Jochen v. County of Saginaw

Michigan Supreme Court

Jochen v. County of Saginaw

110 N.W.2d 780, 363 Mich. 648, 1961 Mich. LEXIS 498

CourtMichigan Supreme Court

DecidedSeptember 21, 1961

DocketDocket 20, Calendar 48,798

StatusPublished

Cited by19 cases

This text of 110 N.W.2d 780 (Jochen v. County of Saginaw) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Jochen v. County of Saginaw, 110 N.W.2d 780, 363 Mich. 648, 1961 Mich. LEXIS 498 (Mich. 1961).

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Opinions

Souris, J.

Section 7 of part 1 of the workmen’s compensation act, CLS 1956, § 411.7 (Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 17.147), provides in part as follows:

“Sec. 7. The term ‘employee’ as used in this act shall be construed to mean:

“1. Every person in the service of the State, or of any county, city, township, incorporated village or school district therein, under any appointment, or contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, except any official of the State, or of any county, city, township, incorporated village or school district therein, elected at the polls.”

The parties to this appeal would have us determine whether or not a petit juror is a county employee within the meaning of section 7 so that if injured in the course of his service as such he would he entitled to receive disability benefits under the act. Plaintiff fell and broke her hip on the steps just inside the outer doors of the Saginaw county courthouse as she was reporting for jury duty on the first day of the September term of court in 1958. The appeal board of the workmen’s compensation department affirmed a referee’s award of compensation benefits to plaintiff for her disability on the ground that she was an employee of the county within the meaning of section 7, above quoted, because she was an appointee for hire.

Defendants’ counsel cite only 3 court decisions from other jurisdictions in which the question here sought to be reviewed has been considered. Our independent research failed to disclose any others. The first case cited to us is Industrial Commission of Ohio v. Rogers, 122 Ohio St 134 (171 NE 35, 70 ALR 1244), in which the supreme court of Ohio in 1930 ruled that a petit juror was an employee of the [650]*650county within the meaning of that State’s workmen’s compensation law. The second case was decided 6 years later by the supreme court of Colorado and resulted in a contrary ruliiig. Board of County Commissioners of the County of Eagle v. Evans, 99 Colo 83 (60 P2d 225). The third case merely cited and, without analysis, followed the second. Seward v. County of Bernalillo, 61 NM 52 (294 P2d 625). The claimants for compensation in all 3 of those cases had been selected to serve, and were actually serving, as jurors when disabled. Mrs. Jochen, on the other hand, was en route to the courtrooms of the circuit judges pursuant to the statutory¹ sheriff’s notice that her name had been drawn for service as a petit juror at the September term of court. Whether or not she was exempt from such service² or otherwise subject to being excused therefrom³ had not been determined at the time of her injury, nor could it be determined until she presented herself to the court for determination of her qualification to serve. In short, Mrs. Jochen was injured before she was accepted as qualified for service as a petit juror and, consequently, it cannot be said that at the time of her injury she was a “person in the service of the * * * county” within the meaning of section 7 of part 1 of the act.

Although appellants submitted to us for determination in this appeal the broader question involved in the Ohio and Colorado cases cited above, we cannot decide, within the limitations of the facts of this case, whether or not a petit juror injured while serving as such is entitled to the benefits of the workmen’s compensation act.

Reversed. No costs.

Smith and Edwards, JJ., concurred with Souris, J.

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Souris, J.

Section 7 of part 1 of the workmen’s compensation act, CLS 1956, § 411.7 (Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 17.147), provides in part as follows:

“Sec. 7. The term ‘employee’ as used in this act shall be construed to mean:

“1. Every person in the service of the State, or of any county, city, township, incorporated village or school district therein, under any appointment, or contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, except any official of the State, or of any county, city, township, incorporated village or school district therein, elected at the polls.”

The parties to this appeal would have us determine whether or not a petit juror is a county employee within the meaning of section 7 so that if injured in the course of his service as such he would he entitled to receive disability benefits under the act. Plaintiff fell and broke her hip on the steps just inside the outer doors of the Saginaw county courthouse as she was reporting for jury duty on the first day of the September term of court in 1958. The appeal board of the workmen’s compensation department affirmed a referee’s award of compensation benefits to plaintiff for her disability on the ground that she was an employee of the county within the meaning of section 7, above quoted, because she was an appointee for hire.

Defendants’ counsel cite only 3 court decisions from other jurisdictions in which the question here sought to be reviewed has been considered. Our independent research failed to disclose any others. The first case cited to us is Industrial Commission of Ohio v. Rogers, 122 Ohio St 134 (171 NE 35, 70 ALR 1244), in which the supreme court of Ohio in 1930 ruled that a petit juror was an employee of the [650]*650county within the meaning of that State’s workmen’s compensation law. The second case was decided 6 years later by the supreme court of Colorado and resulted in a contrary ruliiig. Board of County Commissioners of the County of Eagle v. Evans, 99 Colo 83 (60 P2d 225). The third case merely cited and, without analysis, followed the second. Seward v. County of Bernalillo, 61 NM 52 (294 P2d 625). The claimants for compensation in all 3 of those cases had been selected to serve, and were actually serving, as jurors when disabled. Mrs. Jochen, on the other hand, was en route to the courtrooms of the circuit judges pursuant to the statutory¹ sheriff’s notice that her name had been drawn for service as a petit juror at the September term of court. Whether or not she was exempt from such service² or otherwise subject to being excused therefrom³ had not been determined at the time of her injury, nor could it be determined until she presented herself to the court for determination of her qualification to serve. In short, Mrs. Jochen was injured before she was accepted as qualified for service as a petit juror and, consequently, it cannot be said that at the time of her injury she was a “person in the service of the * * * county” within the meaning of section 7 of part 1 of the act.

Although appellants submitted to us for determination in this appeal the broader question involved in the Ohio and Colorado cases cited above, we cannot decide, within the limitations of the facts of this case, whether or not a petit juror injured while serving as such is entitled to the benefits of the workmen’s compensation act.

Reversed. No costs.

Smith and Edwards, JJ., concurred with Souris, J.

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110 N.W.2d 780, 363 Mich. 648, 1961 Mich. LEXIS 498, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jochen-v-county-of-saginaw-mich-1961.

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