Joe Angel Hernandez v. the State of Texas

Opinion

Opinion filed August 20, 2026

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals

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Nos. 11-25-00291-CR, 11-25-00292-CR, 11-25-00293-CR & 11-25-00294-CR

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JOE ANGEL HERNANDEZ, Appellant V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 106th District Court Dawson County, Texas

Trial Court Cause Nos. 22-9029, 22-8736, 22-8739 & 22-8964

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Joe Angel Hernandez, pled guilty in separate causes to (1) theft of a firearm in trial court cause nos. 22-9029 and 22-8964, state-jail felonies, (2) tampering with physical evidence in trial court cause no. 22-8736, a thirddegree felony, and (3) aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in trial court cause no. 22-8739, a second-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 31.03(a),

(e)(4)(C), 37.09(a), (c) (West Supp. 2025), § 22.02(a)(2), (b) (West 2026). Pursuant to the terms of negotiated plea agreements between Appellant and the State, the trial court sentenced Appellant to two years’ confinement in the State Jail Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice in trial court cause nos. 22-9029 and 22-8964, but suspended the imposition of these sentences, and placed Appellant on community supervision for five years in each cause, and placed Appellant on ten years’ deferred adjudication community supervision in trial court cause nos. 22-8736 and 22-8739.

The State subsequently moved to revoke Appellant’s community supervision in trial court cause nos. 22-9029 and 22-8964 and to adjudicate his guilt in trial court cause nos. 22-8736 and 22-8739, alleging in each cause that Appellant had committed numerous violations of the terms and conditions of his community supervision. The trial court held a hearing on the State’s motions, during which Appellant pled “not true” to all allegations. Upon the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found the following allegations in the State’s motions to be “true”: that Appellant (1) committed subsequent offenses, namely, evading arrest or detention and twice driving while intoxicated, to which he pled guilty to each offense, (2) submitted a hair follicle sample which tested positive for THC, (3) consumed alcohol on various occasions, (4) failed to complete the drug awareness and anger management classes as ordered, and (5) violated his designated curfew. The trial court thereafter revoked Appellant’s community supervision, and sentenced him to two years’ confinement in the State Jail Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice in trial court cause nos. 22-9029 and 22-8964, and adjudicated Appellant’s guilt, revoked his community supervision, and sentenced him to ten years’ and twenty years’ imprisonment, respectively, in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice in trial court cause nos. 22-8736 and

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22-8739. The trial court further ordered that the sentences imposed be served concurrently.

In each appeal, Appellant’s court-appointed counsel has filed a motion to withdraw in this court, supported by a brief in which counsel professionally and conscientiously examines the record and applicable law and concludes that there are no meritorious or arguable issues to present on appeal. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Counsel has provided Appellant with copies of the briefs, copies of the motions to withdraw, an explanatory letter, and copies of the clerk’s and reporter’s records. Counsel also advised Appellant of his right to (1) object to counsel’s motions, (2) review the record, (3) file pro se responses to counsel’s Anders briefs, and (4) file a petition for discretionary review in each appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 6.5, 68. As such, court-appointed counsel has complied with the requirements of Anders, 386 U.S. at 742–44; Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 409–12; and Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

Appellant did not file a response to counsel’s Anders briefs in the appeals.

Following the procedures outlined in Anders and Schulman, we have independently reviewed the record and the briefs, and we conclude that these appeals are without merit. In an adjudication/revocation proceeding, the State need only prove a violation of a term or condition of community supervision by a preponderance of the evidence—the greater weight of credible evidence that would create a reasonable belief that the probationer has violated a term or condition of his community supervision. Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Scamardo v. State, 517 S.W.2d 293, 298 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Guillory v. State, 652 S.W.3d 923, 928 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, pet. ref’d). In this setting, the trial court, as the trier of the facts, is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses, and

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the weight to be afforded their testimony, and may resolve any inconsistencies in their testimony. Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Naquin v. State, 607 S.W.2d 583, 586 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).

Although we review a trial court’s adjudication/revocation decision(s) under an abuse of discretion standard, see Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493, we review the evidence presented at an adjudication/revocation proceeding in the light most favorable to the trial court’s rulings. Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at 865; Garrett v. State, 619 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). Here, the evidence presented at the hearing is sufficient to support each finding of “true” made by the trial court. See Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 764. In this regard, it is well-settled that proof of only a single violation of the terms and conditions of a probationer’s community supervision is sufficient to support the trial court’s adjudication/revocation order. Bryant v. State, 391 S.W.3d 86, 93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Garcia v. State, 387 S.W.3d 20, 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Smith v. State, 286 S.W.3d 333, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Sanchez v. State, 603 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980); Jones v. State, 472 S.W.3d 322, 324 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2015, pet. ref’d); Hart v. State, 264 S.W.3d 364, 367 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2008, pet. ref’d). Therefore, based on our review of the record, we agree with counsel that no meritorious or arguable grounds for appeal exist in these causes. 1 See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

Though not specifically raised as a point of error, counsel does mention, and we note, that the trial court’s judgment in trial court cause no. 22-9029 contains a nonreversible error. This judgment erroneously ordered that “the original attorney’s fees of $600” be assessed against Appellant as reimbursement fees in the parallel

We note that Appellant has the right to file a petition for discretionary review with the Court of 1

Criminal Appeals pursuant to Rule 68 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.

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revocation proceeding. However, the fees were not assessed against Appellant when he was originally sentenced and placed on community supervision, as reflected in the trial court’s judgment from Appellant’s original guilty plea.

Moreover, prior to the revocation hearing, and throughout the duration of this case, Appellant was found to be indigent, and the same counsel was appointed by the trial court to represent Appellant’s interest in all proceedings. A trial court may order an indigent defendant to pay court-appointed attorney reimbursement fees only if the defendant has the financial resources to repay or offset, in whole or in part, the costs of the legal services provided. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 26.05(g), 42A.301(b)(10) (discretionary conditions of community supervision) (West Supp. 2025); see Mayer v. State, 309 S.W.3d 552, 556–57 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Further, a defendant who has been determined by the trial court to be indigent is presumed to remain indigent for the remainder of the proceedings in the case unless a material change in the defendant’s financial circumstances occurs. CRIM. PROC. art. 26.04(p); see Cates v. State, 402 S.W.3d 250, 251–52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Smith v. State, 631 S.W.3d 484, 501 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, no pet.). In this instance, because the trial court had determined that Appellant was indigent and nothing in the record indicates that Appellant’s financial circumstances materially changed for his revocation proceeding, no basis existed to order the assessment of court-appointed attorney reimbursement fees against Appellant. CRIM. PROC. art. 26.04(p); see Cates, 402 S.W.3d at 251–52; Smith, 631 S.W.3d at 501.

We have the authority to modify and reform the trial court’s judgment so that it speaks the truth. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27– 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); French v. State, 830 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Therefore, we modify the trial court’s judgment in trial court cause no. 22-9029 to delete the assessment of the $600 court-appointed attorney reimbursement fees.

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Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motions to withdraw. We affirm the trial court’s judgments in trial court cause nos. 22-8736, 22-8739, and 22-8964, and, as modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in trial court cause no. 22-9029.

W. STACY TROTTER JUSTICE

August 20, 2026 Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J.