and a one year industry wide disqualification that

would bar Appellant from “‘showing, exhibiting or entering any horse’ or ‘participating in

any horse show, horse exhibition, or horse sale or horse auction.’” Supplemental

Authorities at 1, 24-1367, ECF No. 49 (4th Cir. Feb. 5, 2025). Appellant represented that

he would file an appeal of the decision of the ALJ to the Judicial Officer.

II.

We review a district court’s denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction for abuse

of discretion. Frazier v. Prince George’s Cnty., 86 F.4th 537, 543 (4th Cir. 2023). In

determining whether the district court abused its discretion, we review factual findings for

clear error and legal conclusions de novo. Id. (citing Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cnty.,

722 F.3d 184, 188 (4th Cir. 2013)). In order to obtain the “extraordinary relief of a

preliminary injunction,” a plaintiff must demonstrate four factors: (1) a likelihood of

success on the merits; (2) a showing of irreparable harm if preliminary relief is not granted;

(3) that the balance of equities favors granting the injunction; and (4) that an injunction is

in the public interest. Id. (citing Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20

(2008)). The movant must satisfy all of the Winter factors to prevail. Henderson v.

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Bluefield Hosp. Co., 902 F.3d 432, 439 (4th Cir. 2018) (“Winter made clear that each of

these [ ] factors must be satisfied to obtain preliminary injunctive relief.” (emphasis in

original)). Importantly, “a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy intended to

protect the status quo and prevent irreparable harm during the pendency of a lawsuit.” Di

Biase v. SPX Corp., 872 F.3d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal citation omitted).

III.

The district court denied Appellant’s request for a preliminary injunction solely

because Appellant could not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits. On appeal,

Appellant argues that he is likely to succeed on his constitutional challenges to the structure

of the USDA HPA administrative proceedings, and that he is otherwise entitled to a

preliminary injunction based on the alleged constitutional defects. Because a failure to

demonstrate any one of the Winter factors is fatal, we decline to address Appellant’s

likelihood of success on the merits. Instead, we conclude that Appellant fails to

demonstrate a likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief. E.g.,

Henderson v. Bluefield Hosp. Co., 902 F.3d 432, 438–39 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding that a

preliminary injunction may properly be denied based solely on the movant’s failure to show

the likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief).

Appellant alleges that Axon Enterprise, Inc. v. FTC, 598 U.S. 175, 195–196 (2023),

mandates a finding of irreparable harm whenever a litigant is required to litigate in an

allegedly unconstitutionally structured agency proceeding. That is incorrect. In Axon, two

respondents were in administrative proceedings before the Securities Exchange

Commission (“SEC”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”). Both respondents

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sought to enjoin the agency proceedings through a collateral suit in district court arguing

that “some fundamental aspect of the [agencies’] structure violates the Constitution.” Id.

at 182. The respondents alleged that each agency’s ALJ’s were improperly insulated from

the Executive -- due to good cause removal protections determined by the MSPB -- in

violation of Article II of the Constitution.

Both respondents premised jurisdiction over these structural constitutional

challenges on district courts’ federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

At issue before the Court was whether the statutory schemes of the Exchange Act and the

FTC Act displaced district court jurisdiction over the respondents’ constitutional claims,

that is, whether the respondents could pursue their challenges in collateral district court

proceedings or instead through the traditional administrative agency exhaustion.

Consistent with traditional administrative agency review schemes, both the Exchange Act

and FTC Act provide for appellate review in a federal court of appeals after completion of

the administrative agency’s own review process.

Therefore, the issue the Court confronted was whether parties to an ongoing

proceeding before a governmental agency were required to first go through the agency’s

administrative process before suing in federal court to challenge the structural

constitutionality of the administrative proceedings. The Court held that this was not

required, concluding that the Exchange and FTC Acts did not divest federal district courts

of jurisdiction to hear structural constitutional challenges in collateral proceedings. The

Court held that because structural challenges “present a here and now injury” that is

“impossible to remedy once the proceeding is over” an aggrieved party must be able to file

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a collateral challenge during the duration of the administrative proceeding. Axon

Enterprise, Inc., 598 U.S. at 191 (internal citation omitted). It is this language in Axon

upon which Appellant bases his argument that being forced to participate in an allegedly

unconstitutional agency proceeding necessarily qualifies as irreparable harm sufficient to

warrant a preliminary injunction. Appellant claims that because an unconstitutionally

structured proceeding constitutes an injury sufficient to confer collateral district court

jurisdiction it must also suffice to establish the showing of irreparable harm required for

injunctive relief.

Appellant is incorrect, and Axon does not help his cause. As explained, Axon

addressed only a distinct jurisdictional question -- whether Congress intended to divest

district courts of jurisdiction they would ordinarily possess by requiring that parties instead

litigate their claims through agency proceedings. Axon Enterprise, Inc., 598 U.S. at 185–

86. The Court’s answer to this question turned on the determination that a structural

constitutional question both is “wholly collateral to” the questions at issue in agency

proceedings and lies “outside the agency’s expertise.” Id. But, critically, “the Court [in

Axon] did not speak to what constitutes irreparable harm for purposes of the extraordinary

remedy of a preliminary injunction.” Alpine Sec. Corp. v. FINRA, 121 F.4th 1314, 1336

(D.C. Cir. 2024). And here, Appellant has already received the benefit of Axon by filing a

collateral challenge to the USDA HPA proceeding in district court and alleging

constitutional deficiencies.

Axon did not address the distinct question we are presented with in this case: that is,

whether being subject to an allegedly constitutionally deficient proceeding necessarily

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demonstrates the required showing of irreparable harm necessary to obtain a preliminary

injunction. See Alpine Sec. Corp., 121 F.4th at 1336. (“[T]he question before us, which

was not answered in Axon, is whether the injury [the appellant] claims is so great that it

necessitates accelerated and unorthodox summary review of the merits without a developed

factual record.”). At most, Axon holds that a litigant can pursue a federal court challenge

to an allegedly unconstitutionally structured agency proceeding while the proceeding

remains before the agency. Crucially, “it does not say that every agency proceeding already

underway must immediately be halted because of an asserted constitutional flaw.” Id.

Extending the holding of Axon in this circumstance would require a per se finding of

irreparable harm whenever a plaintiff alleges constitutional deficiency in a collateral

proceeding challenging their subjection to an agency proceeding. See Leachco v.

Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 103 F.4th 748, 759 (10th Cir. 2024) (“[W]e will not

misunderstand what was said about jurisdiction in Axon as a holding on a party’s

entitlement to relief based on an unconstitutional removal provision . . . otherwise, the

Supreme Court’s limited jurisdictional holding in Axon would be converted to a broad

ruling that creates an entitlement on the merits to a preliminary injunction in every case

where such constitutional challenges are raised.” (internal citation omitted)). We will not

make that leap.

Therefore, Appellant fails to demonstrate irreparable harm pending the resolution

of the merits in the district court. Because failing to demonstrate any one Winter factor is

enough to defeat Appellant’s motion for a preliminary injunction, and Appellant fails to

make this required showing, we decline to consider the remaining Winter factors.

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IV.

We affirm the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction.

AFFIRMED