Jody Lee Beach and Associated Case in US District Court

CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. New Mexico
DecidedFebruary 7, 2022
Docket21-10762
StatusUnknown

This text of Jody Lee Beach and Associated Case in US District Court (Jody Lee Beach and Associated Case in US District Court) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. New Mexico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Jody Lee Beach and Associated Case in US District Court, (N.M. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

In re:

JODY BEACH and Case no. 21-10762-ta13 RHONDA BEACH,

Debtors.

OPINION

Before the Court is a creditor’s motion to dismiss this chapter 13 case, arguing that Debtors’ unsecured debts exceed the eligibility limit. After a final evidentiary hearing, the Court concludes that the debts are within the statutory limit. The motion therefore will be denied. A. Facts. The Court finds.1 Debtors worked for Iron Horse Welding LLC from April 2010 to August 2019. During most of that time, Debtors and Iron Horse’s owner, Allen Grisham, were good friends. The relationship soured badly. Shortly after Debtors quit their Iron Horse jobs in August 2019, Iron Horse brought two state court actions against Mr. Beach. One of lawsuits suits resulted in a May 18, 2021, judgment against Mr. Beach for $325,000 ($175,000 in actual damages and $150,000 in punitive damages).2 Iron Horse filed a judgment lien on June 15, 2021. Jody and Rhonda Beach filed this chapter 13 case on June 18, 2021. Iron Horse is Debtors’ largest creditor.

1 The Court takes judicial notice of its docket and the dockets of Iron Horse’s state court actions against Mr. Beach. See St. Louis Baptist Temple, Inc. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 605 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 1979) (a court may sua sponte take judicial notice of its docket and of facts that are part of public records). 2 Mr. Beach filed a motion to reconsider the judgment, arguing, inter alia, that Iron Horse had not requested punitive damages. Litigation of that motion is stayed by the automatic stay. Debtors filed their bankruptcy schedules on July 9, 2021. Schedule E/F lists liquidated, noncontingent unsecured claims of $157,660. Schedule D lists Iron Horse as a secured creditor with a $325,000 junior lien on Debtors’ house (the “house”). Debtors valued the house at $538,000. Schedule D also lists Wells Fargo as a secured creditor with a $340,699 first mortgage on the house. In schedule C, Debtors claims a $120,000 homestead exemption in the house. Subtracting

the Wells Fargo mortgage and the homestead exemption from $538,000 results in a $77,301 secured claim for Iron Horse and a $247,699 unsecured claim. Thus, Debtor’s schedules reflect total noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts of $405,359. On October 29, 2021, Iron Horse moved to dismiss Debtors’ case, arguing that Debtors unsecured debt exceeded the $419,275 cap in 11 U.S.C. § 109(e).3 According to Iron Horse’s calculations, Debtors’ liquidated, noncontingent, unsecured debts totaled $430,102.88, about $14,000 over the cap. A bar date was set in this case for August 27, 2021. 29 claims were filed. Wells Fargo filed a claim for $341,472, secured by a first mortgage on the house. Iron Horse filed a judgment lien

claim for $326,469, secured by a junior lien on the house, as well as four other claims. A total of $111,192.38 of unsecured claims were filed, other than Iron Horse’s claims. Debtors amended their schedules on November 19, 2021. The amended schedules reflect noncontingent, liquidated secured claims of $148,174.31. Adding Iron Horse’s $247,699 judgment lien deficiency claim results in noncontingent, liquidated unsecured claims of $395,873.31. Debtors scheduled all of Iron Horse’s unsecured claims as disputed, contingent, and unliquidated. B. Section 109(e). Section 109(e) provides in part:

3 Unless stated otherwise, all statutory references are to 11 U.S.C. Only . . . an individual with regular income and such individual’s spouse . . . that owe, on the date of the filing of the petition, noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts that aggregate less than $419,275 . . . may be a debtor under chapter 13 of this title.

1. Debts must be noncontingent. Debts are contingent when they “do[] not come into existence until the occurrence of a future event.” 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶109.06[2][b] (16th ed.). None of the debts under scrutiny are contingent. 2. Debts must be liquidated. A debt is considered liquidated if “the amount is readily and precisely determinable.” 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶109.06[2][c]; see also In re Rottiers, 450 B.R. 208 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2011): The term “liquidated” is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code. However, it is well- settled that whether a debt is “liquidated” turns on whether the amount is “readily determinable.” ... The amount of debt is readily determinable only if the process of determining the claim is fixed, certain, or otherwise determined by a specific standard. See In re Barcal, 213 B.R. 1008, 1014 (8th Cir. BAP 1997). On the other hand, if the value of the claim depends on a “future exercise of discretion, not restricted by specific criteria, the claim is unliquidated.” See Mazzeo v. United States (In re Mazzeo), 131 F.3d 295, 304 (2d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). ... Kanke v. Adams (In re Adams), 373 B.R. 116, 119–20 (10th Cir. BAP 2007).

450 B.R. at 215. 3. Evidence to be considered in determining eligibility. Some courts have held that § 109(e) eligibility should be determined by reviewing the debtor’s bankruptcy schedules, “checking only to see if the schedules were made in good faith.” See, e.g., In re Scovis, 249 F.3d 975, 982 (9th Cir. 2001); In re Pearson, 773 F.2d 751, 756–57 (6th Cir. 1985). The test in the Tenth Circuit appears to be different. In In re Murphy, 146 Fed. Appx. 285 (10th Cir. 2005) (unpublished), the Tenth Circuit stated: After Murphy filed his petition, both the Trustee and the McArthurs made good faith objections to Murphy’s Chapter 13 eligibility. At that point, it was proper for the bankruptcy court to look past the characterization of Murphy’s claims in his schedules and consider other evidence.

146 Fed. Appx, at 289. This view has support elsewhere. See, e.g., In re Quintana, 107 B.R. 234 (9th Cir. BAP 1989): However, the schedules are not dispositive. If the debtors’ schedules were dispositive, then eligibility could be created by improper or incomplete scheduling of creditors. A bankruptcy court should “look past the schedules to other evidence submitted when a good faith objection to the debtor’s eligibility has been brought by a party in interest.” In re Williams Land Co., 91 B.R. 923, 927 (Bankr. D. Or. 1988).

107 B.R. at 238 n.6; and In re Barcal, 213 B.R. 1008, 1015 (8th Cir. BAP 1997): Rather than making final determinations on disputed liabilities, it is appropriate for a court considering eligibility to rely primarily upon a debtor’s schedules and proofs of claim, checking only to see if these documents were filed in good faith.... In so doing, however, the court should neither place total reliance upon a debtor’s characterization of a debt nor rely unquestionably on a creditor’s proof of claim, for to do so would place eligibility in control of either the debtor or the creditor.... At a hearing on eligibility, the court should thus, canvass and review the debtor’s schedules and proofs of claim, as well as other evidence offered by a debtor or the creditor to decide only whether the good faith, facial amount of the debtor’s liquidated and non-contingent debts exceed statutory limits.

This Court addressed the issue in In re Garcia, 520 B.R. 848 (Bankr. D.N.M.

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